Peo in Interest of MM

24CA0385 Peo in Interest of MM 09-19-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0385
Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JV30234
Honorable Victoria Klingensmith, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of M.M. Child,

and Concerning M.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO
Dunn and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 19, 2024

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Erinn Walz, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora,
Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, M.M. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental

responsibilities for her child, M.M., to S.G., a kinship placement.

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services

(Department) opened a voluntary case with the family after mother

expressed homicidal ideations toward the child and suicidal

statements while allegedly under the influence of alcohol. The

Department subsequently filed a petition in dependency and neglect

after learning about mother’s additional medical concerns;

continued concerns about her being under the influence; and

concern that she was minimizing the circumstances and behaviors

that led to the Department’s involvement. The child was placed

with kin, where he remained throughout the case.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected. The court adopted a treatment plan for mother.

¶4 The guardian ad litem later moved for an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) in favor of the kinship placement. After a two-

day evidentiary hearing, the court determined that it was in the

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child’s best interests to remain with the kinship placement. The

court granted sole decision-making authority and primary

residential custody to the kinship placement.

¶5 The court granted mother four hours per week of supervised

parenting time at her expense. In doing so, the court additionally

found that mother’s parenting time was not to be expanded nor her

supervision level be decreased until she had (1) established

documented sobriety for a minimum of six months; (2) consistently

attended and meaningfully engaged in therapy as recommended by

her therapist for a minimum of six months; (3) consistently

attended family time with the child for a minimum of six months;

(4) complied with the components of her treatment plan; and

(5) complied with the restrictions on communications detailed in the

APR decision.

¶6 Mother appeals the court’s judgment.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and

neglect proceeding, the juvenile court must consider the legislative

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purposes of the Children’s Code. People in Interest of J.G., 2021

COA 47, ¶ 18. Those purposes include:

• securing for each child the care and guidance, preferably

in their own home, that will best serve the child’s welfare

and the interests of society;

• preserving and strengthening family ties whenever

possible, including improving the home environment;

• removing a child from the custody of their parents only

when the child’s welfare and safety or the protection of

the public would otherwise be endangered, and for the

courts to proceed with all possible speed to a legal

determination that will serve the child’s best interests;

and

• securing for any child removed from the custody of their

parents the necessary care, guidance, and discipline to

assist the child in becoming a responsible and productive

member of society.

§ 19-1-102(1)(a)-(d), C.R.S. 2024.

¶8 The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a

child’s welfare and safety by providing procedures through which

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the child’s best interests can be served. J.G., ¶ 19. Thus, the court

must allocate parental responsibilities in accordance with the

child’s best interests. Id.; see § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024.

¶9 The Children’s Code does not prescribe any specific factors the

juvenile court must consider in making its decision. People in

Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo. App. 2005). A court

may consider the best interests factors set forth in the Uniform

Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA), § 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2024,

as long as the court does not exclusively rely on them and the

court’s focus remains on the protection and safety of the child, not

on the “custodial interests” of the parents. People in Interest of

H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13; see also L.A.G. v. People in Interest of

A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1390 (Colo. 1996).

¶ 10 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the

juvenile court’s sound discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. When there is record

support for the juvenile court’s findings, its resolution of conflicting

evidence is binding on review. Id. But whether the court applied

the correct legal standard is a question of law we review de novo.

People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.

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B. Analysis

¶ 11 Mother first argues the juvenile court’s judgment unduly

prohibits her from petitioning the domestic relations court for a

modification until certain conditions are met. We reject this

argument because the judgment does not include any language that

restricts or prohibits her ability to petition the domestic relations

court for a modification.

¶ 12 Mother next contends that, by placing conditions around her

ability to modify parenting time, the court’s order “effectively

introduced the best interests-standard from the Children’s Code

into a proceeding governed by the UDMA.”

¶ 13 But this case does not stem from the UDMA. Rather, it is a

proceeding under the Children’s Code as a result of the filing of a

petition in dependency and neglect. Moreover, following entry of the

APR judgment, the dependency and neglect case was closed and

certified into the domestic relations court. Nothing in the APR

judgment prevents a domestic relations court from determining

what is in the child’s best interests and modifying the APR based on

the circumstances before it. In fact, the juvenile court properly

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ordered that any modification to the APR should occur under

section 14-10-131, C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 14 Mother also argues that, even assuming the juvenile court

considered the child’s best interests under the UDMA, the court

erred because “any determination about the child’s best interests

under the UDMA is premature.” We disagree.

¶ 15 The record shows the juvenile court properly looked to the best

interests standard in the Children’s Code, and it appears the court

also considered the best interests standards contained within the

UDMA. In particular, the court found that the child had been with

the kinship placement throughout the case, the kinship placement

was providing for the child in a safe and stable home, stability was

in the child’s best interests, and it was in the child’s best interests

to have permanency. Considering the best interests standard

under the UDMA is appropriate so “long as the focus is on the

protection and safety of the child.” H.K.W., ¶ 13.

¶ 16 Finally, mother briefly argues that the court should have

afforded her more liberal parenting time with the child because she

had made progress in her treatment plan. In support, she asserts

that she had regularly attended therapy, had completed a dual

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diagnostic evaluation and substance use evaluation, had

maintained contact with caseworkers and attended visits at the

Department, and had obtained housing and employment.

¶ 17 Yet the court found that mother was unfit and had not

substantially complied with her treatment plan. And the court was

concerned that the issues that originally brought the case before it

had not changed.

¶ 18 The record shows that most of mother’s assertions of progress

in her treatment plan are either contrary to or unsupported by the

record. The record, including testimony from the caseworker,

therapist, and mother herself, shows that mother’s attendance at

therapy — as recently as three months prior to the APR hearing —

was inconsistent. And mother was not always forthcoming with her

therapist. While mother had periods of relative consistency in

urinalysis (UA) testing during the case, the permanency supervisor

testified that, in the three months prior to the APR hearing,

mother’s UAs were significantly inconsistent. The caseworker and

permanency supervisor also testified mother had reported multiple

relapses on alcohol and had relapsed as recently as a month prior

to the APR hearing. Testimony from the caseworker, permanency

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supervisor, and mother’s therapist indicated mother had repeatedly

violated protection orders between her and the kinship placement

and had done so as recently as the day before the APR hearing.

And while mother testified that she had housing and employment,

she never provided verification of either to the Department.

¶ 19 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, we

will not disturb them.

III. Conclusion

¶ 20 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

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