Estate of Gallegos

23CA1404 & 23CA2199 Estate of Gallegos 12-12-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals Nos. 23CA1404 & 23CA2199
City and County of Denver Probate Court No. 20PR420
Honorable Elizabeth D. Leith, Judge

In the Matter of the Estate of Joseph T. Gallegos, deceased.

Joanne Cdebaca, as Personal Representative, Heir and Beneficiary,

Appellant,

v.

Richard Gallegos,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
ORDER VACATED, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Freyre and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 12, 2024

Pat Mellen Law, LLC, Patricia Ann Mellen, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

Jonathan S. Willett, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 In this probate proceeding concerning the estate of Joseph T.

Gallegos (decedent), Joanne Cdebaca1 appeals orders and the

judgment from the probate court concerning her dispute with

Richard Gallegos (Gallegos) over the administration of decedent’s

estate. We affirm the judgment in part and reverse the judgment in

part, vacate one order entered by the probate court, and remand

the case with directions.

I. Background

¶2 We draw the following factual background from the record

before us.2

¶3 Decedent died in October 2020 and was survived by multiple

children. Decedent’s children included Cdebaca, Vogel, and

Gallegos. Disputes over decedent’s estate arose following his death,

with Cdebaca and Vogel at odds with Gallegos over who was entitled

1 Lisa Vogel is listed on the caption page of the opening brief but

was later dismissed from this appeal. Only Gallegos and Cdebaca
(in both her role as personal representative of decedent’s estate and
her individual capacity as heir and beneficiary of decedent’s estate)
remain parties to this appeal.
2 Transcripts from three hearings are missing due to a malfunction

with the probate court’s FTR system.

1
to various assets of the estate. Those disputes were based in part

on wills and deeds executed by decedent shortly before his death.

¶4 In October 2020, after decedent’s death, Cdebaca initiated the

Denver probate proceedings that are now before us on appeal. The

probate court in those proceedings appointed Cdebaca as the

personal representative (PR) of decedent’s estate.

¶5 In April 2021, despite the ongoing probate proceedings in

Denver, Cdebaca and Vogel initiated a separate action in Jefferson

County seeking to quiet title to two parcels of real property owned

by decedent during his lifetime. In that action, Cdebaca and Vogel

alleged that two quitclaim deeds executed by decedent before his

death were fraudulent. The first deed purported to transfer

ownership of real property on Federal Boulevard in Denver (the

Federal property) exclusively to Gallegos. The second deed

purported to transfer ownership of real property located on Shirley

Place in Lakewood (the Shirley property) to Gallegos and Cdebaca

as tenants in common, with each owning a 50% interest. The

Jefferson County District Court transferred the quiet title action to

Denver for its resolution with all other probate matters concerning

decedent’s estate.

2
¶6 As relevant to the issues before us, the Denver probate court

held several hearings during which it heard evidence concerning

(1) the disposition of Broncos Towing LLC (Broncos Towing), a

business owned and operated by decedent during his lifetime,

which Cdebaca alleged was part of the estate, and (2) the quitclaim

deeds that purported to transfer the Federal property to Gallegos

and the Shirley property to Gallegos and Cdebaca as tenants in

common.

¶7 After the hearings concerning Broncos Towing, the probate

court found that the business was not part of the estate because

decedent had transferred it to Gallegos before his death. Thus,

Broncos Towing “belong[ed] in totality to Richard Gallegos.”

¶8 Partway through the hearings concerning the disputed parcels

of real property, Cdebaca and Vogel withdrew their quiet title

claims. As a result, the court ruled that Gallegos exclusively owned

the Federal property and Gallegos and Cdebaca each owned a 50%

interest in the Shirley property as tenants in common.

¶9 Arguing that Cdebaca and Vogel had engaged in vexatious

litigation, Gallegos moved for attorney fees and damages. The

probate court granted that motion in May 2023. The following

3
month, the probate court denied Cdebaca and Vogel’s motion for

reconsideration.

¶ 10 In November 2023, the probate court granted a motion from

Gallegos to reform a July 2023 quitclaim deed in which he

mistakenly conveyed to Cdebaca half of his interest in the Shirley

property when he intended to convey his entire interest to three of

his other sisters.

¶ 11 Cdebaca now raises several challenges to the probate court’s

orders and judgment.

II. Broncos Towing

¶ 12 Cdebaca contends that the probate court erroneously resolved

the dispute surrounding Broncos Towing. Specifically, she argues

that the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address

this matter and that it relied on inadmissible evidence to determine

the existence and value of property belonging to the business. We

discern no error.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 13 As PR of decedent’s estate, Cdebaca included Broncos Towing

in the inventory of estate assets that she submitted to the probate

court. She alleged that Broncos Towing should be considered part

4
of the estate because “no sale or transfer of this business was ever

made,” as reflected by the fact that documents indicating Gallegos’s

ownership of the company “were filed 10 days AFTER decedent[’]s

death.” Cdebaca then filed a petition for the appointment of a

special administrator to operate and preserve Broncos Towing as an

estate asset.

¶ 14 The probate court held hearings to resolve the ownership

status of Broncos Towing. At the end of an August 2022 hearing, in

which Ray Baty, a former Broncos Towing employee, and Gallegos

testified at length about the company’s ownership, the probate

court determined that the business was not an estate asset but was

instead owned by Gallegos.

¶ 15 In addition to contesting ownership of Broncos Towing,

Gallegos sought damages arising from the sale and disposal by

Cdebaca and Vogel of Broncos Towing property previously located

in the backyard of a house belonging to decedent. Cdebaca and

Vogel claimed that they gave Gallegos prior notice of a garage sale

in which they sold some of this property and told him to “come and

take anything he wanted” beforehand. According to Cdebaca,

5
Gallegos attended the garage sale but did not take the property he

later claimed belonged to Broncos Towing.

¶ 16 Gallegos, meanwhile, presented evidence to establish exactly

what Broncos Towing property Cdebaca and Vogel sold or otherwise

discarded, as well as the value of that property. During the August

2022 hearing, Baty and Gallegos both testified extensively about

this property, listing and describing, among other things, specific

vehicles, a motor home, a snowmobile, scooters, trailers, wheel

changers, and an air compressor. At the end of this hearing, the

probate court determined that “the machinery and the vehicles and

the tools that were behind the decedent’s house and in the

neighboring yards belonged to [Broncos] Towing.”

¶ 17 The probate court then took written pleadings from both

parties to determine the value of the Broncos Towing property and

the damages to which Gallegos was entitled. Gallegos submitted

evidence that included a list of missing items, screenshots of Kelley

Blue Book listings and listings of items for sale in online

marketplaces that Gallegos contended were the same or comparable

to those items in the list he submitted, and Google Earth

screenshots of decedent’s house and yard that purportedly

6
displayed the property disposed of by Cdebaca and Vogel. In his

motion for damages, Gallegos estimated that the value of the

disposed-of Broncos Towing property was $30,002.74, which he

explained was, aside from a few exceptions, “50% of the comparable

items listed for sale.” Gallegos also requested treble damages for a

total judgment against Cdebaca of $90,008.22.

¶ 18 The probate court granted Gallegos’s motion but awarded him

only $20,000 in damages for “equipment and property” that was

“the property of Bronco[]s Towing” and was “sitting in the backyard

of [d]ecedent’s property and . . . disposed of by [Cdebaca and

Vogel].”

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶ 19 Cdebaca contends that once the probate court determined that

Broncos Towing was not an estate asset, it no longer had subject

matter jurisdiction to address any disputes about the company

during the probate proceedings.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 20 “Subject matter jurisdiction is ‘a court’s power to resolve a

dispute in which it renders judgment.’” In re Estate of Murphy, 195

P.3d 1147, 1150 (Colo. App. 2008) (quoting In re J.C.T., 176 P.3d

7
726, 729 (Colo. 2007)). “A court has subject matter jurisdiction if

the case is one of the type of cases that the court has been

empowered to entertain by the sovereign from which the court

derives its authority.” Id. (quoting Levine v. Katz, 167 P.3d 141,

144 (Colo. App. 2006)). We review jurisdiction de novo and, in

doing so, consider “the nature of the party’s claim and the relief

sought.” Id.

¶ 21 The probate court’s jurisdiction is defined by the Colorado

Constitution and state statutes. Article VI, section 9(3) of the

Colorado Constitution provides that the probate court has

“exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters of probate” in the City

and County of Denver. Section 15-10-302(1)-(2), C.R.S. 2024,

states that “[t]he court has jurisdiction over all subject matter

vested by article VI of the state constitution and by articles 1 to 10

of title 13, C.R.S.,” and “[t]he court has full power to make orders,

judgments, and decrees and take all other action necessary and

proper to administer justice in the matters which come before it.”

¶ 22 Section 13-9-103, C.R.S. 2024, defines the probate court’s

jurisdiction with more specificity. The court “has original and

exclusive jurisdiction in [Denver] of . . . [t]he administration,

8
settlement, and distribution of estates of decedents, wards, and

absentees.” § 13-9-103(1)(a). The court also “has jurisdiction to

determine every legal and equitable question arising in connection

with decedents’ . . . estates, so far as the question concerns any

person who is before the court by reason of any asserted right in

any of the property of the estate.” § 13-9-103(3) (emphasis added).

¶ 23 The statutory phrase “in connection with” has been

interpreted broadly as conferring jurisdiction on the probate court

over claims “logically relating to the estate.” Murphy, 195 P.3d at

1151 (“The commonly understood meaning of ‘in connection with’

contemplates a logical and contextual relationship or association

exhibiting ‘coherence’ or ‘continuity.’ . . . In other words, it means to

‘further, advance, promote, or share a continuity of purpose.’”)

(quoting People v. Baer, 973 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Colo. 1999))).

2. Analysis

¶ 24 As an initial matter, the parties dispute preservation of this

issue. A challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, however,

may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal.

See Herr v. People, 198 P.3d 108, 111 (Colo. 2008). And in any

event, the probate court addressed this argument, thereby

9
satisfying the objective of the preservation rule. See Berra v.

Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010)

(“[T]o preserve the issue for appeal all that was needed was that the

issue be brought to the attention of the trial court and that the

court be given an opportunity to rule on it.”).

¶ 25 Turning to the merits of Cdebaca’s argument, we conclude

that Gallegos’s pursuit of damages for the disposed-of Broncos

Towing property was “logically related to the estate.” Murphy, 195

P.3d at 1150-51. The property in question was stored in the yard of

one of decedent’s houses until his death. While Cdebaca was acting

as PR for decedent’s estate, she claimed Broncos Towing was an

estate asset, and she and Vogel sold or otherwise discarded the

company’s property while cleaning out decedent’s house and

managing decedent’s affairs following his death. It was only after

the probate court ruled that Broncos Towing belonged to Gallegos

that Cdebaca and Vogel began claiming that the probate court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address that issue.

Accordingly, because Gallegos’s claims were “logically related to the

estate” and, therefore, arose “in connection with” the estate, the

probate court had jurisdiction to resolve the questions of who

10
owned Broncos Towing and what damages were owed for its missing

property pursuant to section 13-9-103(3).

C. Evidence of Ownership and Value of Property

¶ 26 Cdebaca contends that the probate court relied on

inadmissible evidence when determining how to value the Broncos

Towing property. As best we can ascertain, she argues that the

Google Earth screenshots were irrelevant and were not properly

authenticated, and that the screenshots of Kelley Blue Book and

online marketplace listings were inadmissible hearsay.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 27 We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Leaf

v. Beihoffer, 2014 COA 117, ¶ 9. A court abuses its discretion when

its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id.

“Even when a trial court may have abused its discretion in

admitting certain evidence, reversal is not required if the error was

harmless under the circumstances.” People v. Summitt, 132 P.3d

320, 327 (Colo. 2006).

¶ 28 Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

11
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

the evidence.” CRE 401.

¶ 29 “Authentication is a condition precedent to admissibility of

physical evidence that is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support

a finding that the evidence in question is what its proponent

claims.” People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16, ¶ 12 (citing CRE 901(a)).

“The burden to authenticate ‘is not high — only a prima facie

showing is required,’ and ‘a district court’s role is to serve as a

gatekeeper in assessing whether the proponent has offered a

satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably find

that the evidence is authentic.’” Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting United States v.

Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)). CRE 602 prohibits a

witness from testifying to “a matter unless evidence is introduced

sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of

the matter.” The “threshold for satisfying the personal-knowledge

requirement is not very high and may be inferable” from the “total

circumstances surrounding the matter.” Murray v. Just In Case

Bus. Lighthouse, LLC, 2016 CO 47M, ¶ 33 (citation omitted).

¶ 30 Although hearsay is not admissible, CRE 802, “[m]arket

quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published

12
compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by

persons in particular occupations” are not excluded by the hearsay

rule. CRE 803(17). This exception to the hearsay rule includes

online resources satisfying these criteria. See People v. Thornton,

251 P.3d 1147, 1149 (Colo. App. 2010) (“We hold that the Kelley

Blue Book may be admitted as proof of value under . . . CRE

803(17), without the need for expert testimony to substantiate the

Blue Book’s valuation.”).

2. Analysis

¶ 31 Cdebaca takes issue with the probate court accepting

Gallegos’s “submission of undated unauthenticated Google [E]arth

photos” as evidence of the missing Broncos Towing property.

However, the probate court does not appear to have based its

conclusions about which property was missing on these images.

Rather, it seems the court credited the list of items that Gallegos

submitted, which appears to have come from Gallegos’s personal

knowledge of the missing property as demonstrated by his August

2022 testimony in which he described his familiarity with decedent,

Broncos Towing, and the property at issue.

13
¶ 32 The nature and extent of Gallegos’s familiarity with this

property went to the weight the fact finder might give his testimony,

not to its admissibility. See Robinson v. People, 927 P.2d 381, 384

(Colo. 1996) (the witness’s degree of familiarity with the defendant

goes to the weight to be given to the witness’s identification of the

defendant, not the admissibility of such testimony). Because

neither the burden to authenticate evidence nor the threshold for

satisfying the personal-knowledge requirement are high, Glover,

¶ 13; Murray, ¶ 33, we see no error in the probate court’s decision

to credit Gallegos’s list of missing items informed by his personal

knowledge. Even if Cdebaca is correct that the probate court erred

in admitting the Google Earth screenshots because they were

irrelevant and unauthenticated, these errors were harmless and

therefore do not warrant reversal.

¶ 33 Cdebaca also sees error in the probate court’s decision to

“award[] damages of $20,000 for these alleged missing assets with

no substantiation for the costs assigned per item” and without

requiring Gallegos to “offer any expert valuation but rather submit[]

unauthenticated printouts of hearsay online information.” This

argument is likewise unavailing.

14
¶ 34 “Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other

published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the

public or by persons in particular occupations” are not excluded by

the hearsay rule. CRE 803(17). And online resources satisfying

these criteria are not excluded; specifically, “the Kelley Blue Book

may be admitted as proof of value under . . . CRE 803(17), without

the need for expert testimony to substantiate the Blue Book’s

valuation.” Thornton, 251 P.3d at 1149. The screenshots of Kelley

Blue Book and online marketplace listings that Gallegos submitted

were thus not inadmissible hearsay and did not require

substantiation via expert testimony. The probate court’s decision to

award Gallegos $20,000 of the $90,008.22 that he requested, based

in part on the Kelley Blue Book and online marketplace listings,

was not erroneous.

¶ 35 As the record exists before us, we cannot say that the probate

court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.

III. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Deed Reformation

¶ 36 Cdebaca contends that the probate court erred by granting

Gallegos’s motion to reform his July 2023 quitclaim deed because it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this question. We agree.

15
A. Additional Facts

¶ 37 In July 2023 — two months after the probate court granted

Gallegos’s motion for attorney fees and damages and one month

after it denied Cdebaca and Vogel’s motion for reconsideration —

Gallegos executed a new quitclaim deed for the Shirley property. At

that time, following the court’s rulings in the previous months,

Gallegos and Cdebaca each had a 50% interest in the Shirley

property as tenants in common. Gallegos’s new quitclaim deed

conveyed half of his interest in the property to three other sisters of

his and conveyed the remaining half of his interest to Cdebaca.

¶ 38 Two months later, Gallegos filed a motion with the probate

court seeking to reform that quitclaim deed. Gallegos explained in

his motion that he had mistakenly included Cdebaca in the

conveyance and had instead intended to transfer his entire interest

in the Shirley property to his three sisters. In November 2023, the

probate court granted Gallegos’s motion, finding that (1) the Shirley

property “is related to the [e]state of [decedent] and is statutorily

within the ambit of this [c]ourt’s jurisdiction”; and (2) “providing a

75% ownership interest in the Shirley [p]roperty to [Cdebaca] is not

16
as the [d]ecedent intended and is not as . . . Gallegos intended and

would unjustly enrich [Cdebaca].”

B. Analysis

¶ 39 As detailed above, we review subject matter jurisdiction de

novo. Murphy, 195 P.3d at 1150. The probate court “has

jurisdiction to determine every legal and equitable question arising

in connection with decedents’ . . . estates, so far as the question

concerns any person who is before the court by reason of any

asserted right in any of the property of the estate.” § 13-9-103(3).

This includes jurisdiction over claims “logically related to the

estate.” Murphy, 195 P.3d at 1151.

¶ 40 Cdebaca alleges that, when granting Gallegos’s motion, the

probate court “asserted indefinite jurisdiction” over the assets of

decedent’s estate, and “stated it retained perpetual jurisdiction to

resolve essentially any disputes regarding the Shirley . . . property.”

Cdebaca cites nothing, and we can locate nothing, in the record to

support this characterization of the probate court’s actions. That

said, we do agree that the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction

when it granted Gallegos’s motion to reform the July 2023 quitclaim

deed.

17
¶ 41 The probate court had jurisdiction to determine all legal and

equitable questions stemming from decedent’s estate and all claims

logically related to his estate. It exercised this jurisdiction when

adjudicating the competing claims to decedent’s assets between

Gallegos and Cdebaca and Vogel, culminating in the court’s May

2023 grant of Gallegos’s motion for attorney fees and damages and

its June 2023 denial of Cdebaca and Vogel’s motion for

reconsideration.

¶ 42 However, the deed reformation issue concerned Gallegos’s

decision in July 2023 — after the probate court’s resolution of the

dispute between Gallegos and Cdebaca and Vogel over decedent’s

estate — to convey his interest in the Shirley property to others. At

that time, the Shirley property was no longer part of decedent’s

estate. Unlike the Broncos Towing dispute, what Gallegos later

decided to do with the property he received from the estate did not

present a question arising in connection with the estate or a claim

logically related to the estate such that it would fall within the

probate court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

¶ 43 In other words, the question of Gallegos’s intent when

executing the July 2023 quitclaim deed did not “concern[] any

18
person who [wa]s before the court by reason of any asserted right in

any of the property of the estate.” § 13-9-103(3). Rather, Gallegos’s

motion to reform the quitclaim deed concerned an asserted right in

property that everyone agreed already belonged to him. The fact

that Gallegos received this property from the estate is immaterial.

¶ 44 Nor does it matter, as Gallegos argues on appeal, that the

initial quiet title action that Cdebaca and Vogel filed concerning the

Shirley property was transferred to the probate court to be resolved

as part of these proceedings. The quiet title action concerned

determining ownership of the Shirley property for purposes of

administering decedent’s estate, not determining ownership of that

property following a later separate conveyance by an individual who

inherited it from the estate.

¶ 45 When granting Gallegos’s motion, the probate court reasoned

that decedent never intended that Cdebaca would own a seventy-

five percent interest in the Shirley property. That may well be true,

but the probate court lost jurisdiction to effectuate decedent’s

intent over this question once it divided the ownership interest in

the Shirley property between Gallegos and Cdebaca. After that

division was complete, Gallegos was free to do as he wished with his

19
50% interest, and his actions no longer concerned decedent’s

estate.

¶ 46 In sum, because Gallegos’s request did not arise in connection

with the estate, the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

to resolve it. Accordingly, we vacate the probate court’s order

granting Gallegos’s motion to reform the July 2023 quitclaim deed.

IV. Attorney Fees

¶ 47 Cdebaca challenges the award of attorney fees3 to Gallegos,

arguing in part that the probate court abused its discretion by

granting fees for work on matters that were outside the scope of the

probate court’s fee award. Because we conclude that the probate

court erred in its approach to awarding attorney fees and that the

fee award requires greater clarification, we reverse the award of

attorney fees and remand for a hearing on their reasonableness.

3 Cdebaca also appears to take issue with the probate court’s award

of costs against her and its refusal to grant her request for her own
fees and costs, but these issues receive only cursory attention in
Cdebaca’s opening brief. Because we do not address undeveloped
arguments, we decline to consider these contentions. See
Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶
41 (“We don’t consider undeveloped and unsupported arguments.”),
aff’d, 2021 CO 56.

20
A. Additional Facts

¶ 48 When granting Gallegos’s motion for attorney fees and

damages, the probate court cited In re Estate of Lewis, 93 P.3d 605

(Colo. App. 2004), and sections 15-10-602(7)(b) and (d), C.R.S.

2024, as support for its award. Under the reasoning of Lewis and

the requirements of the statute, the court explained, Gallegos was

entitled to attorney fees because “the services provided by counsel

for . . . Gallegos have resulted in an order beneficial to the estate, as

[the] representation prevented the unjust attempts by . . . [Cdebaca]

and . . . Vogel to deprive . . . Gallegos of property which the

[d]ecedent intended for him, to include real property and property of

the [d]ecedent’s business, known as Bronco[]s Towing.”

¶ 49 The probate court also awarded attorney fees under section

13-17-102, C.R.S. 2024, finding that “[Cdebaca] individually and in

her capacity as PR for the estate and . . . Vogel made claims and

brought litigation against . . . Gallegos which did not have

substantial justification.”

¶ 50 The probate court awarded Gallegos $54,320 in attorney fees.

In doing so, it credited an affidavit from Gallegos’s counsel

explaining that the dollar amount comprised Gallegos’s legal fees

21
minus, among other things, “all fees associated with the dispute

over ownership of Broncos Towing.”

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 51 We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs for

an abuse of discretion. Accetta v. Brooks Towers Residences Condo.

Ass’n, 2021 COA 147M-2, ¶ 43. A trial court abuses its discretion

when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or

based on a misapplication or misunderstanding of the law. Credit

Serv. Co. v. Skivington, 2020 COA 60M, ¶ 17.

¶ 52 It is also an abuse of discretion when a trial court awards

attorney fees without holding a requested evidentiary hearing.

Shyanne Props., LLC v. Torp, 210 P.3d 490, 493 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶ 53 An award of attorney fees must contain sufficient findings of

fact to allow meaningful appellate review. Yaekle v. Andrews, 169

P.3d 196, 201 (Colo. App. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 195 P.3d

1101 (Colo. 2008); see also C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-22(2)(c).

C. Analysis

¶ 54 Cdebaca contends that while the probate court purportedly

“limited the award of attorney[] fees to those associated with the

quiet title dispute,” it nonetheless granted all of the fees listed in

22
Gallegos’s attorney’s affidavit. This was error, she asserts, because

some of the billing entries on that affidavit “include[d] fees for

activities that can be easily correlated to . . . activities [other than

the quiet title dispute], such as the Bronco[]s Towing hearing in

August 2022.” Cdebaca identified this apparent discrepancy in the

probate court, arguing that supporting documentation that

Gallegos’s attorney submitted did not provide sufficient detail to

assess the affidavit’s accuracy, and expressly requested “a hearing

to address the reasonableness of the costs claimed and their

relationship to the issues litigated.”

¶ 55 The probate court never held the requested hearing. Instead,

it issued an order crediting the affidavit and granting all of the

requested attorney fees. Because due process requires that a court

hold a hearing when requested to determine the reasonableness

and necessity of attorney fees, Roberts v. Adams, 47 P.3d 690, 700

(Colo. App. 2001), the court abused its discretion by not holding the

hearing that Cdebaca requested in response to Gallegos’s attorney’s

affidavit.

¶ 56 Regarding the merits of Cdebaca’s contention that the probate

court incorrectly awarded fees beyond the scope of the quiet title

23
action, we lack sufficient information on appeal to assess this

argument. When the probate court awarded fees, it emphasized

Cdebaca and Vogel’s attempts to deprive Gallegos of property that

decedent intended for him, specifically mentioning “real property

and property of the [d]ecedent’s business, known as Bronco[]s

Towing.” However, the probate court’s later explanation for the fee

amount stated that Gallegos’s attorney’s affidavit “did not include

charges related to the dispute over Bronco[]s Towing.” Yet that does

not precisely reflect the affidavit’s language; rather, the affidavit

stated that Gallegos’s attorney had “removed from the billing all fees

associated with the dispute over ownership of Broncos Towing.”

(Emphasis added.) The affidavit was silent as to whether the

requested fees included work associated with any other disputes

about Broncos Towing, such as the disposed-of property for which

Gallegos received damages. And as Cdebaca points out below and

on appeal, the invoices that Gallegos’s attorney submitted appear to

reflect at least some work associated with Broncos Towing disputes.

¶ 57 The record on appeal leaves us uncertain about which specific

work the probate court’s fee award encompassed and whether the

fees requested by Gallegos’s attorney stayed within those bounds.

24
Accordingly, we reverse the award of attorney fees and remand for a

hearing on their reasonableness.

¶ 58 Due to our reversal of the attorney fee award and the mixed

disposition of this opinion, we decline to award Gallegos the fees

and costs that he requests for defending this appeal.

V. Cdebaca’s Liability

¶ 59 Finally, Cdebaca contends that the probate court reversibly

erred by assessing damages, fees, and costs against her in her

individual capacity as heir and beneficiary of decedent’s estate

when it assigned joint and several liability to Cdebaca and Vogel

and decedent’s estate. We discern no error.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 60 As noted above, we review a trial court’s award of attorney fees

and costs for an abuse of discretion. Accetta, ¶ 43. A trial court’s

decision to allocate costs between parties or to impose joint and

several liability lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Schuessler v. Wolter, 2012 COA 86, ¶ 89.

¶ 61 Section 15-12-808(2), C.R.S. 2024, states that “[a] personal

representative is individually liable for obligations arising from

ownership or control of the estate or for torts committed in the

25
course of administration of the estate only if he is personally at

fault.”

B. Analysis

¶ 62 Cdebaca asserts on appeal that she should not be held

individually liable for damages, costs, or fees because the probate

court “documented no findings of fact or conclusions of law” to

support such an award against her as an individual. As support for

this contention, Cdebaca simply cites the limiting language of

section 15-12-808(2) and asserts that the probate court “baldly”

found her individually liable.

¶ 63 However, as Gallegos points out, in its order granting

Gallegos’s motion for attorney fees and damages the probate court

explicitly found Cdebaca liable as an individual and explained the

basis of that finding. The order stated that “[t]he [c]ourt finds from

the evidence adduced at trial that [Cdebaca] both individually and

as PR . . . did attempt to deprive . . . Gallegos of the property given

to him by . . . [d]ecedent.” The probate court described how

Cdebaca took and disposed of property belonging to Broncos Towing

that sat in the backyard of a house belonging to decedent. The

order also explained that “[t]he [c]ourt finds that [Cdebaca]

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individually and in her capacity as PR for the estate . . . made

claims and brought litigation against . . . Gallegos which did not

have substantial justification.”

¶ 64 This record contradicts Cdebaca’s claim on appeal that the

probate court “documented no findings of fact or conclusions of law

to support” imposing individual liability against her. We therefore

conclude that the probate court did not abuse its discretion by

awarding fees against Cdebaca personally.

VI. Disposition

¶ 65 We affirm the probate court’s resolution of the dispute

surrounding Broncos Towing as well as its imposition of individual

liability against Cdebaca. However, we vacate the probate court’s

order granting Gallegos’s motion to reform his July 2023 quitclaim

deed. We also reverse the award of attorney fees and remand the

case with directions to the probate court to hold a hearing on the

reasonableness of those fees.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE LUM concur.

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