2026 CO 17, 25SA146, People v Lulei, Dakotah2026 CO 18, 23SC927, Amanda Burbaker v Colorado Sun

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court’s opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader’s
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.
ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
March 30, 2026
2026 CO 18
No. 23SC927, Brubaker v. Colorado Sun—Public Records—Colorado Open
Records Act; Children’s Code—Dependency and Neglect Records and
Information—Reports of Child Abuse or Neglect—§ 19-1-307(1)(a), C.R.S.
(2025)— §§ 24-72-201 to -230, C.R.S. (2025)—Peck v. McCann, 43 F.4th 1116 (10th
Cir. 2022).
In this case, two media organizations requested, pursuant to the Colorado
Open Records Act (“CORA”), §§ 24-72-200.1 to -205.5, C.R.S. (2025), the total
number of reports of child abuse or neglect made to local child welfare authorities
from each of three state-funded residential child care facilities over a three-year
period, as well as the number of those reports at each facility that were screened
for investigation. The Colorado Department of Human Services (“CDHS”)
responded that, pursuant to section 19-1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025) (“subsection
(1)(a)”) of the Colorado Children’s Code Records and Information Act, it was
precluded from disclosing the information sought by the media organizations. In
particular, CDHS contended that providing the requested information for each of
the three specific RCCFs would disclose the “address of any child, family, or

informant” contained in a report of child abuse or neglect, or, alternatively, would
confirm that such a report originated from an RCCF’s specific address.
The supreme court concludes that CDHS must disclose the six cardinal
numbers requested by the media organizations. The media organizations asked
CDHS for six cardinal numbers: the total number of reports of child abuse or neglect
made to local child welfare authorities from each of the three specified RCCFs over
a three-year period; and the number of those reports at each facility that were
screened for investigation. Because CDHS has failed to satisfy its burden of
demonstrating that the cardinal numbers requested constitute a “report[] of child
abuse or neglect,” or the “name,” “address,” or “any other identifying
information” of a child, family, or informant contained in such a report, it must
disclose those cardinal numbers to the media organizations. § 19-1-307(1)(a).
A division of the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for
factual findings instead of ordering the disclosure of the six requested cardinal
numbers. Accordingly, the division’s judgment is reversed. The case is remanded
to the division with instructions to return it to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203
2026 CO 18
Supreme Court Case No. 23SC927
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 21CA1608
Petitioner:
Amanda Brubaker, in her official capacity as the Records Custodian for the
Colorado Department of Human Services,
v.
Respondents:
Colorado Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a KUSA-TV/9News.
Judgment Reversed
en banc
March 30, 2026
Attorneys for Petitioner:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Jennifer L. Carty, Senior Assistant Attorney General
Joseph G. Michaels, Assistant Solicitor General
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondents:
Zansberg Beylkin LLC
Steven D. Zansberg
Michael Beylkin
Denver, Colorado
Attorney for Amicus Curiae Denver Human Services:
Amy J. Packer
Denver, Colorado

2
JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICE
BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE GABRIEL, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.
JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ and
JUSTICE HOOD, concurs in the judgment only.

3
JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, one of the most
influential jurists in American history, passionately defended people’s privacy,
going so far as to call an individual’s “right to be let alone” both “the most
comprehensive of rights” and “the right most valued by civilized men.”
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193,
193–220 (1890). Yet he also staunchly spoke out about the importance of
transparency, famously observing that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” Louis D. Brandeis, What
Publicity Can Do, in Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It 92, 92 (1914).
That these two compelling interests are inherently virtuous is beyond question.
But enforcing them simultaneously is sometimes easier said than done.
¶2 Today, we deal with media requests to the Colorado Department of Human
Services (“CDHS”) for information related to reports of child abuse or neglect
made from state-funded residential child care facilities (“RCCFs”). The parties’
dispute pits an individual’s interest in keeping identifying information private (an
interest CDHS seeks to defend) against the public’s interest in transparency from
government agencies (an interest the media seeks to foster). But we’re not called
upon to discern how to breathe life into each one of these vital interests without

4
treading on the other. No, our General Assembly took on that task already: It
struck a delicate balance between the two dueling interests many years ago. Our
mission today is to resolve the parties’ disagreement by ascertaining and
effectuating the legislature’s intent in achieving that equilibrium.
¶3 In this case, Colorado Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a KUSA-TV/9News,
(collectively the “Media Organizations”) requested, pursuant to the Colorado
Open Records Act (“CORA”), §§ 24-72-200.1 to -205.5, C.R.S. (2025), the total
number of reports of child abuse or neglect made to local child welfare authorities
from each of three RCCFs over a three-year period, as well as the number of those
reports at each facility that were screened for investigation.1 CDHS responded
that, pursuant to section 19-1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025) (“subsection (1)(a)”) of the
Colorado Children’s Code Records and Information Act
(“Children’s Records Act”), it was precluded from disclosing the information
sought by the Media Organizations.2 In particular, CDHS contended that
providing the requested information for each of the three specific RCCFs would
1 The Media Organizations’ requests referred to reports of child abuse or neglect,
as well as to calls to the child abuse hotline and reports of runaways. Because child-abuse
hotline calls and reports of runaways fall under the umbrella of reports of child
abuse or neglect, we, like the parties, generally refer to reports of child abuse or
neglect when discussing the Media Organizations’ requests.
2 Subsection (1)(a) prohibits the disclosure of “reports of child abuse or neglect and
the name and address of any child, family, or informant or any other identifying
information contained in such reports.”

5
disclose the “address of any child, family, or informant” contained in a report of
child abuse or neglect, or, alternatively, would confirm that such a report
originated from an RCCF’s specific address.
¶4 We ultimately conclude that CDHS must disclose the six cardinal numbers
requested by the Media Organizations. Because the division remanded the case to
the district court for factual findings instead of ordering the disclosure of the six
requested cardinal numbers, we reverse the division’s judgment. We remand the
case to the division with instructions to return it to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶5 In the proceedings below, the district court perceived no ambiguity in
subsection (1)(a) and agreed with CDHS’s plain-meaning interpretation. It ruled
that subsection (1)(a) barred CDHS from providing the information requested. But
a divided division of the court of appeals saw it differently. Colo. Sun v. Brubaker,
2023 COA 101, ¶ 5, 542 P.3d 1190, 1191. Finding the parties’ divergent
interpretations of subsection (1)(a) equally reasonable, the division cut the
Gordian knot by resorting to other tools of statutory interpretation. Id. at ¶ 32,
542 P.3d at 1195. Specifically, the division considered subsection (1)(a)’s
legislative history and the consequences of endorsing each party’s construction.
Id. at ¶¶ 33–43, 542 P.3d at 1195–96. The division then concluded that not all
addresses of children, families, or informants contained in reports of child abuse

6
or neglect are protected under subsection (1)(a); rather, reasoned the division, an
address is exempt from disclosure pursuant to that statutory provision only when
it constitutes identifying information. Id. at ¶¶ 40–41, 542 P.3d at 1196. Stated
differently, according to the division, some addresses do not qualify as
“identifying information” and thus fall outside the scope of subsection (1)(a).
¶6 In light of its interpretation, the division remanded the case to the district
court for factual findings on whether the requested information “would disclose
‘identifying information’ of a child, family, or informant associated with a child
abuse or neglect report.” Id. at ¶ 44, 542 P.3d at 1197. That is, the division directed
the district court on remand to discern whether the addresses of the three RCCFs
under the magnifying glass constitute “identifying information” pursuant to
subsection (1)(a). Id. Rather than proceed with the remand, however, CDHS
petitioned our court for certiorari review. We granted its petition.3
¶7 In analyzing subsection (1)(a), we first ask whether it is ambiguous. Because
we conclude it is not, we do not reach the second issue raised by CDHS’s petition.
3 We agreed to review the following two issues:
1. Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in
concluding that section 19-1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. (2023), is ambiguous.
2. Whether, if the court of appeals correctly concluded that section
19-1-307(1)(a) is ambiguous, it erred in concluding the legislative
history and Peck v. McCann, 43 F.4th [1116] (10th Cir. 2022),
support its interpretation of the statute.

7
Instead, we proceed to consider whether CDHS has met its burden of showing that
the plain meaning of the language in subsection (1)(a) precludes disclosure of the
information sought by the Media Organizations’ CORA requests. We determine
that it has not.
¶8 The Media Organizations asked CDHS for six cardinal numbers: the total
number of reports of child abuse or neglect made to local child welfare authorities
from each of the three specified RCCFs over a three-year period; and the number
of those reports at each facility that were screened for investigation. Because
CDHS has failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that the cardinal numbers
requested constitute a “report[] of child abuse or neglect,” or the “name,”
“address,” or “any other identifying information” of a child, family, or informant
contained in such a report, it must disclose those cardinal numbers to the Media
Organizations. § 19-1-307(1)(a).
I. Relevant Provisions of CORA and the Children’s Records
Act
¶9 Before reciting the case’s facts and procedural history, we hit the pause
button to discuss the relevant provisions of CORA and the Children’s Records Act.
This background information will help place the rest of our opinion in context.
¶10 When it enacted CORA, our General Assembly appeared to heed Justice
Brandeis’s pearls of wisdom, choosing sunlight as Colorado’s disinfectant and
electric light as Colorado’s police officer. The legislature declared that this state’s

8
public policy is that public records are generally open for inspection at reasonable
times. § 24-72-201, C.R.S. (2025). The term “[p]ublic records” in CORA
encompasses “all writings made, maintained, or kept by the state [or]
any agency . . . for use in the exercise of functions required or authorized by law
or administrative rule or involving the receipt or expenditure of public funds.”
§ 24-72-202(6)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2025). Further, “information obtained by public
agencies in the course of performing their duties” under the Children’s Records
Act “is considered public information” by CORA.
See § 19-1-302(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025). It follows that reports of child abuse or neglect
under the Children’s Records Act generally qualify as “public records” that must
be accessible to the public pursuant to CORA. Indeed, on this much, the parties
agree.
¶11 Of course, rules often paint with broad strokes, and exceptions add the
subtle detail. Any exceptions here, however, must be construed narrowly in light
of the strong presumption in favor of disclosure. Shook v. Pitkin Cnty. Comm’rs,
2015 COA 84, ¶ 6, 411 P.3d 158, 160. And a records custodian asserting an
exception bears the burden of establishing the applicability of that exception. Id.
¶12 One of the exceptions to disclosure under CORA is an “inspection [that]
would be contrary to any state statute.” § 24-72-204(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025). CDHS
relied on the exception in section 24-72-204(1)(a) in denying the Media

9
Organizations’ CORA requests. The “state statute” identified by CDHS as being
contrary to the Media Organizations’ CORA requests was subsection (1)(a) of the
Children’s Records Act. See § 19-1-307(1)(a). Thus, subsection (1)(a) takes center
stage in this opinion.
¶13 Subsection (1)(a), titled “Identifying information—confidential,” states in
pertinent part that “reports of child abuse or neglect and the name and address of
any child, family, or informant, or any other identifying information contained in
such reports shall be confidential and shall not be public information.” This
version of subsection (1)(a) has been on the books since 1977, though it hasn’t
always resided at its current address. See Ch. 246, sec. 8, § 19-10-115(1)(a),
1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1020, 1023. It is the scope of this provision that is at the nub
of this matter.
¶14 Our legislature enacted subsection (1)(a) to preclude the public disclosure
of reports of child abuse or neglect and certain information contained in such
reports. The primary purpose of this confidentiality provision was to “balance the
best interests of children” and the “privacy interests of children and their families”
against the “need to share information among service agencies and schools” and
“to protect the safety of schools and the public at large.” Id. at 1122
(quoting § 19-1-302(2)); see § 19-10-115, 8 C.R.S. (1973 & Supp. 1975).

10
¶15 With this background in mind, we turn to the case’s facts and procedural
history. We then proceed to analyze the merits of the contentions advanced by the
parties.
II. Facts and Procedural History
¶16 CDHS is responsible for regulating private operators of RCCFs across the
state. RCCFs are tasked with providing twenty-four-hour treatment and care for
children who experience serious emotional, behavioral, or developmental
disorders, many of whom are victims of child abuse or neglect. CDHS has the sole
authority to initiate appropriate sanctions, including closure, when RCCFs fail to
comply with the standards prescribed by Colorado law.
¶17 But CDHS also has oversight of our state’s abused and neglected children.
As relevant here, CDHS is responsible for Colorado’s child–abuse hotline, which
is publicly advertised as a “place for reporting known or suspected child abuse or
neglect.” § 26-5-111(2)(a), C.R.S. (2025). Operators of RCCFs have a statutory duty
to report known or suspected child abuse or neglect. When RCCF operators do so
through the hotline, the hotline routes the complainant to the specific CDHS office
responsible for addressing reports of child abuse or neglect in the county involved.
Consequently, every call made to the hotline is reviewed by the county’s CDHS
office. Upon the completion of such review, the complaint is either “screen[ed]
in,” meaning it is assigned to a caseworker for further investigation, or “screen[ed]

11
out,” meaning it is not assigned to a caseworker for further investigation. Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 12 Colo. Code Regs. 2509-2:7.103–103.10 (2025).
¶18 In 2017, CDHS revoked the license of one of the state’s RCCFs, the El Pueblo
Boys and Girls Ranch, in the wake of allegations that the staff there had abused or
neglected some of the resident children. The Office of the Colorado Child
Protection Ombudsman (“Ombudsman”) then launched an investigation into the
circumstances leading to the facility’s closure and issued a report with findings
(“CPO Report”). The CPO Report concluded that there was no “adequate system”
in place to “effectively and efficiently monitor the care being provided to some of
the state’s most vulnerable children.” Off. of Colo.’s Child Prot. Ombudsman,
Investigation Report CPO Case ID: 2017-2736, at 3 (Aug. 12, 2019), https://
coloradocpo.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/El-Pueblo-Boys-and-Girls-
Ranch-Main-Report-Remediated.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM62-MFYN]. In fact,
the CPO Report documented nearly 250 accounts of suspected institutional abuse
or neglect at the El Pueblo Boys and Girls Ranch that had been made in the year
prior to its closure. Alarmingly, the CPO Report noted that a majority of these
matters were screened out without further investigation by Pueblo’s CDHS office.
¶19 A few years after the closure of the El Pueblo Boys and Girls Ranch, a second
RCCF, the Tennyson Center, closed its residential program in Denver. The
Ombudsman later revealed that Denver County officials had received more than

12
100 complaints regarding the facility in the prior year alone, and that, disturbingly,
only eight of those (less than 10 percent) were screened in and assigned for further
investigation. See Jennifer Brown, Denver’s Tennyson Center to Close Its Residential
Program After Runaways, Overdoses and Child’s Death, Colo. Sun (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://coloradosun.com/2021/03/23/tennyson-center-residential-program
[https://perma.cc/VQ3N-2BBL].
¶20 In the two months following the closure of the Tennyson Center’s residential
program, the Media Organizations submitted formal requests under CORA for the
following information:
• “[A]ny documents that show how many calls have been made to the child
abuse hotline from Mount Saint Vincent (RCCF) and Cleo Wallace
(RCCF) from 1/1/2018 to 3/26/2021.”
• “The number of hotline calls/abuse and neglect reports/runaways
reports from the Tennyson Center, Mount Saint Vincent[,] and Cleo
Wallace to local child welfare authorities in the last three years, and how
many were screened in.”
(Emphases added).
¶21 CDHS denied the Media Organizations’ CORA requests, explaining that
subsection (1)(a) prohibits the disclosure of the address of any child, family, or
informant contained in reports of child abuse or neglect. When asked by the
Media Organizations to reconsider, CDHS stood its ground, reasoning that
although the requests did not actually ask for an address, the name of a particular
RCCF was sufficient to identify that RCCF’s address, which, in CDHS’s view,

13
meant that the responsive information would effectively disclose the address of
any child, family, or informant associated with a report of child abuse or neglect
made from that facility. Nevertheless, CDHS offered to share with the Media
Organizations the aggregate number of reports of child abuse or neglect made from
all three facilities combined during the specified three-year timeframe, along with
the aggregate number of those reports combined that were screened in and escalated
for further investigation.
¶22 After turning down CDHS’s offer, the Media Organizations brought a
lawsuit in district court under CORA seeking a court order to compel CDHS to
produce the requested per-facility information. CDHS moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, arguing that the plain meaning of subsection (1)(a)’s text
barred the disclosures requested by the Media Organizations. The district court
agreed with CDHS and granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the responsive
information would violate subsection (1)(a) by “necessarily identif[ying]” the
addresses of reported incidents. Notably, however, the district court
acknowledged that, at least from a practical standpoint, the literal act of “linking
specific [reports] with a specific case, child or informant” might be “difficult” or
“even impossible.”
¶23 The Media Organizations appealed, and a division of the court of appeals
reversed in a split decision. Brubaker, ¶ 5, 542 P.3d at 1191. The division homed

14
in on the core of the parties’ dispute: the meaning of the statutory clause “the name
and address of any child, family, or informant or any other identifying
information” contained in a report of child abuse or neglect. Id. at ¶ 24,
542 P.3d at 1194. Because the division determined that this language was
susceptible to two reasonable interpretations (those advanced by the parties), it
concluded that subsection (1)(a) was ambiguous. Id. at ¶ 27, 542 P.3d at 1194.
¶24 The division explained that under CDHS’s reading, each term in the clause’s
series would “constitute[] confidential ‘identifying information’”: Names would
be categorically confidential, addresses would be categorically confidential, and
“any other identifying information” would operate as a catchall phrase
encompassing additional types of identifying information not “specifically
enumerated” (i.e., identifying information other than names or addresses).
Id. at ¶¶ 25–26, 542 P.3d at 1194. Conversely, observed the division, under the
Media Organizations’ reading, although subsection (1)(a)’s prohibition would
apply to all identifying information contained in reports of child abuse or neglect,
it would not apply to all names or addresses of children, families, or informants
contained in such reports—only if those names or addresses constitute identifying
information would they be barred from disclosure. Id. at ¶ 27, 542 P.3d at 1194.
¶25 Elaborating on the Media Organizations’ construction, the division
explained that it was rooted in a “sort-of reverse ejusdem generis” canon, the

15
much less popular cousin of “ejusdem generis.”4 Id. at ¶ 28, 542 P.3d at 1195. The
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals coined the term “reverse ejusdem
generis” in 1996 in United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
See Brubaker, ¶ 28, 542 P.3d at 1194–95. Pursuant to this somewhat obscure rule of
syntax, in the hypothetical phrase “A, B, or any other C,” the general C would not
be controlled by the types of specific items enumerated in A and B; just the
opposite: A and B would be subsets of, and would be controlled by, C. Id. Thus,
only the As and Bs that are also Cs would be covered.5
4 “Ejusdem generis,” Latin for “of the same kind,” Jay Wexler, Fun With Reverse
Ejusdem Generis, 105 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2020), is a canon of statutory construction
that instructs that “a ‘general or collective term’ at the end of a list of specific items”
is typically “‘controlled and defined by reference to’ the specific classes . . . that
precede it,” Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480, 487 (2024) (omission in original)
(quoting Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450, 458 (2022)). Pursuant to this canon,
general words or phrases following a list of specific articles are interpreted to
include only items of the same kind as those specifically listed. See People v. Sims,
2020 COA 78, ¶ 23, 474 P.3d 189, 194. For example, “the phrase ‘other foods’ in a
provision covering ‘apples, bananas, grapes, oranges, and other foods’ would
likely refer only to fruits that are not apples, bananas, grapes, or oranges.” Wexler,
supra, at 1. So, in this case, the canon would require “any other identifying
information” to refer to identifying information that is not names or addresses.
Here, however, the division used a reverse version of this canon.
5 Unlike the canon of ejusdem generis, which “has a long and storied history in the
law, has been used by judges in countless cases, and has been the subject of a large
body of scholarly commentary over the years,” its mirror-image canon (i.e., its
reverse version) “is far less well known and understood,” “didn’t even have a
name until the mid-1990s,” and had “been the subject of absolutely no scholarly
commentary at all” before November 2020. Wexler, supra, at 1–2 (footnotes
omitted).

16
¶26 In subsection (1)(a), then, rather than deem the phrase “any other
identifying information” to be controlled and defined by the specific terms that
precede it—“name and address”—it would control and define those specific terms
by modifying them. Brubaker, ¶ 31, 542 P.3d at 1195. Differently put, although the
phrase, “any other identifying information,” § 19-1-307(1)(a), would still serve as
a catchall of sorts, it would “reflect[] back on the more specific, rather than the
other way around.” Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 509. Using this construction, only
identifying names and identifying addresses of a child, family, or informant
contained in a report of child abuse or neglect would qualify as confidential. See id.
¶27 In finding ambiguity in subsection (1)(a), the division also pointed to the
legislature’s use of the conjunctive “and” instead of the disjunctive or between
“name” and “address” in the phrase, “the name and address of any child, family,
or informant.” § 19-1-307(1)(a); Brubaker, ¶ 27, 542 P.3d at 1194. The division
surmised that this drafting choice possibly signaled that the legislature “did not
intend for any address on its own to be confidential, but only addresses that are
also disclosed with associated names” and thus constitute “identifying
information.” Id.
¶28 Having landed in the ambiguity camp, the division sought to break the
logjam by turning to two other tools of statutory construction—namely,
subsection (1)(a)’s legislative history and the consequences of the competing

17
interpretations offered by the parties. As it relates to the latter tool, the division
drew insight from the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Peck v. McCann,
43 F.4th 1116, 1126 (10th Cir. 2022). Brubaker, ¶ 39, 542 P.3d at 1196. In Peck, the
court reasoned that, to avert constitutional infirmity, subsection (1)(a) and its
associated penalty provisions could be construed to reach only “identifying
disclosures.” 43 F.4th at 1126. Steered by Peck, the division feared that CDHS’s
broader reading of subsection (1)(a) would require the confidentiality of certain
nonidentifying information, which would run headlong into the First
Amendment. Brubaker, ¶¶ 39–40, 542 P.3d at 1196. The division sidestepped this
potential constitutional concern by adopting the Media Organizations’ position
that subsection (1)(a) prohibits only the disclosure of identifying names and
addresses. Id.; see Peck, 43 F.4th at 1121–22.
¶29 In the end, the division held, as pertinent here, that rather than forbid in “all
circumstances” the disclosure of the address of any child, family, or informant
contained in a report of child abuse or neglect, the legislature intended to proscribe
such a disclosure only when the address constitutes identifying information (i.e.,
only when the address “identif[ies] a particular child, family, or informant
associated with a child abuse or neglect report”).
Brubaker, ¶¶ 3, 41, 542 P.3d at 1191, 1196 (emphasis added). Thus, the division
instructed the district court on remand to determine whether, under this

18
interpretation of subsection (1)(a), the requested disclosures would reveal
“identifying information” of a child, family, or informant contained in a report of
child abuse or neglect. Id. at ¶ 44, 542 P.3d at 1197. Put another way, the division
directed the district court to decide whether the addresses of the three RCCFs in
the crosshairs are identifying addresses pursuant to subsection (1)(a). Id.
¶30 Judge Pawar wrote separately in dissent. She opined that there is only one
reasonable reading of subsection (1)(a): The statute always protects from
disclosure the name, the address, and any other identifying information of any
child, family, or informant contained in a report of child abuse or neglect.
Id. at ¶ 49, 542 P.3d at 1197 (Pawar, J., dissenting). Given what she perceived as
the lack of ambiguity in the language of subsection (1)(a), she would not have
resorted to additional aids of statutory construction. Id. And, effectuating the
plain meaning of subsection (1)(a)’s language, she would have affirmed the district
court’s ruling in favor of CDHS because, in her view, the information sought by
the Media Organizations “link[ed] reports of child abuse to [the three RCCFs’]
particular addresses.” Id. at ¶ 50, 542 P.3d at 1197.
¶31 CDHS timely knocked on our certiorari door. And we opened the door and
entered the fray.

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III. Analysis
¶32 As usual, the launching pad for our analysis is the standard of review. After
identifying that standard, we examine the language of subsection (1)(a) and
conclude that it is unambiguous. Consequently, we accord the statutory words
and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning without consulting other tools of
construction. We then apply our interpretation of subsection (1)(a) to this case.
Although our statutory construction squares with CDHS’s and Judge Pawar’s, we
ultimately run counter to their conclusion that CDHS met its burden of showing
that subsection (1)(a) prohibits disclosing the six cardinal numbers requested by
the Media Organizations.
A. Standard of Review
¶33 We review de novo questions of law, including those involving statutory
interpretation. Reno v. Marks, 2015 CO 33, ¶ 20, 349 P.3d 248, 253. In construing a
statute, we aim to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.
See Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083, 1089 (Colo. 2011); see also
Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 18, 477 P.3d 694, 698. Our first step in discerning
the legislature’s intent is to give statutory language its plain and ordinary
meaning. Elder, ¶ 18, 477 P.3d at 698. To do so, we read such language in context
and in accordance with the rules of grammar. Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO 3, ¶ 19,
364 P.3d 193, 196.

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¶34 We are required to avoid interpretations that result in superfluous or
meaningless words or that lead to “illogical or absurd results.” In re People in Int.
of A.T.C., 2023 CO 19, ¶ 16, 528 P.3d 168, 171; see also Archuleta v. Roane,
2024 CO 74, ¶ 9, 560 P.3d 399, 402. If the language of a statute is clear and we’re
able to decipher the legislative intent with reasonable certainty, we may not resort
to other tools of statutory interpretation. Denver Post Corp., 255 P.3d at 1089.
B. Subsection (1)(a) Is Unambiguous, so We Accord Its
Words and Phrases Their Plain and Ordinary Meaning
¶35 As a refresher, here is the statutory clause that sits at the crossroads of the
parties’ positions:
Except as otherwise provided in this section and section 19-1-303,
[C.R.S. (2025)], reports of child abuse or neglect and the name and
address of any child, family, or informant or any other identifying
information contained in such reports shall be confidential and shall
not be public information.
§ 19-1-307(1)(a). Thus, in subsection (1)(a), our General Assembly chose to protect
as confidential: (1) reports of child abuse or neglect; (2) the name of any child,
family, or informant contained in such reports; (3) the address of any child, family,
or informant contained in such reports; and (4) any other identifying information
contained in such reports. The first category prohibits the disclosure of reports of
child abuse or neglect (in their entirety), while the remaining three categories
prohibit the disclosure of certain information contained within those reports.

21
¶36 Starting with the first category, there is nothing ambiguous about “reports
of child abuse or neglect.” Nor is there any ambiguity in the next two categories:
the “name” of a “child, family, or informant” contained in a report of child abuse
or neglect; or the “address” of a “child, family, or informant” contained in a report
of child abuse or neglect. It follows that, in response to a CORA request, CDHS
may not disclose a report of child abuse or neglect or the name or the address of a
child, family, or informant contained in a report of child abuse or neglect.
¶37 We recognize that subsection (1)(a) refers to “the name and address” of a
“child, family, or informant” contained in a child abuse or neglect report.
(Emphasis added). But we don’t perceive the legislature’s use of the conjunctive
“and,” instead of the disjunctive or, between “name” and “address” to have the
meaning attributed to it by the division. The legislature clearly intended to extend
the protective mantle of subsection (1)(a) to both the “name” and the “address” of
a child, family, or informant contained in a child abuse or neglect report. It would
have been nonsensical for the legislature to use “or” instead of “and” there because
then only the name or the address, but not both, would have been protected:
“[T]he name or address of any child, family, or informant . . . contained in [child
abuse or neglect] reports shall be confidential.”
¶38 Nor are we persuaded by the division’s floated supposition that the
legislature may have employed the conjunctive “and” in “the name and address”

22
to confer confidential status on an address only when paired with a name. Had
that been the legislature’s intent, it presumably would have explicitly stated so.
¶39 That leaves the final category, “any other identifying information.” The
parties agree, as do we, that the plain and ordinary meaning of “identifying
information” in this context is information that—alone or in conjunction with
other information—is likely to either reveal or enable revealing the identity of a
specific person. See generally Identify, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identify [https://perma.cc/43FS-HF7C]
(defining “identify” in part as “to ascertain the identity of someone or something
that is unfamiliar or unknown”). And, by using “any other” in front of
“identifying information,” the legislature conveyed that it considered both the
name and the address of a child, family, or informant contained in a report of child
abuse or neglect to be “identifying information.” This makes sense: A name,
whether alone or in conjunction with other information, is likely to either reveal
or enable revealing the identity of a specific person. The same is true for an
address.
¶40 Viewed through the prism of the core principle requiring us to accord
statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, “any other identifying
information” functions as a catchall category for identifying information. Put
simply, in addition to bringing within the shield of confidentiality both the name

23
and the address of a child, family, or informant contained in a report of child abuse
or neglect, the legislature extended the protective veil to all other identifying
information contained in such a report.
¶41 Under the division’s approach, however, “any other identifying
information” functions to limit the prohibition against disclosing either the
“name” or the “address” of any child, family, or informant contained in a report
of child abuse or neglect. According to the division, such a name or address may
be disclosed under subsection (1)(a) if it is not identifying in nature. In other
words, the division posited that only identifying names (i.e., names that qualify as
identifying information) and identifying addresses (i.e., addresses that qualify as
identifying information) are protected by subsection (1)(a). Brubaker, ¶ 41,
542 P.3d at 1196. But, as mentioned, this interpretation rests on the uncelebrated
footing of reverse ejusdem generis, a more niche canon than its mainstream kin.
¶42 Besides, under the undisputed definition of “identifying information,” we
see no daylight between a name and an identifying name or between an address
and an identifying address. After all, applying the agreed-upon plain and
ordinary meaning of “identifying information,” every name is “identifying
information,” and so is every address. Whether it’s a name or an address, it is
information that, alone or in conjunction with other information, is likely to either
reveal or enable revealing the identity of a specific person. And, like Judge Pawar,

24
we think it dubious to suggest that the legislature meant to protect the names and
addresses of children mentioned in reports of child abuse or neglect only in certain
circumstances. Id. at ¶ 47, 542 P.3d at 1197 (Pawar, J., dissenting). Regardless, if
the legislature intended to draw a distinction between a name and an identifying
name or between an address and an identifying address, and to shield from
disclosure only identifying names and identifying addresses, it presumably would
have expressly said so.6
¶43 In sum, the division’s interpretation is unreasonable, which means that
subsection (1)(a) is not susceptible to two reasonable interpretations and is
unambiguous. Because we’re able to effectuate the legislature’s intent by
interpreting the unambiguous language of subsection (1)(a), attributing to each
word its plain and ordinary meaning, we must “look no further.” Carrera v. People,
2019 CO 83, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d 725, 729. “In such a situation, the plain meaning
rule”—the chief rule of statutory interpretation—“is both the first and the last
canon and nothing more is required of the judicial inquiry.” Id. Thus, our
statutory construction is “at an end,” Crandall v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 238 P.3d
6 We disagree with the division that the interpretation we embrace today will
require certain nonidentifying information to be kept confidential. As we’ve made
clear now, either a name or an address will always constitute identifying
information. Thus, there is no risk of keeping confidential any nonidentifying
information, and the constitutional concerns raised by the Tenth Circuit in Peck,
while valid, are simply inapposite here. 43 F.4th at 1125–26.

25
659, 662 (Colo. 2010), and all that remains is the application of our reading of
subsection (1)(a) to decide whether CDHS has met its burden of demonstrating
that it is prohibited from disclosing the six cardinal numbers requested by the
Media Organizations.
C. CDHS Has Failed to Show That Subsection (1)(a)
Prohibits the Disclosure of the Six Cardinal Numbers
Requested by the Media Organizations
¶44 Our interpretation of subsection (1)(a) using the plain-meaning rule jibes
with CDHS’s. But the final reckoning is whether CDHS has satisfied its burden of
showing that subsection (1)(a) precludes the disclosure of the information
requested by the Media Organizations. We conclude that it has not.
¶45 As noted, the Media Organizations requested six cardinal numbers: the total
number of reports of child abuse or neglect made to local child welfare authorities
from each of three RCCFs over a three-year period; and the number of those
reports at each facility that were screened in for investigation. CDHS argues that
disclosing the numbers requested would effectively make public the address of any
child, family, or informant contained in a report of child abuse or neglect that
originated from the Tennyson Center, Mount Saint Vincent, or Cleo Wallace.
We’re unpersuaded.
¶46 How can the requested disclosures make public what is already public?
That’s no more possible than making public the information found in a book

26
already sitting on a library shelf. Unsurprisingly, nobody in this case asserts that
the three RCCFs’ addresses are secret or otherwise confidential. They aren’t.
These are public facilities with publicly accessible addresses. It would strain logic
to pretend that the addresses of these RCCFs aren’t already public.
¶47 Still, counters CDHS, the requested cardinal numbers would necessarily
confirm that a report of child abuse or neglect originated from a particular RCCF
and thus from that RCCF’s address—and by extension, from the address of a child,
family, or informant contained in such a report.7 But subsection (1)(a)’s
prohibition of the disclosure of an address contained in a report of child abuse or
neglect does not bar the confirmation of an already public address contained in such
a report.
¶48 Expanding the scope of subsection (1)(a) as CDHS urges would stretch that
statutory provision beyond its breaking point and would lead to absurd results.
See Educhildren LLC v. Cnty. of Douglas Bd. of Equalization, 2023 CO 29,
¶ 27, 531 P.3d 986, 993 (cautioning that courts must avoid statutory constructions
“that would yield illogical or absurd results”); Archuleta, ¶ 9, 560 P.3d at 402
(same). Indeed, CDHS’s approach would hinder, if not altogether eliminate,
7 Judge Pawar likewise concluded, in summary fashion, that the cardinal numbers
requested would “link[] reports of child abuse to [the RCCF’s] particular
addresses.” Brubaker, ¶ 50, 542 P.3d at 1197 (Pawar, J., dissenting).

27
oversight of state-funded residential facilities for children. All information,
including a cardinal number, in any way related to a report of child abuse or
neglect originating from an RCCF would presumably be out of bounds because it
would confirm that such a report was made from the particular RCCF’s address.
We are aware of no evidence, and CDHS presents none, that this is what the
legislature intended. To the contrary, our legislature has told us loud and clear
that Colorado favors transparency, Roane, ¶ 10, 560 P.3d at 402, and we have
therefore “narrowly construed” any “exceptions to the broad, general policy of
[CORA]” demanding openness, Sargent Sch. Dist. No. RE-33J v. W. Servs., Inc.,
751 P.2d 56, 60 (Colo. 1988). Remember: Colorado is a sunlight state.
¶49 Significantly, while CDHS declined to provide the six numbers requested
by the Media Organizations, it did offer to disclose the aggregate number of child
abuse or neglect reports made from all three facilities combined over the specified
three-year period, as well as the aggregate number of those reports combined that
were screened in for further investigation. CDHS undoubtedly did so because it
determined that the disclosure of the two aggregate numbers would not constitute
the disclosure of the address of any child, family, or informant contained in a
report of child abuse or neglect—lest we presume that CDHS deliberately agreed
to violate subsection (1)(a). We have a difficult time understanding why providing
a per-facility breakdown of the same two numbers should lead to a different

28
outcome. In other words, if the aggregate numbers do not violate the prohibition
in subsection (1)(a) against the disclosure of the address of any child, family, or
informant contained in a report of child abuse or neglect, why do the per-facility
numbers? Even taking CDHS’s last-resort argument at face value, we’re left to
wonder why the per-facility numbers illegally “confirm” addresses covered by
subsection (1)(a) but the aggregate numbers do not. During oral arguments,
CDHS could not adequately answer these questions or otherwise provide any
satisfactory justification for distinguishing between the aggregate numbers it
offered to disclose and the per-facility numbers it adamantly refuses to produce.
¶50 But what about the part of subsection (1)(a) that protects “other identifying
information”? Even if, as we’ve determined, the disclosure of the cardinal
numbers requested does not constitute the disclosure of an address, could they
nevertheless constitute the disclosure of “other identifying information”? CDHS,
the burden-bearing party, does not argue that they could, and we decline to
overegg the pudding.
¶51 Before us, CDHS’s opposition to the Media Organizations’ requests is
limited to its assertions that disclosing the cardinal numbers in question would
disclose, or alternatively confirm, the addresses of the three RCCFs and, by
extension, the addresses of children, families, or informants contained in reports
of child abuse or neglect. And we have nixed those contentions already. Any

29
argument by CDHS related to “other identifying information” is advanced solely
in the context of refuting the interpretation of subsection (1)(a) championed by the
Media Organizations and approved by the division. Recall that, under the Media
Organizations and the division’s approach, an agency in receipt of a CORA
request must determine whether the disclosure (or even confirmation) of an
address would constitute the disclosure of “identifying information”. We,
however, have now disavowed that construction. It follows that whether a
cardinal number may ever constitute “any other identifying information” is a
tomorrow problem that we have no occasion to pass judgment on today.
¶52 To be clear, our restraint isn’t borne out of a desire to avoid borrowing
trouble. Rather, it is animated by the party presentation principle. That principle
holds parties responsible for framing the issues to be resolved and calls upon
courts to be neutral arbiters as they consider any matters raised. United States v.
Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020). In general, our adversarial system of
adjudication “is designed around the premise” that where, as here, parties are
represented by competent counsel, they “know what is best for them, and are
responsible for advancing the facts and argument entitling them to relief.” Id. at
375–76 (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). To put it more eloquently,
courts may not “sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right”; rather, they

30
must function as “passive instruments of government,” wait for cases to come to
them, and decide only questions raised by the parties. United States v. Samuels,
808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing
en banc). Adhering to the party presentation principle, as we must, we cabin our
analysis to the arguments advanced by CDHS in attempting to meet its burden of
proof.
IV. Conclusion
¶53 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that CDHS must disclose the six
cardinal numbers requested by the Media Organizations. Because the division
remanded the case to the district court for factual findings instead of ordering the
disclosure of the six requested cardinal numbers, we reverse the division’s
judgment. We remand the case to the division with instructions to return it to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the
district court should address the Media Organizations’ request for attorney fees
and costs pursuant to section 24-72-204(5)(b), C.R.S. (2025).
JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ and
JUSTICE HOOD, concurs in the judgment only.

1
JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ and JUSTICE
HOOD, concurring in the judgment only.
¶54 I agree with the majority that section 19-1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025),
(“subsection (1)(a)”) of the Colorado Children’s Code, Records and Information
Act is not ambiguous. Maj. op. ¶ 32. The statute always protects certain
confidential information from disclosure: the name, the address, and any other
identifying information of any child, family, or informant contained in a report of
child abuse or neglect. § 19-1-307(1)(a).
¶55 I write separately because the majority’s conclusion—that subsection (1)(a)
requires a records custodian under the circumstances here to nonetheless disclose
an address contained in a report of child abuse or neglect if someone has already
publicly disclosed it, see Maj. op. ¶ 47—is inconsistent with the explicit language
in the statute and totally at odds with the protection it affords children, families,
and informants. See § 19-1-307(1)(a). But that is not the only issue with the
majority’s opinion: Its conclusions regarding addresses that are “already public[,]”
Maj. op. ¶ 46, is problematic; and its interpretation of subsection (1)(a) is
unreasonable, produces illogical and absurd results, and will likely harm victims,
families, and informants. What’s more, even though the record reveals no public
disclosures regarding reports of abuse or neglect concerning these two facilities,
the majority nonetheless requires the Colorado Department of Human Services

2
(“CDHS”) to confirm the existence of such reports. See id. at ¶¶ 45–47, 49. That
disclosure is unquestionably prohibited by subsection (1)(a).
¶56 For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and
affirm the judgment of the district court. That is why I respectfully concur in the
judgment only.
I. Subsection (1)(a) Always Protects Reports of Child
Abuse or Neglect and the Name and Address of Any
Child, Family, or Informant, or Other Identifying
Information From Disclosure.
¶57 As I have indicated, there are, in my view, multiple flaws in the majority’s
reasoning. To begin, it ignores the plain meaning of subsection (1)(a). It
recognizes, correctly, that subsection (1)(a) protects as confidential the address of
any child, family, or informant contained in a report of child abuse or neglect and
bars the disclosure of this information. Id. at ¶ 35. But then it declares that these
addresses aren’t confidential after all if you can look them up online, thus wiping
out a substantial portion of the protections afforded by the statute in one fell
swoop. See id. at ¶ 47. Finally, it concludes that CDHS has failed to meet its burden
under the Colorado Open Records Act (“CORA”), §§ 24-72-100.1 to § 24-72.4-106,
C.R.S. (2025), and must disclose the requested records, because the cardinal
numbers requested by Colorado Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a KUSA-TV/9News
(collectively the “Media Organizations”), “do[] not constitute the disclosure of an
address.” Maj. op. ¶¶ 8, 50.

3
¶58 While the majority’s concerns regarding CORA’s purposes and the need for
transparency by government agencies (an interest the media seeks to foster) are
understandable, see id. at ¶¶ 1–2, the majority’s reasoning cannot be squared with
subsection (1)(a). See § 19-1-307(1)(a). As Judge Pawar explained, the cardinal
numbers requested by the Media Organizations necessarily confirm that a report
of child abuse or neglect originated from the address of a child, family, or
informant contained in such a report. Colo. Sun v. Brubaker, 2023 COA 101,
¶¶ 45–50, 542 P.3d 1190, 1197 (Pawar, J., dissenting).
¶59 In concluding otherwise, the majority reads words into the statute that
simply do not exist and ignores the words that do. Specifically, it disregards the
language in subsection (1)(a) that explicitly states that this information “shall be
confidential and shall not be public information.” § 19-1-307(1)(a). It also
disregards its own acknowledgment that every address is identifying information
and that it is “dubious to suggest that the legislature meant to protect” sensitive
information “mentioned in reports of child abuse or neglect only in certain
circumstances.” Maj. op. ¶ 42 (emphasis added).
¶60 The majority’s interpretation is problematic because, as we so often observe,
proper statutory interpretation requires that we “respect the legislature’s choice of
language.” Educ. reEnvisioned BOCES v. Colo. Springs Sch. Dist. 11, 2024 CO 29,
¶ 32, 548 P.3d 669, 675. We “must avoid constructions that would render any

4
words or phrases superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results.” Id.
Additionally, we must refrain from rewriting a statute to remedy “practical
challenges.” People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 38, 498 P.3d 142, 154. The proper
remedy for such practical challenges “is legislative action, not judicial fiat.” Id.
¶61 By its very terms, subsection (1)(a) prohibits the disclosure of “reports of
child abuse or neglect and the name and address of any child, family, or informant
or any other identifying information contained in such reports.” § 19-1-307(1)(a).
Nothing about this language supports the majority’s notions regarding addresses
that are “already public” or cardinal numbers. Maj. op. ¶¶ 8, 47. But see
§ 19-1-307(1)(a). Critically, the statute bars the disclosure of information that could
be used to identify a child, family, or informant, not just disclosures that would
identify a child, family, or informant. See § 19-1-307(1)(a). This is hardly
surprising as the point of the statute, as noted, is to always protect this information
from disclosure to the public. Id.
¶62 This is the only reasonable interpretation of the statute as a records
custodian has no way of knowing what other information a requestor already has
(or that they may be able to obtain in the future) which means the records
custodian has no way of knowing if they might be providing the first or the last
puzzle piece that will allow a requestor to identify a specific child, family, or
informant. Requiring the disclosures that the majority does here risks making the

5
custodian complicit in revealing, or enabling the revealing, of the identity of a
victim, family, or informant.
¶63 Plus, if the legislature wanted to carve out an exception to subsection (1)(a)
for addresses that were already public, it could have done so. E.g., Maj. op. ¶ 42
(acknowledging that “if the legislature intended to draw a distinction . . . between
an address and an identifying address, and to shield from disclosure only
identifying . . . addresses, it presumably would have expressly said so”).
II. The Majority is Requiring CDHS to Confirm the
Existence of Confidential Reports.
¶64 The majority nonetheless declares that the addresses of the Tennyson
Center, Mount Saint Vincent, and Cleo Wallace are all “already public.” Id. at ¶ 46.
This is so, it explains, because “[t]hese are public facilities with publicly accessible
addresses[,]” which I take to mean you can easily look them up online. Id. But if
that’s the standard, what address isn’t already public? Any way you slice it, the
majority’s opinion will leave public health departments across Colorado
struggling to understand what they must disclose, potentially exposing them to
awards of attorney fees under CORA—no matter their best efforts.
¶65 More troubling still, the majority does not point to any published report in
the record, by the Ombudsman or otherwise, regarding Mount Saint Vincent or
Cleo Wallace. Unlike the Ombudsman’s disclosures regarding El Pueblo Boys and
Girls Ranch and the Tennyson Center, there are no public disclosures regarding

6
reports of child abuse or neglect originating from these facilities. This is why the
majority is mistaken that the Media Organizations’ CORA request is only about
cardinal numbers.
¶66 By requiring CDHS to disclose the cardinal numbers of hotline calls, abuse
and neglect reports, and runaway reports, the majority is requiring CDHS to
confirm the existence of such reports. Put differently, the majority is requiring
CDHS to disclose confidential information to the Media Organizations about child
abuse and neglect reports even though the disclosure of that information is
unquestionably prohibited by subsection (1)(a). See § 19-1-307(1)(a).
III. The Majority’s Opinion May Cause Countless
Tomorrow Problems.
¶67 Additionally, the majority’s interpretation is unreasonable and produces
absurd and illogical results. Moreover, it has the potential to cause great harm to
victims, families, and informants. The majority claims that questions about the
reach of its holding regarding cardinal numbers are “a tomorrow problem.” Maj.
op. ¶ 51. This might be accurate as it relates to our court, but not so for the public
health departments, media outlets, and trial courts that will have to discern just
what the majority opinion means.
¶68 Questions will inevitably arise about how far the majority’s rationale
extends. If it is applied to victims of abuse or neglect, those victims may lose their
protection under the statute if their names have already been made public, so long

7
as the CORA request purports to be limited to the cardinal number of reports
regarding the victim. See id. at ¶¶ 45–47, 49. Releasing information about the
number of times a victim’s name appears in reports of abuse or neglect hardly
aligns with the General Assembly’s intent to protect victims. See § 19-1-302(1)(a),
(2), C.R.S. (2025).
¶69 Similarly, if the majority’s approach is extended to informants, it may cause
informants, especially those who are not subject to Colorado’s mandatory
reporting scheme, see § 19-3-304(2), C.R.S. (2025), to hesitate to report abuse and
neglect. Concerned neighbors and family members may be reluctant to become
involved if they can so readily lose their anonymity in reporting. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (“Relatives and neighbors who
suspect abuse also will be more willing to come forward if they know that their
identities will be protected.”); Watso v. Colo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 841 P.2d 299, 307,
308–09 (Colo. 1992) (describing that safeguards, such as confidentiality, under the
Child Protection Act protect children and promote “alacrity in reporting” child
abuse).
¶70 And if all it takes for an informant to lose some of the protections of
subsection (1)(a) is a public address and a CORA request asking for a cardinal
number, as here, will mandatory reporters, like employees at schools, childcare

8
centers, and hospitals serving children, also lose some of their protections under
the statute? It is hard to imagine that this is what the legislature had in mind.
¶71 Simply put, in addition to being unreasonable and producing absurd and
illogical results, the majority’s opinion has the potential to cause victims great
harm and to create countless “tomorrow problem[s,]” Maj. op. ¶ 51, raising
significant questions about what protections for vulnerable populations will
remain in its wake. Educ. reEnvisioned, ¶ 32, 548 P.3d at 675 (explaining that, in
interpreting a statute, “we must avoid constructions that would . . . lead to illogical
or absurd results”).
IV. Conclusion
¶72 In sum, the majority fails to follow the plain language and obvious intent of
subsection (1)(a). Its reasoning regarding public addresses is similarly strained,
and its interpretation of subsection (1)(a) is unreasonable, produces illogical and
absurd results, and will likely harm victims, families, and informants.
¶73 Worse still, the majority overlooks the fact that there are no published
reports by the Ombudsman, or anyone for that matter, concerning Mount Saint
Vincent or Cleo Wallace, meaning that if reports of child abuse or neglect
originated from these facilities, there has been no public disclosure of those facts.
Consequently, by requiring CDHS to disclose the cardinal numbers of hotline
calls, abuse and neglect reports, and runaway reports for Mount Saint Vincent and

9
Cleo Wallace, the majority is requiring CDHS to confirm the existence of such
reports. This disclosure is unquestionably prohibited by subsection (1)(a).
¶74 For all these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals
and affirm the judgment of the district court. Because the majority’s holding also
calls for reversal of the division below, I concur in the judgment only.