360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC

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360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
360 M.S.R. ASSOCIATES, LLC, ET AL. v. 350
MAIN STREET MIDDLETOWN, LLC, ET AL.
(AC 47817)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Seeley, Js.*
Syllabus
The defendants, M Co. and B, appealed from the trial court’s judgment
determining, inter alia, that they had interfered with the plaintiff’s use of an
easement over an alleyway, a ten foot wide strip of land that runs between the
property of M Co. and the property of the plaintiff. The defendants claimed,
inter alia, that the court had improperly concluded that the easement was
not limited to pedestrian use. Held:
The trial court did not err in concluding that the easement, which was created
in a 1905 deed between the predecessors in title of the plaintiff and M Co.,
was not limited to pedestrian use, as the unambiguous language of the deed
created an express right-of-way easement without any limitations on how it
could be used, and the circumstances surrounding the alleyway that was the
subject of the easement, its physical characteristics, and public policy did
not warrant a different interpretation of the deed’s language.
The trial court did not err in concluding that passage over the alleyway by
motor vehicles to access the rear of the plaintiff’s property was a reason-
able use of the easement, as there was a lack of evidence to establish that
historical use of the servitude by vehicles unreasonably interfered with the
servient estate, the easement accommodated vehicle use by the plaintiff and
its tenants without issue up until the time that B, M Co.’s tenant, placed
obstructions in the alleyway, use of the easement was the only way in which
the plaintiff could access the rear of its property, and the 1905 deed did not
contain language limiting the scope or use of the easement to pedestrians.
The trial court did not err by failing to evaluate and conclude as a matter
of law that vehicular use of the alleyway was unlawful and against public
policy, as vehicular use of the easement was reasonable, and the court found
that the defendants did not establish their claims that vehicular use of the
easement violated the Life Safety Code, which ensures fire safety compliance,
or public policy governing safe passage by impeding access to the alleyway
by pedestrians in the event of a fire or other emergency.
The trial court reasonably could have determined, on the basis of the testi-
mony before it, that B’s conduct in obstructing vehicular use of the easement
was intentional and was designed to block the plaintiff’s use of the easement
area, even though B did not testify, and, accordingly, this court could not
conclude that the trial court’s decision to award punitive damages constituted
an abuse of its discretion.
*The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as
of the date of oral argument.

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
This court declined to review the defendants’ claim that the trial court erred
in rendering judgment for the plaintiff as to certain counts of the defendants’
counterclaim, as that claim was not adequately briefed.
Argued January 22—officially released August 25, 2026
Procedural History
Action seeking, inter alia, an injunction prohibiting
the defendants from blocking or interfering with the
named plaintiff’s use of an easement, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Middlesex, where the defendants filed a counterclaim;
thereafter, the plaintiff Ford News Diner, LLC, withdrew
its claims against the defendants, and the defendants
withdrew the counts of the counterclaim as against the
plaintiff Ford News Diner, LLC; subsequently, the case
was tried to the court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge
trial referee; judgment in part for the named plaintiff
on the complaint and on the counterclaim, from which
the defendants appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Jonathan M. Shapiro, with whom was Isabella Tatar,
for the appellants (defendants).
Mark A. Balaban, for the appellee (named plaintiff).
Opinion
SEELEY, J. The defendants, 350 Main Street Middle-
town, LLC (350 Main), and Susan Bauer, doing business
as The Cooking Company, appeal from the judgment
of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff 360
M.S.R. Associates, LLC,1 with respect to counts one and
two of the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged that the
defendants had interfered with the plaintiff’s use of an
easement over a ten foot wide strip of land that runs
between property of the plaintiff and 350 Main, and as
to the claims against the plaintiff in a counterclaim filed
1Ford News Diner, LLC, a tenant of 360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC,
originally was a plaintiff in this case. Ford News Diner, LLC, subse-
quently withdrew its claims against the defendants and is not a party
to this appeal. Accordingly, we refer to 360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC,
as the plaintiff in this opinion.

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
by 350 Main. On appeal, the defendants claim that the
court improperly (1) concluded that the easement is not
limited to pedestrian use only, (2) found that vehicu-
lar use of the easement was reasonable, (3) determined
that vehicular use of the easement did not violate public
policy and applicable fire code provisions, (4) found that
Bauer intentionally obstructed and interfered with the
plaintiff’s use of the easement, thereby justifying an
award against Bauer of nominal damages in the amount
of $10 and punitive damages in the form of attorney’s
fees, and (5) rendered judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff with respect to counts three, eight and nine of the
counterclaim. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the
judgment of the court.
The following facts, as set forth by the court in its
memorandum of decision or as otherwise undisputed in
the record, and procedural history are relevant to our
resolution of the defendants’ appeal. The plaintiff owns
property located at 360 Main Street in Middletown,
and 350 Main owns abutting property located at 350
Main Street in Middletown. The plaintiff is the holder
of the dominant estate, and 350 Main is the holder of
the servient estate. The right-of-way easement at issue
in this case “was first created by a deed dated May 1,
1905 [1905 deed], from August Johnson, a predeces-
sor in title of [350 Main’s] property, to the plaintiff’s
predecessor in title, The Pythian Building Corporation
[Pythian].” Pursuant to the 1905 deed, Johnson con-
veyed to Pythian the parcel of property now owned by
the plaintiff and provided Pythian “with a right of way
to the rear of said premises over the passageway on the
south side of [Pythian’s property] about ten (10) feet in
width” (1905 easement). The easement area referenced
in the 1905 deed is situated between the buildings owned
by the plaintiff and 350 Main, leads from Main Street
to the rear of the buildings, and was referred to at trial
as an alleyway (alleyway).2
2We note that the alleyway between the two buildings also was referred
to at trial as an accessway, a passageway and a driveway as well. For

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
On May 15, 1925, Pythian entered into an agreement
(1925 agreement) with 350 Main’s then predecessor in
title, Alessandro Saraceno. Under the 1925 agreement,
each party granted to the other the right to use a five foot
wide strip of land to the rear of each party’s premises,
thereby establishing a ten foot wide passageway (pas-
sageway) that “shall always remain open on the boundary
between the lands of said parties.” The 1925 agreement
further stated that Pythian “shall have the right of using
the drive-way from Main [Street], so as to be able to enter
freely into said passage [1925 easement].” The “drive-
way” referenced in the 1925 agreement is the alleyway
that leads from Main Street to the rear of the buildings.
In 1925, prior to the execution of the 1925 agreement, a
historic theater known as the Capitol Theater was built,
and it was situated in the rear of the property now owned
by 350 Main. The ten foot wide passageway created in
the 1925 agreement surrounded the Capitol Theater
on the rear and both sides and led to the ten foot wide
alleyway that leads out to Main Street. The court specifi-
cally found that it was “reasonable to infer that the 1925
agreement, dated around the time the Capitol Theater
was built, was entered into in order to create a ten foot
wide passageway in the rear of the plaintiff’s property.”
The 1905 and 1925 easements “are deed referenced and
depicted on a map showing the plaintiff’s property . . .
and are also referenced and depicted on maps of [350
Main’s] property.” (Citation omitted.)
The plaintiff acquired the property located at 360 Main
Street by quitclaim deed in 2008. Its deed specifically
provides: “Premises conveyed together with the ten
(10) foot right-of-way contained in a Warrantee Deed
from . . . Johnson to [Pythian] dated on May 1, 1905,
and recorded in Volume 133, at Page 527 of the Middle-
town Land Records; and together with right-of-way as
contained in a[n] agreement between Pythian . . . and . .
. Saraceno dated May 15, 1925 and recorded in Volume
171 at Page 236 of the Middletown Land Records, all
ease of reference, we will refer to it as an alleyway or a right-of-way
in this opinion.

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
as shown on the aforesaid map.” “After [the plaintiff]
purchased the property [at 360 Main Street], [Alford]
Quinland [a principal of the plaintiff] . . . would visit
the property three times a week to perform repairs.
When he visited the property, Quinland would drive
his vehicle over the [alleyway] and park his car in the
rear of 360 [Main Street].” Quinland was able to drive a
motor vehicle through the alleyway without issue from
the time the plaintiff purchased the property located at
360 Main Street until approximately 2017.
Michael Stone, the sole member of 350 Main, purchased
the property located at 350 Main Street in 2012. Two
large doors on the side of the building located at 350
Main Street open into the alleyway between the buildings
owned by 350 Main and the plaintiff. As we indicated
previously in this opinion, prior to Stone’s purchase, “a
portion of the property [at 350 Main Street] was utilized
as . . . the Capitol Theater [which] was . . . demolished
[in part] in 2011.”3 (Footnote omitted.) Subsequent to
Stone’s purchase in 2012, the property remained vacant
until sometime in 2017, when Bauer leased the property
and began operating The Cooking Company. At all rel-
evant times, Bauer was a tenant of 350 Main.
Sometime after The Cooking Company began conduct-
ing business at 350 Main Street, Bauer, unilaterally and
without permission from the plaintiff, placed cement
barriers, tables, chairs, and flowerpots in the alleyway to
benefit patrons of The Cooking Company. After receiv-
ing complaints from tenants, Quinland spoke to Stone,
and, subsequently, the items were removed from the
alleyway. Stone also instructed Bauer to refrain from
blocking the alleyway.
In or around 2019, Bauer, again unilaterally and with-
out permission from the plaintiff, installed two platforms
with stairs that extended approximately four feet into
3The main theater building was demolished in 2011; however, the lobby
building remains on the property. The lobby of the theater building
previously operated as a liquor store, and it now comprises the premises
leased to Bauer for the operation of The Cooking Company.

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
the ten foot alleyway. The platforms allow access to
the alleyway from the doors on the side of the building
located at 350 Main Street. The defendants assert that
these platforms and stairs are necessary to comply with
the Middletown fire marshal’s instructions. As a result of
the installation of the platforms and stairs, the plaintiff
was unable to drive a motor vehicle over the alleyway.
Thereafter, the plaintiff initiated the present action.
By way of a four count, second revised verified complaint
(operative complaint) dated July 2, 2020, the plaintiff
alleged, inter alia, that the defendants, by installing the
platforms and stairs, unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the 1905 easement over
the alleyway. In the first and second counts, the plain-
tiff alleged that the defendants’ actions constituted a
nuisance because they interfered with the plaintiff’s use
and enjoyment of the 1905 easement. In the third and
fourth counts, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants’
actions tortiously interfered with business relations
between the plaintiff and its tenant, Ford News Diner,
LLC, because Quinland could not access the rear of the
property with a motor vehicle to perform his duties as
a landlord. With respect to relief, the plaintiff sought,
inter alia, a declaratory judgment, injunctive and equi-
table relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.
On May 6, 2019, the defendants filed an answer denying
the plaintiff’s allegations, five special defenses,4 and a
counterclaim. In the ten count counterclaim, 350 Main
alleged claims against the plaintiff for trespass, nuisance,
quiet title, breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tortious
interference with business relations, as well as claims
against Ford News Diner, LLC, for trespass and nui-
sance.5 It also sought injunctive and declaratory relief.
4The defendants do not contest the trial court’s judgment in favor of
the plaintiff as to their special defenses, which alleged unclean hands,
estoppel, bad faith, and failure to state a claim on which relief could
be granted.
5Counts six and seven of the counterclaim, which were directed at
Ford News Diner, LLC, were withdrawn prior to trial.

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
The case was tried before the court, Hon. Edward S.
Domnarski, judge trial referee, on December 19 and 20,
2023. Thereafter, both parties filed posttrial briefs. Prior
to trial, the plaintiff and the defendants consented to
the court’s visit to the property, without the presence
of counsel, to view the property at issue in this case.
At trial, the plaintiff presented testimony from Quin-
land as its only witness. Quinland testified that, at the
time the plaintiff purchased the 360 Main Street prop-
erty, Quinland understood that the alleyway was “pro-
tected by an easement,” although he did not obtain the
details of the 1905 easement until the purchase was
completed. Quinland testified that, from the time the
plaintiff purchased the property until the time that
Bauer obstructed the alleyway, he and his tenants drove
over the alleyway without issue. Specifically, Quinland
testified that, shortly after The Cooking Company became
a tenant of 350 Main, Bauer placed flowerpots, tables
and chairs in the alleyway, as well as concrete barriers,
all of which obstructed the alleyway. Quinland explained
that, as a result, he spoke with Stone, and, subsequently,
the concrete barriers, tables and chairs were removed,
but that, in 2019, Bauer installed platforms and stairs
that protruded approximately four feet into the right-
of-way. Further, Quinland testified that, as a result of
those actions, he could not park his motor vehicle in the
back of his property where there was sufficient space for
parking but, instead, had to park in a metered parking
space on Main Street, which required frequent atten-
tion to ensure that he did not receive a parking ticket.
Quinland testified that it was difficult for him to bring
equipment from his vehicle parked on Main Street into
the basement of the plaintiff’s building, which is accessed
through the alleyway. Finally, Quinland testified about
his prior complaints regarding the alleyway, including
at least two complaints to the Middletown Fire Depart-
ment about safety concerns after Bauer installed the
platforms and stairs. Following cross-examination of
Quinland, the plaintiff rested its case.

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
Thereafter, the defendants offered testimony from
Stone; Ok Yi, the owner of Ford News Diner, LLC; and
Al Lespier, a Middletown Deputy Fire Marshal. Stone
testified that, prior to his purchase of 350 Main Street in
2012, he undertook “[s]tandard due diligence” and com-
missioned a survey of the property, which was admitted
into evidence. Stone testified that there were no steps
attached to the two doors on the side of the building at
the time he purchased the property at 350 Main Street.
Stone further testified that, to his knowledge, Bauer
installed the platforms and stairs to comply with the
fire marshal’s instructions. On cross-examination, Stone
acknowledged that the platforms and stairs impacted
approximately 40 percent of the alleyway but asserted
that the platforms and stairs did not block the alleyway
and that it was “still passable.”
Yi testified that she has owned and operated Ford
News Diner, LLC, since 1984 and was familiar with
the alleyway between Ford News Diner, LLC, and the
building at 350 Main Street, and that she previously
had parked her car in the alleyway with permission from
the plaintiff’s predecessor in title sometime during the
1990s. Yi also testified that she recalled others, including
Quinland, parking in the alleyway. Further, Yi testified
that, as a result of Bauer placing objects in the alleyway,
it was inconvenient and difficult to receive deliveries.
Yi also testified that, prior to the installation of the two
stairways in the alleyway, she would drive through the
alleyway on a regular basis to unload groceries at the
back door of her diner, but that she could no longer do
so after the stairways were installed.
The defendants’ final witness, Lespier, testified that,
in his role as the Deputy Fire Marshal of the Middletown
Fire Department, he had visited the property located at
360 Main Street after Quinland submitted complaints
about the obstruction of the alleyway. Lespier testified
that he had received a complaint from Quinland that set
forth safety concerns resulting from the defendants’
conduct in blocking the alleyway. Lespier testified that

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
he had evaluated the alleyway and platforms and stairs
to determine whether there was ample area for a path
of travel in the event of an emergency. Lespier testified
that he had applied the Life Safety Code,6 which requires
a twenty-eight inch wide path of egress that is free from
obstructions in the event of an emergency. When ques-
tioned by the court, Lespier could not state whether a
path that could accommodate a motor vehicle violated
the Life Safety Code.
On June 27, 2024, the court issued a memorandum
of decision finding in favor of the plaintiff with respect
to counts one and two of the operative complaint7 and
counts one, two, three, four, five, eight and ten of the
counterclaim.8 This appeal followed. Additional facts
and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendants first challenge the court’s interpreta-
tion of the 1905 easement over the alleyway. Specifically,
6The Life Safety Code is employed by fire marshals as part of the fire
safety compliance assessment required to operate a business in Con-
necticut. Notably, the defendants did not plead a violation of the Life
Safety Code in their special defenses or the counterclaim.
7The court found that, with respect to counts three and four of the
operative complaint, which alleged tortious interference with business
relations, the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to prove the
allegations in those counts, and it rendered judgment in favor of the
defendants as to counts three and four.
8As we already have indicated, counts six and seven of the counterclaim
were withdrawn prior to trial. See footnote 5 of this opinion. With
respect to count nine of the counterclaim, which sought a declaratory
judgment determining the rights of the parties with respect to the
1905 easement, the court concluded that the 1905 easement over the
alleyway was not limited to pedestrian traffic and that “the passage of
motor vehicles over the right-of-way to access the rear of the plaintiff’s
property [was] a reasonable use of the right-of-way,” and it rendered a
declaratory judgment “in accordance with [those] conclusions.”
With respect to the defendants’ special defenses, the court stated in its
memorandum of decision: “Although the defendants filed general special
defenses as to the plaintiff’s claims, they did not produce evidence at
the trial to establish these defenses. Furthermore, they did not address
their special defenses in their posttrial brief. Further discussion of the
special defenses is not warranted.”

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
the defendants claim that the court improperly (1) deter-
mined that the 1905 easement over the alleyway is not
limited to pedestrian use, (2) determined that vehicu-
lar use of the 1905 easement is a reasonable use of the
right-of-way, and (3) failed to evaluate and conclude as
a matter of law that vehicular use of the right-of-way
is unlawful and against public policy. We address each
claim in turn. Before doing so, however, we set forth
general principles governing easements and the appli-
cable standard of review.
“It is well settled that [a]n easement creates a nonpos-
sessory right to enter and use land in the possession of
another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with
the rules authorized by the easement. . . . [T]he benefit
of an easement . . . is considered a nonpossessory inter-
est in land because it generally authorizes limited uses
of the burdened property for a particular purpose. . . .
[E]asements are not ownership interests but rather privi-
leges to use [the] land of another in [a] certain manner
for [a] certain purpose . . . . Except as limited by the
terms of the servitude . . . the holder of an easement . . .
is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner that is
reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of
the servitude. . . . Likewise, [e]xcept as limited by the
terms of the servitude . . . the holder of the servient
estate is entitled to make any use of the servient estate
that does not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment
of the servitude. . . . 57 Broad Street Stamford, LLC v.
Summer House Owners, LLC, 184 Conn. App. 834, 841,
195 A.3d 1143 (2018).
“The use of an easement must be reasonable and as
little burdensome to the servient estate as the nature
of the easement and the purpose will permit. . . . Ordi-
narily when [judicial] opinions speak of the use of an
easement, it arises in right-of-way cases. Thus use fre-
quently involves the amount of traffic over the easement
or alterations to the land to make it passable. . . . This
is not to overlook, however, that [t]he owner of an ease-
ment has all rights incident or necessary to its proper

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
enjoyment, [although] nothing more. . . . Kuras v. Kope,
205 Conn. 332, 341, 533 A.2d 1202 (1987).
“Significantly, the full scope of the use to be made
of [an easement] requires evaluation of the purpose it
was to serve. . . . [A]ppellate case law . . . [has] used the
terms location, scope, and use somewhat interchange-
ably. . . . [Our Supreme Court has] read scope and use as
having similar meanings insofar as they involve what
[the] holder [of the easement] may do with it, [and] the
purposes for which it may be used.” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Green
Power Ventures, LLC, 221 Conn. App. 657, 669–71, 303
A.3d 13 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 938, 307 A.3d
273 (2024).
In the present case, the parties do not dispute the exis-
tence of the 1905 easement over the alleyway between
the two properties. At issue in this case is the permissible
scope of the 1905 easement and whether the plaintiff’s
utilization of the easement for vehicular access to the
area located in the rear of its building constitutes a rea-
sonable use of the easement.
“Both this court and our Supreme Court have noted
that Connecticut case law regarding the standard of
review in easement cases is somewhat confusing . . . .
Deane v. Kahn, [317 Conn. 157, 167 n.6, 116 A.3d 259
(2015)], quoting Sanders v. Dias, 108 Conn. App. 283,
290, 947 A.2d 1026 (2008). In an attempt to provide some
clarity, our Supreme Court, in Deane v. Kahn, supra, 167
n.6, stated: Our scope of review as to the intent behind
language in a deed is plenary. . . . Although the intent
to create an easement by deed is therefore a question of
law over which our review is plenary . . . if the language
of the deed is incomplete or ambiguous regarding the
location, scope, or use of the easement, the trial court’s
resolution of those issues represents a question of fact
subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. . .
. In the absence of unambiguous or complete language
in the deed, therefore, determining the location, scope,
and use of an express easement is a fact-intensive inquiry

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
properly subject to the clearly erroneous standard of
review. . . .
“Nevertheless, when faced with a question regarding
the construction of language in deeds, the reviewing
court does not give the customary deference to the trial
court’s factual inferences. . . . The meaning and effect
of the [language in the deed] are to be determined, not
by the actual intent of the parties, but by the intent
expressed in the deed, considering all its relevant pro-
visions and reading it in the light of the surrounding
circumstances. . . .
“Our basic rule of construction is that recognition will
be given to the expressed intention of the parties to a
deed . . . and that it shall, if possible, be so construed as to
effectuate the intent of the parties. . . . In arriving at the
intent expressed . . . in the language used, however, it is
always admissible to consider the situation of the parties
and the circumstances connected with the transaction,
and every part of the writing should be considered with
the help of that evidence. . . .
“In the construction of a deed or grant, the language
is to be construed in connection with, and in reference
to, the nature and condition of the subject matter of
the grant at the time the instrument is executed, and
the obvious purpose the parties had in view. . . . [I]f the
meaning of the language contained in a deed or convey-
ance is not clear, the trial court is bound to consider any
relevant extrinsic evidence presented by the parties for
the purpose of clarifying the ambiguity. . . .
“Finally, we note that [t]he fact that servitudes are
intended to bind successors to interests in the land, as
well as the contracting parties, and are generally intended
to last for an indefinite period of time, lends increased
importance to the writing because it is often the primary
source of information available to a prospective pur-
chaser of the land. The language should be interpreted
to accord with the meaning an ordinary purchaser would
ascribe to it in the context of the parcels of land involved.

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
Searching for a particular meaning adopted by the creat-
ing parties is generally inappropriate because the creat-
ing parties intended to bind and benefit successors for
whom the written record will provide the primary evi-
dence of the servitude’s meaning. . . . Simone v. Miller,
91 Conn. App. 98, 108–10, 881 A.2d 397 (2005); see also
Rocamora v. Heaney, 144 Conn. App. 658, 665–66, 74
A.3d 457 (2013). For this reason, [i]n determining the
scope of an express easement, the language of the grant is
paramount in discerning the parties’ intent. Leposky v.
Fenton, 100 Conn. App. 774, 778, 919 A.2d 533 (2007). In
addition, [a]ny ambiguity in the instrument creating an
easement, in a case of reasonable doubt, will be construed
in favor of the grantee. Mackin v. Mackin, [186 Conn.
185, 189, 439 A.2d 1086 (1982)].” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC,
supra, 221 Conn. App. 673–75.
In sum, “[i]n determining the character and extent of
an easement created by deed, the ordinary import of the
language will be accepted as indicative of the intention
of the parties, unless there is something in the situation
of the property or the surrounding circumstances that
calls for a different interpretation.” Oak Leaf Marina,
Inc. v. Ertel, 23 Conn. App. 91, 96, 579 A.2d 568, cert.
denied, 216 Conn. 827, 582 A.2d 206 (1990).
A
The defendants first claim that the trial court erred
in concluding that the 1905 easement over the alleyway
between the two properties is not limited to pedestrian
use. In support of this claim, the defendants contend
that the court failed to consider the 1905 easement “in
light of all [of] the surrounding circumstances at the
time it was created,” namely, that it provided a means of
egress from the fire escape at the rear of the building on
the plaintiff’s property to the alleyway and then to Main
Street and that it served the purpose of providing safe
passage for pedestrians to exit from the Capitol Theater.
The defendants further assert that the characteristics
of the alleyway, namely, its “ ‘narrow’ ” size and the fact

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
that doors in the buildings abutting the alleyway open
directly into the alleyway, “overwhelmingly” support a
conclusion that the 1905 easement over the alleyway was
intended for pedestrian use only. Finally, the defendants
contend that the court improperly failed to address their
claim that public policies governing safe passage sup-
ported a conclusion that the 1905 easement was intended
to be limited to pedestrian traffic. We are not persuaded
by these contentions.
The following additional facts are relevant to our reso-
lution of this claim. In its memorandum of decision, the
court found that “the [1905] easement is not restricted
to pedestrian use,” and its finding was predicated on
“the words ‘right-of-way’ used in the 1905 easement.”
Specifically, the court found that “[t]he right-of-way
granted in the [1905] easement is a general right-of-
way to the rear of the plaintiff’s property; there is no
limiting language in the grant; the language used in
the [1905] easement is clear.” The court found “further
support for its conclusion that the [1905] right-of-way is
not limited to pedestrian use in the clear language used
by the previous owners of the dominant and servient
estates in their 1925 agreement. Although that agree-
ment created a new right-of-way that was separate from
the one created in 1905, the two rights-of-way were con-
nected. Significantly, the parties to the 1925 agreement
expressly stated that the plaintiff’s property ‘shall have
the right of using the drive-way from Main [Street], so
as to be able to enter freely into said passage.’ The use
of the term ‘drive-way’ implies use by vehicles that have
a driver. Significantly, the parties did not use the term
‘walkway.’ It is reasonable to infer that in 1925 motor
vehicles used the right-of-way.” (Emphasis in original.)
Moreover, the court was unpersuaded by the defen-
dants’ claims that the purposes of the 1925 agreement
were to “provide a path of safety from the fire escape at
the rear of the plaintiff’s building to Main Street,” and
“to provide a ten foot passageway around the perimeter
of the former Capitol Theater building to allow for safe

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
passage for the building’s occupants to Main Street.”
With respect to the claim regarding the fire escape, the
court concluded that that “interpretation conveniently
ignore[d] the fact that the right-of-way grant is in gen-
eral terms and is not limited in any manner.” Moreover,
although the court agreed that, given the seating capacity
of the Capitol Theater of 1100 people, “it [was] reasonable
to infer that the 1925 agreement related to the creation
of a ten foot wide pedestrian passageway to serve the the-
ater building,” the court determined that that inference
was not sufficient to establish that the 1905 easement
was limited to pedestrian use. As the court explained:
“It is undisputed that the passageway established by the
1925 agreement connected with the plaintiff’s right-
of-way [that] was created under the 1905 easement. . .
. [T]he 1925 agreement referred to the plaintiff’s 1905
right-of-way as a driveway. The fact that [350 Main’s]
predecessor in title may have sought to create a pedes-
trian passageway over other property of [350 Main’s]
predecessor in title does not alter or diminish the general
right-of-way in favor of the plaintiff created in the 1905
deed.” (Emphasis in original.) We agree with the court’s
analysis in this respect. The fact that the parties to the
1925 agreement sought to and did create an easement in
the rear of their properties likely intended for pedestrian
use in connection with the theater, does not change the
express right-of-way easement created in the 1905 deed,
which contains no limitations or specifications on the
means by which it may be used.
The 1905 deed creates an express right-of-way ease-
ment over the alleyway “to the rear” of the plaintiff’s
property. The 1905 easement contains no language
limiting how the right-of-way may be used, it does not
include the term “walkway,” and it does not include any
language limiting its use to foot traffic or pedestrian
use. Moreover, pursuant to the clear language of the
1925 agreement, the plaintiff’s predecessor in title was
provided with “the right of using the drive-way from
Main [Street], so as to be able to enter freely into [the
1925 easement or passageway that was created in the

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
rear of the two properties].” We conclude that, when
“construed in connection with, and in reference to, the
nature and condition of the subject matter of the grant
at the time the instrument [was] executed, and the obvi-
ous purpose the parties had in view”; Williams v. Green
Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 674; the
unambiguous language of the 1905 deed conveys a gen-
eral right-of-way easement to the plaintiff that is not
limited to pedestrian use.9
Our conclusion is supported by this court’s decision
in Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221
Conn. App. 676, in which this court stated: “[T]he . . .
deed designates a ‘right of way’ without limitation or
reservation. The language, ‘open as a right of way for
the use and benefit of the grantee,’ clearly reflects the
grantor’s intent to create a general right-of-way ease-
ment. The . . . deed contains no specifications of any
particular manner in which [the lot at issue] should be
used and imposes no limitation on the scope of the ease-
ment. More particularly, the language does not limit the
right-of-way to foot passage or to ingress and egress. Con-
sequently, we conclude that the . . . deed and the . . . map
expressly grant a general right-of-way in terms that are
clear and unambiguous.” Thus, in Williams, this court
similarly held that a deed that did not include restrictions
9Relatedly, the defendants claim that the trial court placed “undue
reliance” on the term “drive-way” as used in the 1925 agreement to
reference the 1905 easement established in the earlier 1905 deed. The
defendants argue that the court erroneously inferred that the use of
the term “drive-way” suggested that motor vehicles used the alleyway
in 1925. The defendants claim that “[t]here is no evidence in the record
to support the trial court’s conclusion that motor vehicles used the
right-of-way in the [alleyway] in 1925. In fact, in doing so, the trial
court ignored all other evidence before it to reach its conclusion.” A
review of the record, however, reveals that this inference is reason-
able based on the evidence before the court. We construe the term
“drive-way” according to its ordinary meaning at the time of the 1925
agreement, which implies use by motor vehicles. See, e.g., Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary (3rd Ed. 1916) pp. 310, 836 (defining “driveway”
as “[a] passage, or way, along which vehicles or animals are driven” and
defining “road,” in part, as “an open way or public passage for vehicles,
persons, and animals”).

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
“clearly and unambiguously created a general right-of-
way . . . . See, e.g., Heuer v. Webster, 187 Ill. App. 273,
274–76 (1914) (language of grant, shall be and remain
an open court for light, air, access and right of way,
for the common benefit of the parties hereto, was plain
and unambiguous); Cox v. Glenbrook Co., 78 Nev. 254,
261–62, 371 P.2d 647 (1962) (Here the grantor conveyed
an easement [and right-of-way] with full right of use. To
our mind, that phrase is clear and without ambiguity. It
may not, under the veil of interpretation, be considered to
mean a restricted right of use.).” (Emphasis in original;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 680.
The defendants claim that the circumstances surround-
ing the alleyway—its narrow width, the two doors of the
defendants’ building that open into the alleyway, the
plaintiff’s fire escape that requires use of the alleyway,
the use of the parties’ respective properties at the time
of the 1925 agreement, the fact that motor vehicles did
not use the right-of-way over the alleyway in 1905 when
it was created, and public policy considerations—warrant
a different interpretation of the language of the 1905
easement. We do not agree.
In support of these contentions, the defendants first
argue that the alleyway was a necessity for pedestrians in
1905 after the plaintiff’s predecessor in title converted
the building at 360 Main Street from single-use to mul-
tiuse. The defendants, however, provided no evidence to
the court to support this assertion to demonstrate that
this was a consideration at the time the 1905 easement
was created.10 See McBurney v. Paquin, 302 Conn. 359,
10The defendants point to testimony from Lespier to support this argu-
ment and their contention that public policy considerations governing
safe passage warrant a determination that the 1905 easement is limited
to pedestrian use. The court, however, found that Lespier’s testimony
did not support the defendants’ claim. In making that finding, and in
finding for the plaintiff on all claims, the court necessarily did not credit
Lespier’s testimony. We must defer to the court’s credibility assessment
of Lespier’s testimony. See Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.,
224 Conn. App. 668, 681, 315 A.3d 414 (2024) (“[t]he weight to be given

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
378, 28 A.3d 272 (2011) (“[t]he scope of an easement is
determined by examining the instrument that created
it and the circumstances that existed at the time of its
creation”); see also Oak Leaf Marina, Inc. v. Ertel, supra,
23 Conn. App. 96 (it is appropriate to consider conditions
at time of grant). Furthermore, although the defendants
maintain that the court improperly failed to consider
the circumstances at the time of the creation of the 1905
easement, their arguments primarily focus on the cir-
cumstances surrounding the 1925 agreement creating
the walkway in the rear of the properties for the Capitol
Theater and the alleged safety concerns for patrons exit-
ing the theater. Those safety concerns, however, did not
exist in 1905, the year when the easement at issue in this
appeal was created, given that the theater was not built
until 1925. As the court pointed out, “[t]here’s nothing
in the language [of the 1905 easement] . . . that talks
about the right-of-way [at issue in this appeal] serving
the Capitol Theater.”
With respect to the physical characteristics of the
alleyway, the defendants argue that “[t]he size and char-
acter of the [alleyway] . . . overwhelmingly [support]
the conclusion that the right-of-way [over the alleyway]
was intended for pedestrian use only.” Specifically, the
defendants argue that “[i]t is illogical to conclude that
the owners of the Pythian building (which also had doors
leading and opening directly into the [alleyway]) and the
Capitol Theater property would direct occupants into
oncoming traffic in the ‘narrow alley’ that constitutes the
[alleyway].” (Emphasis added.) The defendants contend
that “[t]he only logical inference is that the parties did
not intend for [more than one] thousand people to exit
into oncoming traffic without room to maneuver.”11
First, during the trial, the court rejected the use of
the term “traffic,” stating: “You use the term ‘traffic.’ I
to the evidence and to the credibility of witnesses is solely within the
determination of the trier of fact” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
11The defendants claim that, when the Capitol Theater was built in
1925, the buildings on the defendants’ property had a capacity of more
than 1100 people. The capacity of the remaining structure is unclear

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
think we’re really focused on access because . . . nothing
I’ve seen so far shows that this is like a thruway con-
necting one road to the other. What [it] appears to be,
as I’m learning about it, is vehicular access to the rear of
another property. It’s not through traffic. It’s vehicular
access over a driveway, the word is used over a driveway,
to other property owned by the dominant estate.” We
concur with the court that the defendants’ argument
about “traffic” in the narrow alleyway being a safety
concern mischaracterizes the circumstances at issue.
The defendants’ arguments regarding the character-
istics of the alleyway again relate to the alleged safety
concerns for patrons exiting the theater, which, as we
already have indicated, do not shed light on the intent of
the grantor in 1905, when the right-of-way easement over
the alleyway was created. Rather, given the language
of the 1905 deed, which conveyed the property at 360
Main Street with the buildings thereon “with a right
of way to the rear of said premises,” it is reasonable to
infer that the 1905 easement was intended to provide the
plaintiff with a means to access the rear of its property.
Moreover, the evidence before the court demonstrates
that the alleyway is not so narrow that vehicles cannot
pass over it.
We are mindful that any ambiguity in the 1905 deed
“must emanate from the language used . . . rather than
from one party’s subjective perception of the terms.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fiorillo v. Hartford,
212 Conn. App. 291, 302, 275 A.3d 628 (2022). The fact
that the defendants advance this alternative interpreta-
tion of the 1905 easement does not require a conclusion
that the language of the easement is ambiguous. The
defendants’ argument also ignores the facts that the
alleyway between the two properties is the only means for
based on the evidence presented at trial. We agree with the court that
it is reasonable to infer that the parties to the 1925 agreement intended
the 1925 easement to the rear of the properties to be used by pedestrians;
however, this inference, without more, does not support the defendants’
claim that the easement over the alleyway that was created in 1905 must
be limited to only pedestrians.

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
the plaintiff to access the area to the rear of its building
from Main Street, and that the 1905 easement, which
created a “right of way to the rear of [the plaintiff’s]
premises over the [alleyway],” was granted in general
terms without restrictions on its use.
The defendants also rely on Russo v. Stepp, 2 Conn.
App. 4, 475 A.2d 331 (1984), to support their position.
In Russo, this court held that the holder of an easement
for “general driveway purposes”; (internal quotation
marks omitted) id., 5; could not park a vehicle in the
easement area located in a steep driveway for extended
periods because the characteristics of the driveway made
“ingress and egress inherently dangerous when vehicles
are parked on any portion of the easement,” as “there was
evidence that on several occasions vehicles of the plain-
tiffs, in attempting to back out of the driveway, ha[d]
collided with vehicles parked within the easement.” Id.,
6. We conclude that the defendants’ reliance on Russo
is misplaced, as the defendants’ contention that driving
over the alleyway in the present case is inherently danger-
ous due to the specific characteristics of the alleyway,
or that pedestrians would be harmed or restricted from
moving through the alleyway if vehicles are allowed to
use it, is based on speculation. See Hagist v. Washburn,
16 Conn. App. 83, 87–88, 546 A.2d 947 (1988) (there
were no physical characteristics of property that would
render use of easement dangerous if plaintiff parked
vehicle within easement area).
Accordingly, the defendants’ challenge to the court’s
finding that the 1905 easement was not limited to pedes-
trian use fails, and we find no merit to their contention
that the court failed to consider the creation of the right-
of-way over the alleyway in light of its surrounding
circumstances and physical characteristics, and public
policy. Our review of the record shows that the court
considered but rejected those claims, and we concur with
its conclusions.

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
B
The defendants next claim that, in light of the “circum-
stances surrounding the area, the potential harm, and
the rights of the servient estate,” the trial court erred
in concluding that “passage over the right-of-way by
vehicles to access the rear of the plaintiff’s property is a
reasonable use of the [1905] easement . . . .” We disagree.
The following additional facts are relevant to our reso-
lution of this claim. In its memorandum of decision, the
court found that “[i]t is obvious from the map exhibits
and a view of the property that the only access to the rear
of the plaintiff’s building from Main Street is over the
ten foot right-of-way that is the subject of this action.
The 1905 easement expressly created ‘a right of way to
the rear of [the plaintiff’s] premises over the [alleyway].’
In the past, authorized users have utilized the right-of-
way for vehicular access to the area located at the rear
of the building located on the plaintiff’s property. This
is a reasonably necessary use of the right-of-way. The
defendants have not pointed to any limiting language
that would prohibit vehicle use in the 1905 easement or
the 1925 agreement. . . . [T]he right-of-way remained
open for vehicular use until 2017.” The court stated
further: “The defendants have not persuaded the court
that the assertion in their brief that ‘automobiles were
not in use in 1905 at the time the right-of-way for the
[alleyway] was granted’ is correct. In any event, ‘that
a means of traversing a right-of-way was not in use at
the time of the granting does not indicate a prohibition
against such a means of travel.’ Williams v. Green Power
Ventures, LLC, supra, [221 Conn. App. 682].”
As we indicated previously in this opinion, the court
also was unpersuaded with the defendants’ argument
that vehicular use of the alleyway is “illogical” because
the alleyway is ten feet wide and “two doors exist on the
side of the defendants’ building that open [into] the right-
of-way.” Additionally, the court rejected the defendants’
claim that vehicular use in the alleyway is illegal, there-
fore invalidating the 1905 easement. The court did “not

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
find that Lespier’s testimony supports the defendants’
claim” that “use of the right-of-way by vehicles would
violate the Life Safety Code since the use would impede
access for pedestrians using the [alleyway] in the event
of a fire or other emergency.” The court elaborated that,
“[w]hen the court asked Lespier whether a driveway could
serve as a means of egress under the Life Safety Code, he
could not give a definitive answer. He responded that it
would be a matter for planning and zoning.” The court
noted that “[t]here is no evidence to establish [that] the
concern now raised by the defendants was a concern for
the parties when the [1905] easement was created. The
court has determined that, under the terms of the [1905]
easement and the facts of this case, the easement allows
vehicles to pass over the [alleyway]. The possibility that
the plaintiff’s exercise of its rights under the [1905]
easement may give rise to consequences is beyond the
court’s purview in this action.” (Emphasis omitted.)
With respect to whether the plaintiff’s use of the
alleyway overburdened the servient estate, the court
explained that, “[i]n determining that vehicle use of the
right-of-way is reasonably necessary for convenient use of
the servitude, the court has also considered the servient
estate. There was a lack of evidence to establish that the
historical use of the servitude by vehicles unreasonably
interfered with the servient estate. The defendants filed
their claims against the plaintiff only after the plaintiff
brought this action. As noted earlier, the [1905] easement
was capable of accommodating vehicle use up until the
time obstructions were placed in the [alleyway] by Bauer.
This is not a case where the servient estate claims that
the dominant estate has overburdened the easement.
See Fitch v. Forsthoefel, 194 Conn. App. 230, [238–39]
220 A.3d 876 (2019) (where easement was limited to
ingress and egress, children playing in easement area
overburdened easement). Here, the servient estate has
interfered with the dominant estate’s reasonable use of
its easement.”

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
“It is well established that ‘[a] right of way granted or
reserved in general terms may be used for any purpose
reasonably necessary for the party entitled to use it. . . .
The grant being general in terms, it must be construed
to include any reasonable use to which the land may be
devoted.’ . . . Peck v. Mackowsky, 85 Conn. 190, 194,
82 A. 199 (1912); see also Mackin v. Mackin, supra, 186
Conn. 189 (easement created by grant in general terms
without restrictions on use ‘is to be construed as broad
enough to permit any use which is reasonably connected
with the reasonable use of the land to which it is appur-
tenant’ . . . ); Birdsey v. Kosienski, 140 Conn. 403, 413,
101 A.2d 274 (1953) (same); Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn.
71, 78 (1881) (general grant conveys ‘unlimited way of
necessity for all legal uses’). ‘The reasonable uses, to
which the granted right-of-way may be put, need only be
reasonably connected with the land and are not limited
to those to which the land was being put when the way
was granted. . . . For instance, the owner of an easement
may use the easement in ways which take advantage of
modern innovations such as commercial utilities.’ . . .
Francini v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 164 Conn. App.
279, 293, 134 A.3d 1278 (2016), aff’d, 327 Conn. 431,
174 A.3d 779 (2018). . . . [When] the language of the . . .
deed clearly and unambiguously create[s] an easement in
general terms without restrictions on its use, the scope of
the easement includes ‘any use which is reasonably con-
nected with the reasonable use of the land to which [the
easement] is appurtenant.’ ” Williams v. Green Power
Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 676–77.
Because the 1905 deed does not contain language limit-
ing the scope or use of the 1905 easement to pedestrians
but, rather, created a general right-of-way easement,
the scope of the plaintiff’s right-of-way over the alley-
way “must be construed to include any reasonable use
to which the land may be devoted.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 685. “[T]he determination of the
scope of an easement is a question of fact . . . [and the]
decision as to what would constitute a reasonable use of
a right-of-way is for the trier of fact whose decision may

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Stefanoni v. Duncan, 282
Conn. 686, 699, 923 A.2d 737 (2007). “A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record
to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed. . . . Our authority, when reviewing
the findings of a judge, is circumscribed by the defer-
ence we must give to decisions of the trier of fact, who
is usually in a superior position to appraise and weigh
the evidence. . . . The question for [an appellate] court
. . . is not whether it would have made the findings the
trial court did, but whether in view of the evidence and
pleadings in the whole record it is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
(Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Krausman v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., 236 Conn. App. 109, 124–25, 347 A.3d 198 (2025).
“[I]n a case tried before the court, the trial judge is the
sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight
to be afforded to specific testimony.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Finocchio Bros., Inc. v. 587 CTA, LLC,
226 Conn. App. 351, 355–56, 317 A.3d 838 (2024).
As we have stated, “[a]n easement creates a nonpos-
sessory right to enter and use land in the possession
of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere
with the rules authorized by the easement. . . . Except
as limited by the terms of the servitude . . . the holder
of an easement . . . is entitled to use the servient estate
in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the conve-
nient enjoyment of the servitude. . . . Likewise, [e]xcept
as limited by the terms of the servitude . . . the holder
of the servient estate is entitled to make any use of the
servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere with
enjoyment of the servitude.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra,
221 Conn. App. 669–70. Additionally, “[t]he use of an
easement must be reasonable and as little burdensome to
the servient estate as the nature of the easement and the

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
purpose will permit.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id., 670. “[Our Supreme Court has] read scope and
use [of an easement] as having similar meanings insofar
as they involve what [the] holder [of the easement] may
do with it, [and] the purposes for which it may be used.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 670–71. “The
reasonable uses, to which the granted right-of-way may
be put, need only be reasonably connected with the land
and are not limited to those to which the land was being
put when the way was granted. . . . For instance, the
owner of an easement may use the easement in ways
which take advantage of modern innovations such as
commercial utilities. . . . Francini v. Goodspeed Airport,
LLC, [supra, 164 Conn. App. 293].” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC,
supra, 677. “The issue of reasonableness is a question of
fact to be determined on a case by case basis, considering
all the relevant circumstances, including such factors
as the amount of harm caused, its foreseeability, the
purpose or motive with which the act was done, and the
consideration of whether the utility of the use of the land
outweighed the gravity of the harm resulting.” Peterson
v. Oxford, 189 Conn. 740, 745, 459 A.2d 100 (1983).
In support of their claim that motor vehicle use of the
alleyway is unreasonable, the defendants argue that (1)
the characteristics surrounding the alleyway demon-
strate safety concerns that render vehicular use of the
1905 easement unreasonable, (2) the plaintiff failed to
establish harm if vehicular use of the alleyway is pro-
hibited, and (3) the court failed to balance the rights of
both the dominant and servient estates in determining
whether vehicular use of the alleyway is reasonable. The
plaintiff counters that an easement granted in general
terms “should be construed as broad enough to permit
any use reasonably connected with the use of the land,”
and that automobile use over the alleyway is “reasonably
connected with the use of the land.” We agree with the
plaintiff.

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
We conclude that the court’s finding that vehicular use
of the alleyway to access the rear of the plaintiff’s prop-
erty constitutes a reasonable use of the 1905 easement is
not clearly erroneous and is supported by the record. To
start, use of the 1905 easement in the alleyway by a motor
vehicle to access the rear of the plaintiff’s property where
parking spaces are present is reasonably connected with
the use of the land. The evidence in the record demon-
strates that vehicular use of the alleyway was utilized by
the plaintiff and its tenants without issue for many years.
Indeed, the court had before it testimony from Quinland,
which it specifically credited, and from Yi, as well as
photographs, supporting its subordinate findings that,
in the past, motor vehicles utilized the right-of-way as a
means to access the rear of the plaintiff’s property and
that “the [1905] easement was capable of accommodating
vehicle use up until the time obstructions were placed in
the [alleyway] by Bauer.” Furthermore, as previously
noted, the only way for the plaintiff to access the rear
of its property was by way of the alleyway, which lends
further support to the court’s finding that vehicular
access to the alleyway was a reasonably necessary use.
We also agree with the court that the use of the term
“drive-way” in the 1925 agreement lends further sup-
port to a finding that vehicular use of the alleyway con-
stituted a reasonable use of the 1905 easement. Finally,
the defendants presented no evidence establishing that
the use of the 1905 easement by vehicles unreasonably
interfered with the servient estate. As the court aptly
found, “[t]he defendants filed their claims against the
plaintiff only after the plaintiff brought this action. . . .
This is not a case where the servient estate claims that
the dominant estate has overburdened the easement. . . .
Here, the servient estate has interfered with the domi-
nant estate’s reasonable use of its easement.” (Citation
omitted.) Nothing in the record supports a determination
that vehicular use of the 1905 easement is unreasonable.
With respect to the defendants’ concerns regarding
fire safety, the court found Lespier’s testimony to be
unsupportive of the defendants’ claims and that “[t]his

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
interpretation conveniently ignores the fact that the
right-of-way grant is in general terms and is not limited
in any manner.” Moreover, although the defendants
elicited testimony from Lespier regarding pedestrian
egress into the alleyway in the event of an emergency,
the court noted that, “[w]hen the court asked Lespier
whether a driveway could serve as a means of egress
under the Life Safety Code, he could not give a definitive
answer. He responded that it would be a matter for plan-
ning and zoning.” See also footnote 10 of this opinion.
The defendants have offered no support, beyond specu-
lation, demonstrating that vehicular use of the 1905
easement is unreasonable. For example, unlike in Russo
v. Stepp, supra, 2 Conn. App. 6, the defendants in the
present case have failed to demonstrate a history of harm
to others through vehicular use of the 1905 easement.
Instead, the defendants summarily claim that the court
“ignored” compelling evidence that the plaintiff’s use is
unreasonable due to the “potential harm” posed by driv-
ing a vehicle in a place where pedestrians may traverse.
The defendants next argue that the plaintiff will suffer
no harm if vehicular use of the 1905 easement is prohib-
ited but that pedestrians stand to suffer harm in that
the plaintiff’s use of the alleyway will block a route of
emergency egress. The defendants’ argument is unavail-
ing because it ignores the general rule that “[a] covenant
may be enforced by injunction without a showing that
violation of the covenant will cause harm to the plain-
tiff, so long as such relief is not inequitable. . . . It is well
settled that the owner of an easement is entitled to relief
upon a showing that he will be disturbed or obstructed
in the exercise of his right.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Gancsos v. Israel, 233 Conn. App. 584, 594,
342 A.3d 283 (2025).
The defendants also take issue with the court’s find-
ings that (1) the doors on the defendants’ building had
no steps, (2) the doors on the defendants’ building were
loading doors and not for ingress and egress, and (3) the
alleyway could accommodate an automobile from the

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
time of its inception to 2019, when Bauer constructed
platforms and stairs that blocked automobiles from enter-
ing. Although the court found that, “[h]istorically, there
were no steps or landings in front of the doors on the
side of [350 Main’s] building,” Quinland testified that
he remembered steps to at least one of those doors and
that, when he purchased his property in 2007, there was
one step. Nevertheless, the court’s misstatement of that
fact did not render clearly erroneous its ultimate finding
that vehicular use of the 1905 easement was reasonable,
especially given Quinland’s testimony that the step did
not interfere with his ability to navigate an automobile
through the alleyway. See Utzler v. Braca, 115 Conn.
App. 261, 270, 972 A.2d 743 (2009) (“[t]he possibil-
ity that the court misstated a subsidiary fact does not,
however, establish that the court’s ultimate finding was
clearly erroneous”). The same holds true with respect to
any impropriety in the court’s finding that the doors on
the defendants’ building were loading doors and not for
ingress and egress. Finally, the court’s finding that the
alleyway was capable of accommodating automobiles
from the time of its inception until 2019, when Bauer
installed the platforms and stairs, is not clearly errone-
ous and is supported by the testimony of Quinland and
Yi that they could and did drive over the alleyway and
park their vehicles in the alleyway prior to when Bauer
installed the platforms and stairs.
After a thorough review of the record, we are unper-
suaded that the trial court erred in finding that motor
vehicle use of the alleyway is reasonable. See Williams
v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App.
682 (“The fact that photographs of the area surround-
ing [the easement] from the time of the granting do not
display vehicles or evidence of vehicular use on [the
easement area] does not lead to the conclusion that the
grantors intended to prohibit passage via motor vehicle.
The absence of evidence of a use does not definitively
indicate an intent to preclude such use, especially where
the grant of the easement was a general right-of-way.”).

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
C
The defendants next claim that the trial court erred
in failing to evaluate and conclude as a matter of law
that the vehicular use of the alleyway is unlawful and
against public policy. In their principal appellate brief,
the defendants’ analysis of this claim consists of the
following: “[T]he trial court failed to analyze whether
vehicular use is illegal or violates public policy. For all
the same reasons set forth [previously in their brief,
which includes an analysis of public policy consider-
ations and the Life Safety Code], the proposed use of
the [alleyway] for vehicular access violates public policy
and the provisions of the Life Safety Code. Accordingly,
the only reasonable use for the [alleyway] is for pedes-
trian use only, and this court should reverse the trial
court’s determination.” Thus, in making this claim, the
defendants appear to be reasserting the claims raised in
part I A and B of this opinion and arguing, again, that
vehicular use of the 1905 easement is not reasonable.
Additionally, their arguments about the Life Safety Code
and public policy concerning safe passage are premised
on the testimony of Lespier, which, as we already have
indicated, the court implicitly did not credit and found
did not establish their claim that vehicular use of the
1905 easement violated the Life Safety Code and public
policy governing safe passage.12 See footnote 10 of this
opinion. In light of the lack of credible evidence before
the court, it properly did not engage in further analysis
of the claim, especially given that the defendants did not
plead a violation of the Life Safety Code in their special
12The court noted that, “[m]ore importantly, in this case the court
must determine the scope and reasonable use of the [1905] easement
based upon the intention of the parties, as expressed in the language
used in the easement documents. There is no evidence to establish [that]
the concern now raised by the defendants was a concern for the parties
when the [1905] easement was created. The court has determined that,
under the terms of the [1905] easement, and the facts of this case,
the [1905] easement allows vehicles to pass over the [alleyway]. The
possibility that the plaintiff’s exercise of its rights under the [1905]
easement may give rise to consequences is beyond the court’s purview
in this action.” (Emphasis omitted.)

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
defenses or the counterclaim. See Burr v. Grossman
Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc., 224 Conn. App. 668, 685, 315
A.3d 414 (2024) (trial court did not err in finding that
there was no evidence to support plaintiffs’ claims when
only evidence presented to support claims was found to
be not credible); see also Lenczewski v. Lenczewski, 229
Conn. App. 752, 761–62, 328 A.3d 718 (2024) (“ ‘[I]t
is fundamental in our law that the right of a [party] to
recover is limited to the allegations in his [pleading]. . . .
Facts found but not averred cannot be made the basis
for a recovery. . . . Thus, it is clear that [t]he court is
not permitted to decide issues outside of those raised
in the pleadings.’ ”). Because, in raising this claim, the
defendants, in essence, are repeating arguments already
addressed and rejected by this court, we do not discuss
it further.13
II
Next, the defendants claim that the trial court erred
in (1) finding that Bauer intentionally interfered with
and obstructed the plaintiff’s use of the 1905 easement,
which formed the basis for its decision to award nominal
damages and punitive damages in the form of attorney’s
fees against Bauer, and (2) rendering judgment in favor
of the plaintiff as to counts three, eight and nine of the
counterclaim. Before addressing each claim in turn, we
first set forth the following additional facts.
With respect to count one of the operative com-
plaint, the court found in its memorandum of decision
that “Bauer/The Cooking Company has intentionally
obstructed and interfered with the plaintiff’s use of the
right-of-way by the installation of the platforms and
steps that protrude into the right-of-way. Although 350
13In their appellate reply brief, the defendants claim further that the
court improperly failed to consider their “criminal exposure for violating
the Life Safety Code,” as well as their exposure to civil liability for any
such violations. These claims, however, were raised by the defendants
for the first time in their appellate reply brief, and, thus, we decline
to review them. See, e.g., McCullough v. Rocky Hill, 239 Conn. App.
70, 91 n.16, ___ A.3d ___ (2026) (declining to review claim raised for
first time in reply brief).

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
Main may have not installed the offending platforms
or steps, it was certainly aware of their construction.
As Bauer’s landlord, and the owner of the [servient]
estate, 350 Main took no action in response to Quinland’s
complaints regarding the obstructed right-of-way. The
plaintiff is entitled to relief in the form of an injunction
requiring the removal of the platforms and steps located
within the right-of-way that are in front of the two doors
on the side of the building located at 350 Main Street. The
plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief related to counts
one and two. The court will order injunctive relief against
350 Main and Bauer. The plaintiff has not established
that [it] is entitled to damages from 350 Main.
“As to count two, the plaintiff has proven that Bauer
intentionally interfered with its right-of-way by con-
structing the subject platforms and stairs; however, the
plaintiff did not present evidence regarding compensa-
tory damages resulting from the defendants’ interference
with the right-of-way. The plaintiff is entitled to nomi-
nal damages on this count. . . . The plaintiff is awarded
nominal damages [in the amount] of $10 as to Bauer.
“The plaintiff also seeks punitive damages in the form
of attorney’s fees. . . . The court finds that Bauer violated
the plaintiff’s rights related to the right-of-way by con-
structing the steps and landing in front of [the] doors [on
the side of 350 Main’s building]. As early as 2017, Bauer
was aware of Quinland’s concerns about interference with
[the plaintiff’s] right-of-way. Despite these concerns, in
2019, Bauer constructed the landing and stairs that block
vehicle use of the right-of-way. Bauer unilaterally and
intentionally constructed the platform and stairs that
violated the plaintiff’s rights. Such action justifies an
award of punitive damages in the form of attorney’s fees
against Bauer. Pursuant to Practice Book § 11-21, the
plaintiff should file a motion for attorney’s fees, with
a supporting affidavit, within thirty days of the filing
of this memorandum of decision. Thereafter, the court
will conduct a hearing on the motion in accordance with

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 839 A.2d 589 (2004).”
(Citations omitted.)
With respect to the claims raised by 350 Main in its
counterclaim, the court concluded that “350 Main did
not present sufficient evidence to establish the allega-
tions contained in [counts one through five, and count
ten, of the counterclaim]. Additionally, in their post-
trial brief, the defendants only addressed [the] claim for
injunctive and declaratory relief. Judgment may enter
in favor of the plaintiff . . . on the first, second, third,
fourth, fifth, and tenth [counts of the counterclaim]. . . .
Based upon the evidence presented, the court finds that
350 Main is not entitled to injunctive relief against [the
plaintiff]. Judgment may enter in favor of the plaintiff
. . . on [count eight of the counterclaim].” With respect
to count nine of the counterclaim, the court rendered
a declaratory judgment that the “right-of-way may be
used by motor vehicles to access the rear of the premises
owned by [the plaintiff].”
A
We first address the defendants’ challenge to the
court’s finding that Bauer intentionally interfered with
and obstructed the plaintiff’s use of the 1905 easement,
which finding formed the basis for the court’s award of
nominal damages and punitive damages in the form of
attorney’s fees against Bauer.14 Specifically, the defen-
dants claim that there was no evidence presented at trial
that supports the court’s finding that Bauer acted in an
intentional manner. The defendants argue that Bauer’s
intent could not be determined on the evidence because
Bauer did not testify at trial and Stone’s testimony did
not suggest that “Bauer or anyone associated with [The
14We construe this claim as a challenge to the court’s decision to award
punitive damages on the basis of its underlying finding of intentional
conduct by Bauer, not to the court’s postjudgment award of attorney’s
fees to the plaintiff in the amount of $26,560, as the defendants did not
amend their appeal to challenge the court’s order awarding attorney’s
fees, which was issued after the defendants filed this appeal. See Freeman
v. A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc., 174 Conn. App. 649, 651–52
n.1, 166 A.3d 857, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 927, 171 A.3d 60 (2017).

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
Cooking Company] had any knowledge about the [1905]
easement or its terms.” The plaintiff counters, inter
alia, that Bauer15 had knowledge of the 1905 easement
and its terms in 2017, when Bauer first obstructed the
alleyway with tables, chairs, and flowerpots. We agree
with the plaintiff.
We set forth our standard of review and the relevant
legal principles that guide us in resolving this claim. “In
order to obtain an award of common-law punitive dam-
ages, the pleadings must allege and the evidence must
be sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find that the
defendant exhibited a reckless indifference to the rights
of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those
rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Landmark
Investment Group, LLC v. CALCO Construction & Devel-
opment Co., 318 Conn. 847, 878, 124 A.3d 847 (2015).
“[T]he trial court has broad discretion in determining
whether [punitive] damages are appropriate. . . . Its
decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear
abuse of discretion. . . . Punitive damages are awarded
when the evidence shows a reckless indifference to the
rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation
of those rights. . . . Punitive damages . . . in Connecticut
are limited to attorney’s fees less taxable costs . . . . Such
damages, however, are not awarded as a matter of right,
but rather as a matter of discretion, to be determined by
the [court] upon a consideration of all the evidence . . . .”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Avery v. Medina,
151 Conn. App. 433, 449, 94 A.3d 1241 (2014).
“Under the common law, [i]n order to establish that
the [defendant’s] conduct was wanton, reckless, wilful,
intentional and malicious, the plaintiff must prove, on
the part of the [defendant], the existence of a state of
consciousness with reference to the consequences of
one’s acts . . . . [Such conduct] is more than negligence,
more than gross negligence. . . . [I]n order to infer it,
15Although the plaintiff, in its appellate brief, refers to the defendants
in asserting this argument, the court’s award of nominal and punitive
damages was against Bauer only.

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
there must be something more than a failure to exercise
a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to
others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury
to them. . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless
disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the
consequences of the action.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Gilman v. Shames, 189 Conn. App. 736, 744,
208 A.3d 1279 (2019).
In the present case, the court found that Bauer violated
the plaintiff’s rights with respect to the right-of-way
over the alleyway by constructing the steps and landings
therein, which precluded vehicular use of the right-of-
way. The court had before it testimony demonstrating
that, in 2017, Quinland expressed concerns relating to the
placement of tables, chairs, large cement potted plants
and other items in the alleyway to Stone, who testified
that he had instructed The Cooking Company “not to
block the [alleyway].” The items were removed at that
time. Nevertheless, in 2019, Bauer installed platforms
and stairs that protruded approximately four feet into
the ten foot right-of-way. Despite the warning from
Stone, which supports an inference that Bauer was made
aware of the 1905 easement, the platforms and stairs
installed by Bauer continued to prevent the plaintiff
from driving over the alleyway. Accordingly, we conclude
that the court reasonably could have determined on the
basis of the testimony before it that Bauer’s conduct
in obstructing vehicular use of the right-of-way over
the alleyway was intentional and designed to block the
plaintiff’s use of the alleyway, even though Bauer herself
did not testify. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the
court’s decision to award punitive damages constituted
an abuse of its discretion. See Curto v. Hartmann, 235
Conn. App. 40, 58–59, 344 A.3d 1244 (2025).
B
Finally, the defendants claim that the trial court
erred in rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff
with respect to counts three (quiet title), eight (injunc-
tive relief) and nine (declaratory judgment) of the

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
counterclaim. Because the defendants did not adequately
brief this claim, we decline to review it.
“We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented
to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analy-
sis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in
order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the
statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory
attention in the brief without substantive discussion or
citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . .
For a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . .
consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties
must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their
briefs. . . . In addition, briefing is inadequate when it
is not only short, but confusing, repetitive, and disor-
ganized.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alterio
v. Spak, 237 Conn. App. 84, 90, 349 A.3d 614 (2026).
Finally, “[a]lthough the number of pages devoted to an
argument in a brief is not necessarily determinative,
relative sparsity weighs in favor of concluding that the
argument has been inadequately briefed.” State v. Buhl,
321 Conn. 688, 726, 138 A.3d 868 (2016).
In the present case, the defendants’ briefing of this
claim consists of one short paragraph, in which the defen-
dants referenced the three counts of the counterclaim
being challenged, stated that those counts “sought to
prevent the plaintiff from using the right-of-way in the
[alleyway] in a manner that violated its terms, including
preventing the plaintiff from driving vehicles and park-
ing in it,” and stated further: “For all the same reasons set
forth [previously in the brief] as to the plaintiff’s claims,
the trial court erred in [rendering] judgment in favor of
the plaintiff on [those counts of] the [counterclaim], and
this court should reverse the judgment on such counts.”
The defendants cite no authority to support this claim
beyond this bare assertion, nor have they provided any
analysis of their claim. See Bongiorno v. J & G Realty,
LLC, 211 Conn. App. 311, 323–24, 272 A.3d 700 (2022)

360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC
(“conclusory assertions regarding a claim, with no men-
tion of the relevant authority and minimal or no citations
from the record, will not suffice” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). In asserting this claim, the defendants
rely on their briefing in support of their other claims;
however, counts three and eight of the counterclaim
assert claims for quiet title and injunctive relief, which
were not previously briefed, and the defendants’ appel-
late briefs contain no relevant legal authority pertaining
to quieting title or injunctive relief, or demonstrating
why the court should have quieted title to the alleyway
in their favor or awarded them injunctive relief. Accord-
ingly, we decline to review this claim. See, e.g., State
v. Adams, 139 Conn. App. 540, 552 n.7, 56 A.3d 747
(2012) (declining to review defendants’ claim that, if
this court deemed claim to be unpreserved, “this court
should review the claim ‘for all of the reasons cited in [the
portion of his brief devoted to claim I],’ ” and concluding
that “[t]his abstract assertion, unsupported by adequate
legal analysis related to the particular claim to which it
applies, is wholly inadequate”), cert. denied, 308 Conn.
928, 64 A.3d 121 (2013). Moreover, even if we were to
review this claim and to the extent that it relies on the
arguments set forth by the defendants in the other por-
tions of their principal appellate brief, which we already
have rejected, the claim nonetheless fails, for the reasons
already set forth in this opinion.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.