2026 CO 21, 25SC12 Khristina Phillips v. People

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado
Supreme Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for
the reader's convenience. As such, they may not be cited or
relied upon. If there is any discrepancy between the language in
the summary and the opinion, the language in the opinion
controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
April 6, 2026

# 2026 CO 21

No. 25SC12, Phillips v. People-Right to a Speedy Trial -§ 18-1-405(6)(b), C.R.S.
(2025) -Interlocutory Appeal-Crim. P. 37.1(a)-C.A.R. 4.1(a) -People v.
Gallegos, 946 P.2d 946, 952-53 (Colo. 1997) -"Good Faith" Test -Arguable
Merit.

In this case, the district court held that the People's pretrial appeal of a
county court's evidentiary ruling -excluding evidence under CRE 401, 402, and
403-constituted a proper "interlocutory appeal" under the speedy trial statute
and therefore tolled the defendant's speedy trial deadline. This court has defined
an "interlocutory appeal" for purposes of the speedy trial statute as one taken "in
good faith" before the sentence is imposed. As relevant here, this court's
jurisprudence makes clear that a pretrial appeal is taken in good faith when the
prosecuting attorney's assertion that the appeal is legally authorized has arguable
merit.

In arguing that their assertion that their appeal was legally authorized had
arguable merit, the People fasten their position firmly to Crim. P. 37.1(a), which

<!-- PageBreak -->

authorizes an interlocutory appeal from a ruling by the county court granting a
"motion to suppress evidence." Despite their efforts to dress up their pretrial
appeal, however, the People can't make it fit within Crim. P. 37.1(a). No matter
what gloss they attempt to place on that appeal, the People cannot escape the fact
that it concerned an evidentiary ruling, not a suppression ruling. In criminal motions
practice, the word "suppress" operates as a term of art-denoting the exclusion
from trial of any evidence procured illegally, typically in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights or protections. This stands in stark contrast to a
ruling precluding evidence based on the rules of evidence.

The supreme court therefore concludes that the People's assertion that their
pretrial appeal was authorized lacked arguable merit. Accordingly, the appeal did
not toll the speedy trial deadline, and Phillips's statutory right to a speedy trial
was violated.

The district court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
district court with instructions to return it to the county court so the county court
may vacate the defendant's judgment of conviction and dismiss the case with
prejudice.

<!-- PageBreak -->

# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 21

Supreme Court Case No. 25SC12
Certiorari to the District Court
El Paso County District Court Case No. 24CV30024
Honorable David A. Gilbert, Judge

Petitioner:
Khristina Phillips,

V.

Respondent:
The People of the State of Colorado.

Judgment Reversed
en banc
April 6, 2026

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Wigglesworth Law Offices, LLC

Erin A. Wigglesworth

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Michael J. Allen, District Attorney, Fourth Judicial District

Joseph W. Eden, Deputy District Attorney

Doyle Baker, Senior Deputy District Attorney

Colorado Springs, Colorado

<!-- PageBreak -->

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE
GABRIEL, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

<!-- PageBreak -->

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 The principle that every person accused of a crime is cloaked in the
presumption of innocence lies at the very bedrock of our justice system. And the
right to a speedy trial "implements that presumption by 'prevent[ing] undue and
oppressive incarceration prior to trial, ... minimiz[ing] anxiety and concern
accompanying public accusation[,] and ... limit[ing] the possibilities that long
delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself."" Betterman v.
Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 442 (2016) (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)). The right to a speedy trial takes
top billing in this opinion.

12 The defendant, Khristina Phillips, claims that her statutory right to a speedy
trial was violated as a result of the delay caused by the People's pursuit of an
improper pretrial appeal from the county court to the district court. The People
counter that their pretrial appeal was proper and thus tolled the speedy trial
deadline. Because Colorado's speedy trial statute provides that a defendant's
speedy trial deadline is tolled during the pendency of a pretrial appeal only if the
appeal is interlocutory, see § 18-1-405(6)(b), C.R.S. (2025), the parties' disagreement
hinges on whether the People's appeal qualified as "interlocutory."

T3
As relevant here, our jurisprudence makes clear that an appeal qualifies as
interlocutory under the speedy trial statute when the prosecuting attorney's

<!-- PageBreak -->

assertion that the appeal is legally authorized has arguable merit. People v.
Gallegos, 946 P.2d 946, 952-53 (Colo. 1997). So, the question we must answer is
whether the People's contention that its pretrial appeal was authorized had
arguable merit.

14 The People fasten their position firmly to Crim. P. 37.1(a), which authorizes
an interlocutory appeal from a ruling by the county court granting a "motion to
suppress evidence." Despite their efforts to dress up their pretrial appeal,
however, the People can't make it fit within Crim. P. 37.1(a). No matter what gloss
they attempt to place on that appeal, the People cannot escape the fact that it
concerned an evidentiary ruling, not a suppression ruling. In criminal motions
practice, the word "suppress" operates as a term of art - an instruction to the court
to bar from trial any evidence procured illegally, usually in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights or protections. This stands in stark contrast to a
ruling precluding evidence based on the rules of evidence.

15 We now conclude that the People's assertion that their pretrial appeal was
authorized lacked arguable merit. Therefore, the appeal did not toll the speedy
trial deadline, and Phillips's statutory right to a speedy trial was violated.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment and remand the case to the
district court with instructions to return it to the county court so the county court
may vacate Phillips's judgment of conviction and dismiss the case with prejudice.

<!-- PageBreak -->

## I. Facts and Procedural History

16
Phillips provided daycare to children in her home. A woman who had used
Phillips's daycare service learned that Phillips's teenage son had done something
"very inappropriate" with her daughters. Several months later, the same woman
learned that Phillips's son had been under a blanket with one of her daughters.
Shortly thereafter, the woman stopped bringing her children to Phillips's daycare.
The woman then learned of additional incidents of improper conduct that had
occurred while her daughters were at Phillips's daycare, and she made a report to
the police.

17 Detective Donya Davis was assigned to investigate the allegations against
Phillips's son. As part of that investigation, Detective Davis asked Phillips to come
to the police station for an interview. Phillips did so willingly, and the interview
was video recorded.

18 During her interview, Phillips described her son's sexualized behavior. She
explained how her son cut open the crotches of dolls and stuffed animals,
masturbated using underwear belonging to others (including the children
attending daycare), masturbated using the couch, stalked girls, and used electronic
devices to watch pornography.

19 After the interview, the People charged Phillips with one count of child
abuse-for unlawfully, knowingly, or recklessly permitting children to be placed

<!-- PageBreak -->

in a situation that posed a threat to their wellbeing - and one count of operating a
childcare facility without a license. Following Phillips's not guilty plea, the county
court and the parties agreed on the speedy trial deadline. Before trial, Phillips
filed a motion to suppress the video of her interview, arguing that Detective Davis
had violated her Miranda rights. The court held a hearing and reviewed the video
of the interview. It found that Phillips was in custody during the latter part of the
interview, and therefore law enforcement had violated her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination by not giving her a Miranda advisement when
her custodial status changed. Accordingly, the court suppressed a portion of the
video.

110 Pursuant to Crim. P. 37.1(a), the People timely filed an interlocutory appeal
in the district court challenging the suppression order. The district court reversed.
It determined that Phillips was not in custody at any point during the interview
and therefore no Miranda violation had occurred and no part of the interview
should have been suppressed. On remand, the parties agreed that the speedy trial
deadline had been tolled during the pendency of the People's interlocutory appeal.
Taking that tolling period into account, the county court and the parties identified
a new speedy trial deadline.

<!-- PageBreak -->

111 Later, at the pretrial readiness conference held seven days before the
rescheduled jury trial, both parties announced ready. The parties did not discuss
their trial exhibits at that time.

112 At approximately 8:00 p.m. on the Monday before the Wednesday trial, the
prosecutor informed defense counsel by email that he intended to introduce into
evidence the entirety of Phillips's interview video. In the same email, the
prosecutor asked counsel if there were substantive objections to any parts of the
video. He noted that he was "just trying to work out the clip beforehand so we
don't have to cut video while we have a jury."

113 Less than forty-eight hours later, on the morning of trial, the prosecutor
notified the court of his intention to offer the video into evidence. He added that
he wanted to "hash out whatever sort of substantive objections there may be
because it is a lengthy video." Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the
video, explaining that parts of it were inadmissible. The judge expressed
frustration, noting that, although this case had been pending for a year and a half,
the prosecutor had raised this issue at the eleventh hour and was essentially
requesting that counsel and the court review and edit the video while the
prospective jurors were waiting in the assembly room. Further, the judge stated
that the interview was duplicative of Detective Davis's anticipated testimony and
that a large portion of it was irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial.

<!-- PageBreak -->

114 After a brief recess, the prosecutor asked the court to clarify whether it had
ruled "that the entirety of the interview between Detective Davis and ... the
Defendant [was] suppressed." (Emphasis added.) The judge responded that he
was "not suppress[ing]" the video but merely excluding it because (1) it was
duplicative of other evidence, (2) portions of it were irrelevant and thus
inadmissible under CRE 401, and (3) parts of it were relevant but unfairly
prejudicial and therefore inadmissible under CRE 403. Then, following another
brief recess, the prosecutor made a record that he intended to play the entire video
and, if the court did not allow it, he would request a continuance so his office could
consider filing another interlocutory appeal.

115 The judge informed the prosecutor that any request for a continuance would
be denied. He explained again that he had not "suppressed" any evidence.
Rather, remarked the judge, his ruling was strictly evidentiary, so it could not
serve as grounds for an interlocutory appeal. Continuing, the judge reiterated that
the video was cumulative, contained irrelevant information, was unfairly
prejudicial, and would cause confusion, undue delay, and a waste of the jury's
time. The judge emphasized that he was "exercising [his] authority in terms of the
admission of evidence under CRE 401, 402, and 403."

116 Partway through jury selection, the prosecutor told the judge that his office
had filed a notice of an interlocutory appeal in the district court. After determining

<!-- PageBreak -->

that his court's jurisdiction had been transferred to the district court, the judge
stopped the proceedings and declared a mistrial. He stressed, however, that he
did not believe the People had a legal basis to file an interlocutory appeal because
he had not suppressed the video.

117 The district court later dismissed the People's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
It reasoned that, "[b]y the plain language of Crim. P. 37.1[,] there must be
'suppression' of evidence by the [c]ounty court for this [c]ourt to have jurisdiction
to hear this interlocutory appeal." The district court then determined that no
evidence had been suppressed; in fact, the court commented that "[t]here is
nothing unusual about requiring inadmissible evidence to be edited out of a
defendant's videotaped interview before it is presented to a jury."

118 On remand, Phillips moved to dismiss, arguing that her rights to a speedy
trial and due process had been violated. Phillips maintained that, because there
were no valid grounds for the second pretrial appeal filed by the People, the
speedy trial deadline should not have been tolled during the pendency of that
appeal. And it was uncontested that, without that tolling, the speedy trial deadline
had passed.

119 The county court denied Phillips's motion. It found that the appeal had
been "taken by the People in good faith" and that no due process violation had
occurred.

<!-- PageBreak -->

120 In the meantime, the People had edited the video. And, after denying
Phillips's motion to dismiss, the court decided that the edited video eliminated
any concerns related to CRE 401-403. It thus admitted the edited video into
evidence. Hence, despite the county court's earlier denial of the People's motion
for a continuance to edit the video, and despite the district court's dismissal of the
People's second pretrial appeal as unauthorized, the People were nevertheless
allowed to play an edited version of the video to the jury.

121 The jury found Phillips guilty of both charges. Phillips appealed to the
district court, arguing, as pertinent here, that her speedy trial and due process
rights had been violated because the prosecution's second pretrial appeal was not
interlocutory and thus did not toll the speedy trial deadline. But the district court
was unpersuaded and affirmed. People v. Phillips, No. 24CV30024, at 3 (Dist. Ct.,
El Paso Cnty., Dec. 2, 2024) (unpublished order).1

T22 The district court concluded that the record demonstrated "that the People
were operating in good faith in deciding to file an interlocutory appeal on the
belief that they had a strong claim that the [county] [c]ourt acted without authority

1 There were three appeals taken from the county court to the district court in this
case: The first pretrial appeal reversing the suppression ruling that there had been
a Miranda violation; the second pretrial appeal, which was dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction; and the appeal following Phillips's conviction. Three
different district court judges presided over these appeals.

<!-- PageBreak -->

in excluding the evidence already found to have been legally obtained in the first
interlocutory appeal." Id. at 2. Elaborating, the court stated that the People had
made "a colorable argument that the trial court's exclusion of the [video]
warranted an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the less restrictive definitions of
Crim. P. 37.1(a)." Id. Thus, the court ruled that the speedy trial deadline had been
tolled while the second pretrial appeal was pending. Id.

T23
Phillips timely sought our review, and we granted her petition.2

## II. Standard of Review

T24
Whether a defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial was violated hinges
on our interpretation of section 18-1-405, the governing statute. The interpretation
of a statute implicates "a question of law, which we review de novo." People v.
Lucy, 2020 CO 68, 1 19, 467 P.3d 332, 336 (quoting People v. Rosas, 2020 CO 22, 1 21,
459 P.3d 540, 545). Additionally, the construction of our procedural rules "is a
question of law that is reviewed de novo." People v. Zhuk, 239 P.3d 437, 438 (Colo.
2010) (involving both the rules of criminal procedure and the rules of appellate

2 We agreed to review the following question:

Whether the tolling of speedy trial due to the government filing an
interlocutory appeal in the district court challenging a county court
ruling concerning the form in which evidence could be presented at
trial violates a defendant's right to speedy trial and right to due
process.

<!-- PageBreak -->

procedure). Lastly, we review a district court's application of our precedent de
novo. Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 147 P.3d 20, 28 (Colo. 2006).

## III. Analysis

### A. Colorado's Statutory Right to a Speedy Trial

125 The statutory right to a speedy trial in Colorado guarantees that a defendant
will be "brought to trial ... within six months from the date of the entry of a plea
of not guilty." § 18-1-405(1). If a defendant is not brought to trial within this
timeframe, "the pending charges shall be dismissed, and the defendant shall not
again" be charged "for the same offense, or for another offense based upon the
same act or series of acts arising out of the same criminal episode." Id.
Section 18-1-405's shield of protection aims to effectuate the constitutional right to
a speedy trial. Lucy, 1 20, 467 P.3d at 336. As such, the statute doesn't actually
create any rights; rather, it stands as a vital bulwark in defense of the constitutional
right to a speedy trial. Id.

126 The trial court and the prosecution bear the burden of compliance with
section 18-1-405(1). Lucy, 1 21, 467 P.3d at 336. To meet its burden, "the trial court
must make 'a record sufficient for an appellate court to determine statutory
compliance."" Id., 467 P.3d at 336-37 (quoting Marquez v. Dist. Ct., 613 P.2d 1302,
1304 (Colo. 1980)).

<!-- PageBreak -->

[27 Whereas subsections (3), (3.5), (4), and (5.1) of section 18-1-405 describe
circumstances when the speedy trial period may be extended, subsection (6) sets
forth circumstances that toll the speedy trial deadline. Lucy, 1 22, 467 P.3d at 337.
Under paragraph (b) of subsection (6), "[t]he period of delay caused by an
interlocutory appeal," whether brought by the defendant or the prosecution, must
be excluded from the computation of the time within which the defendant must
be brought to trial. § 18-1-405(6)(b).

### B. The People's Second Pretrial Appeal Did Not Constitute an Interlocutory Appeal Under Section 18-1-405(6)(b)

128 The People argue that their second pretrial appeal constituted an
interlocutory appeal and therefore tolled the speedy trial deadline pursuant to
subsection (6)(b). Phillips disagrees. To bring the matter to rest, we must ascertain
what qualifies as an interlocutory appeal for purposes of the speedy trial statute.

129 The speedy trial statute does not define the term "interlocutory appeal." But
this isn't a trail we're blazing for the first time. We've previously charted this
stretch of legal terrain.

130 In Gallegos, we were called upon to decide whether the prosecution's appeal
of a partial dismissal of the multi-count information at the preliminary hearing
qualified as an interlocutory appeal within the meaning of the speedy trial statute.
946 P.2d at 948. We held that an interlocutory appeal under section 18-1-405(6)(b):

<!-- PageBreak -->

is an appeal which is taken in good faith before a defendant has been
convicted and sentence is imposed, and which necessarily disrupts
the course of proceeding to a final resolution of the allegations before
the court. An appeal is taken in good faith when the assertion that such an
appeal is authorized has arguable merit, is not taken for the purpose of delay,
and the issues raised have a substantial effect on the prosecution's case.

Gallegos, 946 P.2d at 952-53 (emphases added).

131 Thus, to satisfy the good-faith test from Gallegos, the People must show that:
their assertion that the appeal was legally authorized had arguable merit; the
appeal was not taken for the purpose of delay; and the issues raised in the appeal
had a substantial effect on the People's case. Because we conclude that the
People's assertion that their appeal was authorized had no arguable merit, we
need not address whether the People have established that their appeal was taken
for a non-dilatory purpose and that the issues raised had a substantial effect on
their case. Accordingly, we keep our discussion on a short leash.

## 1. The People's Assertion That Their Appeal Was Legally Authorized Lacked Arguable Merit

132 Under Gallegos, whether the People's assertion that their appeal was legally
authorized had arguable merit requires us to "construe the language of the speedy
trial statute and other related statutes in order to ascertain and effectuate the intent
of the General Assembly." Id. at 950. As mentioned, the language of the speedy
trial statute doesn't move the needle on this front because it doesn't define
"interlocutory appeal." But the language of Crim. P. 37.1(a), which governs

<!-- PageBreak -->

interlocutory appeals from the county court to the district court, and C.A.R. 4.1,
which governs interlocutory appeals from the district court to our court, does.
Construing that language and drawing strength from our relevant jurisprudence,
we conclude that the People's assertion that their appeal was authorized lacked
arguable merit.

## a. The Language of Crim. P. 37.1(a), "Interlocutory Appeal from the County Court"

133
We first turn to the language of Crim. P. 37.1(a). Crim. P. 37.1(a) allows
prosecutors to file an interlocutory appeal in the district court following a county
court ruling in limited circumstances:

The prosecuting attorney may file an interlocutory appeal in the district
court from a ruling of a county court granting a motion made in
advance of trial by the defendant for return of property and to suppress
evidence or granting a motion to suppress evidence or granting a motion to
suppress an extra-judicial confession or admission; provided that the
prosecuting attorney certifies to the judge who granted such motion
and to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purposes of
delay and that the evidence is a substantial part of the proof of the
charge pending against the defendant.

(Emphases added.)

134 The People maintain that the language of this rule accords arguable merit to
their position. Specifically, homing in on the rule's repeated use of the word
"suppress," the People contend that their appeal was in response to an order by
the county court that "suppress[ed] evidence." But the plain meaning of the word
"suppress" in criminal law contradicts the People's argument. Id.

<!-- PageBreak -->

[35 The word "suppress" in criminal motions practice is a specialized term
denoting the exclusion from trial of any evidence procured illegally, typically in
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights or protections. Black's Law
Dictionary confirms this understanding. It defines a "motion to suppress" as a
"pretrial motion to exclude evidence from a criminal trial; esp., a request that the
court prohibit the introduction of illegally obtained evidence." Motion to Suppress,
Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

136 In line with this established legal meaning, our court has acknowledged that
the "suppression of evidence is ... generally confined to violations of
constitutional rights." People v. Bowers, 716 P.2d 471, 473 (Colo. 1986). Indeed, we
have gone so far as to indicate on multiple occasions that suppression is generally
reserved for evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights or protections
and does not normally extend to evidence collected in violation of statutory rights.
See, e.g., People v. Shinaut, 940 P.2d 380, 383 (Colo. 1997) ("In contrast to a
constitutional violation, a statutory violation does not ordinarily require
suppression of relevant evidence . .. . "); Dike v. People, 30 P.3d 197, 200 (Colo. 2001)
("[W]hen noncompliance with a statute does not violate the defendant's
constitutional rights, the suppression of evidence derived from such error may not
be appropriate."); People v. Clayton, 207 P.3d 831, 838 (Colo. 2009) ("Suppression of
evidence is generally reserved to remedy violations of constitutional rights .... ").

<!-- PageBreak -->

137 The record here belies the People's contention that their appeal was based
on the suppression of evidence and was thus authorized by Crim. P. 37.1(a). The
county court judge did not preclude any evidence that was illegally obtained, let
alone evidence allegedly collected in violation of Phillips's constitutional rights or
protections. Far from it. The judge stated, no less than five times, that he was not
suppressing the video of Phillips's interview. Instead, he explained, he was
"exercising [his] authority ... under [CRE] 401, 402, and 403" and keeping the
video out because it was "cumulative" and its probative value was substantially
outweighed by concerns related to "unfair prejudice," "confusion," "und[ue]
delay," and "waste of time." Thus, the judge made it plain that his ruling was
purely evidentiary.

138 Notably, the judge contrasted this evidentiary ruling with his previous
ruling on the "suppression issue" -namely, whether the interview of Phillips
violated her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination-which had
already been "dealt with through an [i]nterlocutory [a]ppeal" that properly tolled
the speedy trial statute. The judge informed the People, in no uncertain terms, that
the evidentiary ruling excluding the video could not be challenged through an
interlocutory appeal. Rather than heed the judge's admonition, however, the
People went forward with their plan to appeal.

<!-- PageBreak -->

139 The People nevertheless claim that suppress is merely the twin of exclude. In
this regard, the People direct us to the "common parlance" usage of the word
"suppress," suggesting that it simply means "to keep from public knowledge
. . . to keep secret." But that dog won't hunt here given the universally accepted
understanding of "suppress" in the specific context of criminal motions practice.
In this context, suppress and exclude do not travel together as interchangeable
terms.

140 We're not persuaded otherwise by the People's reliance on one sentence
from Murray v. Just In Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC, 2016 CO 47M, 1 23, 374 P.3d 443,
452, a civil case. The People wrench from its context our passing reference to the
word "suppress" there as we discussed the trial court's discretion to exclude
evidence that doesn't clear the CRE 403 bar. See id. At no point in Murray did we
touch on-much less undertake any analysis of-the specific use of the term
"suppress" in criminal cases. Hence, the invocation of Murray cannot carry the
day for the People.

141 Significantly, were we to sign off on the People's interpretation of the term
"suppress" in Crim. P. 37.1(a), the practical result would be to greenlight
interlocutory appeals following any adverse pretrial evidentiary ruling. This, in turn,
would all but hand prosecutors a blank check to toll the speedy trial deadline
based on any unfavorable evidentiary ruling. Of course, that would be an absurd

<!-- PageBreak -->

result, and we must eschew interpretations that lead to absurd results. See
McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, 1 38, 442 P.3d 379, 389 (stating that we must avoid
construing statutory language in a way "that would render any words or phrases
superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results"); People v. Angel, 2012 CO 34,
1 17, 277 P.3d 231, 235 (explaining that when we construe the rules of criminal
procedure, we employ the same principles applicable to statutory interpretation).

142 The authority to bring interlocutory appeals is circumscribed because such
appeals necessarily subvert the adjudicatory process. Nothing in the language of
Crim. P. 37.1(a) reflects an intent to grant prosecutors carte blanche to interrupt
proceedings in this way, let alone to encourage gamesmanship by giving them free
reign to engage in dilatory practices when it is to their advantage.

143 Ultimately, the language of Crim. P. 37.1(a) adds no weight to the People's
position. Still, our analysis must go further.

## b. The Language of C.A.R. 4.1, "Interlocutory Appeals in Criminal Cases" from District Court to This Court

144 While Crim. P. 37.1(a) provides the grounds for interlocutory appeals from
the county court to the district court, C.A.R. 4.1(a) provides the grounds for
interlocutory appeals from the district court to our court. Of course, this is an
appeal from the county court to the district court. So, why are we bothering with
C.A.R. 4.1(a)? Because the People contend that the divergence in language
between Crim. P. 37.1(a) and C.A.R. 4.1(a) bestows arguable merit to their

<!-- PageBreak -->

assertion that their appeal was authorized by Crim. P. 37.1(a). We're not sold.
Quite the opposite: The language of C.A.R. 4.1(a) supports our conclusion.

145
C.A.R. 4.1(a) states as follows:

The state may file an interlocutory appeal in the supreme court from a
district court order granting a defendant's pretrial motion under Crim. P.
41(e) and (g) and Crim. P. 41.1(i) for return of property and to suppress
evidence or granting a motion to suppress an extra-judicial confession or
admission, provided that the state certifies to the judge who issued the
order being appealed and to the supreme court that the appeal is not
taken for purposes of delay and that the evidence is a substantial part
of the proof of the charge pending against the defendant.

(Emphases added.)

146 Contrasting the two rules, the People note that, although Crim. P. 37.1(a)
authorizes interlocutory appeals from any rulings granting motions to suppress
evidence, C.A.R. 4.1(a) authorizes interlocutory appeals only from rulings granting
motions to suppress evidence pursuant to Crim. P. 41(e), 41(g), or 41.1(i).3 The People
infer that, unlike C.A.R. 4.1(a), which restricts interlocutory appeals to appeals
based on the three enumerated criminal rules (Crim. P. 41(e), 41(g), and 41.1(i)),
Crim. P. 37.1(a) sweeps in a much broader swath of appeals and includes the
appeal at issue in this case. But that doesn't wash with us.

3 Because the People's contention is cabined to Crim. P. 37.1(a) and C.A.R. 4.1(a),
we limit our analysis accordingly and do not address any other basis for filing an
interlocutory appeal.

<!-- PageBreak -->

147 To begin with, the People overlook that C.A.R. 4.1(a) also refers to a district
court's order granting "a motion to suppress an extra-judicial confession or
admission." This part of the rule makes no reference to, and is therefore not
restricted by, Crim. P. 41(e), 41(g), and 41.1(i).

148 More importantly, the People's argument disregards the similarities
between Crim. P. 37.1(a) and the contents of the three criminal rules listed in C.A.R.
4.1(a). A side-by-side comparison drives the point home:

Crim. P. 37.1(a)

Rules Listed in C.A.R. 4.1(a)

Crim. P. 37.1(a) (first

Crim. P. 41(e):

enumerated basis for appeal):

"[A] motion for Return of

"[A] motion . . . for return of property and to suppress evidence"

Property and to Suppress evidence"

Crim. P. 37.1(a) (second

Crim. P. 41.1(i):

enumerated basis for appeal):

"[A] motion to suppress"

"[A] motion to suppress evidence"

Crim. P. 37.1(a) (third

Crim. P. 41(g):

enumerated basis for appeal):

"[A motion for] Suppression of

"[A] motion to suppress an extra-judicial confession or admission"

Confession or Admission"

As this chart highlights, the substance of Crim. P. 37.1(a) directly mirrors the
substance of the three rules referenced in C.A.R. 4.1(a).

149 In short, the People's reliance on C.A.R. 4.1(a) backfires; that rule drives a
stake through the heart of their argument because it aligns with Crim. P. 37.1(a).
Accordingly, we conclude that C.A.R. 4.1(a) gives the People no foothold.

<!-- PageBreak -->

## c. Relevant Case Law

150 Our precedent applying Crim. P. 37.1's predecessor, Crim. P. 41.2, lends
weight to our conclusion that the People's assertion that their appeal was legally
authorized lacked arguable merit. This case law is particularly persuasive
because, as relevant here, Crim. P. 41.2(a) and its offspring, Crim. P. 37.1(a), are
nearly identical.

151 Applying Crim. P. 41.2(a) in Bowers, we explained that, since any issues
related to evidentiary admissibility were "not constitutional in character, rulings
on such issues [were] not within the scope of Crim. P. 41.2[a]." 716 P.2d at 473.
The People push back, though, arguing that Bowers is inapposite because it relied
on cases dealing with C.A.R. 4.1(a), not Crim. P. 37.1(a). But we've already
determined that C.A.R. 4.1(a) and Crim. P. 37.1(a) are similar in substance.
Besides, by citing C.A.R. 4.1(a) case law to support its holding, Bowers directly
linked C.A.R. 4.1(a) and Crim. P. 41.2(a) (Crim. P. 37.1(a)'s precursor). This
connection is compelling because C.A.R. 4.1(a) does not permit interlocutory
appeals of pretrial evidentiary rulings. See People v. Lindsey, 660 P.2d 502, 505 (Colo.
1983). Rather, appellate review under C.A.R. 4.1(a) is "proper where evidence was
suppressed due to an unlawful search and seizure, an involuntary confession or
admission, or an improperly ordered or insufficiently supported, nontestimonial
identification." People v. Braunthal, 31 P.3d 167, 171 (Colo. 2001) (emphasis added).

<!-- PageBreak -->

152 In harmony with C.A.R. 4.1(a)'s text, we have cautioned prosecutors
bringing C.A.R. 4.1(a) appeals that they "may not ... 'piggyback' issues ... to
obtain review of pre-trial evidentiary decisions." Lindsey, 660 P.2d at 505 (emphasis
added) (quoting People v. Morrison, 583 P.2d 924, 927 (Colo. 1978)). And we see no
reason to break stride in extending Lindsey's rationale here, especially considering
the parallel nature of C.A.R. 4.1(a) and Crim. P. 37.1(a).

153 Tellingly, mapping the holding in Lindsey onto the present circumstances
comports with Crim. P. 37.1(a)'s traditional usage. A review of our jurisprudence
reflects that whenever we've analyzed Crim. P. 37.1(a), the appeal at issue has
stemmed from a ruling suppressing evidence purportedly obtained illegally and
in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights or protections. See, e.g., People v.
Sapp, 934 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Colo. 1997) (involving a Crim. P. 37.1(a) interlocutory
appeal taken in response to a ruling suppressing the defendants' statements as
"involuntary and in violation of Miranda"); Tate v. People, 2012 CO 75, 1 6, 290 P.3d
1268, 1269 (dealing with a Crim. P. 37.1(a) interlocutory appeal taken in response
to the suppression of evidence obtained through an unlawful seizure); Zhuk,
239 P.3d at 438 (implicating a Crim. P. 37.1(a) interlocutory appeal taken in
response to the suppression of evidence based on a Miranda violation). We are
aware of no cases, and the People have unearthed none, suggesting that a Crim. P.
37.1(a) interlocutory appeal may be based on a pretrial evidentiary ruling.

<!-- PageBreak -->

## C. The People's Interlocutory Appeal Did Not Toll the Speedy Trial Deadline

154 Having determined that the People's assertion that their appeal was
authorized lacked arguable merit, the rest of the analytical path requires little
navigation. Because the People failed to clear one of the prongs of the Gallegos
litmus test-that their assertion that their appeal was authorized had arguable
merit - we conclude that their second pretrial appeal was not taken in good faith
and thus did not qualify as "interlocutory" for purposes of the tolling provision in
section 18-1-405(6)(b).

## IV. Conclusion

155
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's judgment. We
remand the case to the district court with instructions to return it to the county
court so the county court may vacate Phillips's judgment of conviction and dismiss
the case with prejudice.