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Haughey v. Commissioner of Correction
NORMAN HAUGHEY v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(AC 47426)
Alvord, Elgo and Keller, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of, inter alia, murder,
appealed following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from
the habeas court’s judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
After the habeas trial, but prior to the issuance of the court’s memorandum
of decision, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss counsel and to appoint
new counsel, alleging that his habeas counsel in the present action rendered
ineffective assistance. After the court issued its decision on the habeas
petition, a different judge denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss counsel
and to appoint new counsel as moot. On appeal, the petitioner claimed,
inter alia, that the court abused its discretion when it denied his petition
for certification to appeal. Held:
The habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certifica-
tion to appeal, as the petitioner demonstrated that the issues raised were
debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve them in a
different manner, or that the questions were adequate to deserve encourage-
ment to proceed further.
The habeas court improperly determined that the petitioner’s motion to
dismiss counsel and to appoint new counsel was moot because a decision
had been rendered on the merits of the habeas petition, as the petitioner
could have obtained practical relief and, therefore, further proceedings were
necessary.
Argued September 3—officially released December 9, 2025
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Tolland and tried to the court, Newson, J.; judgment
denying the petition; thereafter, the court, Wagner, J.,
denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss counsel and
to appoint new counsel; subsequently, the court, New-
son, J., denied the petition for certification to appeal,
and 	the 	petitioner 	appealed 	to 	this 	court. 	Order
reversed; further proceedings.

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Haughey v. Commissioner of Correction
Michael W. Brown, for the appellant (petitioner).
Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state’s
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle,
Jr., state’s attorney, and Craig P. Nowak, senior assis-
tant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion
KELLER, J. The petitioner, Norman Haughey, appeals
from the judgment of the habeas court denying his
petition for certification to appeal and denying his peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus. He claims that the
habeas court (1) abused its discretion when it denied
his petition for certification to appeal, and (2) erred by
rendering judgment on the petition before hearing and
resolving the petitioner’s motion to dismiss counsel and
to appoint new counsel (motion to dismiss counsel).
We conclude that the habeas court abused its discretion
when it denied the petition for certification to appeal
and remand this case to the habeas court for the pur-
pose of conducting a hearing on the merits of the peti-
tioner’s motion to dismiss counsel.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. In 2007, the petitioner was con-
victed, after a jury trial, of robbing and murdering two
women in order to support his drug habit. See State v.
Haughey, 235 Conn. App. 758, 760–61, 	A.3d
(2025). Specifically, the jury found the petitioner guilty
of two counts of murder in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-54a (a), two counts of felony murder in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-54c, and one count of capital
felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2003)
§ 53a-54b (7). Id., 760–61. Thereafter, the criminal trial
court, Thompson, J., sentenced the petitioner to life
imprisonment without the possibility of release. 1 Id.,
1 At sentencing, the trial court merged the murder and felony murder
convictions with the capital felony conviction. See State v. Haughey, 124
Conn. App. 58, 61, 3 A.3d 980, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 912, 10 A.3d 529 (2010).

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761. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the petition-
er’s conviction. See State v. Haughey, 124 Conn. App.
58, 59–60, 3 A.3d 980, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 912, 10
A.3d 529 (2010).
On August 10, 2015, the petitioner filed his second
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which he subse-
quently amended on January 30, 2023. 2 In his amended
petition, the petitioner, in his first count, claimed rele-
vant to this appeal that his criminal trial counsel, Attor-
ney Thomas Ullmann, had rendered ineffective assis-
tance by failing to have him evaluated by a mental health
professional, an evaluation that would have included
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and a substance
abuse evaluation. The petitioner contended that such
an evaluation would have provided mitigation during
the pretrial phase of the case, exculpatory evidence
during the evidentiary phase of the trial, and mitigation
at sentencing. The petitioner also alleged that an MRI
would have revealed ‘‘lesions on the brain which
affected the petitioner cognitively and affected his judg-
ment.’’
In the second count of the amended petition, the
petitioner alleged that his prior habeas counsel, Attor-
ney Bruce McIntyre, had rendered ineffective assis-
tance by failing to claim that Ullmann had rendered
ineffective assistance by not having the petitioner evalu-
ated by a mental health professional. In the third count
of the amended petition, the petitioner claimed that he
was denied the right to a fair trial when the trial court
allowed the jury to hear evidence of his substance abuse
and excluded evidence of his steroid abuse. He also
2 The petitioner filed a prior petition for habeas corpus, but the habeas
court, Fuger, J., denied his petition and denied certification to appeal.
Haughey v. Commissioner of Correction, 173 Conn. App. 559, 560–61, 164
A.3d 849, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 906, 170 A.3d 1 (2017). This court dismissed
his appeal. Id., 573.

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Haughey v. Commissioner of Correction
contended that ‘‘[t]his evidence was so unfairly prejudi-
cial that it deprived the petitioner of a fair trial.’’ Finally,
in the fourth count of the amended petition, the peti-
tioner alleged that the presence of lesions on his brain
amounted to newly discovered evidence that supported
his claim of actual innocence. He asserted that, in 2018,
‘‘a medical doctor at [the University of Connecticut],’’
after administering an MRI, had determined that the
petitioner 	‘‘had 	approximately 	fifteen 	to 	eighteen
lesions on the brain predominantly on the frontal lobe’’
and that ‘‘based on the size and color [these lesions]
were likely present during his childhood,’’ which the
petitioner claimed ‘‘affected his judgment and cognitive
abilities.’’
The same day that the petitioner filed his amended
petition, he also disclosed Andrew Meisler, Ph.D., as
an expert witness pursuant to Practice Book § 13-4.
In this disclosure, the petitioner stated that Meisler, a
clinical and forensic psychologist, was to conduct a
mental health evaluation of the petitioner and was
expected to provide testimony regarding the petition-
er’s current cognitive levels and his cognitive levels at
the time his criminal cases were pending. Meisler also
was to conduct a substance abuse evaluation of the
petitioner and determine how his substance abuse
could have exacerbated his mental health conditions.
Meisler’s evaluations, the petitioner contended, would
establish or demonstrate that providing the petitioner
with proper evaluation and treatment during the pretrial
phase of his criminal case would have been beneficial
in assisting the petitioner with his recollection of facts,
which would have further assisted his case. Meisler
subsequently was listed on the petitioner’s witness list
on March 15, 2023.
On March 30, 2023, several days before the scheduled
trial date, the petitioner’s counsel, Attorney Jason God-
dard, filed a motion requesting an additional one-half

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day of trial. He stated that Meisler had been dealing
with an unexpected emergency and had not completed
his evaluation or report regarding the petitioner. Meisler
still needed to meet face-to-face with the petitioner and
was contemplating completion of his evaluation and
report by early June, 2023. The court granted the peti-
tioner’s motion and scheduled an additional one-half
day of trial for November 14, 2023.
Trial on the habeas petition began on April 3, 2023.
On that date, the petitioner presented testimony by
Attorney Maureen Gaffey, who served as codefense
counsel at his criminal trial; 3 McIntyre, his prior habeas
counsel; Nicole Danna, his former girlfriend; and the
petitioner himself. The petitioner testified that he and
his criminal trial counsel, Ullmann and Gaffey, had
agreed to a defense at the time of his criminal trial that
he was not involved in the two murders because he
was ‘‘getting high’’ somewhere ‘‘in the projects’’ when
the murders had occurred. The petitioner also testified,
however, that he frequently was abusing steroids and
illicit drugs at the time, and, as a result, he sometimes
suffered from blackouts and rages that resulted in
lapses of memory. He asserted, therefore, that it was
possible that his steroid and cocaine abuse could have
affected his mental state so profoundly that he actually
could not remember committing the crimes.
After the evidence concluded on April 3, 2023, the
habeas court, Newson, J., noted that the petitioner’s
one remaining witness was Meisler and that an addi-
tional day of trial would be scheduled. At the start of
3 Ullmann died prior to the commencement of the habeas trial. Although
Gaffey was not mentioned in the petitioner’s amended petition, the petition-
er’s counsel focused his examination of her at trial on her role as part of
a team of attorneys that rendered ineffective assistance during his criminal
trial. Additionally, we note that the petitioner had not alleged or made any
claim of ineffective assistance regarding Attorney Brian Carlow either at
trial or in his appellate brief. Carlow was involved only for the part of the
petitioner’s criminal trial concerning DNA evidence.

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Haughey v. Commissioner of Correction
the scheduled continuance date of November 14, 2023,
Goddard indicated that the petitioner was resting his
case. Goddard advised the court: ‘‘We expected to put
on expert testimony. We do not have that available to
us. So, we would rest at this time.’’ The habeas court
indicated that the case had been discussed in chambers
and then noted: ‘‘As opposed to simply not being avail-
able because of a scheduling issue, the information that
the expert gave you, you have chosen or decided that
you’re not going to present it because you don’t think
it would be helpful. Is that accurate? As opposed to the
fact that the witness just can’t be here and you’re not
calling the witness.’’ Goddard responded that ‘‘[t]he wit-
ness is available. However, the witness is unable to
provide the information that we sought and, therefore,
it would make his—any testimony irrelevant.’’ The court
then stated: ‘‘So . . . you’ve assessed as an officer of
the court that the evidence . . . either would not be
helpful or is not necessary to present.’’ Goddard indi-
cated that the court’s statement was correct and that
Meisler’s testimony would not be helpful to the petition-
er’s case.
The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction,
then rested without calling any witnesses and the par-
ties proceeded to closing arguments. At the conclusion
of the arguments, the court indicated it would take the
case under consideration and issue a written decision
‘‘in due course.’’
One month later, prior to the issuance of the habeas
court’s memorandum of decision, the petitioner filed a
self-represented motion to dismiss counsel, which was
dated December 14, 2023, and stamped as received on
December 18, 2023. In his motion, the petitioner alleged
that Goddard had failed to carry out his responsibilities
regarding his representation of the petitioner in this
habeas action, acted against the petitioner’s interests,
and ‘‘deliberately sabotaged’’ the habeas petition by

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Haughey v. Commissioner of Correction
making false representations to the court about the
mental health expert. Specifically, the petitioner stated
that Goddard had failed to arrange for the petitioner
to meet with a mental health expert to conduct a psychi-
atric evaluation or to provide the expert with available
records regarding the petitioner’s mental state at the
time of the crime and at the time of the criminal trial
and, thereby, Goddard had made it impossible for the
expert to conduct a reasonable professional evaluation
of him. The petitioner alleged that Goddard had con-
cluded that Meisler ‘‘ ‘couldn’t do anything to help us.’ ’’
On December 20, 2023, the court, Wagner, J., issued
an order that it would conduct a hearing on the motion
to dismiss counsel on January 4, 2024.4
On December 29, 2023, prior to the hearing on the
petitioner’s motion to dismiss counsel, but subsequent
to the issuance of Judge Wagner’s scheduling order,
the habeas court issued its decision denying the habeas
petition. On the first count, Judge Newson determined
that the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of
criminal trial counsel was barred by the doctrine of res
judicata because the petitioner previously had raised
and litigated this claim in his first habeas action and
therefore he could not relitigate it in the present matter.
As to the second count, the claim of ineffective assis-
tance of McIntyre, his prior habeas counsel, for not
obtaining an MRI and mental health and substance
abuse evaluations of the petitioner, the court found the
petitioner had not presented any evidence of evalua-
tions, MRI studies, or any other expert reports and,
therefore, had failed to meet his burden to prove his
claim.5 In denying the due process claim alleged in count
4 Counsel for the respondent was excused from attending the hearing on
January 4, 2024.
5 ‘‘To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas
petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v.
Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)].
Strickland requires that a petitioner satisfy both a performance prong and
a prejudice prong. . . . It is well settled that [a] reviewing court can find

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Haughey v. Commissioner of Correction
three of the amended petition, the habeas court con-
cluded that the issues regarding the trial court’s eviden-
tiary rulings regarding his substance abuse and steroid
use should have been raised on direct appeal and were
procedurally defaulted. Finally, regarding the fourth
count alleging actual innocence, the court found that
the petitioner’s claim of newly discovered evidence by
way of results from an MRI study done in 2018, where
brain lesions were discovered on his frontal lobe, also
failed. The habeas court reasoned that, even assuming
that such evidence would support a claim of actual
innocence, the petitioner failed to present the alleged
MRI study or any other evidence regarding the lesions
on his brain or any other issues concerning his cognitive
abilities or mental status.
Six days after the issuance of the decision on the
habeas petition, Judge Wagner held a hearing on Janu-
ary 4, 2024, regarding the petitioner’s motion to dismiss
counsel. At the outset of this proceeding, the petitioner
stated that he had had no communication with Goddard,
except for one meeting that occurred between April
and November of 2023. The petitioner also informed
Judge Wagner that it was his understanding that ‘‘this
entire summer was supposed to be built on the forensic
psychologist to come speak with me. But I never . . .
[saw] or talked to a forensic psychologist in the times
that we were supposed to. . . . But the moral of this is
there’s been a complete breakdown in communication.’’
Goddard was not present at this hearing. Another
attorney from his firm, Attorney Meredith Olan, advised
against a petitioner on either ground, whichever is easier.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Grant v. Commissioner of Correction, 342 Conn. 771,
780, 272 A.3d 189 (2022). Even if we assume that Judge Newson concluded
that counsel’s performance was deficient, Judge Newson’s remarks to coun-
sel at the end of the trial indicate he clearly felt that the petitioner had
failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s allegedly
deficient performance because proof of prejudice required expert testimony.

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the court that Judge Newson had issued a decision on
the habeas petition and suggested that the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss counsel might be moot. Olan also
disputed the petitioner’s claims that Goddard had met
with him only once since the previous April. Judge
Wagner then addressed the petitioner and advised him
that his habeas trial already had concluded, but despite
Olan’s declaration at the beginning of the hearing, Judge
Wagner remained unclear on whether a decision had
been issued. The petitioner argued again that there had
been inadequate communication with Goddard during
the habeas trial. He complained that his whole case
had been ‘‘built on a forensic psychologist . . . [and
then Goddard] showed up the day before trial to say,
oh, by the way . . . we’re not using the forensic psy-
chologist.’’ The petitioner indicated he was ‘‘completely
flabbergasted’’ when he appeared for the continued trial
date of November 14, 2023, and learned that Goddard
would not be calling an expert.
Judge Wagner then informed the petitioner that she
agreed with Olan that at this point the case was moot,
although she appeared to remain under the impression
that the habeas petition had yet to be decided. The
court further explained: ‘‘I think that in light of what
you’ve articulated here today, it sounds like if you’re
unsuccessful . . . in your current habeas case, again,
awaiting that—the decision from Judge Newson—then
you would be looking at—because you’ve articulated
what you see as ineffective assistance from Attorney
Goddard, so you would be looking at filing an additional
petition in which you claim that he was ineffective in
his representation of you.’’ The court also advised the
petitioner that there was no additional work that God-
dard would be doing on his case because he would not
be handling any appeal, so he need not worry about
any further representation by Goddard.

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The petitioner then asked why he should have to
litigate another habeas petition when his current peti-
tion was based on the need for a forensic psychologist.
He stated he did not understand why ‘‘this thing can’t
just be reopened.’’ Judge Wagner responded that the
case could not be opened because his trial had already
come to a close and the case was awaiting decision.
At this point, Olan made it clear to Judge Wagner
that Judge Newson had issued his decision denying the
habeas petition the previous week, on December 29,
2023. The court then instructed Olan to explain the
decision and the appeal process to the petitioner and
directly informed the petitioner that counsel would be
explaining the decision to him. She further advised the
petitioner that he could appeal the denial of this habeas
petition or file a new habeas petition claiming that God-
dard had been ineffective in failing to pursue an evalua-
tion of the petitioner. That same day, Judge Wagner
issued a written order stating that the motion to dismiss
was denied as moot 6 because the case had already gone
to judgment. The petitioner then filed a petition for
certification to appeal, which the habeas court denied,
and this appeal followed.
I
The petitioner first claims that the habeas court
abused its discretion when it denied his petition for
6 ‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a
threshold matter because it implicates [a] court’s subject matter jurisdiction
. . . . Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before
a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be
justiciable. . . . Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual contro-
versy between or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the interests
of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable
of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination
of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant. . . . A
case is considered moot if [the trial] court cannot grant . . . any practical
relief through its disposition of the merits . . . . When . . . events have
occurred that preclude [the] court from granting any practical relief through
its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot.’’ (Internal quotation

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Haughey v. Commissioner of Correction
certification to appeal. The respondent agrees that the
habeas court improperly denied the petition for certifi-
cation to appeal in this case. We conclude that the
petitioner has demonstrated that the issues raised are
debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could
resolve them in a different manner, or that the questions
are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed fur-
ther, and, therefore, the habeas court abused its discre-
tion in denying the petition for certification to appeal.
‘‘In Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 187, 640 A.2d
601 (1994), [our Supreme Court] concluded that . . .
[General Statutes] § 52-470 (b) prevents a reviewing
court from hearing the merits of a habeas appeal follow-
ing the denial of certification to appeal unless the peti-
tioner establishes that the denial of certification consti-
tuted an abuse of discretion by the habeas court. In
Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 615–16, 646 A.2d 126
(1994), [our Supreme Court] incorporated the factors
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Lozada
v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431–32, 111 S. Ct. 860, 112 L.
Ed. 2d 956 (1991), as the appropriate standard for
determining whether the habeas court abused its discre-
tion in denying certification to appeal. This standard
requires the petitioner to demonstrate that the issues
are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could
resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the
questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further. . . . A petitioner who establishes an
abuse of discretion through one of the factors listed
above must then demonstrate that the judgment of the
habeas court should be reversed on its merits. . . .
In determining whether the habeas court abused its
discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certifi-
cation, we necessarily must consider the merits of the
petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether the
marks omitted.) Kemon v. Boudreau, 205 Conn. App. 448, 467, 258 A.3d
755 (2021).

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Haughey v. Commissioner of Correction
habeas court reasonably determined that the petition-
er’s appeal was frivolous.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Caston-
guay v. Commissioner of Correction, 300 Conn. 649,
657–58, 16 A.3d 676 (2011); see also Khan v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 234 Conn. App. 851, 856–57, 344
A.3d 1234 (2025).
In the petition for certification to appeal, the peti-
tioner, in a self-represented capacity, asserted, inter
alia, that the habeas court should not have rendered
its judgment denying the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus before considering the motion to dismiss coun-
sel. Both parties agree that the procedural appropriate-
ness of rendering judgment without resolving the peti-
tioner’s motion to dismiss is a colorable legal issue that
is debatable amongst jurists of reason. The petitioner
also claims that a court could have resolved the issues
differently, or the issues should proceed further for
some other reason.
On the basis of our review of the merits of the peti-
tioner’s appeal, which is set forth in part II of this
opinion, we conclude that the habeas court abused its
discretion in denying the petition for certification to
appeal. We agree with the parties that the petitioner
has demonstrated that his claim, which is premised on
the denial of his motion to dismiss counsel, is debatable
among jurists of reason, could be resolved by a court
in a different manner, or is adequate to deserve encour-
agement to proceed further. Accordingly, we proceed
to a full review of the merits of the petitioner’s appeal.
See, e.g., Antonio A. v. Commissioner of Correction,
205 Conn. App. 46, 79, 256 A.3d 684, cert. denied, 339
Conn. 909, 261 A.3d 744 (2021).
II
Next, we consider the petitioner’s claim that the
habeas court improperly issued its memorandum of

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decision denying his petition prior to considering and
ruling on his motion to dismiss counsel, which was filed
eleven days prior to the issuance of the habeas court’s
decision. The parties agree that the court improperly
concluded that the motion to dismiss counsel was
moot.7 Specifically, the respondent acknowledges that,
even though the judgment denying the habeas petition
had been rendered, the motion to dismiss counsel was
not moot because the decision on the habeas petition
was still subject to (1) a motion to open the judgment
pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212a8 and Practice
Book § 17-4,9 which establish a four month window
following entry of judgment within which a court may
open a civil judgment, or (2) a motion for reconsidera-
tion of the habeas court’s decision on the petition pursu-
ant to Practice Book §§ 11-11 and 11-12. The petitioner
and the respondent also agree that further proceedings
are necessary to allow the court to consider the merits
of the motion to dismiss counsel. 10 We agree with the
7 As noted by the parties in their briefs to this court, had Judge Wagner
granted the motion to dismiss Goddard as the petitioner’s lawyer, new
counsel, or the petitioner in a self-represented capacity, could have taken
steps to obtain practical relief by moving for a mistrial or to open the evi-
dence.
8 General Statutes § 52-212a provides in relevant part: ‘‘Unless otherwise
provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing
jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may
not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed
within four months following the date on which the notice of judgment or
decree was sent. . . .’’
However, § 52-212a ‘‘does not abrogate the court’s common-law authority
to open a judgment beyond the four month limitation upon a showing that
the judgment was obtained by fraud, duress or mutual mistake.’’ Bruno v.
Bruno, 146 Conn. App. 214, 230, 76 A.3d 725 (2013).
9 Practice Book § 17-4 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[A]ny civil judgment
or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside
unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months succeeding
the date on which notice was sent. . . .’’
10 The petitioner presents two alternative arguments in support of his
claim that the habeas court improperly issued its memorandum of decision
denying the habeas petition before it considered and decided the motion
to dismiss counsel. Specifically, he asserts that ‘‘[t]he question in this appeal

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parties that Judge Wagner improperly determined that
the petitioner’s motion to dismiss counsel was moot
because Judge Newson had rendered a decision on the
merits of the habeas petition, as the petitioner could
have obtained practical relief. Accordingly, further pro-
ceedings are necessary.
The parties disagree, however, as to whether addi-
tional direction is necessary. The petitioner requests
that we reverse not only the order denying as moot the
motion to dismiss counsel and remand that matter to
the habeas court for consideration on its merits but
also reverse the judgment denying the habeas petition.
This would ensure that, in the event that the court were
to grant his motion to dismiss counsel, all procedural
and substantive options regarding the present habeas
petition, had his motion to dismiss counsel been granted
prior to the rendering of the judgment denying this
habeas petition, would remain available and viable.
Principally, the petitioner has expressed a concern that,
without such instruction from this court, he might be
foreclosed from moving to open the judgment on this
habeas petition due to the four month limitation to file
such a motion pursuant to § 52-212a and Practice Book
§ 17-4. Moreover, the petitioner contends that, if the
judgment on the habeas petition remains in place, any
future claims may be barred due to estoppel or res
judicata considerations. Specifically, he points to the
recent decision from our Supreme Court in Clue v.
is whether the habeas court had a duty to address the petitioner’s motion
to dismiss counsel before entering judgment, or, alternatively, whether the
failure to address the motion was an abuse of the habeas court’s discretion.’’
We limit our consideration to the second argument advanced by the peti-
tioner, that is, whether the habeas court abused its discretion in failing to
address the motion to dismiss counsel prior to adjudicating the merits of
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We leave for another day the
determination of whether the court had a duty to rule on the motion to
dismiss counsel before it considered the habeas petition and whether the
failure to do so constituted plain error.

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Commissioner of Correction, 353 Conn. 97, 340 A.3d
1102 (2025). In that case, our Supreme Court concluded
that claims of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel
do not fall within the ‘‘[u]nless otherwise provided by
law’’ provision of § 52-212a and serve as a common-law
exception to the requirement that a motion to open a
judgment must be filed within four months. Id., 119–20.
The respondent asserts that reversing the judgment
of the habeas court denying the petition is not required
in this case to ensure that the petitioner’s rights, includ-
ing filing a motion to open that judgment, remain even
if the motion to dismiss counsel is granted at some
future point. 11 Instead, he urges that our remand be
limited to directing the habeas court to consider the
merits of the petitioner’s motion to dismiss counsel.
According to the respondent, if that motion is granted,
any further action must be based on the actions of
counsel. Counsel for the respondent did suggest, how-
ever, that because the motion to dismiss counsel ini-
tially was filed before the judgment denying the habeas
petition, in the event that the motion to dismiss counsel
is granted, a motion to open the judgment would be
permitted even though it was filed outside of the four
month time frame of § 52-212a due to equitable tolling.
Additionally, counsel for the respondent posited that
the present case was distinguishable from the circum-
stances of Clue v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
353 Conn. 97, and therefore a motion to open the judg-
ment would be viable.
As an initial matter, we set forth the relevant law
underlying this matter. It is well established that
11 The respondent acknowledges in his brief to this court, however, that
‘‘it may be the better practice in most circumstances for a court to hear a
motion to dismiss counsel before passing on the merits of a habeas petition
. . . .’’ He further emphasizes, however, that the ‘‘rigid rule’’ offered by the
petitioner would deprive habeas courts of the ‘‘flexibility to interdict dilatory
and insubstantial claims.’’

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‘‘[h]abeas corpus is a civil proceeding.’’ Collins v. York,
159 Conn. 150, 153, 267 A.2d 668 (1970). Consequently,
‘‘[a] habeas corpus action, as a variant of civil actions,
is subject to the ordinary rules of civil procedure, unless
superseded by the more specific rules pertaining to
habeas actions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Kendall v. Commissioner of Correction, 162 Conn. App.
23, 45, 130 A.3d 268 (2015). Furthermore, we emphasize
that a trial court is obligated to consider and rule on
all motions properly before it. ‘‘Courts are in the busi-
ness of ruling on litigants’ contentions, and they gener-
ally operate under the rule essential to the efficient
administration of justice, that where a court is vested
with jurisdiction over the subject-matter . . . and . . .
obtains jurisdiction of the person, it becomes its . . .
duty to determine every question which may arise in
the cause . . . .’’ (Internal quotations marks omitted.)
Ahneman v. Ahneman, 243 Conn. 471, 484, 706 A.2d
960 (1998).12 Finally, we are mindful of the policy of
the law to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute
when possible and to secure for the petitioner his day
in court. See Clue v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 353 Conn. 116.
Next, we consider the four month time frame for
filing a motion to open a judgment set forth in § 52-
212a. ‘‘A motion to open and set aside a judgment in a
12 In Ahneman v. Ahneman, supra, 243 Conn. 471, and an earlier case,
Tough v. Ives, 159 Conn. 605, 268 A.2d 371 (1970), our Supreme Court
addressed a court’s failure to timely rule on motions where the failure to
rule on them was a conscious choice on the part of the judge involved. See
Ahneman v. Ahneman, supra, 483–84; Tough v. Ives, supra, 606. The record
in this case does not disclose why the petitioner’s motion to dismiss counsel
was not referred to Judge Newson, who had been presiding over the habeas
trial. Instead, it was referred to Judge Wagner several days before Judge
Newson issued his memorandum of decision and the record does not dis-
close that Judge Newson was aware that the motion to dismiss counsel had
been filed. Moreover, the record reveals that Judge Wagner had no knowl-
edge that a decision on the merits of the habeas petition had been rendered
prior to the date she heard the petitioner’s motion.

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civil case is governed by § 52-212a and Practice Book
§ 17-4. . . . As a consequence, our analysis begins with
the statutory text. Section 52-212a provides in relevant
part: Unless otherwise provided by law and except in
such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdic-
tion, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior
Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion
to open or set aside is filed within four months following
the date on which the notice of judgment or decree
was sent. . . . We have explained that, outside of the
habeas context, the purpose of § 52-212a is to protect
the finality of judgments. . . . Consistent with this leg-
islative purpose, we have characterized the four month
period as a constraint, not on the trial court’s jurisdic-
tional authority, but on its substantive authority to adju-
dicate the merits of the case before it. . . . This is
because § 52-212a permits waiver of the four month
limitation period, and parties may not waive subject
matter jurisdiction.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Clue v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, supra, 353 Conn. 106–107; see also Prioleau v.
Agosta, 220 Conn. App. 248, 259, 297 A.3d 1012 (2023).
The respondent argues that we need only remand the
case to the habeas court for a determination on the
merits of the motion to dismiss counsel. If the habeas
court were to grant this motion and appoint new coun-
sel, only then should the petitioner be permitted to
pursue further steps pertaining to the judgment of the
habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. In other words, the respondent recommends
that, if the court were to find the allegations in the
motion to dismiss counsel meritorious, it may then
appoint new counsel and, if requested by the newly
appointed counsel, consider whether the allegations
warrant opening the judgment.
The respondent’s proposed remedy is problematic in
that he does not concede that the petitioner may litigate

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those aspects of his motion to dismiss counsel that
sound in ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis to
open the judgment of the habeas court. Allegations of
the ineffective assistance of Goddard, however, are the
only basis for the petitioner’s motion to dismiss counsel.
The respondent asserts that any claims regarding inef-
fective assistance of Goddard relating to the present
habeas petition ‘‘must be presented via a new habeas
petition . . . .’’ The petitioner may thus be forced to
pursue a successive habeas petition, also known as a
‘‘habeas on a habeas.’’ 13 Moreover, there is no assurance
that a future habeas court will necessarily agree with
the respondent’s arguments regarding the availability
of a motion to open the habeas judgment in such future
proceedings. Further, the respondent may object to the
rehearing of the petitioner’s motion to dismiss counsel
because judgment on the habeas petition has been ren-
dered and when a rehearing is scheduled, that habeas
court may agree and determine that the time for consid-
eration of the motion to dismiss counsel has long since
passed. In short, assuming that the petitioner prevails
on his motion to dismiss counsel, he will not have the
opportunity to pursue all of the options regarding the
denial of his habeas petition that would have been avail-
able to him had the court granted it at the time it initially
was filed.
Additionally, the petitioner may lose the opportunity
to utilize other procedural opportunities regarding this
habeas petition. For example, had the habeas court
considered the merits of the motion to dismiss counsel
prior to the issuance of its decision, new counsel may
have been appointed who might have pursued a motion
13 See, e.g., Clue v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 353 Conn. 111;
Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 347 Conn. 335, 376 n.8, 297 A.3d 541
(2023) (Robinson, C. J., dissenting).

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to open the evidence 14 or a motion for a mistrial. 15 If
new counsel is appointed on remand, and that counsel
is left only with the possibility of opening the judgment,
the petitioner may have obtained nothing more than a
Pyrrhic victory. Cf. Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn. 510,
528–29, 481 A.2d 1084 (1984) (habeas court has broad
discretion to frame remedy and relief as law and justice
require).
Furthermore, the motion to dismiss counsel, if the
facts contained therein were proven, might have pre-
sented sufficient grounds for the granting of a swifter
remedy than advising the petitioner to file a third
‘‘habeas on a habeas’’ petition. It detailed specific allega-
tions that second habeas counsel had made material
14 A motion to open the evidence could have been problematic because
such motions ordinarily are heard prior to the conclusion of the trial, and,
in this case, both parties had rested more than one month prior to the date
the petitioner filed his motion to dismiss counsel. Nevertheless, ‘‘[i]n any
ordinary situation if a trial court feels that, by inadvertence or mistake,
there has been a failure to introduce available evidence upon a material
issue in the case of such a nature that in its absence there is a serious
danger of a miscarriage of justice, it may properly permit that evidence to
be introduced at any time before the case has been decided. . . . Whether
or not a trial court will permit further evidence to be offered after the close
of testimony in a case is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the
court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kameron N., 202 Conn.
App. 637, 646, 264 A.3d 578, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 926, 246 A.3d 986 (2021),
and cert. denied, 336 Conn. 927, 246 A.3d 986 (2021); see also Valentine v.
Commissioner of Correction, 219 Conn. App. 276, 337–42, 295 A.3d 973
(habeas court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion to open, which was filed more than one year after conclusion of
habeas trial and after court had rendered judgment), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
913, 303 A.3d 602 (2023).
15 ‘‘In a civil case a mistrial is only warranted if, as a result of some
occurrence, it is apparent to the court that . . . a party cannot have a fair
trial and the whole proceedings are vitiated.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Patrick v. Burns, 5 Conn. App. 663, 673, 502 A.2d 432 (1985), cert.
denied, 198 Conn. 805, 504 A.2d 1059 (1986), and cert. denied, 198 Conn.
805, 504 A.2d 1059 (1986), and cert. denied, 198 Conn. 805, 504 A.2d 1059
(1986); see Wilson v. Commissioner of Correction, Docket No. CV-17-
4008812-S, 2024 WL 575896, *6 (Conn. Super. January 25, 2024) (habeas
court considered and denied motion for mistrial on grounds of judicial bias).

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misrepresentations to the habeas court concerning his
efforts to secure expert testimony that were very detri-
mental to the petitioner. Significantly, after resting with-
out presenting any expert opinion on three claims that
required it, second habeas counsel did not withdraw
the claims related to the failure of trial counsel and
first habeas counsel to investigate and present mental
health evidence on his behalf or the actual innocence
claim. As a result, the habeas court ruled on the merits
of these claims. That ruling may, on the grounds of res
judicata, prohibit the petitioner from raising related
arguments or allegations in a subsequent habeas pro-
ceeding. See, e.g., Walsh v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, 233 Conn. App. 66, 72, 338 A.3d 1169 (2025); Cator
v. Commissioner of Correction, 229 Conn. App. 393,
406–407, 410, 327 A.3d 1028 (2024), cert. denied, 351
Conn. 919, 333 A.3d 105 (2025).
The denial of the petitioner’s motion to dismiss coun-
sel on the basis of mootness is reversed and the case
is remanded to the habeas court for a hearing on the
merits of that motion. In the event that the habeas court
grants the motion to dismiss counsel and appoints new
counsel to represent the petitioner, the judgment of
the habeas court denying counts two and four of the
amended petition is reversed and a new trial is ordered
on those claims. If the habeas court denies the petition-
er’s motion to dismiss counsel, then the judgment is
affirmed.
The judgment denying the petitioner’s motion to dis-
miss counsel and to appoint new counsel is reversed
and the case is remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with the preceding paragraph.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.