People v. Alexander Ryan Fregosi

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
January 18, 2024

2024COA6

No. 21CA0116, People v. Fregosi — Criminal Law — Sentencing
— Restitution — Procedural Deadlines — “Good Cause” to
Extend Trial Court’s Deadline — Actual Costs of Specific Future
Treatment

A division of the court of appeals clarifies the relationship

between sections 18-1.3-603 (1)(b) and (1)(c) following People v.

Weeks, 2021 CO 75 and holds that a district court that defers a

restitution determination for ninety-one days under subsection

(1)(b) may further extend that deadline under subsection (1)(c) when

a victim incurs ongoing therapy expenses. The division also

concludes that sufficient evidence supports the district court’s

decision not to review in camera or to disclose the Crime Victim

Compensation Board records.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2024COA6

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0116
Weld County District Court No. 19CR2209
Honorable Marcelo A. Kopcow, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Alexander Ryan Fregosi,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Yun and Kuhn, JJ., concur

Prior Opinion Announced November 30, 2023, WITHDRAWN

OPINION PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED AS “NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO
C.A.R. 35(e)” ON November 30, 2023, IS NOW DESIGNATED FOR
PUBLICATION

Announced January 18, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mackenzie R. Shields, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Alexander Ryan Fregosi, appeals the district

court’s restitution order. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Fregosi pleaded guilty to menacing as an act of domestic

violence, a class 5 felony, in exchange for the dismissal of two other

counts. As part of his plea agreement, he acknowledged that “[t]he

People reserve[d] restitution” and that he “stipulate[d] to [a] factual

basis.”

¶3 The court accepted the plea agreement and confirmed that

Fregosi understood its terms. The court found Fregosi’s plea was

knowing, intelligent, and entered without undue influence or

coercion. The court then set the matter for a sentencing hearing.

¶4 The court sentenced Fregosi to three years in the custody of

the Department of Corrections. During the hearing, the prosecutor

asked for ninety-one days to seek restitution. The court asked

defense counsel if he had any objection, and counsel responded,

“No, Judge.” The court granted the prosecutor’s request.

¶5 Fifty-one days later, the prosecutor requested $873.10 in

restitution for the victim’s medical and therapy costs accrued to

date. Additionally, the prosecutor said he believed further

1
restitution would be forthcoming and asked the court to reserve

future restitution under section 18-1.3-603(1)(c), C.R.S. 2023, to

account for the victim’s future treatment costs.

¶6 The court gave Fregosi twenty-one days to object to the

motion. Fregosi did not object or otherwise respond to the motion.

Therefore, on May 28, 2020 (seventy-three days after sentencing),

the court ordered Fregosi to pay $873.10 in restitution to the Crime

Victim Compensation Board (CVCB). The order further stated,

“Pursuant to C.R.S. § 18-1.3-603, in addition to the specific amount

of restitution listed in this order, the defendant shall be required to

pay the actual costs of specific future treatment of any victim of the

crime, if applicable.”

¶7 Subsequently, the prosecution filed thirteen amended

restitution requests seeking compensation for the victim’s ongoing

therapy costs. Fregosi objected to the amended requests. Among

other things, he objected to the court entering any orders beyond

the ninety-one-day deadline without making express and timely

good cause findings.

¶8 The court granted all the amended requests. In each of its

orders, the court indicated that, under section 18-1.3-603, it

2
reserved final determination of restitution to account for the costs of

the victim’s ongoing treatment. And at each hearing, the court

reiterated its intent to reserve the final restitution determination

under section 18-1.3-603.

¶9 At a December 2021 restitution hearing, the CVCB coordinator

reported that the victim had reached the limit of therapy sessions

covered by the CVCB. The court then entered a final restitution

order in the amount of $4,473.10.1

II. Restitution

¶ 10 Fregosi contends that the district court lacked the authority to

grant the prosecutor’s requested amount of restitution seventy-

three days after sentencing because (1) the prosecutor failed to file

the information necessary to support restitution before the

judgment of conviction entered, as required by section 18-1.3-

603(2); and (2) the court failed to enter a specific order at

1 Before the final restitution hearing, the prosecutor filed a motion

to clarify the total restitution amount due to a calculation error.
The motion sought to correct the final restitution amount to a total
of $4,923.10. After the hearing, the prosecutor filed a second
motion asking to correct another error. This correction brought the
total to $4,473.10, which is the final restitution amount the court
entered.

3
sentencing under section 18-1.3-603(1). We address and reject

both contentions.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 Questions of statutory interpretation and whether a district

court has authority to order a defendant to pay restitution are legal

questions that we review de novo. People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75,

¶ 24; People v. Roddy, 2021 CO 74, ¶ 23.

¶ 12 The restitution statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(1) Every order of conviction of a felony . . .
shall include consideration of restitution.
Each such order shall include one or more of
the following:

(a) An order of a specific amount of restitution
be paid by the defendant;

(b) An order that the defendant is obligated to
pay restitution, but that the specific amount of
restitution shall be determined within the
ninety-one days immediately following the
order of conviction, unless good cause is
shown for extending the time period by which
the restitution amount shall be determined;

(c) An order, in addition to or in place of a
specific amount of restitution, that the
defendant pay restitution covering the actual
costs of specific future treatment of any victim
of the crime; or

(d) Contain a specific finding that no victim of
the crime suffered a pecuniary loss and

4
therefore no order for the payment of
restitution is being entered.

(2)(a) The court shall base its order for
restitution upon information presented to the
court by the prosecuting attorney, who shall
compile such information through victim
impact statements or other means to
determine the amount of restitution and the
identities of the victims. Further, the
prosecuting attorney shall present this
information to the court prior to the order of
conviction or within ninety-one days, if it is not
available prior to the order of conviction. The
court may extend this date if it finds that there
are extenuating circumstances affecting the
prosecuting attorney’s ability to determine
restitution.

....

(3) Any order for restitution may be:

(a) Increased if additional victims or additional
losses not known to the judge or the
prosecutor at the time the order of restitution
was entered are later discovered and the final
amount of restitution due has not been set by
the court . . . .

§ 18-1.3-603.

¶ 13 Every judgment of conviction must include one or more of the

four types of restitution orders outlined in section 18-1.3-603(1).

Weeks, ¶ 3. Section 18-1.3-603(1) does not permit the district

court “to address the issue of restitution in a judgment of conviction

5
by entering an order deferring that issue in its entirety.” Id. at ¶ 30.

Nor does it allow the prosecution “to ask that the issue of

restitution (not just the amount of restitution) ‘remain open’ for any

period of time after the judgment of conviction enters.” Id.

¶ 14 Further, under section 18-1.3-603(2), the prosecutor must

move for restitution before or during the sentencing hearing and

present the information supporting a proposed amount of

restitution before the judgment of conviction is entered, if it is then

available. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. If that information is not available, the

prosecution may submit it no later than ninety-one days after the

judgment of conviction enters. Id. And the district court may

extend this ninety-one-day deadline if — before the deadline

expires — it expressly finds extenuating circumstances affecting the

prosecution’s ability to determine restitution. Id. at ¶ 40.

¶ 15 Any failure to comply with these provisions bars the district

court from awarding restitution. Id. at ¶ 45.

B. Initial Restitution Request

¶ 16 Fregosi maintains that the district court lacked the authority

to grant the ninety-one-day extension because the prosecution had

access to, but failed to present, information supporting its initial

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restitution request at the time of sentencing. We disagree and

conclude that he waived the issue. We further conclude that even if

he did not waive the issue, the record shows that the restitution

information was not available at the time of sentencing.

1. Waiver

¶ 17 Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or

privilege. People v. Roberson, 2023 COA 70, ¶ 24. Although a

waiver can be implied, the conduct must be unequivocal and clearly

manifest an intent to relinquish the claim. Phillips v. People, 2019

CO 72, ¶ 21. The mere failure to raise an issue does not suffice. Id.

We indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Id. In

“[a]nswering a question not addressed by the Colorado Supreme

Court in [Weeks],” a division of this court recently held that a

district court’s ninety-one-day deadline for entry of restitution

under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) is not jurisdictional and is therefore

waivable. People v. Babcock, 2023 COA 49, ¶¶ 1, 5-11.

¶ 18 We find People v. Johnson, 2023 COA 43M, instructive

concerning waiver. There, the division determined that, under

Weeks, a plea agreement provision giving the prosecutor additional

time to submit restitution information serves “as both a motion for

7
restitution and the parties’ acknowledgment that restitution

information was not available before the conviction.” Johnson,

¶ 24. When the prosecution subsequently files its restitution

motion within ninety-one days, the prosecution has “met its

obligation under subsection (2)” of section 18-1.3-603. Id.

¶ 19 Here, as in Johnson, Fregosi agreed to pay restitution, and

“[t]he People reserve[]d restitution” in the plea agreement. Id. at ¶

6; see also id. at ¶¶ 35-39 (Welling, J., specially concurring)

(concluding that the defendant, by the terms of his plea agreement,

waived any challenge to the prosecution’s deadline in section 18-

1.3-603(2) to provide restitution information to the court before

judgment of conviction enters). Thus, simply by the terms of the

plea agreement, Fregosi waived this issue.

¶ 20 But even if we look beyond the terms of the plea agreement,

the record shows that Fregosi clearly and unequivocally waived this

argument when defense counsel stated at sentencing that he had

no objection to the prosecution’s request for a ninety-one-day

extension. Phillips, ¶ 21.

¶ 21 Accordingly, Fregosi’s challenge to the timeliness of the

prosecution’s requested restitution amount fails.

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2. Restitution Information Was Not Available at Sentencing

¶ 22 Even assuming Fregosi had not waived this issue, we conclude

that the record shows the restitution information was not available

to the prosecution at the time of sentencing.

¶ 23 Fregosi argues that the dates of the service provider’s bills

were the dates that the prosecution should have had the

information to request restitution. But that is not how CVCB

claims are processed. Indeed, as the CVCB coordinator testified,

the CVCB negotiates medical and mental health bills with each

service provider. Thus, the amount the CVCB ultimately pays is

different from the service provider’s original bill.

¶ 24 Here, the record shows that disbursements for the victim’s

mental health therapy were not approved until April 2020 — one

month after sentencing. The record further shows that the victim’s

medical bills were still being processed by the CVCB in early May

2020 — two months after sentencing.

¶ 25 Accordingly, because the prosecution did not have the

information, it had ninety-one days to present that information.

See § 18-1.3-603(2)(a).

9
C. Subsequent Restitution Orders

¶ 26 We next consider and reject Fregosi’s contention that the

district court erred by granting the amended restitution requests

because it did not make the express good cause findings necessary

to extend the ninety-one-day deadline. We disagree for three

reasons.

¶ 27 First, no provision in the restitution statute precludes a court

that deferred its restitution determination under subsection (1)(b)

from later finding good cause (under subsection (1)(b)) and

extenuating circumstances (under subsection (2)(a)) to further

extend the statutory deadline under subsection (1)(c) within the

initial ninety-one-day period. Fregosi’s assertion that the court’s

subsection (1)(c) order could only be given effect if it were entered at

sentencing contradicts subsection (1)(c)’s purpose of accounting for

unknown costs to be ascertained during the initial period.

¶ 28 Second, neither Weeks nor Meza v. People, 2018 CO 23,

demands a contrary conclusion. Indeed, in its discussion of

compensation for ongoing treatment under section 18-1.3-603(3)(a),

the Weeks court observed that when a court enters a subsection

(1)(b) order requiring a partial amount of restitution but defers the

10
final amount of restitution and later invokes subsection (3)(a) to

increase the amount of restitution, the court — though still bound

to determine the final amount of restitution within ninety-one days

of the judgment of conviction — may, alternatively, make its

determination “within whatever expanded time period the court has

established upon a finding of good cause.” Weeks, ¶ 36; see also

Meza, ¶ 14 (“While perhaps less express, paragraph (b), permitting

an order that the defendant is obligated to pay restitution but that

the specific amount of that restitution is to be determined later,

contains nothing actually precluding the court from making

findings at sentencing with regard to particular victims or losses of

which the prosecution is aware, while reserving until a later date,

within ninety-one days, findings with regard to other victims or

losses of which the prosecution is not yet aware.”).

¶ 29 Finally, the record shows that the court complied with the

requirements of section 18-1.3-603(1). During sentencing, the

prosecution requested, and the district court granted, a ninety-one-

day period to determine restitution under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b).

Before the expiration of the ninety-one-day deadline, the court

entered an order under section 18-1.3-603(1)(c), reserving the issue

11
of future restitution costs to account for the victim’s ongoing

therapy treatment. The record further shows that the court

reiterated its section 18-1.3-603(1)(c) order each time it granted the

prosecution’s amended restitution requests. Moreover, at each

hearing, the court expressly indicated its intent to find good cause

to reserve the final determination of restitution based on the

victim’s ongoing treatment. For example, at the third restitution

hearing, defense counsel asked the court to clarify its restitution

order. The court responded,

[T]he victim has received future counseling
expenses and if there’s a need for her to get
additional counseling expenses for mental
health or otherwise than that’s good cause for
the court to consider restitution in the future
based on this — assault that she suffered
where there was physical and now mental
health treatment necessary.

Thus, the court expressly stated that its orders finding that the

victim had incurred future therapy expenses constituted good cause

for extending the final determination of restitution beyond the

statutory deadline.

¶ 30 Based on this record, we conclude that the court’s express

finding that the victim incurred ongoing treatment costs and

12
requiring Fregosi to pay those costs, constituted a valid restitution

order under section 18-1.3-603(1)(c). See Weeks, ¶ 7 n.4 (noting

that, under the restitution statute, “talismanic incantations” are not

necessary, and “substance controls over form”).

¶ 31 Because the court made a good cause finding in an order

entered before the ninety-one-day deadline expired and that order

was reiterated in each restitution order thereafter, we conclude that

the court had the authority to extend the ninety-one-day deadline

based on future losses accounted for in the subsequent restitution

orders.

III. Disclosure of CVCB Records

¶ 32 Fregosi raises two challenges regarding disclosure of the CVCB

records. He first contends that the prosecution failed to establish

that the amounts paid by the CVCB were the direct result of his

criminal conduct. Second, he contends that the district court erred

by declining to conduct an in camera review of the CVCB records.

We reject both contentions.

13
A. Additional Facts

¶ 33 The prosecutor’s amended restitution requests included CVCB

summaries of the victim’s ongoing therapy costs. The summaries

excluded the identity of the victim’s treatment provider.

¶ 34 In his objections to the amended restitution requests, Fregosi

argued that the prosecution had not proved that his conduct was

the proximate cause of the victim’s loss. Specifically, he asserted

that he needed the CVCB summaries to include the identity of the

victim’s treatment providers and requested an in camera review of

the CVCB records.

¶ 35 The court denied Fregosi’s requests in a written order. The

court explained that Fregosi’s purported evidentiary hypothesis for

needing the CVCB records was speculative and did not warrant an

in camera review. The court further found that releasing the

records would pose a threat to the victim’s welfare.

¶ 36 Fregosi reasserted these arguments at subsequent restitution

proceedings. In response, the prosecutor elicited testimony from

the CVCB coordinator who explained the CVCB’s policy of excluding

the identity of the victim’s treatment provider in cases involving

domestic violence. The CVCB coordinator also testified concerning

14
the application process for mental health reimbursement and the

limitations on such requests and confirmed that these standards

were followed in this case.

¶ 37 The court repeatedly found no error in the nondisclosure of

the CVCB records based on its continued finding that disclosure

would pose a risk to the victim’s welfare.

B. Sufficiency

¶ 38 Framed as a sufficiency issue, Fregosi contends that the

prosecution failed to establish that the amounts paid by the CVCB

were the direct result of his criminal conduct because it relied

exclusively on the CVCB payment summaries that did not include

the identity of the victim’s treatment provider or otherwise establish

that including that information would pose a threat to the safety or

welfare of the victim. We are not persuaded.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 39 Generally, we review a trial court’s restitution award for an

abuse of discretion. People v. Gregory, 2019 COA 184, ¶ 21. A trial

court abuses its discretion when it misconstrues or misapplies the

law, or when its decision fixing the amount of restitution is not

supported by the record. Id.

15
¶ 40 But in a sufficiency challenge, we review the record de novo to

determine whether the evidence was sufficient in both quantity and

quality to support a restitution award. People v. Barbre, 2018 COA

123, ¶ 25; Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2005). We

evaluate “whether the evidence, both direct and circumstantial,

when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that

the defendant caused that amount of loss.” Barbre, ¶ 25.

¶ 41 Convicted offenders must “make full restitution to those

harmed by their misconduct.” § 18-1.3-601(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023.

Restitution “means any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim . . .

proximately caused by an offender’s conduct . . . that can be

reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.” § 18-1.3-

602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2023.

¶ 42 “Proximate cause in the context of restitution is defined as a

cause which in natural and probable sequence produced the

claimed injury and without which the claimed injury would not

have been sustained.” People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272, 1274 (Colo.

App. 2010).

16
¶ 43 Crime victims and their relatives may seek compensation from

the CVCB for losses caused by criminal conduct. §§ 24-4.1-102(1),

-108, -109(1), C.R.S. 2023. When a CVCB pays a victim

compensation claim, it is a “[v]ictim” for purposes of the restitution

statute. § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(IV). Therefore, “[i]f a CVCB awards

compensation to a victim or other qualifying person, the CVCB is

eligible to seek and obtain restitution from a defendant in [a]

criminal proceeding.” People v. Martinez-Chavez, 2020 COA 39, ¶

13.

¶ 44 The prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the

victim’s loss and the amount of that loss. People v. Henry, 2018

COA 48M, ¶ 15. For CVCB claims, however, the restitution statute

creates a rebuttable presumption that “the amount of assistance

provided and requested by the [CVCB] is presumed to be a direct

result of the defendant’s criminal conduct and must be considered

by the court in determining the amount of restitution ordered.”

§ 18-1.3-603(10)(a); see Martinez-Chavez, ¶ 20. The rebuttable

presumption shifts the burden to the defendant to present evidence

to show that the amount paid was not the direct result of their

17
criminal conduct. Henry, ¶ 19. “[I]f that burden is not met, [the

presumption] establishes the presumed facts as a matter of law.”

Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting Krueger v. Ary, 205 P.3d 1150, 1154 (Colo.

2009)). To trigger the rebuttable presumption, however, the

prosecution must establish the amount of assistance provided.

Martinez-Chavez, ¶ 20.

¶ 45 The restitution statute prescribes two ways of establishing this

amount: (1) “[a] list of the amount of money paid to each provider”;

or (2) “[i]f the identity or location of a provider would pose a threat

to the safety or welfare of the victim, summary data reflecting what

total payments were made for.” § 18-1.3-603(10)(b)(I)-(II).

2. Analysis

¶ 46 We reject Fregosi’s sufficiency challenge for three reasons.

First, the record supports the court’s determination that disclosing

the identity of the victim’s treatment provider would pose a risk to

the victim. The victim expressed concern that disclosing additional

information about her treatment providers would revictimize her

and “bring[] up a lot of extra trauma for her.” Additionally, the

CVCB coordinator explained that, in the context of domestic

violence cases, releasing this type of information can implicate

18
patient safety and welfare because doing so allows the offender to

“basically look up that provider and know where [the victim] [is]

going to be on that day and time.”

¶ 47 Second, the record shows that the prosecution did not rely

solely on the CVCB summaries. The prosecution presented

testimony from the CVCB coordinator who explained how the CVCB

processes claims and how this case met the statutory requirements.

Additionally, the court also took judicial notice of the pre-sentence

investigation report, the Crim. P. 11 paperwork, and Fregosi’s arrest

affidavit.

¶ 48 Finally, Fregosi offered no evidence to rebut the statutory

presumption of causation, such as evidence of an alternate reason

for the victim’s ongoing therapy.

¶ 49 Accordingly, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the

court’s findings and affirm the order.

C. In Camera Review and Disclosure

¶ 50 Fregosi last contends that the district court erred in declining

to conduct an in camera review of the CVCB records. We disagree.

19
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 51 A trial court’s refusal to conduct an in camera review is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Blackmon, 20 P.3d

1215, 1220 (Colo. App. 2000).

¶ 52 The restitution statute’s definition of “[v]ictim” includes any

CVCB that has compensated a victim. § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(IV). “[T]he

amount of assistance provided and requested by the crime victim

compensation board is presumed to be a direct result of the

defendant’s criminal conduct.” § 18-1.3-603(10)(a). Moreover, the

CVCB’s records relating to the claimed amount of restitution are

confidential. § 24-4.1-107.5(2), C.R.S. 2023. Consequently, “a

defendant generally cannot obtain access to them.” Henry, ¶ 28.

¶ 53 “But in restitution proceedings, section 24-4.1-107.5(3)

creates a two-step process through which a defendant can obtain

information in CVCB records.” People v. Hernandez, 2019 COA

111, ¶ 17.

¶ 54 First, the defendant may ask the court to conduct an in

camera review if the request “is not speculative and is based on an

evidentiary hypothesis that warrants an in camera review” to rebut

20
the presumption established in section 18-1.3-603(10)(a). Id.

(quoting § 24-4.1-107.5(3)).

¶ 55 Second, after conducting an in camera review, the court may

release additional information contained in the records only if it

finds that the information “[i]s necessary for the defendant to

dispute the amount claimed for restitution” and “[w]ill not pose any

threat to the safety or welfare of the victim, or any other person

whose identity may appear in the board’s records, or violate any

other privilege or confidentiality right.” § 24-4.1-107.5(3)(a)-(b).

2. Analysis

¶ 56 Here, Fregosi presented no evidence or information that the

victim received medical or mental health treatment unrelated to the

conduct for which he was convicted. Fregosi’s only evidentiary

hypothesis was that he needed the CVCB records

to investigate and potentially litigate (a)
whether the costs-as-alleged are primarily
based upon outpatient mental-health services;
(b) whether the costs were in-fact “proximately
caused” by [Fregosi’s] conduct, or rather are
related in whole (or in part) to something
besides [Fregosi’s] conduct; or (c) whether the
costs were something for which [the victim]
was eligible to have insurance cover (in whole,
or in part) etc.

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Essentially, Fregosi alleged nothing more than that he needed or

wanted additional information. If a litigant fails to show “a specific

factual basis demonstrating a reasonable likelihood” that the

discovery will yield material evidence, the request for in camera

review is properly denied. People v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d 662, 671-72

(Colo. 2010). Accordingly, we conclude that Fregosi’s insufficient

and speculative evidentiary hypothesis does not meet the statutory

requirements for an in camera review.2 See Rivera, 250 P.3d at

1277 (concluding that defendant’s request for an in camera review

of the victim’s medical records on the basis that the victim “must

have had previous mental health problems” was speculative where

there was no evidence presented that the victim received counseling

before the crime).

IV. Disposition

¶ 57 The restitution order is affirmed.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE KUHN concur.

2 Even assuming Fregosi’s hypothesis were nonspeculative, based

on our conclusion that the district court properly determined that
disclosure of the CVCB records would pose a threat to the victim’s
welfare, the court had sufficient grounds upon which to deny the
request.

22