Singh v. ICAO

24CA0861 Singh v ICAO 12-19-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0861
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
WC No. 5-101-459-010

Amritpal Singh,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado; MKBS, LLC, d/b/a/
Metro Taxi; and Pinnacol Assurance,

Respondents.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Tow and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 19, 2024

Amritpal Singh, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office

Harvey D. Flewelling, Denver, Colorado, for Respondents MKBS, LLC d/b/a/
Metro Taxi and Pinnacol Assurance
¶1 In this workers’ compensation action, claimant, Amritpal

Singh, seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals

Office (Panel) affirming the decision of an administrative law judge

(ALJ) denying his request to reopen his claim. We affirm the Panel’s

order.

I. Background

¶2 Because a division of this court already thoroughly reviewed

and set forth the history of this case in a prior opinion, Singh v.

Indus. Claim Appeals Off., slip op. at 1-14 (Colo. App. No.

21CA0933, June 30, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R.

35(e)), we repeat only the facts and procedural history relevant to

Singh’s current appeal.

¶3 In March 2019, Singh was working as a taxi driver for MKBS

LLC, doing business as Metro Taxi (we refer to Metro Taxi and its

insurer, Pinnacol Assurance, together as “employer”), when he

suffered an admitted work injury in a car accident. After the

accident, an emergency room physician diagnosed him with neck

muscle strain but observed no other signs of serious injury. Singh

received treatment for his injury and temporary total disability

(TTD) benefits until June 25, 2019, when his authorized treating

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physician (ATP) released him to return to work with no restrictions.

In October 2019, his ATP concluded that he had reached maximum

medical improvement (MMI).

¶4 Singh filed an application for hearing (AFH) on the issue of

continued TTD benefits. In November 2019, an ALJ entered an

order finding that once the ATP released Singh to full work duty, his

TTD benefits ceased under section 8-42-105(3)(c), C.R.S. 2024

(providing that TTD benefits continue until an ATP releases an

employee to return to regular employment). The ALJ therefore

denied and dismissed all TTD benefits after June 25, 2019. Singh

continued to receive both medical and psychiatric treatment for

several months, with his ATP reporting that Singh had “subjective

complaints that outweighed the objective findings.”

¶5 In March 2020, Singh underwent a division-sponsored

independent medical exam (DIME). Reviewing Singh’s medical

history, the DIME physician learned that Singh also had at least

four other car accidents reported in his medical records, including a

high-speed, head-on collision in 2007 for which Singh received

extensive treatment. The DIME physician observed that many of

the physical conditions Singh described after the 2019 injury were

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pre-existing. But she concluded that his condition from the prior

accidents had resolved before the 2019 accident. Although the

DIME physician determined that Singh only suffered a neck strain

in the latest accident, she assigned him a 12% permanent physical

impairment rating in addition to a 5% mental impairment rating.

The employer applied for a hearing to challenge the DIME’s

impairment findings.

¶6 On December 8, 2020, an ALJ concluded that the employer

overcame the DIME opinion and that Singh sustained no physical

or medical permanent impairment from the 2019 accident. In June

2021, the Panel affirmed that order, and Singh appealed to this

court. A division of this court affirmed the Panel’s order in an

unpublished opinion on June 30, 2022. Singh then filed a petition

for writ of certiorari to the Colorado Supreme Court, which was

denied.

¶7 On March 15, 2023, Singh filed an AFH to address multiple

issues including medical and TTD benefits, as well as impairment

and permanent disability. The employer moved to strike the

hearing because the issues were closed as a matter of law. On April

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11, an ALJ issued an order eliminating all issues except

disfigurement and penalties.

¶8 A hearing was held on July 18, 2023. The ALJ determined

that Singh failed to identify any penalty or disfigurement. Singh did

not appeal that order, but filed another AFH reasserting the

previous issues and adding “petition to reopen” as an issue for

hearing. After a November 2023 hearing on the issue of reopening,

at which Singh testified, an ALJ determined that Singh failed to

prove an error, mistake, or change of condition that would warrant

reopening his claim. Therefore, the ALJ denied and dismissed

Singh’s petition to reopen. Singh appealed the order to the Panel,

which affirmed. Singh now appeals the Panel’s order.

II. Discussion

A. Issues on Appeal

¶9 In Singh’s opening brief, he expresses dissatisfaction with the

overall conclusion that he is not permanently disabled. He asserts

he is badly injured, both mentally and physically, and should

receive benefits for life. In its answer brief, employer describes the

sole issue on appeal as “whether substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s findings that Singh is not entitled to reopen his claim.” In

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Singh’s lengthy reply brief, he attempts to explain his medical

history and disagreements with prior administrative and judicial

decisions addressing his various claims.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 10 As relevant here, we may only set aside the Panel’s order if

“the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence” or the

“denial of benefits is not supported by applicable law.” § 8-43-308,

C.R.S. 2024.

III. Analysis

¶ 11 At the outset, we note that many of the issues Singh asserts in

this appeal are duplicative of ones he made to the prior division that

entered the 2022 opinion. To the extent that division has already

rejected those arguments, we consider those issues to be the law of

the case. See Youngs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2012 COA 85M,

¶ 49 (“Once an issue has been raised and decided, it becomes the

law of the case.”).

¶ 12 For example, the prior division already concluded that

substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that the

DIME’s permanent impairment finding was overcome and that

Singh was not permanently disabled. The division also addressed

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Singh’s contentions that he could not work, and held that his

allegations lacked record support and were belied by his medical

records. The division considered Singh’s argument that he was not

at MMI, determining that substantial record evidence established

that he reached MMI by October 2019. Because he was returned to

full work duty in June 2019, his TTD benefits ceased as of that date

by operation of statute. Finally, the division held that Singh was

not entitled to maintenance medical benefits because he had not

shown that any post-MMI treatment was reasonably necessary to

relieve him from the effects of the 2019 accident. We perceive no

reason to revisit those issues. Young, ¶ 49.

¶ 13 The only new issue presented in this appeal is whether the

ALJ or Panel erred by denying and dismissing Singh’s petition to

reopen his worker’s compensation claim.

¶ 14 At any time within six years of the date of injury, an ALJ may

reopen an award on the grounds of fraud, overpayment, error,

mistake, or change in condition. § 8-43-303(1) C.R.S. 2024.

Reopening is appropriate if the claimant proves that additional

medical treatment or disability benefits are warranted. Richards v.

Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 996 P.2d 756, 758 (Colo. App. 2000).

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The determination of whether a claimant has sustained his burden

of proof to reopen a claim is left to the sound discretion of the ALJ.

Berg v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 128 P.3d 270, 272 (Colo. App.

2005). An ALJ’s decision to grant or deny a petition to reopen may

therefore “be reversed only for fraud or clear abuse of discretion.”

Wilson v. Jim Snyder Drilling, 747 P.2d 647, 651 (Colo. 1987).

¶ 15 Singh did not provide a transcript of the November 2023

hearing. Accordingly, we must assume that the ALJ’s factual

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.1 Nova

v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 754 P2d 800, 801 (Colo. App. 1988).

¶ 16 The reopening authority granted ALJs by section 8-43-303 “is

permissive, and whether to reopen a prior award when the statutory

criteria have been met is left to the sound discretion of the

ALJ.” Cordova v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 55 P.3d 186, 189 (Colo.

App. 2002). The party seeking reopening bears “the burden of proof

as to any issues sought to be reopened.” § 8-43-303(4). In the

1 We also note that the ALJ’s lengthy and detailed order points to

several comprehensive reports that he credited, which illustrate
there is evidence in the record to support his findings. § 8-43-308,
C.R.S. 2024; Paint Connection Plus v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 240
P.3d 429, 431 (Colo. App. 2010) (“When an ALJ's findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by them.”).

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absence of fraud or clear abuse of discretion, the ALJ’s decision

concerning reopening is binding on appeal. Jarosinski v. Indus.

Claim Appeals Off., 62 P.3d 1082, 1084 (Colo. App. 2002). An

abuse of discretion occurs when the ALJ’s order is beyond the

bounds of reason, as where it is unsupported by the evidence or

contrary to law. Id.

¶ 17 In Singh’s appeal to this court, he makes numerous

arguments that were previously made and rejected, including that

he is permanently disabled and cannot work. For instance, he

asserts he has a “very strong claim” that the ALJ ignored evidence

that he had a brain injury. He takes issue with the ALJ’s

determination that the 2019 accident was a “low speed collision”

and that his injuries have resolved. None of these arguments

explain why his case should be reopened based on the limited

statutory grounds available for reopening a case. Rather, Singh is

merely attempting to relitigate issues that have already been fully

and finally resolved.

¶ 18 Singh’s remaining arguments in this appeal, (for instance, that

he should be awarded benefits for life or that prior decisions were

tainted by fraud) are conclusory, and we decline to address them.

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See Sanchez v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 COA 71, ¶ 62

(declining to address the claimant’s argument because he offered

nothing more than one or two conclusory sentences, with no

citations to legal authority in support of the argument); Castillo v.

Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 291 (Colo. App. 2006) (a party who

does not refer to evidence or authority in support of an argument

does not present a cogent argument for review).

IV. Disposition

¶ 19 The Panel’s order is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

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