Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction

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Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
WILLIE J. COLEMAN v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(AC 47279)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Pellegrino, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of murder, appealed, on
the granting of certification, from the habeas court’s judgment denying his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court
incorrectly concluded that McCoy v. Louisiana (584 U.S. 414), in which
the United States Supreme Court recognized a criminal defendant’s right
under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution to autonomy
in deciding the fundamental objectives of his defense, was not implicated
under the facts of this case. Held:
The habeas court correctly concluded that McCoy was inapplicable to the
petitioner’s case, as, although the petitioner’s counsel at his criminal trial
conceded the petitioner’s guilt to the crime of criminally negligent homicide
during closing argument, the court found that counsel had discussed with
the petitioner his intention to concede the petitioner’s guilt to criminally
negligent homicide, that decision was consistent with the theory of defense,
and the petitioner never objected to that concession and consistently admit-
ted that he stabbed the victim but did not do so with the intent to kill her.
The petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was unavailing, as
the petitioner failed to show that his trial counsel’s concession of his guilt
to criminally negligent homicide was not objectively reasonable and, thus,
the petitioner failed to demonstrate deficient performance.
Argued November 18, 2025—officially released April 21, 2026
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland
and tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment denying the
petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of
certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Hope J. Estrella, deputy assistant public defender,
for the appellant (petitioner).
Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott,
state’s attorney, and Angela R. Macchiarulo, supervi-
sory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respon-
dent).

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
Opinion
CRADLE, C. J. In this certified appeal, the petitioner,
Willie J. Coleman, appeals from the judgment of the
habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in which he sought to vacate his conviction of
murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a.1
On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
incorrectly concluded that (1) McCoy v. Louisiana, 584
U.S. 414, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 200 L. Ed. 2d 821 (2018),
which recognized a criminal defendant’s right under
the sixth amendment to the United States constitution
to autonomy in deciding the fundamental objectives of
his defense, was not implicated under the facts of this
case and (2) his trial counsel did not render ineffective
assistance of counsel. We disagree and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The following facts, as set forth by the habeas court,
Bhatt, J., and procedural history are relevant to the
petitioner’s claims on appeal. The court, in its memo-
randum of decision, set forth portions of our Supreme
Court’s decision that summarized the underlying facts
that the jury reasonably could have found at the peti-
tioner’s criminal trial. “On July 8, 2008, at approxi-
mately 5:30 p.m., the [petitioner] placed a 911 call from
his apartment reporting that he had ‘just stabbed [his]
girlfriend’ and requesting an ambulance. At the time the
[petitioner] placed the call, [the petitioner’s girlfriend,
Twonna] White was still conscious. In response to ques-
tions from the 911 operator as to White’s condition,
the [petitioner] stated that he had ‘[s]tabbed her in the
back and in the front a couple of times’ and that, with
respect to the means by which he had inflicted these
wounds, ‘it was a fork and . . . then I used a knife too.’
The operator inquired as to what had caused the incident,
and the [petitioner] explained: ‘Well, she want to keep
1 General Statutes § 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “(a) A person
is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another
person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes
a suicide by force, duress, or deception . . . .
“(c) Murder is punishable as a class A felony . . . .”

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
on talking about all the people that she got coming in
my house, and I’m tired of it, had enough of it, all the
people that she fucking around with, and I’m tired of
it.’ Following a comment by the operator indicating that
police officers were on their way, the [petitioner] stated:
‘I’m not going nowhere. You know, I did it, you know.
I ain’t scared of nothing. . . . I’m just tired, that’s all it
is. I got tired . . . . I just got home from the court . . . pay
the fine and all that.2 I’m sick of it. Enough is enough.
Enough is enough.’
“When Officers Aaron Boisvert and Robert Quaglini
of the Hartford [P]olice [D]epartment arrived on the
scene, the [petitioner] again acknowledged to Boisvert
that he had stabbed White. Boisvert handcuffed the
[petitioner] . . . placed him on a bed and then went into
the kitchen to aid White. A two-pronged grill fork and a
black handled steak knife were lying near White’s body
in plain view. While Boisvert attempted to ascertain the
location of White’s wounds, he heard the [petitioner]
say that he was tired of White bringing other men to the
apartment and then telling the [petitioner] about those
sexual encounters.
“The [petitioner] reiterated the impetus for the attack
in voluntary statements to Quaglini while being escorted
to the police cruiser and to Detective Seth Condon at the
police station. The [petitioner] told Quaglini that he and
White had been drinking and that ‘[s]he got to my head.
She started telling me about all the guys she was fuck-
ing and I stabbed her with a fork and a knife . . . .’ The
[petitioner] later told Condon that, after the drinking
and White’s boasts of infidelity, he had ‘snapped’ and
stabbed her, but had not meant to hurt or kill her.
“While these events transpired, White received medical
aid, including chest and abdominal surgery, but she did
not survive. The medical examiner’s autopsy revealed
that White had sustained the following external inju-
ries: cuts on the back of two fingers on her left hand that
2 “It appears from the record that the [petitioner] had paid a fine in
connection with an offense committed by White for which she had been
arrested.” State v. Coleman, 304 Conn. 161, 164 n.1, 37 A.3d 713 (2012).

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
appeared to be ‘defense wounds . . . where somebody
might be trying to fend off a weapon’; superficial cuts on
the back of her left hand and on the middle of her back;
a pair of puncture wounds, consistent with a barbeque
type fork, in the superficial layer of the skin in her back; a
pair of scrapes on her left back; a deeper scrape to her left
upper back; and a cut on her scalp. None of these wounds
contributed to her death. The cause of death was a single
stab wound in White’s chest, from the front left of her
breastbone into her heart. The examiner was unable to
determine the sequence of the wounds.
“At trial, the court [O’Keefe, J.] agreed to the [peti-
tioner’s] request for the jury to be instructed on lesser
included offenses to murder, acknowledging that there
was evidence supporting the [petitioner’s] contention
that he did not intend to kill White, and his request for
an instruction on the affirmative defense to murder of
extreme emotional disturbance [(EED)].”3 (Footnote in
original.) State v. Coleman, 304 Conn. 161, 163–65, 37
A.3d 713 (2012).
In his closing argument, the petitioner’s trial counsel,
Attorney John R. Williams, argued that the state had
failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the petitioner acted with the requisite mental
state to support a criminal conviction for murder and that
the petitioner was instead guilty of the lesser included
offense of criminally negligent homicide.4
3 “The EED defense is set forth in General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), which
provides in relevant part: ‘[I]t shall be an affirmative defense that the
defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable
explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under
the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be . . . .’ As our
Supreme Court has explained, the EED defense has two elements: ‘(1)
the defendant committed the offense under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance; and (2) there was a reasonable explanation or
excuse for the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance.’ ” Jan G. v.
Commissioner of Correction, 237 Conn. App. 115, 122 n.4, 350 A.3d
1156 (2026).
4 General Statutes § 53a-58 provides in relevant part: “(a) A person is
guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence,
he causes the death of another person . . . .
“(b) Criminally negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.”

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
Williams also contended that, if the jury were to find
that the state had proven the petitioner possessed the
requisite intent for murder, then it should “turn to the
issue of whether, by a lesser standard, [the petitioner had]
shown [EED].” Williams thereafter addressed each of the
lesser included offenses that the court would instruct the
jury on, explaining why the intent element was not met
for manslaughter in the first degree with intent to cause
serious physical injury, manslaughter in the first degree
by reckless indifference, or manslaughter in the second
degree. Finally, Williams conceded the petitioner’s guilt
to the lesser included offense of criminally negligent
homicide, contending that it was the only offense for
which the intent element was met because “[a] person acts
with criminal negligence with respect to a result when he
fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
such result will occur, and that’s exactly what happened
in this case.” Williams argued “that blind rage, which
was provoked by the victim . . . that blind rage caused
him to fail to perceive anything except [the] blind rage
that he was experiencing at that moment.”
The court then instructed the jury on murder, man-
slaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the second
degree, criminally negligent homicide, and the defense
of EED. The jury thereafter found the petitioner guilty
of murder in violation of § 53a-54a. The court rendered
judgment in accordance with the verdict and sentenced
the petitioner to forty-five years of incarceration. Fol-
lowing his conviction and sentencing, the petitioner
appealed his conviction to our Supreme Court, which,
in turn, affirmed the judgment.5 See State v. Coleman,
supra, 304 Conn. 161.
On August 31, 2015, the petitioner filed a self-repre-
sented petition for a writ of habeas corpus.6 After the
petitioner was appointed counsel, he filed an amended
5 On direct appeal to our Supreme Court, the petitioner “contend[ed]
that the state offered insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt his intent to kill White, that the trial court improperly instructed
the jury that it could infer such intent from the number of wounds he
had inflicted on her and that an improper statement by the prosecutor in
closing argument deprived him of a fair trial.” State v. Coleman, supra,
304 Conn. 163. The court rejected each of these claims. Id.
6 In his August 31, 2015 petition, the petitioner alleged that Wil-
liams provided ineffective assistance by failing to “bring up the illegal

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
petition on January 8, 2019, in which he claimed a vio-
lation of his constitutional right to autonomy under
McCoy v. Louisiana, supra, 584 U.S. 414, and ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 (1984), on the basis, inter alia, of Williams’ con-
cession of the petitioner’s guilt to the lesser included
offense of criminally negligent homicide during closing
argument without discussing it with the petitioner.7
The petitioner’s claims were tried before the
habeas court on June 6 and 23, 2023, during
which the court heard testimony from both the
questioning of [the petitioner] without [his] Miranda rights being given
to [him].” See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct.
1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). The petitioner did not renew this claim
in his amended petition.
7 In his amended petition, the petitioner also claimed ineffective
assistance of counsel pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, supra,
466 U.S. 668, on the basis of Williams’ alleged failures to adequately
perform during the course of jury selection, to investigate and pres-
ent mitigating evidence in his defense at trial and at sentencing, and
to consult with and retain experts concerning the petitioner’s mental
health. The petitioner withdrew those claims at the habeas trial. The
petitioner also asserted an ineffective assistance claim based on Wil-
liams’ alleged failure to present defenses of mental disease and defect
and EED, which he withdrew in his posttrial brief.
In addition, the petitioner asserted a count of ineffective assistance
pursuant to United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80
L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984), on the basis of both Williams’ concession of the
petitioner’s guilt to criminally negligent homicide and Williams’ perfor-
mance during jury selection. At the habeas trial, he withdrew his Cronic
claim as it related to the concession. The court rejected the petitioner’s
remaining Cronic claim as it related to the issue of jury selection, and
the petitioner has not challenged the court’s determination on appeal.
Finally, in his habeas petition, the petitioner claimed a violation of
his rights under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution as well
as rules 1.2 and 1.4 of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct.
Although the petitioner cited to the state constitution and the Rules of
Professional Conduct in his posttrial brief, he did not brief any specific
claim based on them before the habeas court. In addition, the court did
not address them in its memorandum of decision. Because the petitioner
has failed to brief a claim on appeal based on the state constitution or
the Rules of Professional Conduct, or even cited to them in his appellate
briefs, he has abandoned any such claim. See, e.g., Ramos v. Commissioner
of Correction, 237 Conn. App. 372, 387–88, 	A.3d 	(2026) (deeming
state constitutional claim abandoned where petitioner failed to brief it).

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
petitioner and Williams. On October 30, 2023, the
parties submitted their respective posttrial briefs.
On November 27, 2023, the habeas court filed a memo-
randum of decision rejecting the petitioner’s claims and
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court
explained that the petitioner testified, inter alia, “that
. . . Williams did not discuss the defense strategy with
him, nor did they discuss the elements of the charged
offenses or any lesser offenses.” In addition, the peti-
tioner “testified that . . . Williams did not discuss his
closing argument with him and that [the petitioner]
was not aware that . . . Williams was going to concede
a lesser included offense during closing argument.
[The petitioner] testified that he had not, at any point,
conveyed to . . . Williams that he would be in agree-
ment with conceding guilt to a lesser included offense.”
The court also explained that “Williams discussed the
theory of defense with [the petitioner]. According to . . .
Williams, the only defense was . . . [EED] to reduce the
charge to manslaughter. The defense was that it was a
manslaughter committed in the heat of passion.” The
court further indicated that “Williams testified [inter
alia] that he would have conceded to the jury that [the
petitioner] was guilty of manslaughter because it was
not in dispute that [the petitioner] stabbed and killed
the victim. He discussed with [the petitioner] that they
had to concede that [the petitioner] killed the victim
in the heat of passion. He testified that he discussed
with [the petitioner] that they would concede guilt to
criminally negligent homicide and that decision was
consistent with their theory of defense. [The petitioner]
said ‘not much’ in response. [The petitioner] did not
prohibit . . . Williams from arguing guilt on the lesser
included offense, at no point stating that it had to be
murder or nothing, nor did he object to that strategy
during their discussions. Rather . . . Williams testi-
fied that their joint strategy was to aim for a convic-
tion on manslaughter and argue for a lesser sentence.”
The court expressly credited Williams’ testimony
and determined that Williams had “discussed with [the
petitioner] that they would concede guilt to criminally
negligent homicide and that decision was consistent with
their theory of defense. [The petitioner] did not object
to that strategy during their discussions.” The court

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
therefore concluded that the circumstances “[fell] far
short of the vociferous objection required to trigger the
right to autonomy pursuant to McCoy . . . . Thus, the
court [found] that McCoy [was] inapplicable.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) The court also rejected the
petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim, reasoning that
the concession of guilt to criminally negligent homicide
was “a valid strategic decision” to which the petitioner
had acquiesced and that “[t]here was no doubt that [the
petitioner] stabbed the victim . . . [t]he only question
was his intent in doing so.” The court also concluded
that the petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice. The
court thereafter granted the petitioner’s certification
to appeal, and this appeal followed. Additional facts
and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
The petitioner first claims that the habeas court incor-
rectly concluded that McCoy was inapplicable to this
case.8 We disagree.9
8 The petitioner also requests that this court exercise “its supervisory
authority to require trial courts to canvass a defendant regarding conces-
sion to a crime in order to ensure that the objectives of McCoy are reached
and that there has been a clear advisement of the decision to concede
guilt.” It is well settled that invocation of this court’s “[s]upervisory
authority is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. . .
. Such powers should be invoked only when circumstances are such that
the issue at hand, while not rising to the level of a constitutional viola-
tion, is nonetheless of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a
particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system
as a whole. . . . Thus, we are more likely to invoke our supervisory pow-
ers when there is a pervasive and significant problem . . . or when the
conduct or violation at issue is offensive to the sound administration
of justice . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction, 236 Conn. App. 23, 38, 347 A.3d
984 (2025), cert. granted, 354 Conn. 911, 350 A.3d 1141 (2026).
Our Supreme Court in Grant v. Commissioner of Correction, 345 Conn.
683, 287 A.3d 124 (2022), declined a request to exercise its supervisory
authority to adopt a “retroactive, prophylactic rule requiring criminal
defense attorneys to obtain a defendant’s written consent to concede
guilt to an offense as part of their trial strategy,” because it was “not
persuaded that traditional protections are insufficient for ensuring that
criminal defense attorneys adequately apprise defendants of their intent
to concede at trial guilt as to an offense.” Id., 699 n.9. For the reasons
expressed in Grant, we likewise decline the petitioner’s invitation to
exercise our supervisory authority in this case.
9 The parties disagree about whether the United States Supreme Court’s
holding in McCoy v. Louisiana, supra, 584 U.S. 414, applies retroactively.

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
Our Supreme Court has explained that, “[i]n McCoy,
the United States Supreme Court recognized a crimi-
nal defendant’s sixth amendment right to autonomy in
deciding the objectives of his defense and concluded that
the right prohibits defense counsel from admit[ting] a
client’s guilt of a charged crime over the client’s intran-
sigent objection to that admission. . . . When a client
expressly asserts that the objective of his defense is to
maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts, his
lawyer must abide by that objective and may not over-
ride it by conceding guilt.” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Grant v. Commissioner of
Correction, 345 Conn. 683, 694–95, 287 A.3d 124 (2022).
“[T]he sixth amendment right to autonomy is implicated
only when, over a defendant’s express objections, counsel
concedes the defendant’s guilt to a charged offense. This
limitation on the right to autonomy is evident through-
out the [United States Supreme] [C]ourt’s decision [in
McCoy] but especially in the court’s restatement of the
issue presented: whether it is unconstitutional to allow
defense counsel to concede guilt over the defendant’s
intransigent and unambiguous objection.” (Emphasis
added; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 698.
On appeal, “[a]lthough a challenge to the facts found by
the habeas court is reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard . . . whether those facts constituted a violation
of the petitioner’s rights under the sixth amendment is
a mixed question of law and fact subject to this court’s
plenary review.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 694.
Here, the petitioner argues, as he did before the habeas
court, that Williams never discussed with him his inten-
tion to concede the petitioner’s guilt to criminally neg-
ligent homicide. This argument, however, dispositively
undermines the petitioner’s McCoy claim in that, logi-
cally, the petitioner could not meet the requirement set
Because we conclude that McCoy is inapplicable to the facts of this
case, we need not reach the issue of retroactivity. See Grant v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 345 Conn. 683, 686 n.2, 287 A.3d 124 (2022).

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
forth in McCoy that he object to such a concession if he
was never advised by counsel of his intention to make
it.10 Indeed, the petitioner has not challenged the habeas
court’s findings that he did not object to the concession
and that he consistently has admitted that he stabbed
the victim, but that he did not do so with the intent to
kill her.11 The petitioner’s claim that the habeas court
erred in finding that McCoy was inapplicable to this case
is unavailing.
II
The petitioner also claims that the court incorrectly
concluded that Williams did not provide ineffective
assistance by “arguing both that [the petitioner] had no
intent to kill [the victim] by conceding criminally negli-
gent homicide and that [the petitioner] had the intent to
kill [the victim] but should not be considered as culpable
10 For this reason, our Supreme Court suggested in Grant that, if
defense counsel fails to get a defendant’s approval before conceding
guilt to a charge, such a failure properly is challenged via an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, not as a stand-alone McCoy violation. See
Grant v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 345 Conn. 698–99 n.8; see
also White v. Commissioner of Correction, 236 Conn. App. 67, 83 n.9,
347 A.3d 214 (2025) (in cases in which counsel failed to give defendant
notice of intent to make concession of guilt, proper lens for analysis is
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, not freestanding constitutional
claim), cert. granted, 354 Conn. 901, 348 A.3d 813 (2026).
11 For this reason, we also reject the petitioner’s claim that “Williams
violated [his] sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel because
. . . Williams never gave a clear advisement of the proposed strategy or
the potential benefits of such a strategy with [the petitioner].” More-
over, the habeas court expressly found, to the contrary, that Williams’
strategy to concede guilt to the lesser included offense was sound and
that the petitioner agreed with it because “[t]here was no doubt that
[the petitioner] stabbed the victim. The only question was his intent in
doing so.” In challenging the court’s conclusion, the petitioner contends
that the court erred in finding that Williams properly advised him.
To the extent that the petitioner contends that the court erroneously
credited Williams’ testimony that he properly advised the petitioner,
it is axiomatic that the habeas court’s credibility determinations are
“unassailable.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Lopez v. Commissioner of Correction, 232 Conn. App. 825, 828, 337
A.3d 1211, cert. granted, 353 Conn. 902, 341 A.3d 957 (2025). This
claim therefore warrants no additional discussion.

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
due to his heightened emotional state, leading the jury
to be confused as to what the defense was.” We disagree.
It is well settled that, “[t]o succeed on a claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must
satisfy the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v.
Washington, [supra, 466 U.S. 687]. Strickland requires
that a petitioner satisfy both a performance prong and a
prejudice prong. . . . To satisfy the performance prong,
the petitioner must establish that his counsel made errors
so serious that [counsel] was not functioning as the coun-
sel guaranteed [to] the [petitioner] by the [s]ixth [a]mend-
ment. . . . The petitioner must thus show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of rea-
sonableness considering all of the circumstances. . . .
“To satisfy the prejudice prong, a claimant must dem-
onstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different. . . . In its analysis, a
reviewing court may look to the performance prong or to
the prejudice prong, and the petitioner’s failure to prove
either is fatal to a habeas petition.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) White v. Commissioner of Correction,
236 Conn. App. 67, 90–91, 347 A.3d 214 (2025), cert.
granted, 354 Conn. 901, 348 A.3d 813 (2026).
We stress that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s perfor-
mance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting
for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after
conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for
a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omis-
sion of counsel was unreasonable . . . . A fair assessment
of attorney performance requires that every effort be
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s per-
spective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent
in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
[petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action might be con-
sidered sound trial strategy. . . . Indeed, our Supreme
Court has recognized that [t]here are countless ways to
provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the
best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a par-
ticular client in the same way. . . . [A] reviewing court is
required not simply to give [the trial attorney] the benefit
of the doubt . . . but to affirmatively entertain the range
of possible reasons . . . counsel may have had for pro-
ceeding as [he] did . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Morales v. Commissioner
of Correction, 220 Conn. App. 285, 305–306, 298 A.3d
636, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 915, 303 A.3d 603 (2023).
In other words, “[a] petitioner will not be able to dem-
onstrate that trial counsel’s decisions were objectively
unreasonable unless there was no . . . tactical justification
for the course taken. . . . [C]ounsel has wide latitude in
deciding how to best represent a client, and deference to
counsel’s tactical decisions in his closing presentation
is particularly important because of the broad range of
legitimate defense strateg[ies] at that stage.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 313.
“Moreover, counsel’s decision regarding which defense
theory to emphasize . . . is a quintessential decision of
trial strategy and professional judgment that Strickland
considers to be objectively reasonable.” Jordan v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 341 Conn. 279, 309, 267 A.3d
120 (2021).
“On appeal, [a]lthough the underlying historical facts
found by the habeas court may not be disturbed unless
they [are] clearly erroneous, whether those facts consti-
tuted a violation of the petitioner’s rights [to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel] under the sixth amendment
is a mixed determination of law and fact that requires
the application of legal principles to the historical facts
of [the] case. . . . As such, that question requires plenary
review by this court unfettered by the clearly erroneous

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
standard.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) White v.
Commissioner of Correction, supra, 236 Conn. App. 91.
In rejecting the petitioner’s ineffective assistance
claim, the court explained that, at the habeas trial, Wil-
liams testified that he “discussed the theory of defense
with [the petitioner]. According to . . . Williams, the
only defense was . . . [EED] to reduce the charge to man-
slaughter. The defense was that it was a manslaughter
committed in the heat of passion. The state agreed that
this was a manslaughter, but because of [the petitioner’s]
prior record, they wanted the maximum sentence. [The
petitioner] did not want to resolve the matter via plea
because of the twenty year sentence offered, but he was
open to the charge of manslaughter. . . . Williams dis-
cussed the possible convictions to [the petitioner] and
the sentences he could receive via plea or after conviction
by the jury. . . . Williams believed that [the petitioner]
understood his options and the advice provided to him.”
The court concluded that the petitioner had “not proven
that . . . Williams performed deficiently by conceding
guilt to a lesser included offense during closing argu-
ment. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case,
it was a valid strategic decision. There was no doubt
that [the petitioner] stabbed the victim. The only ques-
tion was his intent in doing so. In addition, the evidence
shows that this strategy was discussed with [the peti-
tioner] and he acquiesced to it. Further, [the petitioner]
has not proven any prejudice. Indeed, almost all of [the
petitioner’s] argument on this issue in his posttrial brief
[was] focused on . . . Williams’ deficient performance.
Even assuming deficient performance, there [was] no
evidence from which the court [could] conclude that, but
for the concession to negligent homicide, there [was] a
reasonable likelihood of a different outcome.”
On appeal, the petitioner argues that the court incor-
rectly concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish
that Williams performed deficiently. Specifically, the
petitioner argues that, “[b]y putting forth both theo-
ries in the closing argument and conflating the two . . .

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
Williams was putting forward an objectively unreason-
able defense” and confused the jury. We disagree.
As noted by the habeas court, the petitioner has never
contested that he stabbed the victim and, therefore, “the
only question was [the petitioner’s] intent in [stabbing
White].” By conceding the petitioner’s guilt to negligent
homicide and arguing EED, Williams made a valid tacti-
cal decision by offering the jury two potential pathways to
find the petitioner not guilty of murder. Williams argued
principally that the state had failed to meet its burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner
possessed the requisite intent for murder and that the
petitioner was, instead, guilty of criminally negligent
homicide because he “failed to perceive a substantial and
unjustifiable risk.” Williams argued, in the alternative,
if the jury found that the petitioner intended to kill the
victim, then it should reach the affirmative defense of
EED. In so arguing, Williams maintained throughout his
closing argument that the petitioner lacked the required
intent for murder, which, as found by the habeas court,
was consistent with Williams’ testimony at the habeas
trial that the petitioner and his “joint strategy was to aim
for a conviction on manslaughter and argue for a lesser
sentence,” not to maintain the petitioner’s complete
innocence and seek full acquittal.
The petitioner nevertheless contends that the court
improperly concluded that Williams did not perform
deficiently because, “by arguing both that [the petitioner]
had no intent to kill White by conceding criminally neg-
ligent homicide and that [the petitioner] had the intent
to kill White but should not be considered as culpable
due to his heightened emotional state [by pursuing the
defense of EED], [Williams led] the jury to be confused
as to what the defense was.” The petitioner’s claim is
based on his erroneous belief that, by pursuing a defense
of EED, Williams “was arguing to the jury that all of the
elements of murder—specific intent to cause death and
causing the death of White—were proven . . . .” It is well
settled, however, that “[a] defendant does not concede

Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
the elements of murder by advancing an affirmative
defense of mental disease or defect, or [EED]. The state
still had to prove that the petitioner had the required
intent to kill in order to convict him of murder.” Zachs
v. Commissioner of Correction, 205 Conn. App. 243,
260, 257 A.3d 423, cert. denied, 338 Conn. 909, 258
A.3d 1279 (2021).
Moreover, Williams was clear throughout his closing
argument that, by asserting the affirmative defense of
EED, he was not conceding the petitioner’s intent to
commit murder. For example, Williams argued to the
jury that, “[i]f you find that the prosecutor has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the
crime of murder, then you turn to the issue of whether,
by a lesser standard, we’ve shown [EED]. But you only
do that if you find that the elements of murder have been
proven.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, he later argued
to the jury that “you don’t need to get to the affirmative
defense if you agree that he didn’t intend to commit mur-
der.” (Emphasis added.) We therefore conclude that the
petitioner has failed to show that Williams’ concession
of the petitioner’s guilt to criminally negligent homicide
was not objectively reasonable and agree with the court
that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate deficient
performance.12 Accordingly, the petitioner’s ineffective
assistance claim fails.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
12 Because we agree with the habeas court that the petitioner failed
to establish that Williams performed deficiently by conceding the
petitioner’s guilt to criminally negligent homicide, we need not also
address the petitioner’s challenge to the court’s determination that
he failed to prove prejudice. See White v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 236 Conn. App. 91.