26 CO 31, 24SC513 Hupke, Michael v. People

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The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
May 18, 2026

2026 CO 31

No. 24SC513, Hupke v. People- Statutory Construction - Attempt to Influence a
Public Servant.

Section 18-8-306, C.R.S. (2025), criminalizes attempts to influence a public
servant's actions "by means of deceit." The supreme court holds that this phrase
encompasses a defendant's use of a third party to engage in deception. The
supreme court observes that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "deceit"
is broad and concludes that it encompasses using a third party to convey false
information. Therefore, the supreme court holds that a defendant violates section
18-8-306 when the defendant uses a third party to convey false information in an
effort to influence a public servant's actions and the false information actually
reaches the public servant.

The supreme court further concludes that the evidence at trial, viewed in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to support
Michael Thomas Hupke's conviction under section 18-8-306. Accordingly, the
supreme court affirms the judgment of the court of appeals.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 31

Supreme Court Case No. 24SC513
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 23CA106

Petitioner:
Michael Thomas Hupke,
V.

Respondent:

The People of the State of Colorado.

Judgment Affirmed
en banc
May 18, 2026

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Megan A. Ring, Public Defender

Rachel Z. Geiman, Deputy Public Defender

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General

William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant Attorney General

Denver, Colorado

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CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE
SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

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CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 Under section 18-8-306, C.R.S. (2025), any person who attempts to influence
a public servant's actions "by means of deceit" commits a class 4 felony. In this
case, we are asked to determine whether a person acts "by means of deceit" when
using a third party to lie to a public servant on their behalf.1

12
Michael Thomas Hupke was convicted of violating section 18-8-306 for
instructing his mother to lie to his parole officer in an effort to persuade the officer
to lift Hupke's parole hold. His mother complied and conveyed the false
statement. Hupke argues that section 18-8-306 criminalizes only a defendant's
own direct deceit and does not extend to defendants who engage a third party to
commit deceptive acts on their behalf. In other words, he argues that he did not
act "by means of deceit" for purposes of section 18-8-306 because he did not
personally lie to the parole officer. We disagree.

13 The plain and ordinary meaning of the word "deceit" is broad,
encompassing any trick, contrivance, or act designed to lead someone to believe
something that is not true. Using a third party to convey a lie, especially someone
who may appear more trustworthy or believable, is an act designed to lead the

1 We granted certiorari to review the following issue:

Whether the court of appeals incorrectly held that a violation of
section 18-8-306, C.R.S. (2024) can be accomplished through a third
party's deceit.

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recipient of that information to believe something that is not true. We therefore
hold that the phrase "by means of deceit" in section 18-8-306 encompasses a
defendant's use of a third party to engage in deception.

14 Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence at trial
was sufficient to support Hupke's conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the court of appeals.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

15
In November 2021, Hupke was arrested and booked into county jail. At the
time, Hupke was on parole for unrelated charges, so he was placed on a parole
hold pending review by his parole officer. Hupke had moved his residence
without informing his parole officer, which was a violation of a condition of his
parole. Hupke called his mother from jail, explained the situation, and
emphasized the importance of getting the parole hold lifted so he could be released
from jail. Hupke instructed his mother not to tell his parole officer that he had
already moved, but instead to say that he was in the process of moving. Hupke's
mother ultimately conveyed the false information to the parole officer as
instructed.

16 Hupke's phone calls were recorded and reviewed, and he was charged with
one count of attempt to influence a public servant under section 18-8-306. The
phone calls were admitted as evidence at trial, and Hupke was convicted.

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17 On appeal, Hupke challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction. People v. Hupke, 2024 COA 73, 1 1, 557 P.3d 816, 817. Specifically, he
argued that the phrase "by means of deceit" in section 18-8-306 requires a
defendant to personally deceive a public servant. Id. Here, Hupke contended, the
prosecution presented no evidence that he personally deceived his parole
officer - rather, any deception was carried out by his mother. Id. A division of the
court of appeals rejected his contentions and affirmed his conviction. Id. at [ 16,
557 P.3d at 819.

18 The division reasoned that the plain language of the statute encompassed
Hupke's actions because the phrase "by means of deceit" in section 18-8-306
describes an "offender's attempt to influence a public servant through any
fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation designed to deceive and trick the
public servant." Id. at [ 11, 557 P.3d at 819. The division then concluded that
sufficient evidence supported Hupke's conviction because he acted by means of
deceit when he used his mother to convey false information to his parole officer in
an effort to get his parole hold lifted. Id. at | 14, 557 P.3d at 819.

19 We granted Hupke's petition for a writ of certiorari, and we now affirm.

## II. Analysis

110 Hupke argues that section 18-8-306 criminalizes a defendant's own acts of
deceit, not a defendant's truthful instructions to a third party to engage in

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deceptive acts on the defendant's behalf. He contends that his conduct did not
amount to "deceit" because he told his mother the truth and merely instructed her
to lie; his mother's actions deceived the parole officer.

111 We begin by setting forth the standard of review and applicable legal
principles. We then consider the meaning of the phrase "by means of deceit" in
section 18-8-306 and hold that, contrary to Hupke's contention, "deceit"
encompasses a defendant's use of a third party to engage in deceptive acts on the
defendant's behalf.

112 Next, we turn to the facts of this case and apply them to the elements of
section 18-8-306. We conclude that a reasonable juror could have found that
Hupke's conduct, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
constituted an attempt to influence a public servant by means of deceit.
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Hupke's
conviction.

### A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

113 We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. McCoy v. People,
2019 CO 44, 1 37, 442 P.3d 379, 389. When we construe a statute, our primary
purpose is to identify and give effect to the legislature's intent. Id. We look first
to the language of the statute and give its words and phrases their plain and
ordinary meanings. Id. We discern their ordinary meanings by construing

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undefined words and phrases according to their common usage. People v. Johnson,
2024 CO 32, 1 17, 549 P.3d 957, 961.

114 We likewise review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. Manjarrez v.
People, 2020 CO 53, 1 20, 465 P.3d 547, 551. In so doing, we must "determine
whether the relevant evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, was sufficient to support the conclusion by a reasonable juror
that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Butler v. People, 2019
CO 87, 1 20, 450 P.3d 714, 718.

## B. The Meaning of the Phrase "By Means of Deceit" in Section 18-8-306

115 Section 18-8-306 provides that it is a class 4 felony to "attempt[] to influence
any public servant by means of deceit ... with the intent thereby to alter or affect
the public servant's decision ... or action concerning any matter which is to be
considered or performed by the public servant." The purpose of this provision "is
to protect public servants from undue influence or intimidation by means of
deceit." People v. Janousek, 871 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Colo. 1994).

116 Because the statute does not define "deceit," we look to its plain and
ordinary meaning. Over thirty-two years ago, we explained that "deceit" means
"[a] fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation . .. used by one or more persons
to deceive and trick another, who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and
damage of the party imposed upon." Id. at 1196 (alteration and omission in

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original) (quoting Deceit, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)). It includes "any
trick, collusion, contrivance, false representation, or underhand practice used to
defraud another." Id. (quoting Deceit, Webster's Third New International
Dictionary (1986). Although those dictionary definitions have evolved somewhat
over time, their essence remains unchanged. See Deceit, Black's Law Dictionary
(12th ed. 2024) ("The act of intentionally leading someone to believe something
that is not true; an act designed to deceive or trick .... "); Deceit, Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deceit [https://
perma.cc/7V5T-E94Z] ("[T]he act of causing someone to accept as true or valid
what is false or invalid . .. . ").

117 While Hupke acknowledges that the term "deceit" is broader than "lie," he
argues that "deceit" is not so broad as to include using a third party to convey a
lie on a defendant's behalf. We disagree. As reflected by the broad definitions
above, the ordinary meaning of "deceit" encompasses a wide range of conduct.
True, it is possible to engage in deceit by personally misleading or tricking another
individual into believing something that is not true. But it is equally possible to
mislead or trick another person by using someone else to convey false or misleading
information. Indeed, in some cases, it may be even more deceptive to use a
messenger to convey untrue information-especially a messenger whom the
recipient is likely to find more believable or trustworthy. Either method amounts

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to conduct designed to lead another person to believe something that is not true,
which is the heart of "deceit."2

118 Importantly, the use of deceit is simply a means to an end. Section 18-8-306
does not criminalize deceit in and of itself; it prohibits attempts to influence public
servants "by means of" deceit. Thus, imagine a person asks a third party to convey
false information to a public servant to influence some action by the public servant,
but the third party never follows through. While such a scenario may amount to
solicitation or conspiracy (depending on the circumstances), it does not amount to
an attempt to influence the public servant under section 18-8-306 because a public
servant cannot possibly be influenced by information that never reaches them.3

119 Hupke also contends that the legislature could not have intended for the
statute to cover his conduct because other class 4 felonies, such as second degree

2 Hupke proposes a broad definition of "deceit" that includes "direct lies, ... lying
by omission, misleading statements, or other acts designed to create a false
impression" and insists that such a definition does not encompass instructing
another person to lie. Opening Brief for Petitioner at 7-8. But using another
person to convey a lie or a misleading statement is also an act "designed to create
a false impression." Thus, Hupke's own definition of "deceit" does not preclude
actions that rely on a third party.

3 We note that it is irrelevant whether the third party is aware that the information
to be conveyed is untruthful. The key question in this case is whether section
18-8-306 criminalizes a defendant's use of a third party to deceive a public servant
in an effort to influence that public servant's actions. The answer to that question
does not hinge on the third party's awareness that the information being conveyed
is untruthful.

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assault, § 18-3-203(2)(b), C.R.S. (2025), and second degree motor vehicle theft,
§ 18-4-409(6)(b), C.R.S. (2025), are more serious than using another person to
convey a lie. In other words, Hupke argues that the legislature could not have
intended to punish his actions as harshly as the legislature punishes crimes like
second degree assault. We disagree.

120 First, we find no such limitation in the language chosen by the legislature.
The legislature chose the phrase "by means of deceit," which includes many forms
of trickery. We must presume that its choice was deliberate and made with full
knowledge of the effects. See In re People v. Beverly, 2025 CO 18, 1 21, 568 P.3d 398,
404. Second, given that the purpose of the statute is to "protect public servants
from undue influence or intimidation by means of deceit," Janousek, 871 P.2d at
1194, the legislature reasonably chose language intended to cover a broad range of
conduct. Public servants must routinely make consequential decisions where the
accuracy of information is paramount. So, criminalizing attempts to influence the
actions of public servants is critical to ensuring the accuracy and integrity of their
decisions.

121 In sum, we hold that the meaning of the phrase "by means of deceit" in
section 18-8-306 encompasses a defendant's use of a third party to engage in
deceptive acts on the defendant's behalf.

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## C. Application

122 Turning to the facts of this case, we conclude that a reasonable juror could
have found that Hupke's conduct, viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, amounted to an attempt to influence a public servant by means of
deceit. First, the parties do not contest that a parole officer is a public servant.
Second, undisputed evidence showed that Hupke had changed residences
without his parole officer's permission. Third, there is no dispute that Hupke
sought to be released; the recorded phone conversations revealed that Hupke
wanted his parole officer to lift the parole hold. Fourth, those conversations also
revealed that Hupke asked his mother to lie to his parole officer by saying that he
was in the process of moving when in fact he had already moved. Fifth, the
evidence showed that Hupke's mother actually conveyed the lie to the parole
officer. In sum, Hupke effectively used his mother to lie to his parole officer in an
effort to influence the parole officer's actions. A reasonable juror therefore could
have found that Hupke attempted to influence a public servant by means of deceit,
in violation of section 18-8-306.

## III. Conclusion

123 We hold that the meaning of the phrase "by means of deceit" in section
18-8-306 encompasses a defendant's use of a third party to engage in deception.
Under this definition, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support

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Hupke's conviction for attempt to influence a public servant. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.