United States of America v. Garrick D. Richardson

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 10, 2025 Decided August 21, 2026
No. 24-3151
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE
v.
GARRICK D. RICHARDSON,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:23-cr-00200-1)
Courtney L. Millian, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.
Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony Axam Jr., Assistant
Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.
Katie Hurrelbrink was on the brief for amici curiae
National Association for Public Defense & Federal Defenders
of San Diego Inc. in support of appellant.
William A. Glaser, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for appellee. On the brief were Jeanine Ferris

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Pirro, U.S. Attorney, Chrisellen R. Kolb, Chief, Appellate
Division, and Joshua K. Handell, Attorney.
Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van
Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy
Solicitor General, Thais-Lyn Trayer, Deputy Solicitor General,
and Marcella Coburn, Assistant Attorney General, were on the
brief for amicus curiae the District of Columbia in support of
appellee.
Before: KATSAS and PAN , Circuit Judges, and GINSBURG ,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS .
KATSAS , Circuit Judge: This appeal presents a Second
Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which
prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms. We hold
that section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to felons who
are still under supervision as part of a criminal sentence at the
time of their 922(g)(1) offense.
I
A
The Second Amendment provides that “the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” In
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the
Supreme Court held that the Amendment protects an individual
right to possess firearms. The Court explained that the
Amendment codified a pre-existing right that was “not
unlimited.” Id. at 626. The Court stressed that “the right was
not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Id. And it

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declined to “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” which it
described as “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 626–27 & n.26.
After Heller, this Court adopted a “two-step approach” for
evaluating the constitutionality of firearms restrictions. Heller
v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
First, we considered whether the restriction fell within the
literal terms of the Second Amendment; if not, we evaluated it
only under rational-basis scrutiny. See id. Second, for
restrictions falling within the scope of the Amendment, we
applied some form of heightened, means-end constitutional
scrutiny. For regulations imposing a “substantial” burden on
the core Second Amendment right, we applied strict scrutiny.
Id. at 1257. And for regulations imposing a “less substantial”
burden, we applied intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 1257–59.
Either way, we assessed the strength of the government’s
interest in restricting the use of firearms and the degree to
which the regulation at issue advanced that interest. See id.
Our approach tracked that of many other courts of appeals. See
id. at 1252 (collecting authorities). In the years following
Heller, we applied this approach repeatedly. See, e.g., Wrenn
v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2017);
Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989–91 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597
U.S. 1 (2022), the Supreme Court rejected the “‘two-step’
framework … that combines history with means-end scrutiny.”
Id. at 17. Instead, the Court adopted its own two-step
framework keyed to text and history. First, courts must
determine whether the conduct at issue falls within the Second
Amendment’s “plain text”; if so, then the Amendment
“presumptively protects” it. Id. Second, to sustain a restriction
on such textually covered conduct, “the government must
demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s

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historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. This historical
analysis focuses on “the principles that underpin our regulatory
tradition.” United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024).
So, it “will often involve reasoning by analogy” to asserted
historical analogues, Bruen, 597 U.S. at 28–29, which are “old
legal rules from which a court may draw a strong inference that
the modern law at issue is consistent with the codified right,”
Wolford v. Lopez, 146 S. Ct. 2032, 2044 (2026). Under this
approach, we must consider whether the historical analogue
was both widely accepted and “relevantly similar to the modern
law.” Id. (cleaned up).
Relevant similarity turns on “how and why” the modern
and historical regulations burden the right to keep and bear
arms. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29. If “modern and historical
regulations impose a comparable burden on the right” and if
both are “comparably justified,” then the modern regulation is
likely constitutional. Id. The analogy “must be close enough
to enable a court to say: Because this historical law was
understood to be compatible with the right codified by the
Second Amendment, we can infer that the restriction imposed
by the modern law is likewise consistent with that right.”
Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2044 (cleaned up). So, “analogical
reasoning under the Second Amendment is neither a regulatory
straightjacket nor a regulatory blank check.” Bruen, 597 U.S.
at 30. Instead, it “requires only that the government identify a
well-established and representative historical analogue, not a
historical twin.” Id.; see also Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691 (Heller
and Bruen “were not meant to suggest a law trapped in
amber”).
B
Section 922(g)(1) of Title 18 is among the most prominent
federal firearm restrictions. That provision, generally known

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as the felon-in-possession statute, makes it unlawful for any
person who has been convicted of a “crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess a
firearm.
Before Bruen clarified the decisive role of text and history
in Second Amendment cases, this Court twice considered the
constitutionality of section 922(g)(1). In Schrader, we used
intermediate scrutiny to uphold section 922(g)(1) as applied to
individuals convicted of predicate assault-and-battery offenses
classified as misdemeanors under state law. See 704 F.3d at
989–91. And in Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir.
2019), we upheld section 922(g)(1) as applied to the felony
offense of misrepresenting income on a mortgage application.
See id. at 154. We mentioned our then-prevailing standard of
intermediate scrutiny, id. at 155–56, but we rested our analysis
entirely on historical traditions of felon disarmament without
reaching any question of means-end balancing, id. at 157–61.
We upheld section 922(g)(1) regardless of the dangerousness
of the individual felon, id. at 159, while still reserving a
possible exception for sufficiently “minor or regulatory”
predicate offenses, id. at 160.
II
The District of Columbia makes it a crime, punishable by
up to five years in prison, to carry a pistol outside the home
without a license. D.C. Code § 22-4504(a)(1). Garrick
Richardson has twice been convicted of violating this law, in
2018 and 2022. For the latter offense, a judge on the D.C.
Superior Court sentenced Richardson to 15 months in prison
and three years of supervised release. See D.C. Super. Ct. 2022
CF2 001516, Judgment & Commitment Order (May 24, 2022).
However, the judge suspended the sentence and instead
imposed one year of “supervised probation.” See id. Under

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D.C. law, that term of probation was a “substitute” punishment
for Richardson’s underlying offense. Jones v. United States,
401 A.2d 473, 476–77 (D.C. 1979); see D.C. Code § 16-710.
While still under supervised probation, Richardson
violated section 922(g)(1). Richardson acknowledges that he
knowingly possessed a firearm on May 13, 2023. According
to the government, the firearm was stolen and modified to
permit fully automatic firing, and Richardson brandished the
firearm during a shootout in a parking garage.
A federal grand jury indicted Richardson under section
922(g)(1). Richardson moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that section 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment
on its face and as applied to his individual case. Richardson
argued that Bruen displaced Medina and that section 922(g)(1)
is unconstitutional under Bruen. The district court disagreed,
held that Medina remains good law, and rejected Richardson’s
Second Amendment challenge under Medina. United States v.
Richardson, No. 23-cr-200-1, 2024 WL 402948 (D.D.C. Feb.
2, 2024). Richardson then pleaded guilty but reserved his right
to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The district court
accepted the plea and sentenced Richardson to 40 months of
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.
Richardson appealed. He argues that section 922(g)(1) is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied here. He preserved
this constitutional challenge below, so our review is de novo.
United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 674–75 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
III
The parties urge us to render a sweeping ruling on the
constitutionality of lifetime felon disarmament. Richardson
contends that Bruen eviscerated Medina and that the
government has proven no historical tradition that is both

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widely established and relevantly similar to section 922(g)(1).
Richardson concludes that section 922(g)(1) is therefore
unconstitutional on its face—i.e., that it violates the Second
Amendment in every possible application—and certainly as
applied in his case. For its part, the government responds that
Medina remains good law and that, in any event, there was a
widespread historical tradition of lifetime felon disarmament.
The government concludes that section 922(g)(1) is therefore
constitutional in every possible application—and certainly as
applied to Richardson. Our sister circuits are deeply divided
on whether pre-Bruen precedents upholding section 922(g)(1)
remain good law and on whether lifetime felon disarmament is
constitutional absent some individualized inquiry into whether
the individual felon is dangerous. Compare, e.g., Zherka v.
Bondi, 140 F.4th 68, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2025), and United States
v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887, 888–89 (11th Cir. 2025), with Range
v. Att’y Gen., 124 F.4th 218, 225 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc), and
United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 645–48 (6th Cir.
2024). On plain-error review, we have held it not “obvious”
that Bruen displaces Medina. United States v. Johnson, 158
F.4th 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2025). More recently, we held in an
unpublished judgment that Bruen does not displace Medina.
United States v. Griffith, No. 25-3023 (D.C. Cir. July 31, 2026).
Neither of these decisions binds us on the question presented
here. See In re Grant, 635 F.3d 1227, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
We decline to engage with the broadest arguments pressed
by both sides. Instead, we assume that Medina does not resolve
this case as a matter of precedent. And we assume that section
922(g)(1) restricts conduct within the literal terms of the
Second Amendment. Nonetheless, we rule for the government
on this narrow ground: There is a widespread historical
tradition of disarming felons still serving their criminal

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sentences, and section 922(g)(1), as applied to such felons, falls
comfortably within it.1
A
At the Founding, there was a widespread tradition of
disarming convicted felons serving the most common types of
sentences for a wide range of criminal offenses.
Start with the obvious: Felons were disarmed while
imprisoned. Those sentenced to death suffered civil death, a
legal status involving the loss of all rights while in prison
awaiting execution. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *373–74; see
also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 458–59 (7th Cir. 2019)
(Barrett, J., dissenting). Those sentenced to a term of
imprisonment rather than death had their rights “suspended
during the term of the sentence.” Kanter, 919 F.3d at 461
(Barrett, J., dissenting). Regardless, imprisonment plainly
“involved disarmament.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 772 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). And at common law, it was a crime to provide
arms to prisoners. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *131.
Many Founding-era laws also temporarily disarmed felons
by imposing forfeitures as an element of punishment. Some of
these forfeitures covered all the felon’s property—including
firearms. For example, Pennsylvania required such a forfeiture
for “robbery, burglary, sodomy or buggery,” An Act to Reform
1 The government briefly raises several threshold, assertedly
textual arguments at step one of Bruen. It contends that protected
“[a]rms” include neither stolen guns nor fully automatic machine-
guns and that the right to “keep and bear” arms does not encompass
a right to brandish them for unlawful purposes. We do not consider
whether these arguments are textual or historical ones under Bruen,
or whether any of them has merit.

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the Penal Laws of this State, ch. 565 § 2, 1790 Pa. Laws 801–
02 (Apr. 5, 1790); for counterfeiting, An Act More Effectually
to Prevent Counterfeiting, ch. 869 § 2, 1779 Pa. Laws 244
(Nov. 26, 1779); and for certain anti-competitive practices in
the Philadelphia market, An Act for the Regulation of the
Markets in the City of Philadelphia, ch. 110 §§ 2, 6, 1779 Pa.
Laws 210–11 (Apr. 5, 1779). Massachusetts required such
forfeiture for treason, An Act Against Treason, ch. 32, 1777
Mass. Acts 107 (Feb. 1, 1777), and for rioting, Riot Act, ch. 8,
1786 Mass. Laws 503 (Oct. 28, 1786). New York required
such forfeiture for any felony. Acts of Feb. 1788, reprinted in
2 Laws of the State of New York Passed at the Sessions of the
Legislature 1785–1788, at 632–33, 664–66 (1886). Maryland
required it for counterfeiting, An Act for Punishment of Such
as Shall Counterfeit, ch. 8, 1717 Md. Laws 139 (May 1717), as
well as for embezzlement and fraudulently altering wills, An
Act Against Embezzlement of Wills or Records, ch. 11, 1715
Md. Laws 78–79 (Apr. 1715).
Other forfeiture provisions specifically targeted firearms.
For example, New York required forfeiture of arms for
assisting British forces during the Revolution. Resolutions of
Sept. 1, 1775, 1 Journals of the Provincial Congress,
Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety and Council of
Safety of the State of New-York 132 (T. Weed ed., 1842).
Connecticut required forfeiture of arms for seditious libel. Act
of Dec. 1775, The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut
From May, 1775 to June 1776 193 (C. Hoadly ed., 1890).
Virginia required forfeiture of arms for breaching the peace.
An Act Forbidding and Punishing Affrays, ch. 49, 1786 Va.
Acts 35 (Oct. 16, 1786). And Kentucky required forfeiture of
arms for appearing “with force and arms” before a court. An
Act to Amend the Penal Laws of this Commonwealth, ch. 67
§ 33, 1801 Ky. Laws 136 (Dec. 19, 1801).

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Finally, Founding-era laws temporarily disarmed felons
subject to supervision other than through ordinary
imprisonment. In perhaps the closest eighteenth-century
equivalent to parole, Massachusetts imposed forfeitures to
disarm the rebels of Shays’ Rebellion for a term of three years.
Disqualifying Act, ch. 6, 1787 Mass. Laws 555–57 (Feb. 16,
1787). The State conditionally pardoned rebels who promised
to “keep the peace” for three years. Id. For that term, the rebels
had to surrender their firearms and submit to monitoring by
local officials. Id. If the rebels broke the terms of their pardon,
they stood exposed to the charge of treason. Id. If not, they
could recover their firearms after three years. Id. Other States
imposed estate forfeiture to temporarily disarm individuals
sentenced to terms of impressment, An Act for Preventing the
Forgery of Certain Warrants and Certifications, ch. 11 § 1,
1777 Va. Laws 55 (May 5, 1777), or to terms of service at state
workhouses, Act Against Counterfeiting Bills of Public Credit,
Coins, or Currencies, 1779 Vt. Laws 93 (Feb. 1779).
Collectively, these laws reveal a widespread, Founding-
era practice regarding firearms restrictions: Felons could be
temporarily disarmed while serving their criminal sentences,
including supervision and monitoring.
B
In light of this history and tradition, section 922(g)(1) is
constitutional as applied to individuals who, like Richardson,
are under supervision as part of a felony sentence. For one
thing, the historical disarmaments and section 922(g)(1) share
the same core justification. As explained above, historical
disarmaments arose by application of forfeiture laws imposed
as punishment for a wide range of felonies. So, like all criminal
punishments, they served “to deter” criminal conduct and also
“to reform” and “restrain[]” criminal offenders. 1790 Pa. Laws

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801–02; see, e.g., Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 192
(2025); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003). Section
922(g)(1) likewise disarms felons as a legal consequence of
criminal activity, and it does so to deter future criminal activity.
See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974);
United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1128 (8th Cir. 2024).
Richardson contends that any justification for disarming felons
must turn on an individualized assessment of dangerousness.
But although such an individualized assessment may suffice to
justify disarmament, see Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698–99, nothing
in Bruen forecloses other traditionally-grounded bases for
disarmament. And as shown above, the robust historical
tradition of disarming felons while they serve their sentences
extended beyond violent crimes to non-violent offenses such as
counterfeiting, embezzlement, forgery, seditious libel, and
anti-competitive practices.
For another, as applied to individuals serving criminal
sentences, section 922(g)(1) imposes a burden comparable to
these historical forfeiture provisions—disarmament for the
term of the sentence. To be sure, the historical forfeiture
provisions did not bar felons from reacquiring arms after
completing their sentences, whereas section 922(g)(1) on its
face disarms felons for life. But this case involves a
disarmament imposed while Richardson remained under
supervision as part of his criminal sentence. In resolving
Richardson’s as-applied challenge, we consider the pertinent
facts underlying his individual case. See, e.g., United States v.
Moore, 111 F.4th 266, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2024); United States v.
Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2024). And because there
is no Second Amendment overbreadth doctrine, Richardson
gets no mileage from the possibility that section 922(g)(1) may
be unconstitutional as applied to other felons who have finished
serving their sentences. See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 701 & n.2
(citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). To

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be clear, we do not address the constitutionality of section
922(g)(1) as applied to such other felons. We do not even
address whether Richardson, after serving his various criminal
sentences, may have a viable Second Amendment claim
against the continued application of section 922(g)(1) at that
juncture. All we conclude is that Richardson’s conviction
under section 922(g)(1), for possessing a firearm while still
under supervision as part of a criminal sentence, fits
comfortably within the historical tradition of temporary
disarmament detailed above.
Furthermore, it makes no difference that Richardson’s
sentence was non-custodial. We recognize that non-custodial
punishment, such as supervised release or parole, is largely a
modern creation. “Supervised release was not instituted until
1984, and parole was unknown until the 19th century.” United
States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634, 677 (2019) (Alito, J.,
dissenting); see also Fish, The Constitutional Limits of
Criminal Supervision, 108 Cornell L. Rev. 1375, 1386–87
(2023). Nonetheless, supervised release is imposed “as a part
of the sentence,” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a); see Mont v. United
States, 587 U.S. 514, 523–24 (2019), which is why felons have
greatly diminished rights while serving terms of supervised
release, see, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 854–55
(2006); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 48–49 (2007). So
too with probation, which, “like incarceration, is a form of
criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after
verdict, finding, or plea of guilty.” United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (cleaned up). District of Columbia
law, which governs Richardson’s predicate felony offense,
recognizes these same basic principles. See United States v.
Facon, 288 A.3d 317, 330 (D.C. 2023) (a “term of supervised
release is imposed at the outset as part of the original
sentence”); D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t v. Porter, 332 A.3d 534,
548–49 (D.C. 2025) (same for probation).

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Moreover, disarming serves the same purposes regardless
of whether it is imposed during terms of incarceration or non-
custodial supervision. For one thing, it serves the same
punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative purposes as do criminal
punishments generally. Even more importantly, firearms in the
hands of incarcerated or supervised felons alike “present a
special danger of misuse.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698; accord
Samson, 547 U.S. at 853. Specifically, disarmament protects
the officers charged with monitoring the felon during the
custodial or non-custodial term of his sentence. See Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1979); Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987). It is thus unsurprising that
Founding-era forfeiture laws seemed to extend to non-custodial
sentences of the time, such as they were, as reflected in
examples such as the Massachusetts law regarding punishment
for Shays’ Rebellion. And the small number of such forfeiture
laws in the context of non-custodial sentences, reflecting the
relatively small number of non-custodial sentences, does not
support artificially restricting the relevant tradition to the
context of custodial sentences. To the contrary, “when the
modern law addresses a situation that could not have arisen” at
the Founding, or could have arisen only relatively rarely, “it is
too much to demand” something approaching a “historical
twin.” Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at
30).
In any event, the unquestionably clear tradition supporting
disarmament during a custodial sentence by itself supports
disarmament during a term of supervision. In Rahimi, the
Court held that a historical tradition of imprisoning those who
used weapons to threaten others supported the constitutionality
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which disarms individuals
adjudicated to be a “credible threat to the physical safety of [an]
intimate partner.” The Court reasoned that, if imprisonment
for using guns to threaten others is constitutional, then so too

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is “the lesser restriction of temporary disarmament.” 602 U.S.
at 699. The same reasoning applies here: If disarmament
during a term of incarceration is constitutional, then so too is
disarmament during a term of non-custodial supervision.
To be sure, some greater-includes-the-lesser arguments are
problematic in the Second Amendment context. For example,
because the Constitution no longer permits execution for
counterfeiting, it is perhaps awkward to contend that the greater
historical power to execute counterfeiters implies the lesser
power to disarm them for life. See Kanter, 919 F.3d at 461–62
(Barrett, J., dissenting). But cf. Medina, 913 F.3d at 158 (“it is
difficult to conclude that the public, in 1791, would have
understood [felons] facing death and estate forfeiture to be
within the scope of those entitled to possess arms”). And
though the Constitution still permits the execution of
murderers, no one claims that this greater power supports the
lesser power of preventing a convicted murderer from keeping
a Bible while awaiting execution. But here, the greater power
is unexceptional: There would be no constitutional problem
with imprisoning Richardson for one year for his felony
conviction and disarming him during that period. Moreover,
as explained above, disarmament during custodial and non-
custodial sentences serves largely the same purposes. And
although the need for self-defense might be greater outside the
prison context than inside, cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County,
489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989), Founding-era disarmament
imposed a still greater burden: There were “no police forces”
at the time, which meant that “survival” could even more
“depend on the availability of a firearm,” Wolford, 146 S. Ct.
at 2042. Given all this, it is hard to see how a one-year term of
disarmament, unquestionably constitutional if imposed during
a term of imprisonment, could somehow become
unconstitutional if imposed during a term of supervised release
or probation. In sum, the greater-includes-the-lesser principle

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applied in Rahimi governs here, and the concerns expressed in
then-Judge Barrett’s Kanter dissent are inapposite.
Richardson resists our focus on the circumstances of his
individual case. He contends that we may consider only the
facts that triggered section 922(g)(1)—that is, the fact of his
prior convictions. Thoughtful jurists have differing views on
the scope of materials relevant to as-applied challenges to gun
restrictions. On one end of the spectrum, some courts consider
all record evidence about the defendant, including facts bearing
on his dangerousness. See Williams, 113 F.4th at 657–62;
Moore, 111 F.4th at 272–73. In contrast, others consider only
the prior predicate conviction and sentence. See United States
v. Mitchell, 160 F.4th 169, 179 (5th Cir. 2025). We need not
resolve this question because Richardson loses either way. The
indictment in this case references his D.C. Superior Court
convictions by case number. App. 12. And Richardson’s 2022
sentence, which is judicially noticeable, establishes that
Richardson remained under supervised probation on May 13,
2023—the admitted date of his section 922(g)(1) violation.
Because Richardson’s prior conviction and sentence suffice to
establish the constitutionality of section 922(g)(1) as applied,
we may leave for another day whether other information may
be considered in as-applied challenges like Richardson’s.
C
Finally, we note that our position here finds strong support
in our sister circuits. In United States v. Gay, 98 F.4th 843 (7th
Cir. 2024), the Seventh Circuit held that section 922(g)(1) was
constitutional as applied to a defendant who remained on
parole for his predicate felony at the time of the offense. See
id. at 847 (“Parole is a form of custody. Gay’s sentences had
not expired; all parole did was allow him to serve some of his
sentences outside prison walls.”). In Moore, the Third Circuit,

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after extensively canvassing the historical tradition of
disarming felons during the terms of their sentences, held that
section 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to a defendant
who remained on supervised release for his predicate felony at
the time of the offense. 111 F.4th at 268–72. Shortly
thereafter, the Third Circuit extended Moore to uphold section
922(g)(1) as applied to defendants who remained on parole or
probation for their predicate felonies at the time of the section
922(g)(1) offenses. United States v. Quailes, 126 F.4th 215,
220–24 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2025). The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have
also followed Moore. See United States v. Giglio, 126 F.4th
1039, 1044–45 (5th Cir. 2025); United States v. Goins, 118
F.4th 794, 801–02 (6th Cir. 2024). In doing so, the Sixth
Circuit in Goins concluded that “our nation’s historical
tradition of forfeiture laws, which temporarily disarmed
convicts while they completed their sentences, also supports
disarming those on parole, probation, or supervised release.”
118 F.4th at 801–02 (citing Moore, 111 F.4th at 269–72).
Although the Court cited this historical analysis as one of three
separate reasons to uphold the constitutionality of section
922(g)(1) as applied there, the concurrence thought that it
“alone should be dispositive.” Id. at 805 (Bush, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Limitations on the
constitutional right to bear arms while on probation are
supported by our nation’s historical tradition of firearm
forfeiture laws, which temporarily disarmed persons while they
completed their sentences.”).
One case introduces a slight complication. In United
States v. Hostettler, 170 F.4th 539 (6th Cir. 2026), the Sixth
Circuit vacated a district-court decision striking down section
922(g)(1) as applied to a felon claiming not to be dangerous
and then remanded for further consideration. The Court held
that the district court had overread Sixth Circuit precedent on
the need for as-applied review of lifetime felon disarmament.

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Citing Goins, the government sought outright reversal on the
ground that the defendant felon was still on supervised release
at the time of his section 922(g)(1) offense. See id. at 544–45.
The Court justified the remand on the ground that Goins had
not adopted a rule categorically upholding section 922(g)(1) as
applied to any defendant on supervision for his predicate felony
at the time of the section 922(g)(1) offense. See id. at 545. But
in doing so, the Court provided no historical analysis casting
doubt on its prior conclusion that our historical traditions
justify disarming convicts who are serving their sentences.
Given all of this, we do not read much into the Sixth Circuit’s
cautious approach to its own circuit precedent, which had
routinely cited parole status as an “independent ground” to
reject as-applied challenges to section 922(g)(1). United States
v. Oravets, No. 24-3817, 2025 WL 2682632, at *2 (6th Cir.
Sept. 19, 2025); United States v. Nailor, No. 24-1163, 2026
WL 768779, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2026); accord United
States v. Taylor, No. 23-5644, 2024 WL 4891756, at *2 (6th
Cir. Nov. 25, 2024). For the reasons explained above, we read
the relevant history as the Sixth Circuit did in Goins, and we
find the analysis in the Moore line of cases to be persuasive.
* * * *
We hold that section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied
to defendants who, like Richardson, remained under non-
custodial supervision at the time of their section 922(g)(1)
offense. And because section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as
applied to that category of defendants, it is not facially
unconstitutional. See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693, 701 & n.2.
Affirmed.

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