26CO27, 26SA55 - People v. Schneider (no oral arguments were held)

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The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
May 4, 2026

2026 CO 27

No. 26SA55, People v. Schneider-Jurisdiction-Interlocutory Appeal-
§ 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2025) - C.A.R. 4.1.

The supreme court concludes that section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2025), and
C.A.R. 4.1 do not authorize the prosecution to file an interlocutory appeal to
review a district court's order granting a defendant's pretrial motion to exclude
evidence under section 24-31-902, C.R.S. (2025). Section 24-31-902 requires officers
to activate their body-worn cameras under certain circumstances, and if an officer
fails to do so, it creates a rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility for any
unrecorded evidence related to the incident. § 24-31-902(1)(a)(II)-(III). In this case,
the defendant moved to exclude evidence under section 24-31-902, and the district
court granted the motion under that statute. Thus, the supreme court lacks
appellate jurisdiction to consider this case as an interlocutory appeal under section
16-12-102(2) and C.A.R. 4.1, and it dismisses the appeal.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 27

Supreme Court Case No. 26SA55
Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court
Logan County District Court Case No. 25CR186
Honorable Carl Sidney McGuire III, Judge

Plaintiff-Appellant:
The People of the State of Colorado,

V.
Defendant-Appellee:
Collin Schneider.

Appeal Dismissed
en banc
May 4, 2026

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant:
Travis J. Sides, District Attorney, Thirteenth Judicial District
Kayla Lynn Gehringer, Deputy District Attorney
Sterling, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee:

OllomPrice Criminal Defense

Ross Ollom

Levi Price

Denver, Colorado

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PER CURIAM.

11
This case comes before us as an interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 4.1 asking
us to review a Logan County District Court order granting a defendant's pretrial
motion to exclude evidence under section 24-31-902, C.R.S. (2025). That statute
requires officers to activate their body-worn cameras under certain circumstances
and creates a rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility of unrecorded evidence
related to the incident if the officer fails to do so. § 24-31-902(1)(a)(II)-(III).
Because we conclude that we lack appellate jurisdiction to consider this case under
C.A.R. 4.1, we dismiss the appeal.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

12 Defendant Collin Schneider was charged with vehicular eluding and
reckless driving. Schneider filed a pretrial motion to exclude officers' testimony
pursuant to section 24-31-902, arguing that the officers failed to activate their body-
worn cameras as required by that statute. He contended that there was no basis
to rebut the statutory presumption of inadmissibility of the officers' testimony
regarding the events that should have been recorded. Thus, he asserted, the
officers' testimony regarding approximately twenty minutes of unrecorded police
activity was inadmissible and must be excluded from trial. At the motions
hearing, the district court's findings and conclusions on this issue related only to

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whether the police violated section 24-31-902. Ultimately, the district court
granted Schneider's motion.

13 The People thereafter filed this C.A.R. 4.1 appeal challenging the district
court's order excluding the officers' testimony under section 24-31-902.

## II. Analysis

14 "Because we must always satisfy ourselves that we have jurisdiction to hear
an appeal, we may raise jurisdictional defects sua sponte, regardless of whether
the parties have raised the issue." People v. S.X.G., 2012 CO 5, 1 9, 269 P.3d 735,
737.

15 Here, we conclude we lack jurisdiction to hear this case as an interlocutory
appeal under section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2025), and C.A.R. 4.1. Section
16-12-102(2) and C.A.R. 4.1 authorize the prosecution to immediately appeal a
district court's order granting a defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence
based on certain constitutional violations. People v. Brown, 2022 CO 11, 1 13,
504 P.3d 970, 974. Here, however, the district court's order granted a motion to
exclude evidence under section 24-31-902. Because section 16-12-102(2) and
C.A.R. 4.1 do not authorize such an appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider it.

16
Section 16-12-102(2) authorizes the prosecution in criminal cases to file an
interlocutory appeal in the supreme court under limited circumstances. Largely
tracking the statute, Colorado Appellate Rule 4.1(a) limits our appellate review to

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district court orders granting a defendant's pretrial motion under Crim. P. 41(e)
and (g) and Crim. P. 41.1(i). Crim. P. 41(e) concerns the return of property and the
suppression of evidence resulting from an unlawful search and seizure;
Crim. P. 41(g) concerns the suppression of an involuntary confession or
admission; and Crim. P. 41.1(i) concerns nontestimonial identification evidence
seized without sufficient grounds or a proper order. See Phillips v. People, 2026 CO
21, T1 45-46, _ P.3d _. Each of these grounds for suppression is premised on a
violation of a defendant's Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights.
See People v. Lindsey, 660 P.2d 502, 504 (Colo. 1983).

17 Moreover, in suppression motions and under C.A.R. 4.1, the word
"suppress" "is a specialized term denoting the exclusion from trial of any evidence
procured illegally, typically in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights or
protections." Phillips, 1 35. "[W]e have gone so far as to indicate on multiple
occasions that suppression is generally reserved for evidence obtained in violation
of constitutional rights or protections and does not normally extend to evidence
collected in violation of statutory rights." Id. at | 36. Relevant here, "suppress and
exclude do not travel together as interchangeable terms." Id. at | 39.

18 By contrast, the motion and order excluding evidence here were grounded
entirely in section 24-31-902. Under that statute, an officer must activate their
body-worn camera

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when responding to a call for service, entering into a premises for the
purposes of enforcing the law or in response to a call for service,
during a welfare check except for a motorist assist, or during any
interaction with the public initiated by the peace officer, whether
consensual or nonconsensual, for the purpose of enforcing the law or
investigating possible violations of the law.

§ 24-31-902(1)(a)(II)(A).

19 If an officer fails to do so, "there is a permissive inference in any
investigation or legal proceeding . . . that the missing footage would have reflected
misconduct by the peace officer." § 24-31-902(1)(a)(III). The failure to comply
"creates a rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility" of "any statements or
conduct sought to be introduced in a prosecution through the peace officer related
to the incident that were not recorded." Id.

110 In this case, Schneider did not file a motion to suppress evidence under
Crim. P. 41(e), (g), or Crim. P. 41.1(i). Instead, he filed a motion to exclude officers'
testimony under section 24-31-902 regarding about twenty minutes of unrecorded
police activity. In addressing the motion, the district court did not mention any
constitutional or enumerated basis under C.A.R. 4.1 to suppress officers'
testimony. Instead, it granted Schneider's motion to exclude the testimony
expressly and solely under section 24-31-902. Such a ruling is not encompassed
by the confines of a C.A.R. 4.1 appeal. See Lindsey, 660 P.2d at 505 ("Simply stated,
interlocutory appeals may not be used to obtain pre-trial review of issues not
covered by C.A.R. 4.1. Likewise, C.A.R. 4.1 may not be used to 'piggyback' issues

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not embraced by that rule to obtain review of pre-trial evidentiary decisions."
(citation omitted) (quoting People v. Morrison, 583 P.2d 924, 927 (Colo. 1978))).

111 Although we considered the interaction of C.A.R. 4.1 and section 24-31-902
in People v. Havens, 2025 CO 65, 580 P.3d 1179, that case is distinguishable. There,
the district court suppressed evidence because it was seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment -not based on a violation of section 24-31-902 itself. Havens,
TT 1-3, 580 P.3d at 1180. In that case, an officer failed to activate the audio on his
body-worn camera when talking to a motel clerk. Id. at 1 6, 580 P.3d at 1181. The
court found that the officer's testimony about the clerk's statement was
inadmissible under section 24-31-902. Havens, 13, 580 P.3d at 1180. Because the
clerk's statement was the sole basis for the search warrant, the court concluded
that the warrant lacked probable cause. Id. Accordingly, the court suppressed the
fruits of the search. Id. We had no reason to question our jurisdiction under
C.A.R. 4.1 because the basis of the district court's ruling was constitutional rather
than purely statutory.

112 People v. Soron, 2026 CO 3, 581 P.3d 778, another case appealed through
C.A.R. 4.1, is likewise distinguishable. There, we discussed section 24-31-902 in
the context of whether body-worn camera footage contained information within
the scope of the physician-patient privilege. Soron, T1 38-42, 581 P.3d at 786. The
issue in that case did not concern the body-worn camera activation requirements

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under section 24-31-902(1)(a)(II). And although the defendant in Soron disputed
our C.A.R. 4.1 jurisdiction, contending that the trial court based its order on
alleged privilege and statutory violations not at issue here, we concluded that our
jurisdiction was proper because the trial court expressly looked to Crim. P. 41(e),
analyzed the questions according to the law governing search warrants, and relied
on Fourth Amendment principles in issuing its ruling. Soron, TT 18-19, 581 P.3d
at 783. By contrast, the district court's ruling here was grounded entirely in section
24-31-902.

113 In sum, the district court granted Schneider's pretrial motion to exclude
evidence under section 24-31-902; it did not grant a pretrial motion to suppress
evidence under Crim. P. 41(e), (g), or Crim. P. 41.1(i), nor did it discuss these rules
or their underlying constitutional principles as grounds for its ruling. Because
C.A.R. 4.1 does not authorize the prosecution to file an interlocutory appeal to
review a district court's order granting a defendant's pretrial motion to exclude
evidence under section 24-31-902, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to
consider the People's appeal.

## III. Conclusion

114 Because we lack appellate jurisdiction under section 16-12-102(2) and
C.A.R. 4.1, we dismiss the appeal.