Peo in Interest of MS

25CA1741 Peo in Interest of MS 10-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1741
Arapahoe County District Court No. 21JV640
Honorable Shay Whitaker, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of M.S., a Child,
and Concerning S.D. and M.S., Sr.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division A
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN*
Tow, C.J., and Ashby*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 15, 2026
John Christoffereson, Interim County Attorney, Kiley Schaumleffel, Assistant
County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant S.D.
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant M.S., Sr.
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026.

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¶ 1 S.D. (mother) and M.S., Sr. (father), appeal the judgment
terminating their parent-child legal relationships with M.S. (the
child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services filed a
petition in dependency or neglect after the Department received a
referral alleging concerns about the parents’ substance use, mental
health, and potential domestic violence. The petition also alleged
that the parents intended to flee the state to avoid further
dependency or neglect proceedings.
¶ 3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or
neglected and adopted treatment plans for both parents. Later, the
Department moved to terminate both parents’ parental rights.
Nearly four years after the petition was filed and following a
contested hearing, the juvenile court terminated mother’s and
father’s parental rights in a thorough, extensive written order.1
1 The parents have five children. During the course of these
proceedings, the family was also involved in dependency or neglect
proceedings involving the other four children in Adams County and
Kent County in Delaware.

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II. Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
¶ 4 Father first asserts that the juvenile court erred by
determining that it had subject matter jurisdiction under the
Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA). We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 5 The UCCJEA aims to avoid interstate jurisdictional
competition in child-custody matters. Brandt v. Brandt, 2012 CO 3,
¶ 19, 268 P.3d 406, 410-11; see also People in Interest of S.A.G.,
2021 CO 38, ¶ 23, 487 P.3d 677, 682 (noting that every State has
adopted the UCCJEA except Massachusetts). To that end, it
establishes a comprehensive framework for determining whether a
court may exercise jurisdiction in a child-custody matter or,
instead, must defer to a court of another state. People in Interest of
A.B-A., 2019 COA 125, ¶ 9, 451 P.3d 1278, 1282.
¶ 6 The UCCJEA prescribes two ways for a Colorado court to issue
an initial child-custody determination: temporary emergency
jurisdiction, § 14-13-204, C.R.S. 2026, and nonemergency
jurisdiction, § 14-13-201, C.R.S. 2026. A court may exercise
nonemergency jurisdiction in one of four ways: (1) home-state

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jurisdiction; (2) significant-connection jurisdiction; (3) more-
appropriate-forum jurisdiction; and (4) last-resort jurisdiction. See
§ 14-13-201(1); S.A.G., ¶ 26, 487 P.3d at 682-83.
¶ 7 A state has home-state jurisdiction only if it
is the home state of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or was the
home state of the child within one hundred
eighty-two days before the commencement of
the proceeding and the child is absent from
this state but a parent or person acting as a
parent continues to live in this state.
§ 14-13-201(1)(a). Commencement is defined as “the filing of the
first pleading in a proceeding.” § 14-13-102(5), C.R.S. 2026.
¶ 8 “Home state” is defined as the state in which
a child [has] lived with a parent or a person
acting as a parent for at least one hundred
eighty-two consecutive days immediately
before the commencement of a child-custody
proceeding. In the case of a child less than six
months of age, the term means the state in
which the child lived from birth with any of the
persons mentioned. A period of temporary
absence of any of the mentioned persons is
part of the period.
§ 14-13-102(7)(a).
¶ 9 The UCCJEA prioritizes home-state jurisdiction. In other
words, it is only when a child has no home state or the child’s home

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state has declined jurisdiction that a court looks to the three other
paths. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.C.B., 2015 COA
42, ¶ 11, 411 P.3d 926, 930.
¶ 10 We review de novo whether a juvenile court had subject matter
jurisdiction over a child-custody proceeding. People in Interest of
B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 27, 488 P.3d 1026, 1034. Any underlying
factual disputes, however, are for the juvenile court to resolve, and
we may not disturb its factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. S.A.G., ¶ 21, 487 P.3d at 681.
B. Additional Background
¶ 11 The petition in dependency or neglect was filed in November
2021. The same day, the juvenile court issued a verbal removal
order giving custody of the child to the Department.
¶ 12 Four days later, the court held a temporary custody hearing,
at which father’s counsel reported that the parents and child had
left the state and were residing in Delaware and that the court, as a
result, had no jurisdiction over the matter. The Department and
guardian ad litem argued that Colorado was the child’s home state.
The court determined it had jurisdiction to preside over the matter
and proceeded with the hearing. Shortly thereafter, the Department

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reported that Delaware had conducted its own hearing regarding
the child’s removal and had also determined that Colorado had
home-state jurisdiction; however the Department still requested
that the courts in both states hold a UCCJEA conference. At the
UCCJEA conference, the Delaware court confirmed it had
determined that Colorado was the only state with home-state
jurisdiction, that Colorado had already issued a child custody
determination, and that Delaware had dismissed any actions
related to the child. Following the Delaware court’s ruling, the
juvenile court held a jurisdictional hearing. The court again found
that the child’s home state was Colorado and that it had subject
matter jurisdiction over the proceedings.
C. Analysis
¶ 13 Father argues that the juvenile court erred when it found that
it had temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to section 14-13-
204. Father’s argument misconstrues the court’s findings.
Although the court’s findings could have been clearer, the court
found that it had home state jurisdiction. The record supports the
court’s findings.

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¶ 14 The child was born in Colorado and the family continuously
resided in the state until roughly a day prior to the filing of the
petition.2 Testimony established that before the parents’ abrupt
departure from Colorado, father had gained new employment and
the family had recently moved into a new apartment. The family
also purportedly told professionals they were only temporarily
leaving for “vacation.” See § 14-13-102(7)(a) (home state
jurisdiction is retained when a child is away from the state for a
“period of temporary absence”). Notably, the Delaware court
determined that “Colorado is, in fact, [the child’s] home state and
her only home state.” To the extent that the court’s finding was
unclear at the temporary custody hearing, any ambiguity was
sufficiently resolved when the court properly asserted it had home-
state jurisdiction and later reaffirmed that finding in a clear written
order. Father further argues that the child could not have had a
home state, but because he raises this issue for the first time in his
2 It is undisputed that there was no ongoing child-custody
proceeding in another state and that no out-of-state court had
made a custody determination regarding the child.

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reply brief, we do not consider it. See In re Marriage of Dean, 2017
COA 51, ¶ 31, 413 P.3d 246, 252.
¶ 15 Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the proceedings.
III. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶ 16 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) a child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an
appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not
been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct
or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time. § 19-3-
604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2026.
¶ 17 Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights under
section 19-3-604(1)(c), the county department of human services
must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and reunite
families. §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-
604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2026. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of
diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children. § 19-1-
103(114).

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¶ 18 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights is
a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,
2020 COA 12, ¶ 10, 486 P.3d 1201, 1204. Whether a department
of human services satisfied its obligation to make reasonable efforts
is also a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.S.L.,
2022 COA 146, ¶ 8, 527 P.3d 404, 407. We review a juvenile
court’s factual findings for clear error, and we may not disturb the
court’s findings if they have record support. Id. However, we review
de novo the juvenile court’s legal determination, based on those
findings, whether the department satisfied its reasonable efforts
obligation. Id.
¶ 19 “The credibility of the witnesses; the sufficiency, probative
value, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and
conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are within the discretion
of the [juvenile] court.” People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO
14, ¶ 15, 480 P.3d 682, 686.

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IV. Father’s Arguments
A. Treatment Plan Compliance
¶ 20 Father contends that the juvenile court erred when it found
that he did not substantially comply with his treatment plan. We
disagree.
1. Applicable Law
¶ 21 A treatment plan is successful if it renders a parent fit. People
in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 611 (Colo. 1982). Partial
compliance, or even substantial compliance, may not result in a
successful plan that renders the parent fit. People in Interest of
D.M.W., 752 P.2d 587, 588 (Colo. App. 1987). It is a parent’s
responsibility to ensure compliance with, and the success of, the
treatment plan. People in Interest of A.H., 736 P.2d 425, 428 (Colo.
App. 1987).
2. Analysis
¶ 22 Father’s treatment plan required him to (1) cooperate and
maintain contact with the Department and professionals; (2) meet
the child’s needs in a safe and stable home; (3) gain an
understanding of the child’s needs through regular parenting
education courses; (4) participate in parenting time; (5) undergo a

10
dual mental health and substance use evaluation; (6) develop a
support network; (7) participate in a neurological evaluation; and
(8) complete a domestic violence assessment and follow through
with any recommendations therein. The juvenile court
acknowledged that father had complied with certain aspects of his
treatment plan and found that he had
• “mostly” cooperated with the Department, though he
had previously been inconsistent in communicating with
the Department;
• completed an online parenting class and a combined
mental health and substance use diagnostic evaluation;
• finished a domestic violence curriculum, though safety
concerns about the parents’ relationship remained;
• demonstrated “months of sobriety at one time in [the]
case,” but had not demonstrated sobriety for nearly a
year before the termination hearing; and
• enrolled in mental health services.
¶ 23 Ultimately, the court found that father had made “insufficient
progress on his treatment plan” because he was not able “to
mitigate the issues related to substance use and mental health” and

11
had only “recently begun to consistently engage in services.”
Notably, the court found that father had not consistently attended
mental health treatment. The court further found that, despite his
period of sobriety, the evidence showed father continued to use
substances and that it was “clear that he does not wish to maintain
sobriety [as he] continues to disagree that [substance use] impacts
the safety of [the child].”
¶ 24 The court also noted that the “most current information”
indicated the family home was unsafe for the child. While the court
acknowledged that the Department had not referred father for a
neurological evaluation, the court determined that, even though the
Department could not provide an out-of-state referral for the
evaluation, the caseworker still tried to persuade father to seek a
referral from his primary care physician. On appeal, father points
us to the favorable evidence in the record and asserts that it shows
he “was in substantial compliance with his treatment plan.”
However, father’s argument requires us to reweigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for the juvenile court’s, which we cannot
do. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29, 524 P.3d
1209, 1217. Additionally, father ignores the court’s finding that,

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even though he complied with certain aspects of the treatment plan,
it was not successful in rehabilitating him. Because compliance
alone does not necessarily render a parent fit, we reject father’s
argument. See C.A.K., 652 P.2d at 611 (“The fact that an individual
fulfills the tasks and duties enumerated in the treatment plan does
not mean that the individual will be able to meet his responsibilities
as a parent.”).
¶ 25 To the extent that father argues the Department should have
modified his treatment plan after his move to Delaware, we note
that he does not argue his treatment plan was inappropriate. He
also does not point to any authority, nor are we aware of any,
obligating the Department to amend his treatment plan under those
circumstances. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the juvenile
court’s finding that father did not comply with his treatment plan.
B. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 26 Father contends that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts because it did not provide adequate referrals for
services in Delaware.
¶ 27 We discern no basis for reversal.

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1. Applicable Law
¶ 28 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy
the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). Among the
services required under section 19-3-208 are screening,
assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;
home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral
services to available public and private assistance resources; family
time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).
¶ 29 The juvenile court should consider whether the services
provided were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan,
People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by
“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all
services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the
completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of
My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33, 512 P.3d 132, 143. But the
parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to comply
with the plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285
(Colo. App. 2011). And the court may consider a parent’s
unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining whether

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the department made reasonable efforts. People in Interest of A.V.,
2012 COA 210, ¶ 12, 297 P.3d 1019, 1022.
2. Analysis
¶ 30 The juvenile court found that father’s lack of engagement and
difficulties connecting with out-of-state providers — not the
Department’s lack of efforts — impeded father’s successful
reunification with the child. Specifically, the court pointed to
father’s inconsistent communication with the Department and his
refusal to work with alternative service providers, as well as the
Delaware providers’ failure to timely respond to information
inquiries from the Department. Ultimately, the court found that
“considering the totality of the efforts made,” the Department made
reasonable efforts. See A.M., ¶ 15, 480 P.3d at 686. The record
supports the court’s findings.
¶ 31 First, father asserts that, aside from one inconveniently
located service provider, the Department failed to provide any
referrals or services to him once he relocated to Delaware. Yet after
father had moved, he quickly reported that he already had mental
health and substance use services in place. Caseworkers later
discovered father’s chosen provider was run by his sister, which

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caused concern about a potential conflict of interest. The
caseworker repeatedly discussed those concerns with father;
however, he consistently stated he did not want to seek treatment
elsewhere. Still, the caseworker asserted that, in conjunction with
the various departments, the Department had recommended an
additional five alternative providers, but father declined to switch
services. See A.V., ¶ 12, 297 P.3d at 1022 (a department’s
obligation to make reasonable efforts does not include making
efforts it knows to be futile).
¶ 32 True, as father asserts, the caseworker initially did not appear
to realize one of the proposed alternative providers offered only
substance use services and not mental health treatment. Similarly,
the juvenile court noted that “there were additional steps the
[D]epartment might have taken during the case.” Regardless, father
never engaged in services with that provider; rather, he continued
to engage with the providers he had identified. Also, the court
found it would not “have been reasonable” to locate other mental
health and substance use providers when father was “not willing to
work with other providers.”

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¶ 33 Nevertheless, father later switched service providers to an
agency unaffiliated with his family that reportedly provided mental
health services, substance use treatment, and urinalysis testing.
Father had located this agency on his own, without assistance from
the Department. At that time, father also reported to the
caseworkers that he was participating in services, such as
parenting education classes, individual therapy, domestic violence
treatment, and urinalysis testing and that he had completed a dual
diagnosis evaluation. However, this information was difficult to
verify because the providers did not timely respond to the
Department’s information requests. However, the Adams County
caseworker opined, and the court agreed, that because father was
already involved in treatment services, it was not a good use of the
Department’s time to investigate additional alternative service
providers.
¶ 34 Father also appears to assert that the Department failed in its
duty to provide reasonable efforts because it did not document its
attempts to locate providers or his treatment engagement records in
Delaware. However, father cites no law, and we are aware of none,
that would require the Department to do so. Still, the caseworker

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testified about her efforts to locate appropriate alternative service
providers and to obtain records from the providers with which
father was engaging. As described above, she noted that those
efforts were impeded by father’s refusal to engage with alternative
providers and a lack of communication from the Delaware agencies.
¶ 35 Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the
juvenile court’s determination that the Department made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father.
C. Fit within a Reasonable Period of Time
¶ 36 Last, father argues that even if he was unfit when the
termination hearing occurred, the juvenile court erred when it
determined he could not become fit within a reasonable time. We
discern no error.
1. Applicable Law
¶ 37 “An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders
[the parent] unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental
care.” S.Z.S., ¶ 23, 524 P.3d at 1216. At a minimum, reasonable
parental care requires that a parent provide nurturing and
protection adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and
mental health needs. S.R.N.J.-S., ¶ 9, 486 P.3d at 1204.

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¶ 38 A reasonable time is not an indefinite time but must be
considered based on the physical, mental, and emotional conditions
and needs of the child. S.Z.S., ¶ 25, 524 P.3d at 1216. When
determining whether a parent may become fit within a reasonable
time, “the court may consider whether any change has occurred
during the proceeding, the parent’s social history, and the chronic
or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition.” Id. at
¶ 24, 524 P.3d at 1216. Partial or even substantial compliance with
a treatment plan does not necessarily render a parent fit. People in
Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 26, 369 P.3d 822, 828.
¶ 39 If a parent has made little to no progress on a treatment plan,
the court need not give the parent additional time to comply. See
S.Z.S., ¶ 24, 524 P.3d at 1216. When, as here, a child is under six
years old, the court must consider the expedited permanency
planning (EPP) provisions, which require that the child be placed in
a permanent home as expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6),
19-1-123(1)(a), 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2026.
2. Analysis
¶ 40 The juvenile court determined that father’s conduct and
condition were unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The

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court noted that father had made “some progress” but found that,
in this EPP case, it had “been nearly four years” since the child had
been removed from the home and “there continue[d] to be
significant child protection concerns.”
¶ 41 In arguing that he could become fit within a reasonable time,
father again asserts that he substantially complied with his
treatment plan and that the Department failed to provide
reasonable efforts. However, as detailed above, the record does not
support those arguments.
¶ 42 Still, father points us to the caseworker’s testimony at an
earlier hearing in which she asserted that she believed father was
sober. At the termination hearing, however the caseworker testified
that she had concerns about father’s substance use based on a lack
of corroborating evidence to prove his sobriety. The juvenile court
considered the caseworker’s prior testimony and disagreed, finding
that the evidence at termination indicated father “has returned to
[substance] use.” See A.M., ¶ 15, 480 P.3d at 686.
¶ 43 Accordingly, in light of our conclusions above, the record
supports the juvenile court’s finding that father was unlikely to
become fit within a reasonable time.

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V. Mother’s Argument
¶ 44 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by terminating her
parental rights because the Department did not comply with
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and, therefore, it did not
make reasonable efforts. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
¶ 45 If a parent has a qualifying disability under the ADA, the
juvenile court must also consider whether the department provided
reasonable accommodations for that disability when assessing
whether reasonable efforts were made. People in Interest of S.K.,
2019 COA 36, ¶ 34, 440 P.3d 1240, 1250; see also § 19-3-208(2)(g)
(noting that services provided under section 19-3-208 must comply
with the ADA). “[W]hat constitutes a reasonable accommodation
will vary from case to case based on the child’s health and safety
needs, the nature of the parent’s disability, and the available
resources.” S.K., ¶ 39, 440 P.3d at 1250.
B. Additional Background
¶ 46 Roughly a year and a half after the petition was filed, mother
filed a notice of ADA applicability and requested reasonable
accommodations. It is undisputed that the ADA applies to mother.

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¶ 47 As relevant here, the parties stipulated that the Department
would accommodate mother by
• allowing an individual who would assist with mother’s
anxiety and learning disorder to be present for all
caseworker meetings that mother chooses as long as that
person was not father;
• simplifying caseworker meetings to “one or two issues in
the case rather than all ongoing issues;” and
• assisting mother with locating providers in Delaware.
¶ 48 The juvenile court found that, when “[v]iewing reasonable
efforts, including accommodations under the ADA as a whole,” the
Department had made reasonable efforts to accommodate mother’s
disability. The record supports the court’s findings.
C. Analysis
¶ 49 First, mother argues that contrary to the stipulated
accommodations, the Department relied on father to assist with
mother’s anxiety and learning disorder. But the caseworker
testified that only mother identified father for this role and
repeatedly requested that he be present in conversations with the
Department. The Department was not aware of anyone else who

22
could fill this role, nor did mother identify any alternatives. The
juvenile court acknowledged this was “not ideal” but concluded that
because mother lived out of state and had not identified any other
appropriate support, the Department reasonably accommodated her
by allowing father to provide that support.
¶ 50 Second, mother asserts that the Department failed to
accommodate her because the caseworker testified that she “did not
know” if she limited the number of issues discussed in every
conversation she had with mother. While true, the caseworker also
reported that she collaborated with the other departments to try
and “keep things focused and simple” for mother. She noted that
she tried to change the way she interacted with mother by being
more specific in requests, labeling future tasks as steps, and
sending information through texts so that mother had the
information written down. She would also speak slowly and use
words that were easier to understand.
¶ 51 Next, mother argues that the Department failed to provide
referrals for her in Delaware. However, mother’s accommodations
required the Department to assist with locating providers, which the
Department did. As detailed above, through the coordination of all

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departments involved, five alternative service providers were
identified and offered to the parents. Mother repeatedly declined
the alternatives and instead chose to engage with the services father
had identified. Last, mother contends that the Department did not
make reasonable efforts because it did not provide any in-person
family time after the parents relocated to Delaware, even though
that was a specific accommodation to which mother and the
Department had agreed.
¶ 52 The juvenile court concluded that, once the family had
relocated, the Department was not obligated to provide in-person
family time. The court recognized that regular in-person visits were
not feasible due to the Department’s funding limitations and the
substantial resources such arrangements would demand for a
single family. The record supports the court’s findings.
¶ 53 While the caseworker acknowledged there was funding that
could be used on services for parents living out of the state, she
noted the process was “very complicated” and that the program was
“pretty strict” on how its funding was utilized. The Adams County
caseworker further testified that it would not be reasonable, given

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the Department’s limited available resources, to facilitate in-person
family time for the family.
¶ 54 Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s determination that
the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother.
VI. Disposition
¶ 55 The judgment is affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE TOW and JUDGE ASHBY concur.