Peo in Interest of CAP

24CA0521 Peo in Interest of CAP 10-17-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0521
Costilla County District Court No. 21JV2
Honorable Crista Newmyer-Olsen, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of C.A.P. and G.U.P., Children,

and Concerning:

S.A.W.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Brown and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 17, 2024.

Rebecca N. Rian, Assistant County Attorney, Alamosa, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem for C.A.P.

Debra Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem for G.U.P.

Lindsey Parlin, Office for Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, S.A.W. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationships with C.A.P. and G.U.P. (the children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Costilla County Department of Social Services (the

Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect, alleging

that the children had been exposed to domestic violence and were

being negatively affected by mother’s mental health and substance

use. Initially, the children were placed with father on a safety plan,

but after a month the juvenile court granted temporary custody to

the Department and entered a protective order requiring supervised

family time. The court later determined that the children’s health

and safety required additional restrictions on mother’s family time.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. About a year

after the petition was filed, the guardian ad litem moved to

terminate mother’s parental rights.

¶4 The juvenile court denied the first motion to terminate

parental rights after finding the Department didn’t make reasonable

efforts to reunite the family. The court found that, although mother

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had been “largely noncompliant” with her treatment plan, the court

was unclear “whether her lack of compliance [was] based upon her

own refusals or whether it [was] related to simply not having the

appropriate services in place given her extreme needs.” In the order

denying termination, the court gave the Department specific

instructions to cure the reasonable efforts concerns. Among other

things, the Department had to create an amended treatment plan

that was individualized for mother and which identified specific

services to support mother in addressing the treatment plan

objectives. The Department did so, and an amended treatment plan

was adopted by the court twenty-two months after the petition was

filed.

¶5 The juvenile court ordered that mother should have six

months to demonstrate substantial compliance with the amended

treatment plan. Almost a year after the amended treatment plan

had been adopted, the Department moved to terminate mother’s

parental rights. Three years after the petition was filed, the court

granted the motion after a contested hearing.1

1 Father relinquished his parental rights and isn’t a party to this

appeal.

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II. Reasonable Efforts

¶6 On appeal, mother contends that the juvenile court erred by

finding the Department made reasonable efforts. We aren’t

persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 The reasonable efforts standard requires the Department to

exercise diligence to reunify the family, generally by providing

services identified in the parent’s treatment plan so that the parent

can become fit. See People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915

(Colo. App. 2011); §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5, 19-3-604(2)(h),

C.R.S. 2024. Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-

208, C.R.S. 2024, satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. People in

Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 13; § 19-1-103(114).

¶8 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. Therefore, we review the

juvenile court’s factual findings on the issue for clear error but

review de novo the court’s legal determination, based on those

findings, as to whether a department satisfied its reasonable efforts

obligation. Id.

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B. Analysis

¶9 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

she was unfit because the Department didn’t make reasonable

efforts. In support of her claim, mother asserts that the

Department didn’t provide her with “several services identified in

section 19-3-208(2)(b).” But we aren’t aware of, and mother doesn’t

provide, support for her assertion that a department must provide

every service included in the Children’s Code. See S.N-V., 300 P.3d

at 915 (when evaluating whether a department made reasonable

efforts, the court should consider whether the provided services

were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan); see also

People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33 (a

department may “prioritize certain services or resources to address

a family’s most pressing needs in a way that will assist the family’s

overall completion of the treatment plan”).

¶ 10 In any event, the juvenile court found that the Department

made reasonable efforts after the first termination motion was

denied. The court found that the Department had “done simply all

[it] can do to give [mother] a reasonable and fair opportunity” to

maintain her parental relationships with the children. The court

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found that there were “repeated referrals” for appropriate services

but, importantly, mother stopped participating in the case after the

amended treatment plan was adopted.

¶ 11 The juvenile court’s factual findings are supported by the

record. After the court denied the first termination motion, the

Department provided updates detailing what efforts it was making

to support the new treatment plan objectives. At the second

termination hearing, the caseworker summarized these efforts,

testifying that the Department made referrals for individual therapy,

therapeutic family time, substance abuse treatment, domestic

violence treatment, and anger management. The caseworker

testified that she gave mother housing applications and made calls

with mother to get her on the waiting list for housing, but mother

“never followed through with trying to get housing.” The

Department also made referrals for substance monitoring and

offered mother transportation to complete urinalysis testing.

Furthermore, both the caseworker and the caseworker’s supervisor

testified that they encouraged mother to participate in services and

regularly reached out to her through phone calls, texts, and emails.

Despite these efforts, mother discontinued her individual therapy,

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stopped providing urinalysis samples ten months before the

termination hearing, and didn’t participate in the other services

offered by the Department as part of the amended treatment plan.

¶ 12 Mother doesn’t identify which additional services she believes

the Department should have provided to her as part of her amended

treatment plan. Nor does she provide record support for her

contention that the caseworker admitted to making “no efforts” to

resume mother’s family time. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89

P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (stating that where an appellant

doesn’t identify supporting facts, make specific arguments, or set

forth specific authorities to support a contention, the contention is

not properly before the appellate court and will not be addressed).

¶ 13 Mother claims that, if the Department had done more, she

“would have been making progress surrounding her treatment plan

objectives and would have been able to have contact with her

children.” But the juvenile court found that mother didn’t

participate in therapeutically supervised family time with the older

child, even though it was available to her. True, family time with

the younger child was suspended at the time of the termination

hearing. As part of the termination judgment, the court found that

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mother didn’t engage in her treatment and, as a result, “the court

simply did not ever get to a point where [it] thought that [family

time with mother] was safe and appropriate for [the younger child]”

so that the protective order could be amended. Here, the court

appropriately considered mother’s lack of participation in services

and court proceedings when it determined the Department made

reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210,

¶ 12; see also People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285

(Colo. App. 2011) (a parent is ultimately responsible for using the

provided services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with

the treatment plan). As discussed above, the record supports the

juvenile court’s findings that the lack of family time was due to

mother’s nonengagement, and not a lack of reasonable efforts by

the Department.

¶ 14 To the extent that mother contends that the Department failed

to provide appropriate services to the children to support their

availability for family time, we aren’t persuaded. At the time of

termination, G.U.P. was nine years old and C.A.P. was almost six

years old. The caseworker testified that both children had high

needs. The caseworker testified that G.U.P. was placed in a

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therapeutic foster home, where he was receiving “intensive care.”

G.U.P.’s placement provider testified that he attended an affective

needs program at school and attended both individual and family

therapy to address his emotional and mental health needs. C.A.P.’s

placement provider testified that he was seen by a team of

specialists to address his high medical needs. C.A.P. received extra

support at school as well as play therapy, occupational therapy,

and speech language therapy. Mother doesn’t suggest what

additional services could or should have been provided to support

her children’s needs. And, in any event, the record demonstrates

that it was mother’s nonengagement, and not the children’s high

needs, that prevented her from participating in family time with the

children.

¶ 15 Considering both the court’s findings and mother’s

unsupported assertions, we agree with the juvenile court’s

conclusions that the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate mother and reunify the family. Thus, we discern no

error.

III. Disposition

¶ 16 The judgment is affirmed.

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JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE MOLUTRIE concur.

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