Marriage of Goldstone

23CA0605 Marriage of Goldstone 10-17-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0605
Boulder County District Court No. 21DR30037
Honorable Bruce Langer, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Nicole K. Collins,

Appellee,

and

Scott J. Goldstone,

Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, JUDGMENT AFFIRMED,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE RICHMAN*
Dunn and Navarro, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 17, 2024

Scardina Law, LLC, Autumn Scardina, Todd Scardina, Denver Colorado, for
Appellee

Aitken Law, LLC, Sharlene J. Aitken, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Scott J. Goldstone (husband) appeals the district court’s

judgment of punitive contempt. We dismiss the appeal in part,

affirm the judgment against husband, and remand the case for

further proceedings regarding appellate attorney fees.

I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

¶2 On November 16, 2021, the district court entered written

permanent orders dissolving the marriage between husband and

Nicole K. Collins (wife). As relevant here, the court allocated

husband’s Chase checking account x7523 (Chase account) to wife.

The account had a $2,923 balance at the time of the permanent

orders hearing in October 2021. Because a month had passed

since the hearing, the court ordered the parties to evenly split any

fluctuation of 10% or greater to the value of the Chase account.

The court also ordered the parties to sell their home (Jackson home)

and split the proceeds equally. And the court divided husband’s

retirement account (TD Ameritrade account) by allocating $158,375

from the account to wife and the remaining $162,236 to husband.

Again, because the court’s value for the TD Ameritrade account was

based on its value at the time of the hearing a month earlier, the

court ordered the parties to divide any increase in the account as of

1
November 16, 2021, by allocating wife 45% and husband the other

55%.

¶3 The parties filed motions for post-trial relief. In response to

husband’s requests, the court directed the parties to determine any

fluctuation in the Chase account’s value as of November 16, 2021,

and to evenly divide the property taxes owed on the Jackson home

should it not sell in 2021 (post-trial order). The court also declined

husband’s request to amend the allocation of the TD Ameritrade

account.

¶4 Following the post-trial order, wife alleged that husband had

not transferred to her the Chase account or her share of the TD

Ameritrade account. She asked the court to enter judgments

against husband and award her interest. During the pendency of

that motion, wife informed the court that husband had transferred

to her the Chase account, but she asserted that husband had taken

money from the account, had misrepresented to her the true value

of the account, and continued to withhold the full value allocated by

the court.

¶5 The court entered a judgment against husband and awarded

wife interest (money judgment order). Husband then paid wife the

2
remaining funds from the Chase account and attempted to settle

the TD Ameritrade account by sending wife checks for her share.

¶6 Husband appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, wife

pursued punitive contempt sanctions against husband, alleging

that he willfully violated the court’s orders concerning (1) the Chase

account; (2) the Jackson home; and (3) the TD Ameritrade account.

Husband asked the court to stay the contempt proceedings due to

the pending appeal. The court denied his request, and after a

three-day hearing, it found husband guilty of punitive contempt.

Husband asked the court for another stay, and after denying that

request, the court ordered him to serve ten days on work crew

through the county jail.

¶7 A division of this court later affirmed the permanent orders,

including the allocation of the TD Ameritrade account, but reversed

the date of “wrongful withholding” for purposes of calculating the

award of interest provided by the money judgment order. In re

Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶¶ 27, 76, 88 (Collins I).

II. Husband’s Right to Testify

¶8 Husband contends that the district court made comments

during the contempt hearing that “foreclosed [his] constitutional

3
right to testify by prohibiting [him] from deciding at what point, and

if, he was going to testify.” We disagree.

A. Legal Principles

¶9 In a punitive contempt proceeding, an alleged contemnor has

the right to remain silent as well as the right to testify in their

defense. C.R.C.P. 107(d)(1); see Moore v. People, 2014 CO 8, ¶ 10;

People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970, 977 (Colo. 1985). The contemnor’s

decision on whether to testify is within their exclusive discretion,

and they may surrender this right through a knowing, voluntary,

and intelligent waiver. See Moore, ¶ 10. We review de novo whether

a court infringed on a party’s right to testify. See id. at ¶ 17.

B. Discussion

¶ 10 As an initial matter, wife argues that husband cannot assert

this argument in his direct appeal of the contempt judgment but

that he, instead, must raise it “through [a] post-conviction

proceeding.” She highlights that in criminal proceedings, a

defendant must challenge their waiver of the right to testify through

postconviction relief. See id. at ¶¶ 8, 17. However, the

postconviction relief proceedings available to criminal defendants do

not extend to a judgment of punitive contempt. See Benninghoven

4
v. Dees, 849 P.2d 906, 908 (Colo. App. 1993). Still, wife suggests

that husband could have raised this issue under C.R.C.P. 107(e),

which allows a court to reconsider punitive sanctions. But C.R.C.P.

107(e) does not set forth a process by which a contemnor may seek

postconviction relief. And even if we were to assume that husband

could have sought such relief under C.R.C.P. 107(e), wife directs us

to no legal authority that required him to do so or that now

precludes us from addressing his argument that the court’s

comments foreclosed his right to testify. Absent such authority, we

elect to review husband’s contention and discern no error.

¶ 11 After continuing the contempt hearing to a third day, the court

commented to wife’s attorney that the hearing must be completed at

their next setting. Wife agreed to conclude her case but noted that

she was not accounting for any testimony husband may offer in his

defense. The court said that they would “cross that bridge if we

come to it” and then said, “Imagine how thrilled I’m going to be if I

find out that we have another few hours that I wasn’t given advance

notice of.”

¶ 12 Near the end of the hearing’s third day, and after the

completion of wife’s case-in-chief, the court asked husband’s

5
attorney if she would be presenting “any witnesses.” When

husband’s attorney asked to have a few minutes to discuss the

matter, the court responded, “This hearing is over in 15 minutes. . .

. This is something that should have been addressed long ago. . . .

I understand you have a right to wait and decide what you’re going

to do, but . . . I am not setting a fourth hearing.”

¶ 13 After a recess, husband’s attorney told the court that husband

would assert his constitutional right to remain silent and that she

would not present any other additional witnesses in husband’s

defense. (Earlier in the hearing, one witness testified for husband’s

defense.) In response, the court clarified its “intemperate words,”

saying that husband “absolutely ha[d] a right to testify” and it didn’t

want him to take what the court had said as “trying to prevent him

from testifying if he wishe[d] to do so.” The court further said that

“if [husband] wishe[d] to testify, [it] [would] find a way to make that

happen” and that it wanted to “make sure that that’s clear.”

Following the court’s additional clarification, husband’s attorney

confirmed that husband would not testify.

¶ 14 Husband, who is a practicing attorney, does not dispute that

the court properly advised him of his right to remain silent before

6
the hearing and that he confirmed his understanding of that right.

Although the court expressed some frustration concerning the

length of the hearing, the court clarified to husband that those

comments should not impede him from freely exercising his right to

testify. In addition to that clarification, husband conferred with his

trial and appellate attorneys, both of whom were present

throughout the contempt hearing, immediately before deciding not

to testify. And he makes no claim that they did not fully inform him

of his rights. Moreover, contrary to husband’s suggestion, he was

not required to decide whether to testify until after wife had

completed her presentation of evidence. See People v. Reed, 216

P.3d 55, 58 (Colo. App. 2008) (“The decision to testify at trial

remains within the exclusive discretion of a defendant; . . . a

defendant has the constitutional right to decide at what point . . .

he or she wishes to testify.”).

¶ 15 We therefore discern no merit to husband’s assertion that the

court prohibited him from deciding when, and if, he would testify.

The decision not to testify was made by husband, and the record

reveals that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently declined to

do so after being fully informed of his rights.

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III. Punitive Contempt Determinations

¶ 16 We next consider and reject husband’s contentions

challenging the district court’s entry of punitive contempt.

A. Legal Principles

¶ 17 A court may hold a party in contempt for disobedience or

resistance to, or interference with, a lawful court order. C.R.C.P.

107(a)(1). When the court finds that the contemnor’s conduct was

offensive to the authority and dignity of the court, it may impose

punitive sanctions. See C.R.C.P. 107(a)(4), (d)(1); In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning A.C.B., 2022 COA 3, ¶¶ 18, 23. Punitive

sanctions must be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt

that (1) a lawful court order existed; (2) the contemnor knew of the

order; (3) the contemnor had the ability to comply with the order;

and (4) the contemnor willfully refused to comply. A.C.B., ¶ 23.

¶ 18 Whether a party is in contempt lies within the court’s sound

discretion, and its factual findings are binding on review unless

they are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Webb, 284 P.3d 107,

108-09 (Colo. App. 2011). We therefore will uphold the court’s

contempt decision absent a showing that it acted in a manifestly

8
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair manner, or misapplied the law.

In re Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 23.

B. Chase Account

¶ 19 Husband contends that the record does not support the

district court’s finding that he knowingly and willfully withdrew

money from the Chase account in violation of the court’s orders.

We disagree.

¶ 20 The court found that the November 16, 2021, written

permanent orders allocated the Chase account to wife. The court

noted that husband took a screenshot of the account’s balance at

1:31 a.m. on November 17, 2021, apparently to represent the

account’s November 16, 2021, balance. The court found that on

November 17, 2021, and before husband took the screenshot, he

used $3,149 from the account to pay his credit card bill (a debt the

court allocated to him). The court further found that although

husband “testified” that he had not reviewed the permanent orders

before the credit card payment, the weight of the evidence indicated

otherwise.

¶ 21 The court also noted that husband had made other

withdrawals from the Chase account and that he had

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misrepresented the balance of the account during the parties’ post-

decree efforts to “reconcile” the court’s allocation. Additionally, the

court determined that husband’s delay in transferring the account

balance to wife was unreasonable and that it could not find any

good faith explanation for his “foot-dragging other than that he was

unhappy with the [c]ourt’s orders and attempted to pressure [wife]

into agreeing to a resolution more favorable to him.”

¶ 22 The court then concluded that a lawful order existed for the

allocation of the Chase account to wife, husband knew of that

order, he had the ability to comply with it, and he willfully failed to

comply.

¶ 23 Contrary to husband’s contention, the record and reasonable

inferences drawn from it support the court’s findings that husband

knew of the permanent orders before he paid his credit card debt

and that his use of the Chase account was a willful violation of the

permanent orders. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80,

¶ 49 (recognizing that credibility determinations and the weight,

probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the

inferences and conclusions to be drawn, are matters within the

district court’s sole discretion); Aspen Springs Metro. Dist. v. Keno,

10
2015 COA 97, ¶ 27 (“Because the record supports the district

court’s factual findings concerning contempt, we will not disturb

those findings.”).

¶ 24 Husband’s former attorney testified that he received the

permanent orders on November 16, 2021, and that his typical

practice was to inform his client of a court’s permanent orders. His

attorney also confirmed that husband created a screenshot of the

TD Ameritrade account’s balance on November 16, 2021, but did

not create a screenshot of the Chase account’s balance until

November 17, 2021 (after the credit card payment had been made).

Additionally, wife testified that during the few months of

discussions after permanent orders, husband never disclosed that

he had paid his credit card with the Chase account funds and

continuously misrepresented to her the actual balance of the

account as of November 16, 2021. She also testified that in their

discussions, husband tried to convince her to let him keep the

Chase account and that, when she took action to have the account

transferred, husband initially did not cooperate. Wife further

testified that, in addition to the credit card payment, husband

11
withdrew an additional $3,000 from the Chase account and that

when she ultimately received the Chase account, it had only $459.

¶ 25 Husband asks us to draw different inferences from the

conflicting evidence, but we may not set aside the court’s

determinations, when, as here, the record supports them. See

Thorburn, ¶ 49; Aspen Springs, ¶ 27.

¶ 26 Husband also disputes the court’s reference to his “testimony”

in its ruling, noting that he never testified at the hearing. Even if

the court mistakenly mentioned that husband testified, the court’s

comment referred to husband’s claim that he did not know of the

permanent orders when his credit card debt was paid, and husband

does not dispute that he asserted this claim in his defense. Indeed,

husband submitted an affidavit to the court, which was admitted at

the hearing, in which he attested that he initiated the credit card

payment before he had reviewed the court’s permanent orders.

Husband does not challenge the admission of the affidavit, and we

therefore discern no prejudice from the court’s misstatement that

husband “testified.” See C.A.R. 35(c).

¶ 27 Nor are we persuaded that the absence of a specific deadline

in the permanent orders directing when husband must transfer the

12
account renders the court’s contempt decision improper. As

discussed below, the court acted within its discretion to apply a

reasonable time analysis in the absence of a specific deadline. And

the court found, with record support, that husband unreasonably

delayed the transfer of this account for three months to try to

receive a more favorable allocation. See Thorburn, ¶ 49; Aspen

Springs, ¶ 27.

¶ 28 The court therefore did not abuse its discretion by finding

husband guilty of punitive contempt for withdrawing money from

the Chase account after knowing that the account had been

allocated to wife and misleading her about the account’s balance.

C. Jackson Home

¶ 29 Husband also contends that the district court erred by

imposing the punitive contempt judgment related to the Jackson

home. He argues that, in wife’s contempt motion, she alleged that

he violated only the permanent orders, while the court relied on

provisions of the post-trial order to conclude that he violated his

obligation to pay an equal share of the 2021 property taxes. We

disagree.

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¶ 30 The permanent orders directed the parties to sell the Jackson

home and split the proceeds equally. The court found that the

home sold a few months after the entry of permanent orders and a

month after the post-trial order, which clarified that the parties

must equally divide any property taxes due on the Jackson home.

It found that husband refused to pay his share of the 2021 property

taxes when the home sold and that his actions required $3,049

from wife’s share of the sale proceeds (half the amount of the

outstanding property taxes) being placed in escrow. The court

noted that husband purportedly justified his refusal to pay the

2021 property taxes because wife received a financial windfall by

being allowed to live in the home rent free for several months more

than him. And it found that the escrowed funds were not released

to wife until husband made the request approximately two months

after the closing of the sale.

¶ 31 The court determined that husband had no basis for insisting

that wife’s funds be held in escrow for the property taxes. And it

concluded that husband willfully violated the permanent orders by

delaying wife’s receipt of her share of the sale proceeds.

14
¶ 32 A contemnor must have notice of the order they are alleged to

have violated. See In re Marriage of Nussbeck, 974 P.2d 493, 499

(Colo. 1999). And to be held in contempt, the contemnor must have

refused to do exactly what the court’s order required. See In re

Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530, 537 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 33 According to husband, he did not violate the court’s

permanent orders because that order did not address his obligation

to equally divide the property taxes owed on the Jackson home.

However, as the district court noted, the permanent orders directed

husband and wife to “equally split the proceeds” from the sale of the

Jackson home. And the record revealed that, when they closed on

the home’s sale, they had to pay their property tax obligation from

the sale proceeds. Thus, by refusing to pay his share of the

property tax obligation at the closing, husband caused wife to

receive less than her equal share of the sale proceeds at the closing,

which was a violation of the permanent orders. We therefore reject

husband’s claim that the court relied on the post-trial order to find

him in contempt.

¶ 34 Nor are we persuaded by husband’s suggestion that the court

could not consider the post-trial order when reaching its conclusion

15
that he violated the permanent orders. To the extent husband

claimed any confusion concerning his obligations imposed by the

permanent orders, the post-trial order clarified that the parties

must evenly divide the property taxes owed on the home. But a

month after this order, husband still refused to do so, and his

conduct was relevant evidence for the court to consider when

determining that he willfully refused to comply with his obligation

under the permanent orders.

¶ 35 Husband goes on to highlight evidence from the hearing which

he believes could have supported findings contrary to those made

by the district court. Although conflicting evidence was presented,

we must defer to the court’s resolution of those conflicts, when as

here the record supports the court’s findings. See Thorburn, ¶ 49;

Aspen Springs, ¶ 27. In particular, the parties’ real estate agent

testified that husband did not agree to pay the property taxes at

closing; his insistence caused the disputed funds, which were due

to wife, to be placed in escrow; and those funds were not released to

wife until husband agreed to do so. Wife also testified that

husband’s actions deprived her of her equal share of the home sale

16
proceeds at closing and unjustifiably delayed her receipt of the

funds allocated to her.

¶ 36 The court therefore acted within its discretion to find husband

guilty of punitive contempt for not complying with its order on the

allocation of the Jackson home.

D. TD Ameritrade Account

¶ 37 Husband next contends that the district court erred by

entering the punitive contempt judgment against him concerning

the TD Ameritrade account. He argues that the permanent orders

did not specify the manner by which he had to transfer the TD

Ameritrade account to wife and that the court improperly relied on

its later orders to conclude that he was obligated to transfer her

share of the account directly to her. We disagree.

¶ 38 In its contempt order, the court determined that, based on the

value of the TD Ameritrade account as of November 16, 2021, the

permanent orders allocated to wife $178,137 and that the “clear

intent” of the court’s allocation “was that the funds should be in the

form of a transfer from the TD [Ameritrade] account” to wife, and

not a cash payment.

17
¶ 39 The court further explained that, following the permanent

orders, husband tried to get the court to revisit its allocation and

have wife share in the post-decree losses sustained in the TD

Ameritrade account. And it noted that after the court denied his

multiple requests, he tried to supplant the court-ordered division of

the account with a cash payout to wife, allowing him to retain the

TD Ameritrade account holdings. Specifically, the court found that

instead of transferring her share of the account, husband sent wife

checks totaling $178,137 and that by doing so, husband willfully

violated the court’s order.

¶ 40 Contrary to husband’s claim, the permanent orders were not

“silent” on the way by which he was directed to satisfy the

allocation of the TD Ameritrade account. The permanent orders

expressly allocated to wife a specific value of the funds “[f]rom [the]

account.” See Ad Two, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 9 P.3d 373,

376 (Colo. 2000) (recognizing that we construe language in

accordance with its plain and generally accepted meaning).

Moreover, husband attested that he contacted a representative at

TD Ameritrade within two days of the entry of permanent orders to

learn how he could transfer the funds from the account to wife,

18
demonstrating his belief that he needed to effectuate a direct

transfer to wife from the account.

¶ 41 We also reject husband’s argument that the court modified the

permanent orders when it directed him to “pay” wife “the $178,137”

in the money judgment order. (Although Collins I did not directly

resolve this issue, it “question[ed]” husband’s claim that the money

judgment order modified any aspect of the court’s permanent

orders. Collins I, ¶ 78.) Even though the court used the term “pay,”

it made clear that it was not “reconsider[ing] its findings and orders

in [p]ermanent [o]rders.”

¶ 42 Husband notes that in the money judgment order, the court

directed him to pay the funds from the TD Ameritrade account

within seven days and argues that because a transfer from the

account would be impractical within that time frame, it is

reasonable to interpret the court’s statement as modifying the

permanent orders. However, he directs us to nothing in the record

that established he could not initiate or complete a transfer from

the TD Ameritrade account within this timeframe or that the court

understood that such a limitation existed.

19
¶ 43 Husband goes on to claim that the court erroneously

considered “multiple court orders” to determine that he was

required to directly transfer her share of the TD Ameritrade account

to wife. True, the court considered the money judgment order in

addition to the permanent orders. But it was husband who injected

the money judgment order into the court’s consideration by alleging

that this order had modified the allocation set forth by the

permanent orders. Thus, to fully address husband’s defense, the

court logically considered the provisions of the money judgment

order and determine the effect that order had on the court’s

allocation. And the court only mentioned the post-trial order when

noting that husband had unsuccessfully tried to modify the

allocation of the TD Ameritrade account.

¶ 44 Nor do we agree that by discussing the multiple orders, the

court’s findings lacked specificity. The court plainly relied on its

allocation of the TD Ameritrade account in the permanent orders,

and it found that husband knew of his obligation under that order,

had the ability to comply with it, and willfully refused to comply.

¶ 45 In his reply brief, husband also notes that Collins I, as relevant

here, reversed the court’s determination for the date from which

20
husband wrongfully withheld the TD Ameritrade account. Id. at

¶ 76. He argues that given that determination in Collins I and the

district court’s reliance on the money judgment order in support of

its contempt ruling, the contempt judgment must be reversed.

However, Collins I affirmed the permanent orders allocation of the

TD Ameritrade account. Id. at ¶¶ 24-27. And the court’s contempt

ruling was based on husband’s failure to comply with that order; it

was not based on the money judgment order.

¶ 46 Additionally, Collins I concluded that the district court did not

properly calculate the date for determining when wife reasonably

expected to receive the TD Ameritrade account funds when

awarding interest. Id. at ¶¶ 72-75. It did not, as husband

suggests, conclude that he had not wrongfully withheld the funds

from the TD Ameritrade account. Moreover, when the court entered

its contempt ruling (over a year after the entry of permanent

orders), it found that husband still had not transferred the funds

from the TD Ameritrade account as directed, and it found that his

continued, unreasonable delay supported the willfulness of his

violation. Collins I would not affect that determination.

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¶ 47 The district court therefore did not err by finding that husband

willfully violated the court’s order concerning the allocation of the

TD Ameritrade account.

E. Reasonable Time to Comply

¶ 48 When addressing the allegations of punitive contempt, the

district court considered husband’s defense that the permanent

orders did not contain clear deadlines by which he must comply,

and it found that when no stated deadline exists, it was appropriate

to apply a reasonable time analysis. Husband argues that the

court’s decision was unsupported by any legal authority. However,

as noted in Collins I, when a time for performance is not specified,

the court may imply a reasonable time for performance. Id. at ¶ 73;

see In re Marriage of Cyr, 186 P.3d 88, 95 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 49 We therefore reject husband’s claim that the court acted

without legal authority to apply a reasonable time analysis. And as

discussed above, the court found, with record support, that

husband failed to comply with the court’s orders within a

reasonable time.

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F. Offensive to the Authority and Dignity of the Court

¶ 50 At the start of the sentencing hearing, the district court

supplemented its contempt findings and found “beyond a

reasonable doubt that [husband’s] conduct was offensive to the

authority and dignity of the [c]ourt.” See C.R.C.P. 107(a)(4), (d)(1).

Husband contends that the court’s finding, entered almost two

months after the contempt ruling, was improper.

¶ 51 However, a court may revise or amend any of its findings

before entering a final judgment. Collins I, ¶ 79. And a judgment of

contempt is not final until the court imposes a sanction. In re

Marriage of January, 2019 COA 87, ¶ 12. Thus, although the court

did not expressly find that husband’s conduct was offensive to the

authority and dignity of the court when it initially entered its

contempt ruling, the court acted within its authority to supplement

its ruling and make that finding before it imposed punitive

sanctions. See Collins I, ¶ 79. And husband directs us to no legal

authority that requires a different conclusion. See In re Marriage of

Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 27 (noting that appellants bear the burden

to provide legal authority in support of their appellate contentions).

23
¶ 52 Husband also suggests that the court made comments at the

sentencing hearing that conflicted with its finding that his conduct

was offensive to the authority and dignity of the court. He

highlights the court’s statements that “there was a level of conflict

that was coming from both parties” and that it “wished [it] could

award [wife] attorney’s fees” for having to engage in this lengthy

litigation. However, beyond the conclusory suggestion, he does not

explain how these comments affected the court’s finding or

otherwise warrant reversal. See In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 29 (declining to consider an

undeveloped argument).

¶ 53 The court acted within its authority to supplement its

contempt findings at sentencing, and its findings were supported by

the record.

IV. Requests to Stay the Contempt Proceedings

¶ 54 Husband next contends that the district court erred by

denying his requests to stay the contempt proceedings. We dismiss

this portion of his appeal.

¶ 55 We will not address the merits of an issue that has been

rendered moot. In re Marriage of Tibbetts, 2018 COA 117, ¶ 7; see

24
also In re Marriage of Thomas, 2021 COA 123, ¶ 22 (recognizing that

a court may raise the issue of mootness sua sponte). An issue is

rendered moot when the judgment would have no practical effect on

the existing controversy. Tibbetts, ¶ 8.

¶ 56 In a prehearing motion and again before the court imposed

punitive sanctions, husband asked the court to stay the contempt

proceedings until the resolution of his appeal concerning

permanent orders. He argued that the district court could sentence

him to jail as a punitive sanction and that if the court of appeals

reversed the permanent orders, the court’s deprivation of “his

constitutional liberty” could not be restored. The court denied his

requests. And after conducting the contempt proceedings, it

sentenced husband to ten days of work crew, and husband has

completed that sentence.

¶ 57 Because any decision we now render concerning the propriety

of the court’s rulings to not stay the contempt proceedings would

have no practical legal effect, we conclude that the issues have been

rendered moot. See id. The district court completed the contempt

proceedings, and husband served his sentence. As well, Collins I

determined husband’s appeal of the permanent orders. See Collins

25
I, ¶ 88. While his petition for writ of certiorari is currently pending

with our supreme court, any potential change to Collins I would not

change the fact that a stay of the contempt proceedings cannot now

be given to husband. We discern no basis to apply an exception to

the mootness doctrine. See In re Marriage of Wiggins, 2012 CO 44,

¶ 16 n.2 (recognizing an exception may apply when the issue (1) is

capable of repetition, yet evading review; or (2) involves a question

of great public importance). Nor has husband alleged such a basis.

¶ 58 We thus dismiss this portion of the appeal. See In re Marriage

of Walker, 264 P.3d 630, 631 (Colo. App. 2011) (dismissing an

appeal for mootness).

V. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 59 Husband and wife each request an award of appellate attorney

fees under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2024, claiming that the other

party has superior financial resources. See Collins I, ¶ 86. We

remand this issue to the district court. See id.; C.A.R. 39.1.

VI. Disposition

¶ 60 We affirm the punitive contempt judgment and dismiss the

part of husband’s appeal challenging the decision not to stay the

contempt proceedings. We remand the case for further proceedings

26
on the parties’ requests for appellate attorney fees under section 14-

10-119.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE NAVARRO concur

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