26 CO 48, 25SC53 People v. Jebe, Quinn

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE

June 23, 2026

2026 CO 48

No. 25SC53, People v. Jebe-Appeal Timeliness-Motions to Reconsider-
Tolling Effect.

The supreme court granted certiorari to review whether the court of appeals
erred in dismissing the People's appeal as untimely. The People filed their appeal
within forty-nine days of the district court's order denying their motion to
reconsider its judgment dismissing Quinn M. Jebe's charges with prejudice.

The supreme court holds that when the People timely file a motion to
reconsider in the district court, it tolls the appeal timeline. Hence, the supreme
court concludes here that the People's appeal was timely because they (1) filed a
motion to reconsider within the forty-nine-day appeal period set forth in
C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A), which tolled the appeal timeline, and then, factoring in the time
period tolled, (2) filed a notice of appeal within forty-nine days of the district
court's order denying the motion to reconsider. Accordingly, the supreme court
reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands the case for the court
of appeals to reinstate the People's appeal as timely filed.

<!-- PageBreak -->

# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 48

Supreme Court Case No. 25SC53
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 23CA1676

Petitioner:
The People of the State of Colorado,

V.
Respondent:
Quinn M. Jebe.

Judgment Reversed
en banc
June 23, 2026

Attorneys for Petitioner:
John Walsh, District Attorney, Second Judicial District
Robert M. Russel, Chief Deputy District Attorney
Jeff M. Van der Veer, Senior Deputy District Attorney
Alison Suthers, Senior Deputy District Attorney
Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Teodorovic Law, P.C.

Adrienne R. Teodorovic

Windsor, Colorado

<!-- PageBreak -->

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and
JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

JUSTICE GABRIEL, joined by JUSTICE HOOD, concurred in the judgment.

<!-- PageBreak -->

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 While Quinn M. Jebe awaited trial, the People moved to dismiss his case
without prejudice because the victim was unavailable to testify. After the People
explained that this would not foreseeably change, the district court dismissed the
case with prejudice. The People immediately filed a motion to reconsider, which
the district court denied thirty-nine days later. The People then filed a notice of
appeal within a month from the district court's denial of the motion to reconsider
but more than forty-nine days from the initial dismissal. A division of the court of
appeals concluded that the People's appeal was untimely because it had been filed
more than forty-nine days after the dismissal, and the motion to reconsider did
not extend that appeal period. People v. Jebe, No. 23CA1676, 11 (Dec. 5, 2024); see
C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A). We granted the People's petition for certiorari.1

T2
We hold that when the People timely file a motion to reconsider in the
district court, it tolls the appeal timeline.2 Hence, we conclude here that the

1 We granted certiorari to review the following issue:

Whether the court of appeals erred in dismissing the petitioner's
appeal as untimely, when that appeal was filed within [forty-nine]
days of the order denying a motion for reconsideration.

2 The division and the parties agree that C.A.R. 4(b)(2) already provides for tolling
of a defendant's time to appeal a judgment of conviction upon the defendant's
timely filing of certain post-trial motions in the trial court. See Jebe, [ 11. Thus,
our holding today focuses on the tolling effect of the People's timely filed motion
to reconsider.

<!-- PageBreak -->

People's appeal was timely because they (1) filed a motion to reconsider within
the forty-nine-day appeal period set forth in C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A), which tolled the
appeal timeline, and then, factoring in the time period tolled, (2) filed a notice of
appeal within forty-nine days of the district court's order denying the motion to
reconsider. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and
remand the case for the court of appeals to reinstate the People's appeal as timely
filed.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

T3
The People charged Jebe with three counts of sexual assault on a child and
distribution of a controlled substance to a minor. His speedy trial deadline was
August 28, 2023, and trial was set for August 1. At a pretrial conference on July 17,
the People indicated to the district court that the victim could not testify due to a
mental health condition, which would not change within the speedy trial deadline.
The district court continued the pretrial conference to July 24. On that date, the
parties agreed to appear on July 28 for a plea hearing, and the court maintained
the August 1 trial date.

14 On July 27, the People filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice because
the victim was unavailable to testify, and they reiterated this request at the plea
hearing the next day. Jebe objected and asked the court to reset trial for August 28,
the last date of his speedy trial deadline. But when the court asked the People if

<!-- PageBreak -->

they would be ready for trial then, they responded that they would "be in the same
position." Based on these circumstances, the court dismissed the case but instead,
with prejudice, on July 28.

15
That same day, the People filed a motion to reconsider the court's decision
to dismiss the case with prejudice. The district court denied that motion on
September 5, thirty-nine days later. The People then filed a notice of appeal on
September 28, twenty-three days after the court denied their motion to reconsider
and sixty-two days after the order dismissing the case with prejudice.

16 The court of appeals issued an order to show cause why the appeal should
not be dismissed as untimely under C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A). The order to show cause
stated that because the district court appeared to have dismissed all the charges
on July 28, the appeal was due by September 15.3

17 The People responded, citing case law to suggest that the time period for an
appeal did not begin to run until the district court ruled on their motion to
reconsider. See People v. Tuffo, 209 P.3d 1226, 1229 (Colo. App. 2009); People v.
Melton, 910 P.2d 672, 675 n.4 (Colo. 1996), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated
in, People v. Zhuk, 239 P.3d 437, 439 (Colo. 2010); People v. Blue, 253 P.3d 1273, 1275

3 Here, we note that, in considering the tolling effect of the People's motion to
reconsider, the forty-nine-day appeal period would instead begin to run
September 5, when the district court ruled on the motion, making the People's
appeal due October 24.

<!-- PageBreak -->

(Colo. App. 2011). In the alternative, the People argued that their reliance on that
case law constituted excusable neglect, warranting a thirty-five-day extension and
rendering the appeal timely. See C.A.R. 4(b)(3).

18 A division of the court of appeals disagreed and dismissed the People's
appeal as untimely. Jebe, 11. The division concluded that C.A.R. 4 does not toll
the time to appeal for postjudgment motions filed by the prosecution. Id. at 1 9.
The division also distinguished the People's cited case law, noting that those cases
involved either interlocutory appeals or "unusual procedural circumstances." Id.
at 1 13. Furthermore, the division concluded that the People made no showing of
excusable neglect because their misinterpretation of the cases was avoidable "legal
error" and because they still had ten days to file their notice of appeal when the
district court denied the motion to reconsider on September 5. Id. at | 19.

19
We granted the People's petition for certiorari.

## II. Analysis

110 We begin by establishing our standard of review. We then look to our
Colorado Appellate Rules governing prosecutorial appeals in criminal cases,
specifically, C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A). Next, we review case law regarding tolling when a
party files a postjudgment motion with the trial court, seeking substantive review
of an immediately appealable order. Finally, we apply this law to the facts
presented here.

<!-- PageBreak -->

111 We hold that when the People timely file a motion to reconsider in the
district court, it tolls the appeal timeline. Hence, we conclude here that the
People's appeal was timely because they (1) filed a motion to reconsider within
the forty-nine-day appeal period set forth in C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A), which tolled the
appeal timeline, and then, factoring in the time period tolled, (2) filed a notice of
appeal within forty-nine days of the district court's order denying the motion to
reconsider. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and
remand the case for the court of appeals to reinstate the People's appeal as timely
filed.

## A. Standard of Review

112 A party's "[f]ailure to file a timely appeal is a jurisdictional defect." People v.
Donahue, 750 P.2d 921, 922 (Colo. 1988). Jurisdiction is a question of law that we
review de novo. E.g., People v. Maser, 2012 CO 41, 1 10, 278 P.3d 361, 364.

## B. Prosecutorial Appeals in Criminal Cases

113 A trial court's order dismissing a defendant's charges is an immediately
appealable final order. § 16-12-102(1), C.R.S. (2025). The People's appeal of a
district court's final order in a criminal case must comport with the applicable
procedures set forth in the Colorado Appellate Rules. Id .; Crim. P. 38. Specifically,
C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A) requires that the People file their notice of appeal "within [forty-
nine] days after the entry of judgment or order appealed from."

<!-- PageBreak -->

114 The court of appeals has jurisdiction to hear an appeal only when it is timely
filed.4 C.A.R. 3(a); People v. Baker, 104 P.3d 893, 895 (Colo. 2005). And C.A.R.
4(b)(6)(A) is silent regarding the effect of motions to reconsider on the timing for
prosecutorial appeals in criminal cases. Whereas C.A.R. 4(b)(2) provides for
tolling in criminal cases following a defendant's post-trial motion after conviction,
C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A) does not address whether postjudgment motions to reconsider
affect the deadline for prosecutorial appeals.

## C. Appeal Timeliness in the Context of Subsequent Motions to the Trial Court After a Directly Appealable Order

115 We have previously held that a timely motion to reconsider a trial court's
suppression order-filed within the applicable interlocutory appeal
timeline - tolls the time for that interlocutory appeal. People v. Powers, 47 P.3d 686,
687 (Colo. 2002), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in, Zhuk, 239 P.3d at
439.5 In Powers, we observed that "C.A.R. 4.1 does not address motions for

4 However, "[u]pon a showing of excusable neglect," the appellate court may
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal up to thirty-five days. C.A.R. 4(b)(3).
"Excusable neglect involves a situation where the failure to act results from
circumstances which would cause a reasonably careful person to neglect a duty."
Farmers Ins. Grp. v. Dist. Ct., 507 P.2d 865, 867 (Colo. 1973). Because our holding
today establishes that the People's appeal was timely, we do not address the issue
of excusable neglect.

5 However, because the People in Powers filed their motion to reconsider after the
interlocutory appeal timeline, we ultimately held that their appeal was untimely.
47 P.3d at 689-90.

<!-- PageBreak -->

reconsideration," and we had not already addressed this issue in the interlocutory
appeal context. Id. at 688. We then relied on the Supreme Court's conclusions in
United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 78-79 (1964); United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6,
8-9 (1976); and United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1991), in addition to the
Tenth Circuit's reasoning in United States v. Martinez, 681 F.2d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir.
1982). Powers, 47 P.3d at 689.

116 We observed that in Healy, Dieter, and Ibarra, the "Supreme Court has held
that a timely motion to reconsider tolls the running of the [appeal] period,"
meaning that the appeal period "begin[s] again once the trial court rules on the
motion for reconsideration." Id. (first citing Ibarra, 502 U.S. at 4 n.2; then citing
Dieter, 429 U.S. at 8; and then citing Healy, 376 U.S. at 78-79). We further noted
that in Martinez, the Tenth Circuit explained that "[a]n untimely request for
rehearing will not toll the running of the appeal period." Id. (citing Martinez,
681 F.2d at 1253). And we found "the reasoning of these cases persuasive." Id.
Thus, we incorporated this rule into our case law, specifically in the context of
interlocutory appeals. Id.

117 Divisions of the court of appeals have followed suit. In Tuffo, a division
cited Powers for its rule that "a proper and timely motion for reconsideration
suspends the order's finality such that the full time for appealing begins to run
only when reconsideration is denied." Tuffo, 209 P.3d at 1229 (citing Powers,

<!-- PageBreak -->

47 P.3d at 689). There, at sentencing, defense counsel was unprepared to address
the sexually violent predator designation, and the court allowed counsel to file a
motion for reconsideration, which would be reviewed at a later hearing. Id. After
several subsequent hearings and about seven months after sentencing, the court
permitted arguments regarding the designation and ultimately denied the
defendant's oral motion to reconsider. Id. When the People later disputed the
defendant's subsequent appeal as untimely, the division instead held that the
challenge was timely because the trial court had allowed the oral motion for
reconsideration made at sentencing to be heard at a later date and the prosecution
did not object at any point. Id. (relying on Powers, 47 P.3d at 689).

118 Another division of the court of appeals relied on Powers and Tuffo in Blue,
where the trial court reduced a charge, creating a partial dismissal subject to
interlocutory appeal. Blue, 253 P.3d at 1276. The People moved for
reconsideration within the interlocutory appeal timeline, and after the trial court
denied their motion, they filed their notice of appeal two days later. Id. The
division concluded that the People's interlocutory appeal was timely. Id. It first
stated that under Powers, "if Colorado criminal rules do not expressly provide for
reconsideration, then a reconsideration motion is timely as long as it is filed within
the specified time for taking an appeal." Id. (citing Powers, 47 P.3d at 689). The
division then also pointed to Tuffo, observing that a timely motion to reconsider

<!-- PageBreak -->

tolls the appeal time "such that the full time for appealing begins to run only when
reconsideration is denied." Id. (quoting Tuffo, 209 P.3d at 1229) (applying the rule
established in Powers, 47 P.3d at 689).

## D. Whether Powers Is Applicable

119 Jebe argues that the federal common law rule we adopted in Powers is
inapposite here because Powers dealt with an interlocutory appeal, and unlike
C.A.R. 4.1, C.A.R. 4 is not wholly silent on the effect of postjudgment motions. He
notes that in Dieter, the Court did not distinguish between civil and criminal cases
and that in Healy, the Court found that the procedural rules did not sufficiently
resolve the issue. He points out that C.A.R. 4 distinguishes between civil and
criminal cases and between defendant and prosecutorial appellants. Compare
C.A.R. 4(a) (governing appeals in civil cases), with C.A.R. 4(b) (governing appeals
in criminal cases); compare C.A.R. 4(b)(2) (governing a defendant's post-trial
motion), with C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A) (governing prosecutorial appeals).

120 In particular, Jebe cites C.A.R. 4(a)(3), which provides that any party filing
a C.R.C.P. 59 motion tolls the appeal timeline in civil cases, and C.A.R. 4(b)(2),
which provides that certain post-trial motions filed by a defendant toll the appeal
timeline in criminal cases. He argues that these distinctions are intentional and
restrict what the provisions do not expressly allow, meaning courts should not
infer tolling mechanisms in C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A). Moreover, he asserts that because

<!-- PageBreak -->

C.A.R. 4 addresses the tolling effect of certain post-trial motions, the rule differs
from C.A.R. 4.1's silence, rendering Powers distinguishable.

121 As an initial matter, in Healy and Dieter, the applicable statute and appellate
rule were both silent on the effect of post-trial motions. Healy, 376 U.S. at 77 (first
citing 18 U.S.C. § 3731; and then citing Sup. Ct. R. 11(2) (1964)); Dieter, 429 U.S. at
7 n.2 (first citing 18 U.S.C. § 3731; and then citing Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)). Similarly,
in Powers, we observed that no rule prescribed the applicable procedure and that
we had not already addressed the issue. 47 P.3d at 688. Accordingly, we
incorporated precedent from the Supreme Court. Id. at 688-89. Jebe contends that
we are not in the same position here because C.A.R. 4 does address motions to
reconsider and, as he argues, restricts their tolling effect to those provisions, which
do not include postjudgment motions filed by the People.

122 Jebe points out that, in civil cases, C.A.R. 4(a)(3) incorporates C.R.C.P. 59,
which governs motions for post-trial relief in civil cases. Specifically,
C.A.R. 4(a)(3) adopts C.R.C.P. 59(a), which limits parties to filing for post-trial
relief within fourteen days of the entry of a judgment, and C.R.C.P. 59(j), which
then requires that a trial court rule on the motion within sixty-three days.
C.A.R. 4(a)(3) provides:

The running of the time for filing a notice of appeal is terminated as
to all parties when any party timely files a motion in the lower court
pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59, and the time for an appeal ... runs for all
parties from the timely entry of any order disposing of the last such

<!-- PageBreak -->

timely filed motion under C.R.C.P. 59 or the expiration of the time for
ruling on such a motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(j).

T23
Next, C.A.R. 4(b)(2) provides that, in criminal cases, "[i]f the defendant files
a timely motion in arrest of judgment, for judgment of acquittal, or for a new trial
on any ground other than newly discovered evidence, an appeal from a judgment
of conviction must be taken within [forty-nine] days after entry of an order
denying the motion."

124 Turning to the subsection for prosecutorial appeals, C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A) sets
forth the forty-nine-day appeal timeline but does not provide any similar language
regarding post-trial motions. In full, C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A) states:

Unless otherwise provided by statute or these rules, when an appeal
by the state or the people is authorized by statute, the notice of appeal
must be filed in the court of appeals within [forty-nine] days after the
entry of judgment or order appealed from. The court of appeals will
issue a written decision answering the issues in the case and will not
dismiss the appeal on the ground that a decision will have no
precedential value. The final decision of the court of appeals is subject
to petition for certiorari to the supreme court.

125
Although it is true that C.A.R. 4 expressly provides for tolling in civil cases
and upon certain post-trial motions raised by a defendant in criminal cases, the
rule is silent on prosecutorial postjudgment motions. See C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A).
Despite Jebe's contention that this subsection's silence precludes tolling the time
to appeal when the People seek reconsideration, there is simply no guidance
relating to this scenario. Thus, C.A.R. 4 provides no applicable procedure to follow

<!-- PageBreak -->

in these circumstances. See § 16-12-102(1) ("The procedure to be followed in filing
and prosecuting appeals under this section shall be as provided by applicable rule
of the supreme court of Colorado." (emphasis added)). And this is similar to the
lack of procedure that we encountered in Powers. See Powers, 47 P.3d at 688.

126 Jebe nonetheless argues that Powers is distinguishable because final
dismissals are "final order[s] that shall be immediately appealable" under section
16-12-102(1), yet Powers involved an interlocutory appeal under section
16-12-102(2), which does not contain similar language. He asserts that this
language limits appeals to that final order and does not authorize appealing a trial
court's order on a motion to reconsider.

127 Jebe relies on two cases from divisions of the court of appeals that
interpreted similar finality language in Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IX) and held that a motion
to reconsider a court's postconviction order cannot suspend the order's finality or
toll the time for an appeal. See People v. Adams, 905 P.2d 17, 19 (Colo. App. 1995);
People v. Thomas, 195 P.3d 1162, 1164 (Colo. App. 2008). However, the
postconviction context is distinguishable because Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI) bars
postconviction relief based on previously denied claims. Jebe contends that the
same logic applies here. But C.A.R. 4 contains no comparable language.

128 Further, in addition to final dismissals, section 16-12-102(1) also applies to
partial dismissals. § 16-12-102(1) ("Any order of a court that either dismisses one

<!-- PageBreak -->

or more counts ... shall constitute a final order that shall be immediately
appealable .... "). And partial dismissals are subject to interlocutory appeal, just
like the appeal of a suppression order at issue in Powers. See C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(B).
Moreover, both interlocutory appeals and appeals of final dismissals seek
substantive review of a trial court's ruling.

129 Finally, we note that in Powers, we applied Supreme Court case law
involving dismissals to interlocutory appeals. See Healy, 376 U.S. at 76-77
(pertaining to a dismissed indictment); Dieter, 429 U.S. at 7 (same). Thus, the
distinctions between the two are immaterial for our present purpose. Accordingly,
the rule in Powers applies here.

## E. Application

130 The rule of Powers - that a timely motion to reconsider a suppression order
tolls the period for filing an interlocutory appeal, provided the motion is filed
within the period to file the appeal itself -also applies to prosecutorial appeals
under C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A). In effect, the People must file their motion to reconsider
within forty-nine days after entry of a final dismissal.

131 Here, the People filed their motion to reconsider on July 28, the same day
the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. They filed the motion within
the forty-nine-day appeal period, and thus, it was timely. C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A).

<!-- PageBreak -->

Because the motion to reconsider was timely, the district court retained
jurisdiction to review its dismissal with prejudice.

132 Our holding recognizes that if a timely motion to reconsider only protected
jurisdiction and did not toll the appeal period, then upon a notice of appeal while
a motion to reconsider is still pending, the district court and court of appeals
would both be presented with the same legal question. So, we note that if the
People were to file a motion to reconsider with the district court and also file a
notice of appeal before the district court ruled on the motion, then the district court
would be divested of jurisdiction. Even though the district court would lose
jurisdiction in this scenario, it would not promote judicial economy. On the other
hand, if the trial court recognizes that it erred and could correct that error before
the People commence an appeal, then this would improve efficiency.

133 Thus, we conclude that the People's July 28 motion to reconsider was timely
under C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A) because it was filed the same day the district court
dismissed the case, which was within the forty-nine-day appeal period. Because
it was timely, it necessarily tolled the appeal period. And the appeal timeline
restarted when the district court denied the motion in a written order on
September 5, giving the People forty-nine-days from that date to file an appeal.
The People's September 28 notice of appeal was thus timely because it fell within
the forty-nine-day appeal period relating back to the September 5 order.

<!-- PageBreak -->

## III. Conclusion

134 We hold that when the People timely file a motion to reconsider in the
district court, it tolls the appeal timeline. Hence, we conclude here that the
People's appeal was timely because they (1) filed a motion to reconsider within
the forty-nine-day appeal period set forth in C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A), which tolled the
appeal timeline, and then, factoring in the time period tolled, (2) filed a notice of
appeal within forty-nine days of the district court's order denying the motion to
reconsider. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and
remand the case for the court of appeals to reinstate the People's appeal as timely
filed.

JUSTICE GABRIEL, joined by JUSTICE HOOD, concurred in the judgment.

<!-- PageBreak -->

JUSTICE GABRIEL, joined by JUSTICE HOOD, concurring in the judgment.

135 The majority concludes that when the People timely file a motion to
reconsider in the district court, it tolls the appeal timeline and, thus, the People's
appeal was timely in this case. Maj. op. 11 2, 34. Under settled principles of rule
construction, however, I cannot agree that a motion for reconsideration by the
People tolls their timeline for appeal. As a result, I would conclude that the
People's appeal was untimely in this case. But I would further conclude that given
the state of case law from our court and divisions of our court of appeals, the
People's untimely filing was the result of excusable neglect. For that reason, like
the majority, I would conclude that the People's appeal was properly before the
court of appeals division below and that the division reversibly erred in dismissing
that appeal.

136 I therefore respectfully concur in the judgment only.

## I. Analysis

137 The majority correctly sets forth the applicable facts, and I need not repeat
those facts here. Accordingly, I begin by noting our standard of review and
pertinent principles of rule construction. I then apply those principles and
conclude that, under the applicable appellate rules, a timely motion for
reconsideration does not toll the People's time to file an appeal in a criminal case
and, therefore, the People's appeal was untimely here. I end by addressing

<!-- PageBreak -->

whether the People's untimely filing was the result of excusable neglect and
conclude that it was.

### A. Standard of Review and Principles of Rule Construction

138 We review interpretations of our procedural rules de novo. People v. Corson,
2016 CO 33, 1 44, 379 P.3d 288, 297. In construing our procedural rules, we employ
the same interpretive rules applicable to statutory construction. Buell v. People,
2019 CO 27, 1 19, 439 P.3d 857, 861. Accordingly, we seek to discern and effectuate
the rule framers' intent. See People in Int. of B.C.B., 2025 CO 28, 1 24, 569 P.3d 74,
79. In doing this, we apply words and phrases in accordance with their plain and
ordinary meanings, and we consider the entire scheme of the rules in order to give
consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. See id. Moreover, we
must avoid interpretations that would render any words or phrases of a rule
superfluous or that would lead to illogical or absurd results. See id. And because
we presume that rule framers, like our legislature, act intentionally when selecting
the words used in a rule, we may not add words to a rule or subtract words from
it. See id. at [ 25, 569 P.3d at 79; Nesjan v. J & A Distrib., Inc., 2025 COA 81, 19,
580 P.3d 596, 598-99.

<!-- PageBreak -->

### B. Timeliness of the People's Appeal

139 Applying the foregoing principles, for several reasons, I do not believe that
the applicable appellate rules tolled the time for appeal upon the People's timely
filing of their motion for reconsideration.

140 First, C.A.R. 4(b), which addresses appeals in criminal cases, does not
provide for tolling in the circumstances now before us. That rule states, in
pertinent part:

(1) Time for Filing a Notice of Appeal. Except as provided in
C.A.R. 4(c) and (d), the defendant's notice of appeal must be filed in
the appellate court and an advisory copy served on the lower court
within 49 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.

(2) Effect of a Post-Trial Motion on the Deadline for Filing a Notice of
Appeal. If the defendant files a timely motion in arrest of judgment, for
judgment of acquittal, or for a new trial on any ground other than
newly discovered evidence, an appeal from a judgment of conviction
must be taken within 49 days after entry of an order denying the
motion. A motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
will similarly extend the time for appeal from a judgment of
conviction if the motion is made within 14 days after entry of the
judgment.

(3) Extension of Time to File a Notice of Appeal. Upon a showing of
excusable neglect the appellate court may, before or after the time has
expired, with or without motion and notice, extend the time for filing
a notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 35 days from the
expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this section (b).

....

(6) Prosecutorial Appeals.

(A) In General. Unless otherwise provided by statute or these rules,
when an appeal by the state or the people is authorized by statute, the

<!-- PageBreak -->

notice of appeal must be filed in the court of appeals within 49 days
after the entry of judgment or order appealed from. The court of
appeals will issue a written decision answering the issues in the case
and will not dismiss the appeal on the ground that a decision will
have no precedential value. The final decision of the court of appeals
is subject to petition for certiorari to the supreme court.

(Emphases added.)

141 Nothing in C.A.R. 4(b)(6), which governs criminal appeals by the People,
provides for either a motion for reconsideration or tolling of the time to appeal
upon the filing of such a motion. Accordingly, the text of the rule does not support
the majority's conclusion that a timely motion for reconsideration by the People
tolls their time to appeal.

142 Second, the framers of C.A.R. 4 knew how to provide for motions for
reconsideration and tolling when these were intended. For example, C.A.R. 4(a)(3)
expressly addresses C.R.C.P. 59 motions in civil cases and tolls the time to file a
notice of appeal during the pendency of such a motion. Likewise, C.A.R. 4(b)(2)
expressly addresses post-trial motions filed by criminal defendants and tolls the
time to appeal when such motions are pending. C.A.R. 4(b)(6), which concerns
prosecutorial appeals in criminal cases, in contrast, is silent regarding post-trial
motions and any tolling of the prosecution's time to appeal. As noted above, we
must presume that the framers acted intentionally in selecting the words of
C.A.R. 4, and we may not add words to the rule as the majority does. See B.C.B.,
T 25, 569 P.3d at 79; Nesjan, 1 9, 580 P.3d at 598-99. Moreover, inferring a tolling

<!-- PageBreak -->

provision from C.A.R. 4(b)(6)'s silence fails to read all of C.A.R. 4's parts
consistently, as we are required to do. See B.C.B., 1 24, 569 P.3d at 79.

143 Finally, the majority's interpretation renders the tolling provisions of
C.A.R. 4(a)(3) and C.A.R. 4(b)(2) superfluous, which we may not do. See B.C.B.,
1 24, 569 P.3d at 79. If a rule that is silent regarding motions for reconsideration
and tolling always allows for reconsideration and tolling, as the majority suggests,
then there would have been no reason to include express tolling provisions in
C.A.R. 4(a)(3) and C.A.R. 4(b)(2).

144 For these reasons, I would conclude that a timely motion for reconsideration
by the People does not toll the People's time for filing an appeal in a criminal case.
If C.A.R. 4(b)(6) is to include such a provision, then the proper procedure is to
request that our Rules of Appellate Procedure Committee amend that rule. I do
not believe that we should effectively amend our procedural rules by way of case
law, thereby bypassing our usual processes (including standing committee vetting
and, often, public comment and hearing) for the adoption or amendment of such
rules.

145 Accordingly, because the People's notice of appeal was filed sixty-two days
after the district court entered the pertinent order dismissing the underlying case
with prejudice, that appeal was untimely.

<!-- PageBreak -->

146 This, however, does not end my analysis. Under C.A.R. 4(b)(3), upon a
showing of excusable neglect in a criminal case, an appellate court may, before or
after the time to file a notice of appeal has expired, extend the time for filing such
a notice for a period not to exceed thirty-five days from the expiration of the time
otherwise prescribed in C.A.R. 4(b). "A party's conduct constitutes excusable
neglect when the surrounding circumstances would cause a reasonably careful
person similarly to neglect a duty." In re Weisbard, 25 P.3d 24, 26 (Colo. 2001)
(quoting Tyler v. Adams Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 697 P.2d 29, 32 (Colo. 1985).
147 Here, as the majority points out, a number of opinions from our court and
from divisions of our court of appeals have suggested, albeit perhaps in different
contexts, that a timely motion for reconsideration tolls the time for filing an appeal.
Maj. op. 11 15-18 (citing, among other cases, People v. Powers, 47 P.3d 686, 689
(Colo. 2002), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in, People v. Zhuk, 239 P.3d
437, 439 (Colo. 2010); People v. Blue, 253 P.3d 1273, 1276 (Colo. App. 2011); and
People v. Tuffo, 209 P.3d 1226, 1229 (Colo. App. 2009)).

148 Here, even if an argument could be made that the foregoing cases were
incorrect, inapposite, or distinguishable, I believe that a reasonably careful
attorney could well have read them, as the People here did, to support the view
that a timely motion for reconsideration tolls the time for filing an appeal, even if
the applicable appellate rule is silent on the subject.

<!-- PageBreak -->

149
Accordingly, I would conclude that the People's untimely filing here was
the result of excusable neglect and, therefore, their appeal was properly before the
division below.

## II. Conclusion

150
For these reasons, although I cannot agree that a timely motion for
reconsideration filed by the People tolls their time to appeal and that, therefore,
the People's appeal was timely in this case, I would conclude that the People's
untimely appeal was the result of excusable neglect. Accordingly, like the
majority, I believe that the appeal was properly before the division below and that
the division reversibly erred in dismissing that appeal.

151 I therefore respectfully concur in the majority's judgment in this case.