Peo v Calloway

24CA1328 Peo v Calloway 10-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1328
El Paso County District Court No. 22CR5421
Honorable Frances Johnson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
James Dean Calloway,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III
Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ*
Dunn and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 15, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rachel Lieb, Assistant Attorney General II,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Amy Shiloh Lorde, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026.

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¶ 1 Defendant, James Dean Calloway, appeals the district court’s
order awarding restitution. We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 According to the probable cause affidavit, Calloway admitted
to squeezing and bracing his infant daughter against his body, with
an intensity of five or six out of ten, as well as shoving a baby bottle
into her mouth. She had difficulty breathing and her mouth was
bleeding, so Calloway called 911. She was taken to the hospital
where it was determined that she suffered fractures to her ribs and
left clavicle and a tear to the top of her frenulum,1 as well as
possible mild bruising to one armpit and knee.
¶ 3 Calloway was charged with two counts of child abuse, one a
class three felony and the other a class one misdemeanor. The
parties reached a plea agreement under which Calloway agreed to
plead guilty to an added count of child abuse as a class four felony,
with sentencing left open to the district court. The plea agreement
provided that restitution was reserved, Calloway agreed to pay
restitution, and he “stipulate[d] to causation for restitution
1 The frenulum is the connective tissue between the tongue and the
bottom of the mouth.

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purposes.” At the providency hearing, Calloway “admitted to
bracing [his] child too hard, which may have caused a fracture.”
¶ 4 The district court sentenced Calloway to four years of
probation. The court reserved restitution to allow the prosecution
time to collect the victim’s hospital bills.
¶ 5 The prosecution later submitted a restitution request for
$54,590.89 to reimburse the Colorado Department of Health Care
Policy & Financing for Medicaid payments made on behalf of the
victim. The defense objected, and the district court set the matter
for a hearing.
¶ 6 At the restitution hearing, the prosecution introduced
Medicaid bills showing the payments made on the victim’s behalf.
The prosecution’s restitution manager testified that she reviewed
the probable cause affidavit in which Calloway admitted to
squeezing the victim around her ribs and shoving a bottle into her
mouth. The defense admitted two reports in which a doctor and
nurse, after reviewing the victim’s medical records, independently
concluded that the victim’s injuries were unlikely to be caused by
Calloway’s conduct but were instead the result of the victim having
a metabolic bone disorder. However, the defense’s investigator

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testified that the only doctor to examine the victim in person
determined that her injuries were a result of child abuse.
¶ 7 The district court found that Calloway proximately caused the
victim’s injuries. The court found that the victim went to the doctor
weekly but did not have any bruises until this incident. The court
also found that the doctor and nurse who concluded that the victim
had a metabolic bone disorder did not examine her in person and
that there were missing pieces from the reports that prevented the
court from concluding that Calloway did not proximately cause her
injuries. The court also noted that both circumstances could be
true: the victim could have a metabolic bone disorder and Calloway
could have handled her in a way to cause her injuries. The court
ordered the requested restitution amount.
II. Analysis
¶ 8 Calloway contends that the prosecution presented insufficient
evidence to establish that he proximately caused the victim’s
medical expenses. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
¶ 9 Restitution means “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim . . .
proximately caused by an offender’s conduct and that can be

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reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.”
§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2026. Proximate cause “is defined as a
cause which in natural and probable sequence produced the
claimed injury and without which the claimed injury would not
have been sustained.” People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272, 1274 (Colo.
App. 2010). The prosecution must prove “by a preponderance of
the evidence not only the victim’s losses, but also that the victim’s
losses were proximately caused by the defendant’s criminal
conduct.” People v. Martinez-Chavez, 2020 COA 39, ¶ 14.
B. Standard of Review
¶ 10 We assume, without deciding, that Calloway is raising a “true”
sufficiency challenge — that is, one addressing “whether the
quantum of evidence provided to the court is ‘substantial and
sufficient’ to support” the court’s conclusion. Martinez v. People,
2024 CO 6M, ¶¶ 20, 22. Our review is therefore de novo. Id. at
¶¶ 19-20. In conducting that review, we determine “whether the
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole
and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused that
amount of loss.” People v. Barbre, 2018 COA 123, ¶ 25.

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C. Waiver
¶ 11 As noted above, Calloway “stipulate[d] to causation for
restitution purposes” in the plea agreement. The parties dispute
the effect of that stipulation on Calloway’s challenge to the district
court’s restitution order. We do not need to resolve that dispute,
however, because even assuming that the stipulation did not waive
Calloway’s challenge, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient
to prove that Calloway’s criminal conduct was a proximate cause of
the victim’s medical expenses.
D. Application
¶ 12 Viewing the direct and circumstantial evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence
presented at the restitution hearing for a reasonable fact finder to
conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that Calloway caused
the victim’s injuries, which resulted in her medical bills. See
Barbre, ¶ 25.
¶ 13 The probable cause affidavit, which the district court took
judicial notice of at the restitution hearing, stated that Calloway
shoved a baby bottle into the victim’s mouth and squeezed and
braced her against his body, with an intensity of five or six out of

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ten. It also stated that the victim had trouble breathing and was
bleeding, so Calloway called 911, which resulted in her hospital
admission. The restitution hearing officer testified that Calloway
admitted to squeezing the victim around her ribs and shoving a
bottle into her mouth. The defense investigator testified that the
only doctor who examined the victim in person “diagnosed child
abuse.”
¶ 14 Against this evidence, Calloway relies on the two reports that
opined that the victim had a metabolic bone disorder. But the
district court reviewed those reports and noted that the doctor and
nurse had not examined the victim in person and that the reports
were incomplete. See People in Interest of A.V., 2018 COA 138M,
¶ 29 (stating that it is for the district court to resolve conflicts in the
evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and determine the
weight to give each piece of evidence).
¶ 15 Moreover, there can be more than one proximate cause. See
People v. Lopez, 97 P.3d 277, 280 (Colo. App. 2004) (“[D]efendant’s
conduct does not have to be the only, nearest, or last cause . . . so
long as it is a cause but for which the [injury] would not have
occurred.”). In other words, even if the victim had a metabolic bone

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disorder, the evidence was sufficient to prove that but for Calloway’s
conduct, the victim would not have sustained the injuries that led
to her medical expenses. Cf. McLaughlin v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2012
COA 92, ¶ 35 (“[T]he tortfeasor may not escape or reduce liability
because the victim’s pre-existing condition made him more
susceptible of injury from the tortfeasor’s conduct.”).
¶ 16 Calloway’s reliance on Bellot v. State, 964 So.2d 857, 860 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007), does not alter our conclusion. In Bellot, the
court concluded that the evidence presented “raise[d] questions
about causation that need resolution and for which no competent,
substantial evidence was presented at the hearing.” 964 So.2d at
860. But, as discussed, in this case, the prosecution presented
sufficient evidence that Calloway proximately caused the victim’s
medical expenses.
III. Disposition
¶ 17 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.