Peo v. Melton

22CA1895 Peo v Melton 07-03-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1895

El Paso County District Court No. 21CR7100

Honorable Jessica L. Curtis, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Rodney Leonard Melton,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE KUHN

Tow and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced July 3, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Abigail M. Armstrong, Assistant Attorney

General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jeffrey C. Parsons, Alternate Defense Counsel, Broomfield, Colorado, for

Defendant-Appellant

* Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const.

art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.

1

¶ 1 Defendant, Rodney Leonard Melton, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of a single

count of third degree assault. We affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 In December 2021, Melton and the victim got into a physical

altercation. According to the prosecution’s evidence at trial, Melton

approached a group of people that the victim was hanging out with

in front of a shelter for unhoused families. After the two exchanged

words, Melton kicked the victim in the face. The victim responded

by lunging at Melton, taking him to the ground, and placing him in

a chokehold. During the ensuing struggle, Melton pulled out a

knife and stabbed the victim ten times in the left arm, left flank,

and back.

¶ 3 Melton’s description of what happened after he was placed in

the chokehold mostly matched the prosecution’s evidence. But he

recounted a different version of the events that escalated the

encounter. Melton testified that after he approached the group of

people the victim was with, the victim made a racially charged

comment about him and spat on him. He reacted by “attempt[ing]

to kick at” the victim but testified that he wasn’t sure whether his

2

kick “connected” with the victim. He testified that the scuffle then

spiraled into an all-out fight between the two, ultimately resulting

in the victim sustaining serious injuries from the stabbing.

¶ 4 The prosecution charged Melton with one count each of first

degree assault and third degree assault. A jury found him guilty of

third degree assault but couldn’t reach a unanimous verdict as to

the other count. The trial court declared a mistrial, and a different

jury later acquitted him of first degree assault.

¶ 5 The trial court then sentenced Melton to two years in county

jail for third degree assault.

II. Analysis

¶ 6 Melton contends that the trial court erred by (1) entering a

conviction for third degree assault based on insufficient evidence

and (2) sentencing him to the maximum term of incarceration

allowed under the statute for that offense. We disagree with both

contentions.

3

A. Melton’s Conviction is Supported by

Sufficient Evidence in the Record

¶ 7 Melton contends that the prosecution failed to present

sufficient evidence in support of his conviction for third degree

assault. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 8 “[W]e review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence before the jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality

to sustain the convictions.” Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807

(Colo. 2005).

¶ 9 In doing so, we employ the substantial evidence test and ask

whether the evidence — viewed as a whole and in the light most

favorable to the prosecution — is substantial and sufficient to

support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is

guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Gorostieta v.

People, 2022 CO 41, ¶ 16. We “must ‘give the prosecution the

benefit of every reasonable inference which might be fairly drawn

from the evidence.’ It does not matter that we might have reached a

different conclusion were we the triers of fact.” Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting

People v. Harrison, 2020 CO 57, ¶ 32).

4

¶ 10 As relevant here, a person commits third degree assault when

that person “knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another

person.” § 18-3-204(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023. Bodily injury means

“physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical or mental

condition.” § 18-1-901(3)(c), C.R.S. 2023. “Our supreme court has

interpreted this definition to mean that bodily injury is ‘at least

some physical pain, illness or physical or mental impairment,

however slight.’” People v. Black, 2020 COA 136, ¶ 35 (emphasis

added) (quoting People v. Hines, 194 Colo. 284, 289, 572 P.2d 467,

470 (1977)). There is no requirement that the injury “be of a

crippling or otherwise incapacitating nature to be within the

statutory prohibition.” People v. Lobato, 187 Colo. 285, 288, 530

P.2d 493, 495 (1975).

2. Discussion

¶ 11 The prosecution argued during the first trial that Melton’s kick

to the victim’s face constituted third degree assault. In support, the

prosecution introduced a surveillance video showing the incident.

The video showed Melton kicking the victim and the victim’s head

snapping back from the force of the kick. The prosecution also

presented the testimony of two eyewitnesses, who said that Melton

5

had kicked the victim before he was taken to the ground and placed

into the chokehold.

¶ 12 Melton contends that this evidence was nonetheless

insufficient to establish the bodily injury element of third degree

assault. He points out that the victim — who died from unrelated

causes before the trial — couldn’t testify about the injuries

sustained as a result of Melton’s conduct. Indeed, Melton

continues, “neither the lay witnesses to the incident nor the police

officer witnesses that responded to the scene and encountered the

alleged victim presented any testimony as to any effect any kick had

on [the victim], let alone any physical impairment.”

¶ 13 It’s true that the prosecution didn’t present testimony that the

victim had reported any pain or any physical or mental impairment

as a result of Melton’s kick. And while the People direct our

attention to a hospital photograph that appears to show an injury

on the victim’s face, no trial evidence was introduced linking the

injury to the incident, let alone the kick underlying Melton’s third

degree assault conviction.

¶ 14 Nevertheless, we conclude that the prosecution presented

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable mind could infer the

6

bodily injury element of the offense based on the nature of the

events. While the prosecution introduced no direct evidence about

the extent of the victim’s injuries from the kick, a reasonable juror

could infer that the victim suffered some level of bodily harm when

Melton kicked him in the head. See Gorostieta, ¶ 16 (stating that

the prosecution receives the benefit of all reasonable inferences that

may be drawn from the evidence); see also People v. Perez, 2016 CO

12, ¶ 31 (“The question is not whether it is possible to disagree with

the inferences, but rather, whether the inferences are reasonable

when the evidence is viewed as a whole in the light most favorable

to the prosecution.”). The jury wouldn’t have to rely on “guessing,

speculation, conjecture, or a mere modicum of relevant evidence,”

see People v. Donald, 2020 CO 24, ¶ 19 (quoting Perez, ¶ 25), to

reach that conclusion in this case. Rather, the jury heard

eyewitness testimony and viewed a video of the events. That

evidence provided a sufficient foundation upon which the jury could

conclude that Melton kicking the victim in the head caused the

victim to experience some amount of physical pain or impairment,

however slight. See id. No more was required to establish the

bodily injury element of third degree assault. See Black, ¶ 35.

7

Melton’s sufficiency challenge, then, must fail.

1

B. The Trial Court Didn’t Err by Sentencing

Melton to Two Years in County Jail

¶ 15 Melton next argues that the trial court abused its discretion

when it sentenced him to the maximum term of incarceration for

third degree assault. We again disagree.

1. Additional Background

¶ 16 The prosecutor requested a two-year jail sentence at the

sentencing hearing, arguing that the sentence was appropriate

given that third degree assault was still an extraordinary risk crime

when Melton committed it; the victim ultimately sustained serious

injuries as a result of the altercation; Melton had three prior second

degree assault convictions; and throughout the trial proceedings, he

manifested “a lack of willingness to accept accountability and a

continual attempt to frustrate the process.”

1

Melton also asserts, without providing supporting authority or

developing an argument, that the prosecution “presented no

testimony of any kind as to [his] mens rea, further demonstrating

the lack of sufficiency of the evidence.” Because we don’t “consider

a bald legal proposition presented without argument or

development,” we don’t address this issue further. People v. Rios,

2020 COA 2, ¶ 7 n.1.

8

¶ 17 Melton’s trial counsel, on the other hand, pointed out that

while Melton was convicted of third degree assault for kicking the

victim, the court presided over the second trial in which a different

jury acquitted him of first degree assault based on the theory that

he stabbed the victim in self-defense. Considering this mixed

outcome, and the fact that Melton had already been incarcerated for

almost a year at the time of sentencing, counsel asked the court “to

grant him credit for time served with no further penalty.”

¶ 18 The trial court granted the prosecution’s request, sentencing

Melton to two years in county jail.

2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 19 A trial court has extremely broad discretion when, as here, it

imposes a sentence within the statutory range. People v. Rice, 2015

COA 168, ¶ 8. We review such decisions for an abuse of discretion

because “the trial court’s ‘familiarity with the facts of the case’

places it ‘in the best position to fix a sentence that reflects a

balance of the relevant considerations.’” People v. Torrez, 2013 COA

37, ¶ 71 (quoting People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 507 (Colo. 1986)).

We will not disturb this kind of sentencing decision on appeal

absent a showing that the court abused its discretion by imposing a

9

sentence that is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is

based on an erroneous construction of the law. People v. Herrera,

2014 COA 20, ¶ 16.

¶ 20 But “a trial court’s sentence must not be devoid of reason or

principle and should reflect a rational selection of the sentencing

alternatives consistent with the aims of the sentencing process.”

Torrez, ¶ 72. Thus, in exercising its discretion, the court should

consider, among other things, the nature of the defendant’s crime,

the defendant’s criminal history, the events surrounding the

criminal conduct, and the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries.

Id. at ¶ 73; People v. Koehler, 30 P.3d 694, 698 (Colo. App. 2000).

When weighing various factors, however, the court need not

expressly refer to each factor it considers and need only provide a

reasonable explanation for its sentence. See Torrez, ¶ 74 (citing

People v. Martinez, 179 P.3d 23, 26 (Colo. App. 2007)).

3. Discussion

¶ 21 The two-year jail sentence was the maximum term the trial

court could impose for Melton’s class 1 misdemeanor offense.

§ 18-3-204(3) (“Assault in the third degree is a class 1

misdemeanor.”); § 18-1.3-501(1)(a), (3)(a), (b)(I), C.R.S. 2023

10

(classifying third degree assaults committed before March 1, 2022,

as extraordinary risk crimes that are subject to an additional

six-month term beyond the eighteen-month maximum term

applicable to most other class 1 misdemeanors).

2

But even though

the court sentenced Melton within the statutory range, he contends

that the court abused its discretion by “failing to sufficiently justify

the maximum allowable sentence” for his conviction.

¶ 22 The trial court provided the following reasoning for imposing

the two-year jail sentence:

The first jury that acted as fact finder, with

respect to the original charges brought against

Mr. Melton, found that the Prosecution had

[disproved] his claim of self-defense as to third

degree assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The second jury found -- or evidently found

that the Prosecution failed to disprove Mr.

Melton’s claim of self-defense as to the

stabbing of [the victim].

2

Melton relies on section 18-1.3-401(10), C.R.S. 2023, to assert

that “the Colorado statute defining ‘extraordinary risk’ crimes

pertain only to felonies and do not list third degree assault among

those crimes.” But as we note above, Melton’s third degree assault

is a class 1 misdemeanor that is deemed an extraordinary risk

crime under the statute governing sentencing for misdemeanors.

Section 18-1.3-401, which applies only to felonies, is therefore

irrelevant here.

11

The reasonable conclusion the Court is left

with is that the first jury felt that Mr. Melton’s

kick of [the victim] was not an act of self-

defense but that perhaps the Prosecution did

not meet [its] burden in disproving that the

stabbing was not in self-defense. The

reasonable conclusion being that Mr. Melton’s

kick of [the victim] set off a chain of events in

which [the victim] was stabbed and could have

died.

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 23 Thus, while the court also noted that defense counsel’s and

the prosecutor’s “recitation of the posture of this case [wa]s

accurate,” it grounded its sentencing decision on Melton’s kick

triggering the subsequent events that ultimately left the victim with

serious stab wounds. Implicit in this analysis is consideration of

the nature of Melton’s conduct, the events surrounding that

conduct, and the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries. Each of

these considerations is a proper sentencing factor. See Koehler, 30

P.3d at 698. The trial court didn’t need to discuss each one to

justify its sentencing decision. Torrez, ¶ 74.

¶ 24 It’s true that the trial court could have made more extensive

findings in support of its decision. The court, for example, made no

mention of Melton’s prior criminal convictions or his demeanor

12

during the trial proceedings, even though the prosecutor brought

these matters to the court’s attention. But the fact that the court

didn’t address those additional factors doesn’t mean that its

sentence is “devoid of reason or principle,” id. at ¶ 72, or that the

court — in Melton’s words — “failed to rely on ‘sound reasons’” in

imposing it. To the contrary, by focusing on the bodily harm

resulting from Melton’s conduct, the trial court articulated a clear

basis for selecting a sentence at the top end of the statutory range.

¶ 25 Melton nevertheless argues that the court’s rationale for

imposing the maximum sentence is improper because it’s grounded

upon his stabbing of the victim, the conduct for which a different

jury acquitted him. By acquitting him of first degree assault,

Melton continues, “the jury necessarily found that the stabbing was

a lawful act, having occurred in self-defense.” Consequently, he

argues, there was “no reasonable basis for the Court to determine

that any alleged kick had resulted in the stab[b]ing and near death

of [the victim].”

¶ 26 Even if this argument has some intuitive force, it still doesn’t

carry the day. As we have already noted, sentencing courts have

extremely broad discretion when choosing a sentence within the

13

statutory range. Rice, ¶ 8. That discretion allows the court to

consider not only the previously identified factors, but also, “in

some circumstances, conduct for which [the defendant] was

charged and subsequently acquitted.” People v. Newman, 91 P.3d

369, 372 (Colo. 2004) (first citing United States v. Juarez-Ortega,

866 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1989); then citing United States v.

Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223, 1224 (9th Cir. 1973)).

¶ 27 In Newman, a defendant was convicted of storing and

disposing hazardous waste in violation of the relevant statute. Id.

at 370. On appeal, his storage conviction was upheld but his

disposal conviction was reversed because the applicable statute of

limitations for that offense had run. Id. In sentencing the

defendant on remand, the court nonetheless relied on the facts

giving rise to the reversed conviction. Id. In a subsequent appeal

from that ruling, the supreme court affirmed the court’s sentence.

Id. at 374. It determined that the court didn’t abuse its discretion

by considering the facts underlying the reversed conviction because

the two incidents, while separate, were sufficiently connected to one

another and the defendant played a significant role in both. Id. at

373-74.

14

¶ 28 Similarly, in Juarez-Ortega, a defendant challenged his

sentence for two counts of distributing cocaine on grounds that the

sentencing court improperly considered the fact that he possessed a

handgun during the drug offense because the jury had “acquitted

him of a substantive count of carrying a firearm during a drug

trafficking offense.” 866 F.2d at 748. The Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals rejected this argument. It reasoned that even though the

jury determined that the prosecution hadn’t proved all of the

elements of the weapons offense, such a determination didn’t

preclude the court from considering facts underlying that charge for

purposes of sentencing, given that those facts were neither in

dispute nor unreliable. Id. at 748-49.

¶ 29 The circumstances in this case are akin to those present in

Newman and Juarez-Ortega. Specifically, the facts underlying the

charge for which Melton was acquitted are not in dispute. The

prosecution presented overwhelming evidence at trial that Melton

stabbed the victim, and he didn’t assert otherwise. And while the

stabbing occurred immediately after the victim placed Melton in the

chokehold, it was still just seconds removed from Melton kicking

the victim in the face. This shows that not only were the two acts

15

sufficiently connected, but that they were part and parcel of the

same altercation. See Newman, 91 P.3d at 374. Thus, while

Melton was acquitted of criminal liability for the stabbing in

connection with his first degree assault charge, we perceive no

abuse of discretion in the court’s consideration of that act in

imposing his sentence for the third degree assault that triggered the

later events.

¶ 30 “‘Only in truly exceptional situations’ will we substitute our

judgment for that of the sentencing court and overturn a sentence.”

People v. Tresco, 2019 COA 61, ¶ 31 (quoting People v. Beatty, 80

P.3d 847, 855 (Colo. App. 2003)). For the reasons articulated

above, we conclude that this isn’t such a case.

III. Disposition

¶ 31 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.