Peo v. McCoy

22CA1702 Peo v McCoy 10-17-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1702
City and County of Denver District Court No. 21CR3206
Honorable Jay S. Grant, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Weldon B. McCoy,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Welling and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 17, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Christopher Smallwood,
Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Weldon B. McCoy, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of third

degree assault. On appeal, McCoy contends that the district court

made two evidentiary errors and allowed the prosecutor to commit

misconduct. McCoy also contends that the cumulative effect of

these errors requires reversal. We address and reject each

contention and affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 On the night of May 15, 2021, friends John Russell, Brayden

Hallet, and Alex Barnes went out drinking in downtown Denver.

While sitting outside at a bar, they began to laugh at an unhoused

man on the street. McCoy noticed the friends laughing at the man

and asked Barnes if he found homelessness “funny or amusing.”

McCoy and Barnes got into a heated argument, and then McCoy

struck Barnes with his fist and grabbed him.

¶3 Barnes never struck back, but Russell intervened by

repeatedly punching McCoy. McCoy pulled out a window-breaking

tool “to firm up [his] fists” and punched Russell in his side. Russell

“fell feeble,” and the physical altercation ended. While video

surveillance partially captured the sequence of events, what led to

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the altercation — including who made what threats — remained in

dispute at trial.

¶4 The People charged McCoy with one count of third degree

assault against Barnes and one count of first degree assault against

Russell. After a two-day trial, a jury convicted McCoy of the third

degree assault of Barnes but acquitted him of the first degree

assault of Russell. The district court sentenced McCoy to eighteen

months of probation.

II. Evidentiary Errors

¶5 McCoy contends that the district court erred by (1) prohibiting

a witness from testifying about McCoy’s character for truthfulness

and (2) allowing the prosecutor to improperly impeach a witness.

A. Standard of Review

¶6 We review a trial court’s determination regarding the

admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v. Lane,

2014 COA 48, ¶ 21. A trial court abuses its discretion when its

ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or is based

on an erroneous understanding or application of the law. People v.

Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d 471, 480 (Colo. App. 2011).

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B. Character Evidence

¶7 McCoy contends that the district court erred by prohibiting

him from presenting witness testimony pertaining to his character

for truthfulness after permitting the prosecutor to attack his

credibility in a “slashing” cross-examination. We disagree.

1. Applicable Law

¶8 In general, evidence of a person’s character may not be

admitted to show that the person acted in conformity therewith on

a particular occasion. CRE 404(a); People v. Goldfuss, 98 P.3d 935,

937 (Colo. App. 2004). If a defendant in a criminal prosecution

wishes to offer evidence of their truthful character, however, they

may do so under CRE 608(a), but only after the prosecution first

attacks their character for truthfulness. People v. Serra, 2015 COA

130, ¶ 62; see also People v. Miller, 890 P.2d 84, 95 (Colo. 1995)

(“[A] defendant does not have the right to introduce character

evidence simply by virtue of the fact that the defendant takes the

witness stand in [their] own defense at trial.”).

¶9 “A person’s character with respect to truthfulness means that

person’s propensity to tell the truth in all the varying situations of

life” — in other words, their “general propensity to tell the truth.”

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Serra, ¶ 66 (quoting State v. Colon, 284 P.3d 589, 594 (Or. Ct. App.

2012)). Questions that imply that a defendant’s testimony is not

credible do not necessarily attack the defendant’s overall “character

for truthfulness.” Id. at ¶¶ 65-66; see also Miller, 890 P.2d at 93

(“[T]he mere fact that a witness is contradicted by other evidence in

the case does not constitute an attack upon his reputation for truth

and veracity.”) (citation omitted).

2. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Excluding
Testimony of McCoy’s Character for Truthfulness

¶ 10 McCoy argues that the prosecutor’s “slashing, lengthy, and

contradicting” cross-examination had the net effect of attacking his

character for truthfulness, such that he should have been allowed

under CRE 608(a) to present a witness who would testify to his

character for truthfulness. To support his request to admit the

character evidence at trial, McCoy highlighted five examples of

questions he claimed attacked his truthful character.

• The prosecutor asked McCoy a series of questions,

repeating the phrase “you don’t remember,” in reference

to McCoy’s inability to recall his whereabouts leading up

to the incident.

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• While discussing contradictions between the People’s

version of events and McCoy’s testimony, the prosecutor

probed McCoy, “Doesn’t it make more sense what the

People’s witnesses testified to . . . ?”

• When referencing discrepancies between the video of the

incident and McCoy’s recounting, the prosecutor asked

on two occasions, “[I]s it that [what you testified to]

wasn’t recorded or that it didn’t happen?”

• Twice during the cross-examination, the prosecutor

asked McCoy, “[Y]ou’re asking the jury to believe that?”

• The prosecutor allegedly used a sarcastic tone when

repeating McCoy’s statements back to him, as if to call

the credibility of the statements into question.

¶ 11 The district court disallowed the character witness’ testimony,

reasoning that there is a difference between questioning a person’s

truthfulness as to a particular event and arguing that the person

has a dishonest character generally.

¶ 12 We perceive no error in the district court’s decision to exclude

evidence of McCoy’s character for truthfulness. True, the

prosecutor asked tough, pointed questions that had the effect of

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undermining McCoy’s testimony as it related to the incident giving

rise to the charges in the case — including about McCoy’s lack of

clarity regarding what he was doing before the incident and how his

account was contradicted by the video evidence and witness

testimony. But the prosecutor’s questions, viewed individually or

collectively, did not attack McCoy’s “propensity to tell the truth in

all varying situations of life.” Serra, ¶ 66. Instead, the questions

appropriately identified discrepancies between McCoy’s testimony

and the other admitted evidence and invited the jury to view

McCoy’s version of events with skepticism as a result. See Miller,

890 P.2d at 95 (whether a witness’ character for truthfulness has

been attacked depends on the circumstances of each case).

Because the prosecutor’s cross-examination of McCoy did not

amount to an attack on his character, evidence that McCoy was a

truthful person was not admissible. See Serra, ¶ 68. Thus, the

district court did not abuse its discretion by precluding the

evidence.

C. Impeachment Evidence

¶ 13 McCoy next contends that the district court erred by

permitting the prosecutor to impeach a witness with a prior

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statement that did not contradict her live testimony. We discern no

abuse of discretion.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 14 Under CRE 613, a witness may be impeached with a prior

inconsistent statement. Liscio v. Pinson, 83 P.3d 1149, 1155 (Colo.

App. 2003). Notably, the inconsistency between the prior statement

and the witness’ trial testimony need not amount to a patent

contradiction; rather, the rule requires only “a material variance

between the witness’ testimony and the prior statement or at least

the omission of a significant detail which it would have been

natural to mention in the prior statement.” Williams v. Dist. Ct.,

700 P.2d 549, 557 (Colo. 1985).

2. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Allowing
the Prosecution to Impeach the Witness

¶ 15 Evidence established that McCoy was “a regular” at the bar

outside of which the altercation occurred. During the direct

examination of an employee who worked the night of the incident,

the prosecutor inquired about McCoy’s interactions with other

customers, asking, “[D]o your customers tend to get along with him,

not get along with him?” The employee testified that, “for the

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majority, [she] saw people getting along with him.” In a statement

the employee provided to the prosecution four months earlier,

however, the employee had said that “some customers [take] offense

to [McCoy].” Due to the perceived inconsistency between the two

statements, the prosecutor impeached the witness with her prior

statement. McCoy objected to the “improper impeachment,” but the

court overruled the objection.

¶ 16 McCoy argues that the prosecutor’s impeachment was

improper because stating that most people get along with McCoy is

not inconsistent with stating some people take offense to him;

rather, one is simply “a corollary” of the other. Corollary or not, the

statement “some people take offense” to an individual is likely to

have a materially different effect on a listener than the statement

“most people get along” with them. Moreover, the employee’s trial

testimony left out the “significant detail” that some people take

offense to McCoy. See Williams, 700 P.2d at 557. Thus, we

conclude that the district court’s decision to allow the prosecutor to

ask the employee about her prior statement was not an abuse of

discretion.

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III. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 17 McCoy contends that the district court erred by permitting the

prosecutor to commit misconduct by (1) asking hypothetical

questions during voir dire that too closely mirrored the facts of the

case; (2) commenting on McCoy’s failure to retreat before acting in

self-defense; and (3) commenting on McCoy’s pretrial silence. We

perceive no reversible error.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 18 We engage in a two-step analysis when reviewing claims of

prosecutorial misconduct. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096

(Colo. 2010). First, we determine whether the prosecutor’s conduct

was improper based on the totality of the circumstances. Id.

Second, if the conduct was improper, we decide whether it warrants

reversal under the proper standard of review. Id.

¶ 19 While a prosecutor can use every legitimate means to bring

about a just conviction, they have a duty to avoid using improper

methods designed to obtain an unjust result. Domingo-Gomez v.

People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1048 (Colo. 2005). When determining

whether a prosecutor’s statements were improper and whether

reversal is warranted, we may consider the language used, the

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context of the statements, the strength of the evidence, whether the

prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors’ sentiments, whether

the misconduct was repeated, and any other relevant factors.

People v. Walters, 148 P.3d 331, 335 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 20 We review a trial court’s ruling on prosecutorial misconduct

for a “gross abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice and a denial

of justice.” People v. Camarigg, 2017 COA 115M, ¶ 39 (quoting

People v. Garner, 2015 COA 175, ¶ 26). If the defendant objected at

trial, we review for harmless error. People v. Sauser, 2020 COA

174, ¶ 80. Under this standard, reversal is required only if the

error affects the substantial rights of the parties by substantially

influencing the verdict or affecting the fairness of the trial. Id.

¶ 21 If the defendant failed to object at trial, we review for plain

error. Id. “To constitute plain error, prosecutorial misconduct

must be flagrant or glaringly or tremendously improper, and it must

so undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast

serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.”

People v. McMinn, 2013 COA 94, ¶ 58.

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B. Hypothetical Voir Dire Questions

¶ 22 McCoy first contends that the prosecutor committed

misconduct by asking hypothetical questions during voir dire that

too closely mirrored the facts of the case and “rewarded a negative

prejudgment” of McCoy. We disagree.

¶ 23 During voir dire, the prosecutor posed the following

hypothetical to prospective jurors:

So let’s say you are so close to home. You’ve
been in your car for about half an hour. It’s
bumper-to-bumper traffic. You are so close to
your exit. You want to get off, but the person
in front of you is not moving. They’re taking
forever and being extremely slow, and it’s
annoying you.

Is there a situation that you can foresee
yourself getting out of the car?

The prosecutor then asked how the prospective jurors would react

in a similar circumstance, offering questions such as, “Do you [] lay

on the horn? Do you give that person maybe the middle finger? Do

you stay completely silent? What do you do?” Defense counsel did

not object.

¶ 24 McCoy argues the hypothetical posed by the prosecutor too

closely mirrored the facts of the case such that it encouraged the

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prospective jurors to prejudge McCoy before hearing any of the

evidence. Specifically, McCoy asserts the “impatient driver” in the

hypothetical represents McCoy, and the sole purpose of the

questioning was to discern “whether it was reasonable for the driver

(Mr. McCoy) to confront the stationary driver (the three men).” This

argument is unconvincing.

¶ 25 The frustrated-driver hypothetical posed by the prosecutor

during vior dire does not mirror the facts of this case, which include

a verbal altercation purportedly prompted by bullying of an

unhoused individual that escalated to a physical fight outside of a

bar. Importantly, the purpose of voir dire is for counsel to assess

the potential jurors and any beliefs they hold that may introduce

bias into the proceedings. People v. Wilson, 2013 COA 75, ¶ 12.

Here, given the stark differences between the hypothetical and the

facts of the case, it is apparent that the prosecutor’s questions were

not intended to instruct the prospective jurors about the case or

encourage them to prejudge the facts, but were intended to explore

their biases regarding confrontation generally. Accordingly, we

conclude that the prosecutor’s use of this hypothetical to determine

potential biases or prejudices was not improper.

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C. Failure to Retreat

¶ 26 McCoy next contends that the prosecutor committed

misconduct by misstating the law of self-defense and discussing

McCoy’s failure to retreat during the confrontation. Based on the

broader context of the prosecutor’s statements and questions, we

disagree.

¶ 27 During opening statement, the prosecutor referred to McCoy’s

ability to leave the confrontation:

Ladies and gentlemen, the defendant in this
case knows this area. He could have taken
many different avenues. He could have walked
away from a conversation that, apparently, he
was insulted by. He was in the middle of
downtown. He could have gone inside and
asked his friends for help if he ever thought he
was in danger. He could have tried to walk
away from the situation. He could have left in
one of six different directions downtown, but
he didn’t. Ladies and gentlemen, the
defendant was the initial aggressor here.

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 28 The prosecutor raised the issue again during her cross-

examination of McCoy. First, the prosecutor questioned why McCoy

began “making a semicircle [around the three men] . . . instead

of . . . going straight and walking away, [or] turning around[.]”

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Later, the prosecutor asked McCoy what stopped him from crossing

the street “before [he] assaulted two men.”

¶ 29 Finally, the prosecutor revisited the issue during closing

argument, telling the jury that after the fight, “[McCoy] chooses to

cross the street and leave, the same street that he told you

yesterday he couldn’t cross in order to avoid the fight because he

was afraid of getting smushed.” Defense counsel did not object to

any of these comments.

¶ 30 McCoy asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

commenting on his failure to retreat before using self-defense

because prosecutors are categorically prohibited from doing so. We

disagree that such a categorical prohibition exists where, as here,

the prosecution’s theory of the case is that the defendant was the

initial aggressor.

¶ 31 Under Colorado law, “a person is justified in using physical

force upon another person in order to defend himself . . . from what

he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful

physical force by that other person.” § 18-1-704(1), C.R.S. 2024. A

non-aggressor — one who did not initiate the contact in question —

is entitled to assert self-defense without considering whether a

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reasonable person would retreat to safety rather than resorting to

physical force. People v. Toler, 9 P.3d 341, 347 (Colo. 2000).

¶ 32 Accordingly, a prosecutor “may not argue that a defendant is

barred from acting in self-defense unless [he] first retreats from an

encounter.” People v. Monroe, 2020 CO 67, ¶ 20. Nor may a

prosecutor argue that a defendant’s failure to retreat undermines

the reasonableness of their decision to act in self-defense because

allowing such an argument would “cripple the no-duty-to-retreat

rule.” Id. at ¶ 30.

¶ 33 However, if the defendant is the initial aggressor — one who

initiates the physical conflict, Castillo v. People, 2018 CO 62, ¶ 43

— they must first “withdraw[] from the encounter and effectively

communicate[] to the other person [their] intent to do so” before

using force in self-defense, § 18-1-704(3)(b). See Monroe, ¶ 19. In

other words, an initial aggressor has a duty to retreat before they

are legally justified to use self-defense.

¶ 34 In Monroe, the supreme court discussed this distinction in

reference to People v. Martinez, 224 P.3d 1026 (Colo. App. 2009).

Monroe, ¶¶ 27-28, 36. In Martinez, the defendant had already

started to drive away when he observed the victim leaving a bar,

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stopped his car, and engaged in a fight. Martinez, 224 P.3d at

1029-30. The defendant claimed that he had acted in self-defense

because he was “so scared and . . . nervous” about the victim. Id.

at 1033. In closing, the prosecutor argued that if the defendant

was scared and nervous, he could have left, and defense counsel

objected, arguing that the prosecutor’s comments misstated the

no-duty-to-retreat rule. Id. at 1031.

¶ 35 The supreme court explained that “when viewed in context, it’s

clear that the prosecutor’s comments were directed, not at the

defendant’s failure to retreat once he felt threatened, but his

decision to enter the fray, which arguably made him an initial

aggressor.” Monroe, ¶ 28. In this way, the court distinguished the

prosecutor’s comments in Martinez from the type of comments it

prohibited — those “admitted for the purpose of undermining the

reasonableness of the defendant’s claim that he acted in

self-defense.” Id.

¶ 36 Based on the video of the incident that showed McCoy

initiating the physical conflict, the prosecutor made clear during

her opening statement that the prosecution’s theory was that

McCoy “was the initial aggressor,” and she did so when discussing

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McCoy’s available avenues of retreat. The cross-examination

questions and closing argument that followed echoed this theory of

the case. Given the context, the prosecutor’s comments pertaining

to McCoy not walking away or crossing the street appear directed at

his decision to enter the fray as the initial aggressor rather than a

more generalized failure to retreat. See id. at ¶ 28.

¶ 37 At a minimum, the prosecutor’s comments were not flagrant,

glaring, or tremendously improper, so they do not warrant reversal

under plain error review. McMinn, ¶ 58.

D. Pretrial Silence

¶ 38 Finally, McCoy contends that the prosecutor committed

misconduct during cross-examination and rebuttal closing

argument by improperly commenting on McCoy’s pretrial silence.

We perceive no reversable error.

¶ 39 While prosecutors should avoid commenting on a defendant’s

pre- or post-arrest silence, “the Fifth Amendment protections do not

apply to conduct that occurs in a noncustodial setting.” People v.

Rios, 2020 COA 2, ¶ 24 (quoting People v. Thomas, 2014 COA 64,

¶ 25). Further, even if such a comment is made, “reversible error

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exists only when the prosecutor uses the defendant’s silence as a

means of implying guilt.” Id.

1. Questions About McCoy’s Whereabouts

¶ 40 First, while discussing his whereabouts leading up to the

physical confrontation, McCoy testified on cross-examination that

he visited a nearby Walgreens before the fight started. On direct

examination, however, McCoy said that he visited Walgreens after

the physical altercation had concluded. The prosecutor asked

McCoy, “So . . . you going to the Walgreens, you coming back . . . ,

we don’t have a recording of any of that, do we?” McCoy responded,

“Right.” The prosecutor continued, “So today is the first time that

we’re hearing about any of that, right?” Defense counsel did not

object.

¶ 41 McCoy argues that the prosecutor’s last question is an

improper comment on his pretrial silence. Viewed in context,

however, the prosecutor was referencing the discrepancy between

McCoy’s direct and cross-examination testimony, which is not a

comment on pretrial silence at all, but an attack on the credibility

of McCoy’s trial testimony.

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2. Questions About Threats

¶ 42 Second, McCoy testified on cross-examination that the men

“came around the corner and said, ‘We’re going to fucking kill you

now, you fucking [N word].’” He continued, “If someone threatens to

kill you, ma’am, you should probably believe them.” The prosecutor

responded, “You should. Although this is the first time that we are

hearing that somebody threatened to kill you. That’s all.” Defense

counsel did not object.

¶ 43 Again, McCoy argues that the prosecutor’s statement about

hearing a part of McCoy’s story for the first time at trial is an

improper comment on his pretrial silence. Unlike the first

comment, the second comment is not so clearly directed at a

discrepancy in McCoy’s trial testimony because McCoy testified to

the same threat on direct examination. But it is not directed at

McCoy’s custodial silence either. See id. at ¶ 24.

¶ 44 McCoy testified on direct examination that he did not engage

with police at the scene but spoke with people at the bar afterward.

McCoy also said he did not know police were looking for him until

they arrested him on a warrant sometime later. And there does not

appear to be evidence that McCoy was subject to a custodial

19
interview. Given this record, the prosecutor’s comment was not

obviously a comment on McCoy’s pretrial, custodial silence.

Rather, the comment is more reasonably interpreted as a proper

attempt to undermine McCoy’s version of events.

3. Questions About Contacting Police

¶ 45 Third, during an exchange concerning why McCoy failed to

discuss the incident with law enforcement following the

confrontation, the prosecutor asked McCoy if he failed to contact

the police about the incident because he did not believe the police

would be looking for him. Following McCoy’s explanation of why he

left the scene and then came back, the prosecutor asked, “[I]n any

case, you never tried to talk to the police about what happened in

this case, correct?” McCoy said, “I would have if someone had

asked me. If they came to the scene while I was on the scene, I

would have happily told them everything that happened and that I

had been assaulted.”

¶ 46 McCoy argues that the prosecutor’s question about talking to

the police was an improper comment on his pretrial silence. As an

initial matter, we note that McCoy testified on direct examination

that the police were not on scene when he returned after the fight

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but that he “would have waited around if [he] would have thought

the police were en route.” The prosecutor’s question fairly sought to

expound upon McCoy’s direct testimony.

¶ 47 Moreover, it is clear the prosecutor was inquiring into conduct

that occurred, if at all, in a noncustodial setting. If there were no

police present at the scene after the altercation, then McCoy’s

supposed silence during that time was necessarily noncustodial.

And if McCoy had voluntarily sought out the police sometime later

to report the fight, his silence then would likewise be noncustodial.

Because the specific conduct implicated by the question was

noncustodial, it was not improper for the prosecutor to ask about it.

See id.

4. Closing Argument Comments

¶ 48 Lastly, McCoy contends that the prosecutor committed

misconduct by improperly commenting on his pretrial silence when

she repeatedly used the phrase “for the very first time, we hear . . .”

during closing argument. In the first instance, the prosecutor

stated “[f]or the very first time, yesterday, we hear: . . . ‘[t]hey told

me they were going to fucking kill me, you N word.’” Later, she

followed up stating, “we hear for the first time on cross-examination

21
that he was spit on[.]” Finally, in discussing the threats that McCoy

testified to, she again stated, “for the very first time,” at which point

McCoy’s counsel objected.

¶ 49 For the same reasons we concluded that the prosecutor’s

cross-examination questions about McCoy mentioning threats for

the first time at trial were not improper, we conclude that her

closing argument on the same issue was not improper. The

argument was not a comment on custodial pretrial silence but an

attack on the believability of McCoy’s story. In fact, immediately

following this part of her closing argument, the prosecutor referred

the jurors to the instruction on credibility and asked them to

“examine not only that statement, but everything else that came off

of that witness stand yesterday from Mr. McCoy.”

¶ 50 The prosecutor’s comment that “for the first time on

cross-examination” McCoy stated that he was spat on during the

fight was most reasonably viewed as a comparison between McCoy’s

direct and cross-examination, rather than a comment on pretrial

silence. Indeed, any doubt about the comparison being drawn was

erased when, immediately after the prosecutor made this comment,

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she said, “He didn’t say that when his attorney was doing his direct

examination.”

¶ 51 Finally, even if the prosecutor’s questions and argument could

somehow be viewed as commenting on McCoy’s custodial pretrial

silence, the prosecutor did not use the statements as a means of

implying McCoy’s guilt, but instead to impeach McCoy’s testimony.

See id. Ultimately, we conclude that the prosecutor did not

improperly comment on McCoy’s custodial pretrial silence.

IV. Cumulative Errors

¶ 52 McCoy contends that, even if the alleged errors individually do

not warrant reversal, their cumulative prejudice does. When

reviewing for cumulative error, we ask whether “numerous formal

irregularities, each of which in itself might be deemed harmless,

may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.”

Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 24. However, for the

doctrine to apply, numerous errors must have been committed, not

merely alleged. People v. Shanks, 2019 COA 160, ¶ 76.

¶ 53 Although we expressed some concern with the prosecutor’s

comments about McCoy’s duty to retreat, we concluded that any

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error was not plain. Because we found no other errors, there can

be no cumulative error.

V. Disposition

¶ 54 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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