2026 CO 22 24SC761, Mostellar, Jaimi v. City of Colorado Springs

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The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
April 13, 2026

# 2026 CO 22

No. 24SC761, Mostellar v. City of Colo. Springs-Governmental Immunity-
Public Entities - Personal Injury.

The supreme court granted certiorari to consider whether (1) the court of
appeals division below erred in reversing the district court's order denying the
defendant's motion to dismiss, in which the district court had found that the
deadline to provide notice under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act
("CGIA") did not begin to run until the City of Manitou Springs informed the
plaintiff of an intergovernmental agreement that made the defendant potentially
liable for her accident; and (2) the CGIA should require strict compliance when
such compliance is impossible based on one public entity's failure to inform the
claimant of the potential liability of another public entity.

The court now concludes that this case does not implicate a scenario in
which strict compliance with the CGIA was impossible or a defendant prevented
strict compliance by misleading a plaintiff. Having thus decided, the court further
concludes that under section 24-10-109(1), C.R.S. (2025), of the CGIA, the notice

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period began to run on the date on which the claimant was injured on August 26,
2021, not on the date that Manitou Springs informed her of the intergovernmental
agreement. Accordingly, the plaintiff's notice of claim was untimely, and the
division correctly determined that her claim must be dismissed.

The court therefore affirms the division's judgment.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 22

Supreme Court Case No. 24SC761
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 23CA1908

Petitioner:
Jaimi J. Mostellar,
V.

Respondent:
City of Colorado Springs, a Colorado municipality.

Judgment Affirmed
en banc
April 13, 2026

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Kane Law Firm, P.C.

Mark H. Kane

Colorado Springs, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Marc Smith, Acting City Attorney

W. Erik Lamphere, Division Chief

Colorado Springs, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Municipal League:

Robert D. Sheesley

Rachel Bender

Denver, Colorado

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JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE
SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

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JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 We granted certiorari to consider whether (1) the court of appeals division
below erred in reversing the district court's order denying the City of Colorado
Springs' motion to dismiss, in which the district court had found that the deadline
to provide notice under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act ("CGIA") did
not begin to run until the City of Manitou Springs informed Jaimi J. Mostellar of
the intergovernmental agreement that made Colorado Springs potentially liable
for her accident; and (2) the CGIA should require strict compliance when such
compliance is impossible based on one public entity's failure to inform the
claimant of the potential liability of another public entity.

12 Addressing the second issue first, we conclude that this case does not
implicate a scenario in which strict compliance with the CGIA was impossible or
a defendant prevented strict compliance by misleading a plaintiff. In this case,
Colorado Springs, which was the entity entitled to notice, did nothing to inhibit
Mostellar's compliance with the CGIA. Accordingly, strict compliance with the
CGIA's plain terms was required.

13 Having thus decided, we turn to the first issue on which we granted
certiorari, and we conclude that under section 24-10-109(1), C.R.S. (2025), of the
CGIA, the notice period began to run on August 26, 2021, the date on which
Mostellar was injured, not on the date that Manitou Springs informed her of the

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intergovernmental agreement. Accordingly, Mostellar's notice of claim was
untimely, and the division correctly determined that her claim must be dismissed.

14
We therefore affirm the division's judgment.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

15
Mostellar alleged that she was injured on a public sidewalk in Manitou
Springs on August 26, 2021, when she tripped and fell over the base of an old bus
stop sign that had been removed. She then provided Manitou Springs with timely
notice of her injury pursuant to section 24-10-109(1) of the CGIA, which requires
"person[s] claiming to have suffered an injury by a public entity" to file written
notice with that public entity "within one hundred eighty-two days after the date
of the discovery of the injury."

16
Over the ensuing months, Manitou Springs never indicated that it was not
the real party in interest. In April 2023, however, over a year and a half after
Mostellar's fall, Manitou Springs informed Mostellar, for the first time, that
pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement between it and Colorado Springs,
Colorado Springs was responsible for the condition of the sign (and, thus, the
condition of the sidewalk on which Mostellar was injured).

17
Forty days later, on May 30, 2023, Mostellar provided Colorado Springs
with notice under the CGIA. By that point, however (and even by the day on

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which Mostellar was advised of Colorado Springs' involvement), section
24-10-109(1)'s 182-day notice period had long passed.

18 Mostellar thereafter brought an action against both Colorado Springs and
Manitou Springs, asserting claims for premises liability and negligence, stemming
from the existence of a "significant trip hazard" on the sidewalk on which
Mostellar had fallen. Colorado Springs responded by moving to dismiss on the
ground that Mostellar had not provided it with timely notice under the CGIA. In
support of this contention, Colorado Springs argued, among other things, that
equitable defenses, such as tolling, did not overcome the CGIA's 182-day notice
period and that Mostellar's failure to comply with that statutory deadline required
the court to dismiss her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

19 Mostellar responded that her notice to Colorado Springs was timely under
the CGIA, because, in her view, "the statute of limitations with respect to
Defendant Colorado Springs did not begin to run until Plaintiff knew of the city's
potential liability as the real party in interest for the cause of her injury." In
support of this argument, Mostellar asserted that under our decision in Finnie v.
Jefferson County School District R-1, 79 P.3d 1253, 1256-58 (Colo. 2003),
determinations of compliance with section 24-10-109(1) should consider whether
the purposes of the statute-namely, to allow public entities to investigate and
remedy dangerous conditions promptly, to foster prompt settlement of

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meritorious claims, to make necessary arrangements to cover potential liability,
and to prepare to defend themselves - were satisfied. She further contended that
when a public entity has engaged with a plaintiff in a way that thwarts those aims,
service on that entity is not necessary and principles of agency and equity should
apply. And she argued that a claimant like her must be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to discover the basic and material facts underlying a claim before
having to provide the statutorily required notice. This was particularly true here,
given that she asserts that she had no means of discovering the intergovernmental
agreement other than through Manitou Springs and Manitou Springs had not
advised her of that agreement until approximately a year and a half after Mostellar
had provided it with notice. Mostellar thus contended that her claim was "within
the 182 day requirement upon discovering the basic and material facts concerning
Colorado Springs' responsibility."

110 The district court ultimately denied Colorado Springs' motion to dismiss.
Although the court believed that Finnie was distinguishable because it implicated
section 24-10-109(3), rather than section 24-10-109(1), of the CGIA, the court agreed
with Mostellar that under State v. Young, 665 P.2d 108, 109-11 (Colo. 1983), the
CGIA's notice period did not begin to run until she learned not only of her injury
but also of who caused it. In the court's view, Mostellar did not obtain the latter
information until Manitou Springs informed her of the intergovernmental

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agreement that purportedly rendered Colorado Springs responsible for the
accident. This was because the incident happened on a public sidewalk in
Manitou Springs and, the court opined, Mostellar could not reasonably have been
expected to know that Colorado Springs would have had potential liability.
Specifically, the court discerned no reason Mostellar would have been expected to
learn of the intergovernmental agreement between the two cities. Accordingly,
because Mostellar had been reasonably diligent in investigating her claim and
giving timely notice to Manitou Springs, and because Colorado Springs had not
suggested that the intergovernmental agreement was widely known or that
Mostellar, with reasonable diligence, could or should have discovered it before
Manitou Springs disclosed it, the court denied Colorado Springs' motion to
dismiss.

111 Colorado Springs then appealed, and in a unanimous, unpublished
decision, the division below disagreed with the district court and reversed its
judgment. Mostellar v. City of Colo. Springs, No. 23CA1908, 1 1 (Oct. 24, 2024). The
division began by noting that "[t]he 182-day deadline is jurisdictional, and because
it is a non-claim provision, it cannot be waived, tolled, or estopped." Id. at [ 10.
Accordingly, a claimant's failure to comply strictly with the CGIA's notice
requirement mandates dismissal of her complaint. Id. Next, the court observed
that "[t]he CGIA's notice period begins when a claimant 'knew or, through the

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exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known' that she was wrongfully
injured," although "[t]he claimant need not yet know the cause of the injury or the
extent of the damage." Id. at | 11 (quoting Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of
Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 923 (Colo. 1993)). Lastly, the division took issue with
the district court's reliance on Young because that case predated the legislature's
1986 amendment to section 24-10-109(1), which responded to our opinion in Young
by clarifying that the CGIA's notice period is triggered by claimants' discovery of
their injury, not their discovery of the legal theory underlying their claims. Id. at
T 14.

112 Applying these legal principles to the facts before it, the division concluded
that it would have been immediately apparent that Mostellar's fall and injury were
the result of negligence that met the CGIA's definition of injury. Id. at [ 16. Thus,
Mostellar's time to provide notice began running on the date of her injury. Id. And
because she did not provide the required notice until 602 days after her injury, she
had not strictly complied with the CGIA's notice deadline, and her complaint
should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at | 18.

113 Judge Freyre specially concurred. Id. at 11 22-26 (Freyre, J., specially
concurring). Although she agreed with the majority's reasoning and application
of the law, she expressed concern regarding the policy implications of the
division's decision, noting that the facts of this case contradict the prompt

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investigation policy underlying the CGIA's notice requirements. Id. at 11 22, 25.
She thus urged the General Assembly to consider statutory modifications that
would preclude public entities from misleading plaintiffs regarding how to
comply with the CGIA's notice provisions and then assert a defense of
noncompliance. Id. at [ 26.

114 Mostellar thereafter petitioned this court for certiorari review, and we
granted her petition.

## II. Analysis

115 We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review and principles
of statutory construction. Next, we address the second issue on which we granted
certiorari, namely, whether the CGIA requires strict compliance with its notice
provision when such compliance is impossible based on one public entity's failure
to inform a claimant of the potential liability of another public entity. Concluding
that this case implicates neither impossibility of compliance nor any misleading
conduct by Colorado Springs, we determine that the CGIA demanded strict
compliance here. We then address whether Mostellar strictly complied with the
CGIA's notice requirement and conclude that she did not.

### A. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Construction

[16 The CGIA is a non-claim statute that raises a jurisdictional bar if notice is
not given within the applicable time period. Trinity, 848 P.2d at 923. When, as

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here, the parties dispute only the characterization of a plaintiff's complaint and
not the jurisdictional facts alleged therein, we review de novo a court's ruling on
a C.R.C.P 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. City of
Boulder v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 2018 CO 59, 1 14, 420 P.3d 289, 293.

117 Statutory construction presents a question of law that we review de novo.
Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Outdoor Design Landscaping LLC, 2026 CO 6, 1 23, 583 P.3d
778, 783. In interpreting statutory provisions, we seek to determine and effectuate
the intent of those who adopted those measures. Id. To do so, we begin with the
language employed, and we give words and phrases their plain and ordinary
meanings. Id.

118 If the language of a provision is unambiguous, then we apply it as written
and need not turn to other tools of construction. Id. at | 24. If, however, the
provision is ambiguous, then we may consider the intent of those who adopted
the provision, the circumstances of its adoption, and the possible consequences of
different interpretations. Id. A provision is ambiguous when it is reasonably
susceptible of multiple interpretations. Id.

### B. Whether Strict Compliance Was Required

119
Section 24-10-109(1) provides, in pertinent part:

Any person claiming to have suffered an injury by a public entity . . . ,
whether or not by a willful and wanton act or omission, shall file a
written notice as provided in this section within one hundred
eighty-two days after the date of the discovery of the injury,

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regardless of whether the person then knew all of the elements of a
claim or of a cause of action for such injury. Compliance with the
provisions of this section shall be a jurisdictional prerequisite to any action
brought under the provisions of this article, and failure of compliance shall
forever bar any such action.

(Emphasis added.)

120 This language unambiguously requires written notice within 182 days after
the date the claimant discovers their injury, regardless of whether they knew all of
the elements of their claim. The language further makes clear that strict
compliance with the statute is a jurisdictional prerequisite to any action brought
under the CGIA. Thus, we have held, "A claimant's failure to comply with the
requirements of section 24-10-109(1) requires a court to dismiss the action for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction." Mesa Cnty. Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d
1200, 1206 (Colo. 2000). And we have further opined that section 24-10-109(1) is a
non-claim statute, and, therefore, unlike an ordinary statute of limitations, it is
"not subject to equitable defenses such as waiver, tolling, or estoppel." Id .; accord
City & Cnty. of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627, 633 (Colo. 2007).

121 Notwithstanding the foregoing, Mostellar asserts that (1) section
24-10-109(1) includes a discovery rule that required her to know not only of her
injury but also of Colorado Springs' involvement in it before her time to provide
notice began to run; (2) when compliance with the statutory deadline was
impossible due to Manitou Springs' delay in disclosing Colorado Springs'

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involvement, principles of agency and equity should apply; and (3) requiring strict
compliance leads to absurd results when, as here, Mostellar could not ascertain the
identity of the governmental entity to whom she was to provide notice under the
CGIA. We address and reject each of these arguments in turn.

T22 First, as to Mostellar's argument that section 24-10-109(1) includes a
discovery rule that required her to know both of her injury and of Colorado
Springs' involvement in it before the notice period began to run, the statutory
language belies this contention. As noted above, the statute makes clear that
discovery of the injury alone is sufficient to trigger the running of the notice
period. § 24-10-109(1).

123 Young, 665 P.2d at 111, on which Mostellar relies, does not persuade us
otherwise. Although in Young, we held that a claimant must have a reasonable
opportunity to discover the basic and material facts underlying their claim before
being required to provide notice under the CGIA, id., the legislature amended
section 24-10-109(1) in 1986 to override that decision, see Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Lopez,
916 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Colo. 1996). Thus, since the 1986 amendment, we have been
clear that the CGIA's "notice period is triggered when a claimant has only
discovered that he or she has been wrongfully injured." Trinity, 848 P.2d at 923.

124 Second, as to Mostellar's contention that because compliance with the
statutory deadline was impossible due to Manitou Springs' delay in disclosing

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Colorado Springs' involvement, principles of agency and equity should apply, we
initially note that Mostellar has provided no evidence to support her claim of
impossibility of compliance. For example, she has not explained why she could
not have submitted an open records request or researched how transit systems are
organized in Manitou Springs, either of which could have revealed Colorado
Springs' involvement. Accordingly, the premise of Mostellar's argument fails.
125 In any event, Finnie, on which Mostellar relies to assert that equitable
principles should excuse her noncompliance here, does not support her
contention. In Finnie, 79 P.3d at 1256, we differentiated between section
24-10-109(1) and section 24-10-109(3), the latter of which sets forth where a CGIA
notice is to be filed. We observed that section 24-10-109(1) creates a "jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit that therefore requires strict compliance with its terms," while
section 24-10-109(3), in contrast, "provid[es] a statutory defense to claims rather
than creating a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit." Finnie, 79 P.3d at 1256. Thus,
we said, with regard to section 24-10-109(3) only, that a court may make
"case-by-case determinations of compliance, which consider principles of agency
and equity, the purposes of the statute, and concerns of protecting plaintiffs from
misrepresentations by governmental entities." Finnie, 79 P.3d at 1258. We opined
that this standard "is best described as substantial compliance." Id.

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126 Even if Finnie's substantial compliance standard for section 24-10-109(3)
could theoretically apply under the circumstances presented here, which involve
section 24-10-109(1), and even if Mostellar's compliance were truly impossible,
Finnie still would not assist Mostellar because Colorado Springs, the party that was
entitled to the CGIA notice at issue in this case, did nothing to impede Mostellar
from providing timely notice. In Finnie, counsel for a plaintiff who had been
injured in a school contacted the school district's risk management department to
determine where a CGIA notice of claim should be filed. Id. at 1254. Counsel was
told by an employee of the department that the department was authorized to
receive the CGIA notice on the school board's behalf, and counsel submitted a
timely notice of claim as directed, which the department acknowledged receiving.
Id. at 1254-55. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a tort action against the school district,
but the district moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiff had
failed to send notice to the school board or its attorney, as required by the CGIA.
Id. at 1255.

[27 The district court granted the school district's motion, concluding that strict
compliance with the statute was required, and a division of the court of appeals
affirmed. Id. We, however, granted review and reversed. Id. In so ruling, we
observed that the purposes behind section 24-10-109(3) are critical in determining
whether a claimant has complied with that statute. Id. at 1258. We then opined,

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"Allowing public entities to mislead plaintiffs about how to meet the requirements
of the notice provision, and then to assert the affirmative defense of
noncompliance, is beyond the legitimate purposes of the [C]GIA's notice
provision." Id. Accordingly, we deemed it appropriate in such circumstances to
apply a substantial compliance standard that allowed a court to consider, among
other things, principles of agency and equity and concerns of protecting plaintiffs
from misrepresentations by governmental entities. Id.

128 Here, in contrast, Colorado Springs did not mislead Mostellar in any way.
Nor did it do anything to prevent her from filing a timely notice of claim. Indeed,
Mostellar does not assert that Colorado Springs engaged in any such conduct.
Instead, she focuses on what she believes to be Manitou Springs' misconduct in
failing to disclose Colorado Springs' involvement on a timely basis. But any
misconduct by Manitou Springs is irrelevant to Mostellar's statutory duties
toward Colorado Springs, the party entitled to notice here.

129 Finally, as to Mostellar's assertion that strict compliance with the applicable
statutory deadline would lead to absurd results because she could not ascertain
the proper entity to whom she was to give notice, as noted above, Mostellar has
provided no evidence to establish that she could not ascertain this information.
Nor do we perceive any absurdity in applying section 24-10-109(1) as the
legislature plainly wrote it. As we observed above, the statute is clear in its

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mandates, and we view strict adherence with those mandates as consistent with
the legislature's intent to allow public entities to investigate and remedy
dangerous conditions promptly, to foster prompt settlement of meritorious claims,
to make fiscal arrangements to cover any potential liability, and to prepare to
defend against claims. Jefferson Cnty. Health Servs. Ass'n v. Feeney, 974 P.2d 1001,
1003 (Colo. 1998).

130 For these reasons, we conclude that on the facts of this case, section
24-10-109(1) required strict compliance with its deadline to file a notice of claim.

131 Having so concluded, we turn to whether Mostellar complied with her
statutory duties here.

### C. Application

132 As noted above, by its plain terms, section 24-10-109(1) requires a person
claiming to have suffered any injury by a public entity to provide written notice to
that entity within 182 days after the date the person discovers their injury,
regardless of whether they knew all of the elements of their claim. The statute
further makes clear that strict compliance with its terms is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to any action brought under the CGIA. Id. Thus, a plaintiff's failure
to comply with section 24-10-109(1)'s deadline requires a court to dismiss the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mesa Cnty. Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51,
8 P.3d at 1206.

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133 Here, Mostellar unquestionably knew of her injury on the day of her
accident, August 26, 2021. Accordingly, she had 182 days from that date to
provide the requisite notice to Colorado Springs. It is undisputed, however, that
she did not provide notice by the statutory deadline.

134 For these reasons, like the division below, we conclude that section
24-10-109(1) required the dismissal of Mostellar's claims against Colorado Springs.
135 In so concluding, we acknowledge, as did the division below, see Mostellar,
[ 18 n.1; id. at 11 22-26 (Freyre, J., specially concurring), that the result that we
reach today may, to some, seem harsh and inequitable because Mostellar and her
counsel appear to have acted in good faith and tried to comply with the CGIA's
mandates, while Manitou Springs delayed disclosing the intergovernmental
agreement for a lengthy period of time. Although we are not unsympathetic to
this argument, we are constrained to follow the plain language of section
24-10-109(1), and any effort to remedy inequity that might result from the
application of the statute's plain language is more appropriately directed to our
General Assembly.

## III. Conclusion

136 For these reasons, we conclude that, even if principles of agency and equity
could apply here, this case does not involve a scenario in which strict compliance
with the CGIA was impossible or a defendant prevented a plaintiff's strict

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compliance by misleading the plaintiff. Accordingly, strict compliance with the
CGIA's notice period was required, and, under the plain language of section
24-10-109(1), Mostellar's time to provide the requisite notice began to run on the
date she was injured, August 26, 2021. Because Mostellar did not provide
Colorado Springs with the statutorily required notice within 182 days of that date,
her claim was untimely, and, as the division below concluded, dismissal was
required.

137
37 We therefore affirm the division's judgment.