Lafferty v. Jones

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2 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

ERICA LAFFERTY ET AL. v. ALEX
EMRIC JONES ET AL.
(AC 46194)
Bright, C. J., and Moll and Prescott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff in error, P, the attorney for J and several other defendants in
the underlying consolidated actions, filed a writ of error challenging the
order of the trial court suspending him from the practice of law for a
period of six months. The plaintiffs in those actions, including certain
family members of those killed in the mass shooting at the Sandy Hook
Elementary School in Newtown, had filed suit against J and the other
defendants as a result of J’s use of his nationally syndicated radio
program and Internet websites he owned to publish content proclaiming
that the mass shooting was a staged event. During trial, the court issued
a protective order concerning sensitive personal and confidential infor-
mation about the plaintiffs that the defendants had obtained through the
discovery process. The order limited use of the information to counsel
of record and others involved in the preparation and litigation of the
underlying actions. The plaintiffs’ confidential information was released
during the course of communications P had with attorneys in Texas,
including R, about related actions pending there and the possible collabo-
ration between P and R on the cases in both states. During that time
period, L, a Texas attorney, filed a bankruptcy petition for several defen-
dants in the Texas cases. L then contacted W, who was counsel prior
to P for several of the defendants in the underlying Connecticut actions,
and requested access to all of the discovery materials obtained in the
Connection actions. W then emailed L and P, warning that L might
not be authorized to access the confidential documents in light of the
protective order. Later that day, L obtained copies of the protective
order. P did not ask L to sign a confidentiality order, and L was not
informed by P or anyone from P’s law firm that the discovery materials
he was being provided included the plaintiffs’ confidential information.
A, an attorney in P’s law firm, then emailed L, asking him to give R a
hard drive that contained the confidential information. L responded to
A’s email, stating that he already had given the hard drive to R, who
also was not asked to sign a confidentiality agreement. Neither L nor
R had filed an appearance in the Connecticut cases. P thereafter
informed M, the plaintiffs’ counsel in the Connecticut actions, about
the release of the confidential information. The trial court learned from
media reports that the plaintiffs’ confidential information had been
released to unauthorized individuals. The court, sua sponte, then sched-
uled a hearing requiring P to appear and show cause as to whether he
should be referred to disciplinary authorities or sanctioned by the court
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 3
Lafferty v. Jones
as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiffs’ confidential information.
After the court stated during the show cause hearing that it would not
refer the matter to disciplinary authorities but would instead conduct
disciplinary proceedings itself, P filed motions to dismiss the show cause
order and to disqualify the court from presiding over the disciplinary
proceedings. P claimed that the court’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned as a result of its decision to conduct the disciplinary
proceedings, rather than to refer the matter to disciplinary authorities,
as well as the court’s statements during the show cause hearing about
the dismissal of a grievance complaint against P three years earlier that
pertained to an affidavit he had filed in the underlying actions. The
court denied both motions and thereafter found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that P had violated several Rules of Professional Conduct and
suspended him from the practice of law. On P’s appeal to this court, held:
1. P could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court violated
his right to procedural due process by initiating disciplinary proceedings
against him on the basis of events that occurred outside of the court’s
presence: after weighing the factors set forth in the balancing test for
procedural due process claims under Mathews v. Eldridge (424 U.S.
319), this court was not persuaded that due process mandated the
imposition of a constraint on the trial court’s inherent authority to
regulate attorney conduct and to impose discipline by distinguishing
between conduct that occurred before the court and conduct that tran-
spired outside of the court’s presence, as P was afforded notice and an
opportunity to defend his interests, nothing in the record indicated that
the disciplinary proceeding was tainted by publicity surrounding the
underlying actions, and this court did not discern that the trial court’s
decision to conduct the disciplinary proceeding placed P’s property
interest in his law license at risk of an erroneous deprivation; moreover,
although P contended that the trial court’s ability to refer the matter
to disciplinary authorities mitigated any adverse effect on the court’s
interests in managing its docket and protecting the rights of other parties,
the court had a significant interest in immediately adjudicating the seri-
ous allegations against P, which enabled the court to inquire promptly
into the matter.
2. P could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying his motion to disqualify the court from presiding over the
disciplinary proceedings: this court could not conclude that the trial
court’s impartiality reasonably could be questioned as a result of the
court’s statements about the dismissal of the earlier grievance complaint
against P and its decision to conduct the disciplinary proceedings rather
than to refer the matter to disciplinary authorities, the court having
explained on the record that its recitation of the background of the
underlying actions, including the dismissal of the grievance complaint
against P, constituted an effort to conduct fair and transparent disciplin-
ary proceedings and to accommodate P’s counsel, who had recently
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4 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones
appeared on behalf of P and had requested a continuance for medical
reasons; moreover, because P did not claim that disqualification of the
trial court was required on the ground of actual bias, P did not present
a viable due process claim that would be subject to this court’s ple-
nary review.
3. The trial court improperly determined that P violated certain Rules of
Professional Conduct pertaining to his handling of the plaintiffs’ confi-
dential information and violation of the protective order, as well as his
sponsoring of an out-of-state attorney in Connecticut:
a. This court concluded that the trial court correctly applied rule 1.1 of
the Rules of Professional Conduct in finding that P failed to act compe-
tently in handling the plaintiffs’ confidential records; contrary to P’s
contention that rule 1.1 was inapplicable to him in the circumstances
of this case because it makes no mention of an attorney’s duty to persons
other than his client, to provide competent representation in accordance
with rule 1.1, an attorney must responsibly engage in discovery and
safeguard sensitive discovery materials, whether provided by the client
or produced by an opposing party, and P’s conduct ran the risk of
subjecting the defendants he represented to sanctions.
b. The trial court incorrectly determined that P violated rule 1.15 (b) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct, which addresses the safeguarding
of funds and financial information but does not encompass discovery
materials such as the plaintiffs’ confidential records: contrary to the trial
court’s interpretation of the phrase ‘‘[o]ther property’’ in rule 1.15 (b)
as encompassing the plaintiffs’ confidential records, this court’s reading
of rule 1.15 as a whole and its application of the rule of statutory construc-
tion requiring that terms be assigned their ordinary meaning, led it to
construe the phrase ‘‘[o]ther property’’ as excluding discovery materials;
moreover, the majority of the provisions of rule 1.15 expressly address,
in whole or in part, matters that are financial in nature; furthermore,
the commentary to rule 1.15 did not support the trial court’s assertion
that the plaintiffs’ records were included within the meaning of ‘‘[o]ther
property,’’ as the commentary expressly provides guidance on safekeep-
ing moneys and securities, neither of which is similar to discovery materi-
als produced during litigation.
c. The trial court incorrectly determined that P violated rule 3.4 (3)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which addresses an attorney’s
obligation to obey a court’s directives: the record did not establish by
clear and convincing evidence that P knowingly disobeyed the require-
ments of the protective order, as the evidence did not support the court’s
finding that P had actual knowledge of the fact that the hard drive that
was transferred by A, a subordinate attorney in P’s law firm, to L, and
then to R, contained the plaintiffs’ confidential information; moreover,
P’s statements in an email addressed to M, the plaintiffs’ counsel in
Connecticut, about the transfer of the hard drive did not constitute clear
and convincing evidence that P had actual knowledge that the hard drive
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 5
Lafferty v. Jones
contained the plaintiffs’ confidential information, and an email P received
from W, warning about the protective order, did not show that P knew
he was violating the protective order when he directed A to send the
hard drive to L and R.
d. The evidence was not adequate to support the trial court’s determina-
tion that P violated rule 5.1 (c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
which expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for the
acts of another, to the extent that P acted as the sponsoring attorney
in Connecticut for R, who had not filed an appearance in the underlying
actions at the time of the unauthorized disclosure to him of the confiden-
tial records: P was not involved in R’s inadvertent disclosure of the
confidential documents to B, the plaintiffs’ counsel in the Texas case,
and there was no evidence that P gave R improper directions with regard
to the confidential records or that P knowingly ratified R’s disclosure
of the confidential records; moreover, clear and convincing evidence did
not exist establishing that P knew of R’s conduct at a time when remedial
action could have been taken to avoid or mitigate its consequences, and
there was insufficient evidence to establish that P knowingly authorized
the transfer of the confidential records or that he knew they had been
disclosed prior to informing M that they had been released; furthermore,
this court rejected P’s assertion that the trial court improperly applied
rule 5.1 (b) and (c) concerning the exercise of his supervisory authority
over A, as it was implicit in the trial court’s decision that P did not
make reasonable efforts to ensure that A conformed to the Rules of
Professional Conduct under rule 5.1 (b) and that A violated the rules
for purposes of rule 5.1 (c).
e. P could not prevail on his claim that his actions did not fall within
the scope of rule 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which
addresses conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice:
the trial court correctly applied that rule in finding that P improperly
permitted the disclosure to unauthorized persons of the plaintiffs’ per-
sonal and sensitive information and that his misconduct unilaterally
imposed a significant cost on the plaintiffs in their attempt to obtain
justice in the underlying actions; moreover, despite P’s assertion that
his failure to properly maintain records did not affect the trial process
or the court’s administration of justice, as well as his claim that there
was no evidence that he insulted or criticized the trial court or attempted
to hinder the disciplinary proceedings, this court found P’s restrictive
interpretation of rule 8.4 (4) to be untenable, as his mishandling of
the plaintiffs’ confidential records fell within the expansive range of
misconduct encompassed by rule 8.4 (4).
4. In light of this court’s conclusion that the trial court improperly deter-
mined, in whole or in part, that P had violated rules 1.15 (b), 3.4 (3)
and 5.1 (c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the disciplinary order,
which was not predicated on P’s violation of any particular rule, could
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6 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones
not stand; accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court for a
new hearing on sanctions before a different judge.
Argued January 2—officially released May 28, 2024

Procedural History

Writ of error from the order of the Superior Court
in the judicial district of Waterbury, Bellis, J., sus-
pending the plaintiff in error from the practice of law
for a period of six months; thereafter, the defendants
in error each filed a motion to dismiss; subsequently,
this court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed
the writ of error as to the defendant in error Hon.
Barbara N. Bellis and denied the motion to dismiss as
to the defendant in error Office of Chief Disciplinary
Counsel; thereafter, the court, Bellis, J., denied the
motion for a stay of its order filed by the plaintiff in
error; subsequently, the court, Bellis, J., issued an artic-
ulation of its decision. Writ granted in part; order
vacated; further proceedings.
Christopher T. DeMatteo, for the appellant (plaintiff
in error Norman A. Pattis).
Brian B. Staines, chief disciplinary counsel, for the
appellee (defendant in error Office of Chief Disciplinary
Counsel).
Opinion

MOLL, J. The plaintiff in error, Norman A. Pattis,
a Connecticut attorney and counsel of record for the
defendants, Alex Emric Jones and Free Speech Sys-
tems, LLC,1 in the underlying consolidated tort actions2
1
There were additional defendants who participated in the underlying
consolidated actions, including three that Pattis also represented, namely,
Infowars, LLC, Infowars Health, LLC, and Prison Planet TV, LLC. Jones and
Free Speech Systems, LLC, however, were the only remaining defendants
at the time of the show cause hearing described in this opinion. We refer
in this opinion (1) to Jones and Free Speech Systems, LLC, collectively as
the defendants, and (2) to Jones, Free Speech Systems, LLC, Infowars, LLC,
Infowars Health, LLC, and Prison Planet TV, LLC, collectively as the Jones
defendants.
2
‘‘The consolidated actions are Lafferty v. Jones, Superior Court, judicial
district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page iii

225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 7
Lafferty v. Jones

arising out of the mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elemen-
tary School, filed this writ of error challenging the order
of the trial court suspending him from the practice of
law for a period of six months after determining that he
had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Pattis
claims that the court (1) violated his procedural due
process rights in initiating, sua sponte, disciplinary pro-
ceedings against him, pursuant to its inherent authority
to discipline attorneys, on the basis of conduct that
occurred outside of its presence, (2) improperly denied
his motion to disqualify the Honorable Barbara N. Bellis
from presiding over the disciplinary proceedings, (3)
improperly determined that he had violated the Rules
of Professional Conduct, and (4) imposed an arbitrary
and disproportionate disciplinary order. We reject
Pattis’ first two claims, but we conclude that the court
incorrectly found that he violated certain provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, we
grant in part the writ of error and remand the matter
to the court to vacate the improper findings, as well as
the attendant disciplinary order, and to conduct a new
hearing on sanctions before a different judge.
The following facts and procedural history, as set
forth by the trial court in its decision, as set forth by
this court in prior decisions, or as are undisputed in
the record, are relevant to our resolution of this writ
of error. ‘‘On December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza entered
Sandy Hook Elementary School (Sandy Hook), and
thereafter shot and killed twenty first-grade children
and six adults, in addition to wounding two other vic-
tims who survived the attack. In the underlying consoli-
dated actions, the plaintiffs, consisting of a first
S; Sherlach v. Jones, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex
Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S; and Sherlach v. Jones, Supe-
rior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket
No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S.’’ Lafferty v. Jones, 220 Conn. App. 724, 725 n.2, 299
A.3d 1161 (2023).
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8 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

responder, who was not a victim of the Sandy Hook
shooting but was depicted in the media following the
shooting, and the immediate family members of five of
the children, one educator, the principal of Sandy Hook,
and a school psychologist who were killed in the shoot-
ing,3 brought these separate actions . . . .

‘‘In the complaints, the plaintiffs alleged that [Jones]
hosts a nationally syndicated radio program and owns
and operates multiple Internet websites that hold them-
selves out as news and journalism platforms. The plain-
tiffs further alleged that [Jones] began publishing con-
tent related to the Sandy Hook shooting on his radio
and Internet platforms and circulated videos on his
YouTube channel. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged
that, between December 19, 2012, and June 26, 2017,
[Jones] used his Internet and radio platforms to spread
the message that the Sandy Hook shooting was a staged
3
‘‘There are three underlying actions. In the first action, the plaintiffs are
Erica Lafferty, David Wheeler, Francine Wheeler, Jacqueline Barden, Mark
Barden, Nicole Hockley, Ian Hockley, Jennifer Hensel, Jeremy Richman,
Donna Soto, Carlee Soto-Parisi, Carlos Soto, Jillian Soto, and William Alden-
berg. On November 29, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to consolidate the second
and third cases . . . with their action pursuant to Practice Book § 9-5.
William Sherlach is a plaintiff in the second and third cases and Robert
Parker is a plaintiff in the third case. On December 17, 2018, the court
granted the motion to consolidate the cases. Jeremy Richman died while
this action was pending, and, on June 7, 2021, the court granted the plaintiffs’
motion to substitute Jennifer Hensel, executrix of the estate of Jeremy
Richman, as a plaintiff in his place; however, on June 8, 2021, Jennifer Hensel,
in her capacity as executrix of the estate of Jeremy Richman, withdrew her
claims against the defendants. On October 20, 2021, the court granted Erica
Lafferty’s motion to substitute Richard Coan, trustee of the bankruptcy
estate of Erica L. Garbatini, in her place as a plaintiff in this case.’’ Lafferty
v. Jones, 222 Conn. App. 855, 858 n.1, 307 A.3d 923 (2023). On December
14, 2023, the court granted a motion to substitute Erica Ash, also known
as Erica Lafferty, as a plaintiff in place of Richard Coan, trustee of the
bankruptcy estate of Erica L. Garbatini. All references in this opinion to
the plaintiffs are to the remaining plaintiffs and do not include Jeremy
Richman, Jennifer Hensel, as executrix of the estate of Jeremy Richman,
or Richard Coan, trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Erica L. Garbatini.
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 9
Lafferty v. Jones

event to the millions of his weekly listeners and sub-
scribers. The complaints each consisted of five counts,
including causes of action sounding in invasion of pri-
vacy by false light, defamation and defamation per se,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
infliction of emotional distress,4 and a violation of the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Stat-
utes § 42-110a et seq.’’5 (Citation omitted; footnotes
added.) Lafferty v. Jones, 222 Conn. App. 855, 859–60,
307 A.3d 923 (2023).
As the trial court, Bellis, J., set forth in its decision,
‘‘[o]n February 22, 2019, the court granted [a] motion for
protective order filed by the Jones defendants, which
allowed, inter alia, the plaintiffs’ medical and/or mental
health records to be designated as confidential.6 The
4
The plaintiffs subsequently abandoned the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress claim.
5
‘‘On November 15, 2021, the [trial] court [Bellis, J.] entered a default
against the [Jones] defendants as a sanction for failing to fully and fairly
comply with the plaintiffs’ discovery requests. The [underlying consolidated]
cases proceeded to trial for a hearing in damages, and . . . a verdict was
reached and a judgment was rendered in each case in favor of the plaintiffs.’’
Lafferty v. Jones, 222 Conn. App. 855, 860, 307 A.3d 923 (2023). Following
the court’s denials of postverdict motions, the defendants appealed from
the judgments rendered in the underlying consolidated actions, which
appeals were consolidated. The consolidated appeal remains pending before
this court. See Lafferty v. Jones, Connecticut Appellate Court, Docket No.
AC 46131 (appeal filed December 29, 2022).
6
‘‘The order limited access to confidential information to the following
individuals in this case and all cases consolidated with this case: ‘All counsel
of record, including staff persons employed by such counsel; the parties,
but only to the extent reasonably necessary to the litigation of this case;
any consultant, investigator or expert (collectively ‘‘Expert’’) who is assisting
in the preparation and/or trial of this action, but only to the extent reasonably
necessary to enable such Expert to render such assistance; any deponent
or witness who is reasonably believed to have been eligible to have access
to Confidential Information by virtue of his or her employment or other
affiliation with the Designating Party, and other non-party witnesses deposed
in this case but only for the time reasonably necessary to question the
witness; court reporters, videographers and outside vendors performing
litigation support services for parties in this case; counsel who are presently
representing clients in a case against any one or more of the [Jones] Defen-
dants, which arises out of the same or similar set of facts, transactions or
occurrences, provided that before disclosing Confidential Information to
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10 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

court order limited the use of such confidential informa-
tion.7 On June 16, 2021, the court granted, without
objection, the plaintiffs’ motion to modify the
protective order8 to create a Highly Confidential-
Attorneys Eyes Only designation.9 Finally, on June 15,
2022,10 the court granted by consent a final modification
to the order of protection,11 adding ‘sensitive informa-
tion of parties or witnesses, which is ordinarily kept
such counsel, such Defendant (1) must receive notice of the intention to
disclose Confidential Information to such counsel; (2) must have the oppor-
tunity to move for a protective order in the case in which counsel is involved;
and (3) a ruling on the motion for protective order must be issued; and the
Court and its personnel.’ ’’
7
‘‘The protective order stated as follows: ‘Except to the extent expressly
authorized by this Protective Order, Confidential Information shall not be
used or disclosed for any purpose other than the preparation and trial of
this case, all cases consolidated with this case, and in any appeal taken
from any order or judgment herein.’ This ‘Limitations on Use’ provision can
be found in the subsequent modifications to the protective order.’’
8
‘‘The motion stated as justification for the modification the fact that the
Jones defendants were seeking the plaintiffs’ highly personal information
such as medical histories and psychiatric records; abusive litigation tactics;
and the propensity of Jones to make the plaintiffs’ personal information a
topic on his show.’’
9
‘‘The modified protective order limited access to Highly Confidential-
Attorneys Eyes [Only] information to counsel of record, and staff persons
employed by such counsel who reasonably need to handle such information;
outside consulting experts or testifying expert witnesses, but only to the
extent reasonably necessary; any deponent or witness who is reasonably
believed to have been eligible to have access to Confidential Information
by virtue of his or her employment or other affiliation with the Designating
Party, and other non-party witnesses deposed in this case but only for the
time reasonably necessary to question the witness, and only to the extent
such questioning is reasonably necessary; court reporters, videographers
and outside vendors performing litigation support services for parties in
this case; and the court and its personnel. The only sharing provision in the
order allowed ‘(c)ounsel who are presently representing clients in a case
against any one or more of the [Jones] defendants’ to share confidential
information with each other, that is, counsel representing plaintiffs in cases
against a Jones defendant.’’
10
On March 7, 2022, the court granted by consent a motion filed by the
plaintiffs to modify the protective order. The modifications were included
in the final modification entered on June 15, 2022.
11
‘‘The plaintiffs, in [a motion to modify the protective order filed on
June 13, 2022], stated as follows: ‘During the course of discovery, sensitive
personal information, which would normally be kept confidential, especially
in a case of this degree of public exposure, has been disclosed and/or
discovered.’ The plaintiffs were concerned that Jones, or other Jones defen-
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 11
Lafferty v. Jones

confidential’ as a category of information which could
be designated as confidential.12 All . . . versions of the
protective order required that ‘(a)ll persons having
access to Confidential Information’ to ‘maintain it in a
safe and secure manner.’ ’’ (Footnotes added; footnotes
in original; footnote omitted.)
‘‘On August 4, 2022, in each of the [underlying] consol-
idated actions, the . . . court issued, sua sponte, an
order requiring . . . Pattis to appear and show cause
at a hearing on August 10, 2022, ‘as to whether he should
be referred to disciplinary authorities or sanctioned by
the court directly; see . . . Practice Book [§] 2-45;13
regarding the purported release of medical records of
the plaintiffs, in violation of state and federal statute
dants, would use their personal information publicly, given their view of
the conduct of Jones during the course of the litigation.’’
12
‘‘The order limited access to Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only
information to the same individuals as the prior order, adding the words
‘in this action’ to further define ‘counsel of record’: ‘a. Counsel of record
in this action, and staff persons employed by such counsel who reasonably
need to handle such information; b. Outside consulting experts or testifying
expert witnesses, but only to the extent reasonably necessary. Any Party
choosing to show such material to such expert shall have the duty to reason-
ably ensure that such person observes the terms of this Protective Order
and shall be responsible upon breach of such duty for the failure of such
person to observe the terms of this Protective Order; c. Any deponent or
witness who is reasonably believed to have been eligible to have access to
Confidential Information by virtue of his or her employment or other affilia-
tion with the Designating Party, and other non-party witnesses deposed in
this case but only for the time reasonably necessary to question the witness,
and only to the extent such questioning is reasonably necessary; d. Court
reporters, videographers and outside vendors performing litigation support
services for parties in this case; and The Court and its personnel. No such
information shall be disclosed to any other party or person.’ ’’
13
Practice Book § 2-44 provides: ‘‘The Superior Court may, for just cause,
suspend or disbar attorneys and may, for just cause, punish or restrain any
person engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.’’
Practice Book § 2-45 provides: ‘‘If such cause occurs in the actual presence
of the court, the order may be summary, and without complaint or hearing;
but a record shall be made of such order, reciting the ground thereof. Without
limiting the inherent powers of the court, if attorney misconduct occurs in
the actual presence of the court, the Statewide Grievance Committee and
the grievance panels shall defer to the court if the court chooses to exercise
its jurisdiction.’’
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12 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

and th[e] court’s protective order, to unauthorized indi-
viduals.’ The order also directed the clerk ‘to notify
Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Brian Staines [disciplinary
counsel], of the show cause hearing and . . . to imme-
diately provide him with a copy of this order.’ Disciplin-
ary counsel had previously filed an appearance.’’ (Foot-
note added.) Lafferty v. Jones, 220 Conn. App. 724, 726,
299 A.3d 1161 (2023).
The court held the show cause hearing on August 10,
17 and 25, 2022. Pattis appeared and was represented
by counsel, and disciplinary counsel also participated.
During the August 10, 2022 hearing, the court, inter alia,
(1) stated that it intended to conduct the disciplinary
proceedings directly, rather than refer the matter to
disciplinary authorities, (2) noted that it had ‘‘only
learned of [the release of the plaintiffs’ confidential
records to unauthorized individuals] by reading head-
lines,’’14 and (3) posed questions that it wanted
addressed by the evidence adduced during the hearing.
On August 15, 2022, Pattis filed a motion to dismiss the
show cause order. On August 16, 2022, Pattis filed a
motion to disqualify Judge Bellis from presiding over
the disciplinary proceedings. On August 17, 2022, the
court denied both motions.
The parties offered evidence during the show cause
hearing on August 17 and 25, 2022. Pattis called six
character witnesses. Disciplinary counsel called as wit-
nesses (1) Christopher M. Mattei, the plaintiffs’ attor-
ney, (2) Federico Andino Reynal, a Texas attorney,15 and
(3) Kyung S. Lee, another Texas attorney. Disciplinary
14
The court further stated: ‘‘I am clearly gravely concerned about what I
had to hear in headlines on the news. It was never reported to me by counsel
that there were any issues. But just what I read in the news.’’
15
On August 4, 2022, the court issued a separate show cause order directed
to Reynal, who was the subject of an application filed by Pattis to appear pro
hac vice in the underlying consolidated cases. The disciplinary proceedings
against Reynal are not germane to this writ of error.
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 13
Lafferty v. Jones

counsel also called Pattis as a witness; however, follow-
ing each of disciplinary counsel’s questions, Pattis
invoked his right to remain silent pursuant to the fifth
amendment to the United States constitution, article
first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, and General
Statutes § 51-35. The court also admitted several exhib-
its in full, including various email correspondence. The
parties subsequently filed posthearing briefs.
On January 5, 2023, the court issued a memorandum
of decision, determining, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that Pattis had violated rules 1.1, 1.15 (b), 3.4 (3),
5.1 (b), 5.1 (c), and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. As discipline, the court suspended Pattis from
the practice of law for a period of six months.16 This
writ of error followed.17 Additional facts and procedural
history will be set forth as necessary.
I
Pattis first claims that the trial court violated his
rights to procedural due process pursuant to the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States consti-
tution18 in initiating, sua sponte, disciplinary proceed-
ings against him, pursuant to its inherent authority to
16
The disciplinary order is stayed pending the final resolution of this writ
of error. See Lafferty v. Jones, supra, 220 Conn. App. 726–27 n.4 (setting
forth procedural background of stay order).
17
In a docketing statement filed on January 30, 2023, Pattis named disci-
plinary counsel as the defendant in error. In an amended docketing statement
filed the next day, Pattis named Judge Bellis as a second defendant in error.
Both disciplinary counsel and Judge Bellis filed motions to dismiss the writ
of error. This court (1) granted Judge Bellis’ motion to dismiss, dismissing
the writ of error as it pertained to her, but (2) denied disciplinary counsel’s
motion to dismiss. See Lafferty v. Jones, supra, 220 Conn. App. 731.
18
Pattis also claims that the court violated his right to procedural due
process pursuant to article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. Pattis
has not provided a separate state constitutional analysis, and, therefore, we
deem his state constitutional claim to be abandoned. See Glanz v. Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles, 210 Conn. App. 515, 521 n.3, 270 A.3d 766 (2022).
‘‘In any event, [o]ur Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, as a general
rule, the due process clauses of both the United States and Connecticut
constitutions have the same meanings and impose similar limitations.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
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14 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

discipline attorneys, on the basis of events that tran-
spired outside of its presence, namely, the release of
the plaintiffs’ confidential records to unauthorized indi-
viduals. We conclude that this unpreserved claim,
although reviewable, fails on the merits under the third
prong of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567
A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317
Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. The show cause
order provided in relevant part that Pattis was ‘‘ordered
to show cause . . . as to whether he should be referred
to disciplinary authorities or sanctioned by the court
directly, see . . . Practice Book [§] 2-45, regarding the
purported release of medical records of the plaintiffs,
in violation of state and federal statute and th[e] court’s
protective order, to unauthorized individuals. . . .’’ In
his motion to dismiss the show cause order, Pattis
asserted, inter alia, that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction or authority to pursue the show cause order
because (1) § 2-45 requires the just cause to occur in
the ‘‘actual presence of the court’’ and (2) the record
reflected that the court learned of the release of the
plaintiffs’ confidential records to unauthorized individu-
als through media sources.19
On August 17, 2022, the court denied the motion to
dismiss,20 reasoning that, ‘‘[a]n attorney, as an officer of
the court in the administration of justice, is continually
accountable to it for the manner in which he exercises
19
In support of his motion to dismiss the show cause order, Pattis further
claimed that (1) there was a bankruptcy stay in effect and (2) the court did
not afford him sufficient notice of the federal and state statutes that he
allegedly violated. Pattis has not raised either issue in this writ of error.
20
The court heard argument from Pattis’ trial counsel on the motion to
dismiss during the August 17, 2022 hearing. Following argument, the court
orally denied the motion to dismiss and stated that a written order would fol-
low.
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 15
Lafferty v. Jones

the privilege which has been accorded him. . . . An
attorney must conduct himself or herself in a manner
that comports with the proper functioning of the judicial
system. . . . The court has the inherent authority to
discipline attorneys. . . . Our rules of practice codify
the authority of the court to summarily discipline an
attorney, without the need to refer the attorney to the
disciplinary authorities. . . . Practice Book [§] 2-45
provides that the court has authority to address attorney
misconduct that occurs in its presence, and [Practice
Book §] 2-32 (a) (2) (F)21 recognizes that courts may
address misconduct occurring in a court action by
allowing for the dismissal of a complaint where the
complaint alleged misconduct occurring in a court
action, and where the court rendered a decision
addressing the misconduct. In short, the court has the
authority—and jurisdiction—to address attorney mis-
conduct that occurs in a court action. The court rejects
[Pattis’] argument that the court can only address mis-
conduct that occurs in the physical presence of the
21
Practice Book § 2-32 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person, including
disciplinary counsel, or a grievance panel on its own motion, may file a
written complaint, executed under penalties of false statement, alleging
attorney misconduct whether or not such alleged misconduct occurred in
the actual presence of the court. Complaints against attorneys shall be
filed with the statewide bar counsel. Within seven days of the receipt of a
complaint, the statewide bar counsel shall review the complaint and process
it in accordance with subdivision . . . (2) . . . of this subsection as fol-
lows . . .
‘‘(2) refer the complaint to the chair of the Statewide Grievance Committee
or an attorney designee of the chair and to a nonattorney member of the
committee, and the statewide bar counsel in conjunction with the chair or
attorney designee and the nonattorney member shall, if deemed appropriate,
dismiss the complaint on one or more of the following grounds . . .
‘‘(F) the complaint alleges misconduct occurring in a Superior Court,
Appellate Court or Supreme Court action and the court has been made
aware of the allegations of misconduct and has rendered a decision finding
misconduct or finding that either no misconduct has occurred or that the
allegations should not be referred to the Statewide Grievance Committee
. . . .’’
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16 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

court.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote added; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.)
Pattis acknowledges that the court had the inherent
authority to discipline him. See Disciplinary Counsel
v. Serafinowicz, 160 Conn. App. 92, 98, 123 A.3d 1279
(‘‘[t]he Superior Court possesses inherent authority to
regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the mem-
bers of the bar’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 319 Conn. 953, 125 A.3d 531 (2015). Pattis
maintains, however, that this inherent authority ‘‘is sub-
ject to constitutional restraint’’ and that the court
infringed on his procedural due process rights in initiat-
ing, sua sponte, disciplinary proceedings against him
on the basis of conduct that occurred outside of its
presence.
As a preliminary matter, we observe that Pattis raises
this procedural due process claim for the first time in
this writ of error. Pattis contends that this constitutional
claim, if unpreserved,22 is reviewable under Golding.
Pursuant to Golding, a plaintiff in error ‘‘can prevail on
a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial
only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the
record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error;
22
Pattis asserts that this constitutional claim is preserved because he
raised it in the motion to dismiss the show cause order. In the motion to
dismiss, Pattis contended in relevant part that (1) the show cause order
‘‘[did not] comport with due process’’ because it failed to identify the specific
state and federal statutes that he allegedly violated and (2) the court did
not cure the defective notice during the August 10, 2022 hearing. Pattis did
not raise the discrete claim, now presented in this writ of error, that the
court violated his procedural due process rights in commencing, sua sponte,
disciplinary proceedings against him to investigate conduct that did not
occur in its presence. Insofar as Pattis claimed error on the ground that the
conduct at issue occurred outside of the court’s presence, his claim was
limited to challenging the court’s reliance on Practice Book § 2-45, which
the court cited in the show cause order and which concerns just cause
‘‘occur[ring] in the actual presence of the court . . . .’’ See footnote 13 of
this opinion. Pattis is not claiming in this writ of error that the court commit-
ted error in relying on § 2-45 or that he received defective notice.
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 17
Lafferty v. Jones

(2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging
the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged
constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived
the [plaintiff in error] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject
to harmless error analysis, the [defendant in error] has
failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged con-
stitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
The first two steps in the Golding analysis address the
reviewability of the claim, [whereas] the last two steps
involve the merits of the claim.’’ (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Gabriella M.,
221 Conn. App. 827, 836, 303 A.3d 319, cert. denied, 348
Conn. 925, 304 A.3d 443 (2023). We conclude that Pattis’
unpreserved claim is reviewable, as (1) the record is
adequate for review and (2) the claim is of constitutional
magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right.
We further conclude, however, that Pattis’ claim fails
on the merits under the third prong of Golding because
he has not demonstrated that the court’s actions vio-
lated his procedural due process rights.
‘‘Because a license to practice law is a vested property
interest and disciplinary proceedings are adversary pro-
ceedings of a quasi-criminal nature, an attorney subject
to discipline is entitled to due process of law. . . . Due
process is inherently fact-bound because due process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands. . . . The constitu-
tional requirement of procedural due process thus
invokes a balancing process that cannot take place in
a factual vacuum. . . . Accordingly, [t]he determina-
tion of the particular process that is due depends on
the nature of the proceeding and the interests at stake.
. . . In attorney disciplinary proceedings, two interests
are of paramount importance. On the one hand, we
must not tie the hands of grievance committees and
trial courts with procedural requirements so strict that
it becomes virtually impossible to discipline an attorney
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18 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

for any but the most obvious, egregious and public
misconduct. On the other hand, we must ensure that
attorneys subject to disciplinary action are afforded the
full measure of procedural due process required under
the constitution so that we do not unjustly deprive them
of their reputation and livelihood.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Mottolese,
267 Conn. 1, 19–20, 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied,
541 U.S. 1073, 124 S. Ct. 2422, 158 L. Ed. 2d 983 (2004).
‘‘[In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct.
893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976)] [t]he United States Supreme
Court . . . set forth three factors [which our Supreme
Court has followed] to consider when analyzing
whether an individual is constitutionally entitled to a
particular judicial or administrative procedure: First,
the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment’s inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. . . . Due pro-
cess analysis requires balancing the government’s inter-
est in existing procedures against the risk of erroneous
deprivation of a private interest inherent in those proce-
dures. . . .
‘‘The fundamental requisite of due process of law is
the opportunity to be heard . . . [which] must be at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. . . .
[T]hese principles require that a [litigant] have timely
and adequate notice detailing the reasons for [the pro-
posed action], and an effective opportunity to defend
by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting
his own arguments and evidence orally.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Harris, 277 Conn. 378, 395–96, 890 A.2d 559 (2006).
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 19
Lafferty v. Jones

Whether the court deprived Pattis of his procedural due
process rights presents a question of law subject to
plenary review. See Ambrose v. Ambrose, 223 Conn.
App. 609, 619, 309 A.3d 305 (2024).
Pattis does not contend that the court deprived him
of sufficient notice or of a meaningful opportunity to
be heard with regard to the show cause order. Instead,
applying the Mathews factors, Pattis asserts that, ‘‘[i]n
order to provide sufficient due process, a court’s institu-
tion of disciplinary proceedings should . . . [be] lim-
ited to conduct that occurs in its presence and not
for what a judge might hear or see in the news.’’ We
disagree.
With respect to the second Mathews factor,23 Pattis
asserts that disciplinary proceedings commenced
against an attorney on the basis of a public complaint
or inquiry, particularly by the Superior Court, ‘‘immedi-
ately [jeopardize] the attorney’s livelihood’’ and, when
such proceedings are focused on conduct that occurred
outside of the court’s presence, require investigation
and fact-finding. Pattis further contends that the under-
lying consolidated actions were ‘‘highly publicized’’ and
that the show cause order ‘‘attracted media attention,’’
such that his ‘‘potential discipline became its own
national media story before any evidence was put on.’’
Pattis posits that, rather than initiate, sua sponte, disci-
plinary proceedings against him, the court should have
referred the matter to disciplinary authorities, thereby
(1) permitting the matter to be investigated privately,
‘‘not in public hearings that were part of an already
publicized civil case,’’ and (2) providing additional lay-
ers of review.
23
As to the first Mathews factor, the parties agree that Pattis has a property
interest in his law license. See Burton v. Mottolese, supra, 267 Conn. 19 (‘‘a
license to practice law is a vested property interest’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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20 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

We are not convinced that the court’s course of action
risked an erroneous deprivation of Pattis’ property
interest in his law license. The record demonstrates
that the court afforded Pattis notice by way of the show
cause order and an opportunity to defend his interest
by way of the show cause hearing. Notwithstanding the
court’s comments reflecting that it had learned of the
release of the plaintiffs’ confidential records to unautho-
rized individuals through the news, nothing in the
record indicates that the disciplinary proceedings were
tainted by publicity surrounding the underlying consoli-
dated actions. Moreover, although the court had the
option to refer the matter to disciplinary authorities,
we do not discern the court’s decision to adjudicate
the matter itself as placing Pattis’ property interest in
his law license at risk of erroneous deprivation. See
Burton v. Mottolese, supra, 267 Conn. 28 (concluding
that trial court properly initiated disciplinary proceed-
ings against attorney and that Statewide Grievance
Committee is not ‘‘exclusive tribunal in which attorney
misconduct claims may be investigated’’).
With respect to the third Mathews factor, Pattis main-
tains that the court’s ability to refer the matter to disci-
plinary authorities mitigated any adverse effect on its
interests in managing its docket and in protecting the
rights of other parties. We do not agree. The court
had a significant interest in immediately adjudicating
serious allegations that Pattis had engaged in conduct
that led to the release of the plaintiffs’ confidential
records to unauthorized individuals in violation of the
court’s protective order. Commencing disciplinary pro-
ceedings against Pattis directly, rather than invoking the
procedures governing attorney grievance proceedings;
see General Statutes § 51-90 et seq.; Practice Book § 2-
29 et seq.;24 enabled the court to inquire promptly into
the matter.
24
‘‘Attorney grievance proceedings are governed by the General Statutes
and the rules of practice. See General Statutes § 51-90 et seq.; Practice Book
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 21
Lafferty v. Jones

In sum, after weighing the Mathews factors, we are
not persuaded that due process mandates the imposi-
tion of a constraint on the Superior Court’s inherent
authority to regulate and to discipline attorneys by
drawing a distinction between conduct that occurred
before the court and conduct that transpired outside
of its presence. We conclude that the court did not
violate Pattis’ procedural due process rights in initiat-
ing, sua sponte, disciplinary proceedings against him
on the basis of conduct that occurred outside of its
presence,25 and, therefore, we further conclude that
§ 2-29 et seq.’’ Brunswick v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 103 Conn.
App. 601, 608, 931 A.2d 319, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 929, 934 A.2d 244 (2007).
25
Pattis argues that ‘‘[t]he present case may be the first time in Connecticut
that a Superior Court judge instituted disciplinary proceedings against an
attorney because she read or saw a report in the news.’’ In support of
his position, Pattis cites several disciplinary cases in which trial courts
considered whether to discipline attorneys on the basis of conduct that
either (1) the courts observed directly or (2) occurred outside of the courts’
presence but was brought to the courts’ attention by parties or counsel.
See Burton v. Mottolese, supra, 267 Conn. 6, 28 (court initiated disciplinary
proceedings against attorney after opposing counsel, during hearing on
motion for sanctions, represented to court that one of purported plaintiffs
had not authorized attorney to commence action); Briggs v. McWeeny, 260
Conn. 296, 303, 796 A.2d 516 (2002) (court initiated disciplinary proceedings
against attorney after certain parties informed court, during hearing on
application for prejudgment remedy, that attorney had engaged in efforts
to suppress and to alter architect’s report); Disciplinary Counsel v. Wil-
liams, 166 Conn. App. 557, 560, 568, 142 A.3d 391 (2016) (court initiated
disciplinary proceedings against attorney on basis of attorney’s conduct
during trial); Sowell v. DiCara, 161 Conn. App. 102, 118, 127 A.3d 356 (in
adjudicating emergency motion for protective order, court determined that
attorney violated Rules of Professional Conduct), cert. denied, 320 Conn.
909, 128 A.3d 953 (2015). These cases do not advance Pattis’ contention
that, to comport with due process, a trial court may initiate, sua sponte,
disciplinary proceedings against counsel only when (1) the court observes
misconduct in its presence or (2) misconduct that occurred outside of the
court’s presence is brought to its attention by the parties or counsel. Indeed,
adopting Pattis’ position would yield absurd results. For instance, pursuant
to Pattis’ argument, a trial court judge who learns of out-of-court misconduct
that affects an ongoing trial, such as witness tampering, would be prohibited
from immediately addressing the issue unless it is brought to its attention
by a party or counsel. We cannot countenance such a restriction on a
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22 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

Pattis has failed to demonstrate a violation of his consti-
tutional rights as required under the third prong of
Golding.26
II
Pattis next claims that Judge Bellis improperly denied
his motion to disqualify her from presiding over the
disciplinary proceedings. We are not persuaded.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. In a decision dated
December 20, 2019, a reviewing committee of the State-
wide Grievance Committee dismissed a complaint filed
on June 12, 2019, alleging that Pattis had violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct in connection with the
execution of a personal affidavit of Jones (Jones affida-
vit), which Pattis filed in the underlying consolidated
actions.27 The reviewing committee found in relevant
part as follows. During a hearing on April 10, 2019,
Judge Bellis was made aware that Pattis may have acted
court’s inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to sanction as
appropriate.
26
In the alternative, Pattis requests reversal of the court’s judgment pursu-
ant to the plain error doctrine. ‘‘The plain error doctrine is based on Practice
Book § 60-5, which provides in relevant part: The court shall not be bound
to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose
subsequent to the trial. The court may in the interests of justice notice plain
error not brought to the attention of the trial court. . . . The plain error
doctrine is reserved for truly extraordinary situations [in which] the exis-
tence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of
and public confidence in the judicial proceedings. . . . A party cannot pre-
vail under [the] plain error [doctrine] unless [he] has demonstrated that the
failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Patel, 194 Conn. App. 245, 253 n.5, 221 A.3d 45
(2019), aff’d, 342 Conn. 445, 270 A.3d 627, cert. denied sub nom. Patel v.
Connecticut, U.S. , 143 S. Ct. 216, 214 L. Ed. 2d 86 (2022). For the
same reasons that we reject his claim under the third prong of Golding, we
conclude that Pattis has not ‘‘met the stringent standard for relief pursuant
to the plain error doctrine.’’ Id., 253.
27
On July 22, 2019, a grievance panel found probable cause that Pattis
had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct in relation to his handling
of the Jones affidavit.
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 23
Lafferty v. Jones

improperly with respect to the execution of the Jones
affidavit, which (1) was signed in Jones’ name by Jones’
personal representative, who had a power of attorney,
and (2) did not state where it was signed. Pattis self-
reported the matter by correspondence dated April 12,
2019, and Judge Bellis referred the matter to the Office
of Chief Disciplinary Counsel by correspondence dated
April 24, 2019.
In dismissing the grievance complaint, the reviewing
committee concluded that the record lacked clear and
convincing evidence to substantiate a finding that Pattis
had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The
reviewing committee determined that Pattis’ ‘‘conduct
in connection with the [Jones] affidavit did not rise to
the level of an ethical violation, in this instance. . . .
[Pattis] acknowledged that he made a mistake in con-
nection with the execution of the [Jones] affidavit.
When [Pattis] realized his error, he immediately cor-
rected it [by filing a new affidavit signed by Jones]. We
find [Pattis] credible that he made a mistake and had
no intent to deceive the court or opposing counsel.’’
The reviewing committee further commented that,
although it was dismissing the grievance complaint, it
was ‘‘critical of [Pattis’] level of diligence in researching
how to handle an affidavit involving an attorney-in-fact
acting under a Texas power of attorney in a Connecticut
civil proceeding. It is the opinion of this reviewing com-
mittee that [Pattis’] practice was sloppy with regard
to the execution of the [Jones] affidavit and that he
exercised bad judgment. Further, it was inappropriate
not to request the power of attorney document for
review.’’
During the show cause hearing on August 10, 2022,
Judge Bellis notified the parties that ‘‘in the interest of
candor . . . I do intend to handle this matter directly,
rather than making a referral to disciplinary authori-
ties.’’ Judge Bellis further stated that she wanted to (1)
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24 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

‘‘go through the history and the background and lay
everything out’’ in light of the ‘‘situation’’ of counsel
representing Pattis, who had recently appeared on
behalf of Pattis and who, as Judge Bellis observed, was
‘‘not necessarily familiar with the entire background
here,’’28 and (2) ‘‘go into considerable detail regarding
prior disciplinary issues in this case’’ because she
‘‘want[ed] [the disciplinary] proceeding[s] to be fair and
transparent . . . .’’ As part of her recitation of this his-
tory, Judge Bellis discussed the reviewing committee’s
dismissal of the June 12, 2019 grievance complaint.
Judge Bellis summarized the background of the com-
plaint and quoted portions of the reviewing committee’s
decision, including the committee’s statements that,
notwithstanding its determination that Pattis did not
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, (1) it was
‘‘critical’’ of Pattis’ level of diligence, (2) his practice
was ‘‘sloppy,’’ and (3) ‘‘he exercised bad judgment.’’
In his motion to disqualify Judge Bellis, Pattis claimed
that ‘‘[i]t is prudent, proper and required under the law
for Judge Bellis to be disqualified from hearing this
attorney disciplinary proceeding, and for Judge Bellis
to proceed is a violation of [his] due process rights.’’
Pattis maintained that (1) Judge Bellis’ decision to issue
the show cause order could ‘‘give rise to the public the
improper impression (irrespective of its validity) that
the court has improperly chosen sides in litigation,’’
(2) Judge Bellis’ comments during the August 10, 2022
hearing (a) reflected that she was ‘‘dissatisfied’’ with
the reviewing committee’s dismissal of the June 12, 2019
grievance complaint and (b) could ‘‘create an improper
public perception that [he] may end up being punished
28
Attorney Wesley Robert Mead filed an appearance on behalf of Pattis
on August 8, 2022. On the same day, Mead filed a motion for a continuance
of the August 10, 2022 hearing on the basis of medical issues. Judge Bellis
held the August 10, 2022 hearing; however, to accommodate Mead, she
limited the scope of the hearing that day.
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 25
Lafferty v. Jones

not on the merits of these allegations but based on
[her] discontent with the [reviewing] committee’s prior
determination,’’ (3) it would be ‘‘troubling’’ for Judge
Bellis to preside simultaneously over ‘‘an exceedingly
high profile publicized trial’’ and disciplinary proceed-
ings against him, potentially harming him and the defen-
dants, as well as ‘‘ ‘chill[ing]’ ’’ advocacy, and (4) the
show cause order left ‘‘open the possibility that [he]
could have fully complied with the [protective order]
but still have violated a federal or state statute govern-
ing the release of medical records,’’ in which case (a)
compliance with the protective order would be a
defense in any ensuing prosecution and (b) Judge Bellis,
who had entered the protective order, would ‘‘likely be
in the position to support the [protective order] . . . .’’
In denying the motion to disqualify, Judge Bellis stated
that ‘‘[t]he burden of establishing judicial bias, partial-
ity, or impropriety rests on the movant. The motion is
denied as [Pattis] has not met his burden.’’29
Pattis asserts that Judge Bellis improperly denied
his motion to disqualify her from presiding over the
disciplinary proceedings because her ‘‘impartiality
could reasonably be questioned’’ in light of her com-
ments during the August 10, 2022 hearing (1) notifying
the parties that she would preside over the disciplinary
proceedings, rather than refer the matter to disciplinary
authorities, and (2) discussing the reviewing commit-
tee’s dismissal of the June 12, 2019 grievance complaint.
Initially, we address the standard of review applicable
to Pattis’ claim. Pattis maintains that Judge Bellis’
29
Judge Bellis further stated that (1) she would consider the merits of the
motion to disqualify notwithstanding that Pattis failed to file the necessary
accompanying affidavit or a proper certificate of good faith; see Practice
Book § 1-23 (‘‘[a] motion to disqualify a judicial authority shall be in writing
and shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the facts relied upon
to show the grounds for disqualification and a certificate of the counsel of
record that the motion is made in good faith’’); and (2) an evidentiary
hearing was not necessary because the facts giving rise to the motion were
undisputed.
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26 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

refusal to disqualify herself implicates his due process
rights, thereby requiring us to employ plenary review.
As our Supreme Court has explained, however, ‘‘[t]he
United States Supreme Court consistently has held that
a judge’s failure to disqualify himself or herself will
implicate the due process clause only when the right
to disqualification arises from actual bias on the part
of that judge.’’ (Emphasis in original.) State v. Canales,
281 Conn. 572, 594, 916 A.2d 767 (2007); see also State
v. Sumler, 199 Conn. App. 187, 196–97, 235 A.3d 576
(2020) (citing Canales in stating that ‘‘[t]he law is clear
. . . that the mere appearance of bias is insufficient to
implicate a due process violation’’), vacated in part on
other grounds, 345 Conn. 961, 284 A.3d 982 (2022). Pattis
does not assert that Judge Bellis had to be disqualified
on the ground of actual bias; indeed, in his principal
appellate brief, Pattis cites legal authority for the propo-
sition that ‘‘[a] moving party does not need to prove
actual bias.’’ We construe the crux of Pattis’ claim to
be that Judge Bellis should have disqualified herself
because her involvement in the disciplinary proceed-
ings would reasonably call into question her impartial-
ity. Thus, Pattis has not presented us with a viable due
process claim subject to plenary review.
We proceed to set forth the following relevant legal
principles and governing standard of review. ‘‘Pursuant
to our rules of practice; see Practice Book § 1-22;30 a
judge should disqualify himself [or herself] from acting
30
Practice Book § 1-22 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A judicial authority
shall, upon motion of either party or upon its own motion, be disqualified
from acting in a matter if such judicial authority is disqualified from acting
therein pursuant to Rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct or because
the judicial authority previously tried the same matter and a new trial was
granted therein or because the judgment was reversed on appeal. A judicial
authority may not preside at the hearing of any motion attacking the validity
or sufficiency of any warrant the judicial authority issued nor may the
judicial authority sit in appellate review of a judgment or order originally
rendered by such authority. . . .’’
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 27
Lafferty v. Jones

in a matter if it is required by rule 2.11 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which provides in relevant part that
[a] judge shall disqualify himself [or herself] . . . in
any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned . . . . In applying this rule,
[t]he reasonableness standard is an objective one. Thus,
the question is not only whether the particular judge
is, in fact, impartial but whether a reasonable person
would question the judge’s impartiality on the basis of
all the circumstances. . . . Moreover, it is well estab-
lished that [e]ven in the absence of actual bias, a judge
must disqualify himself [or herself] in any proceeding
in which his [or her] impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, because the appearance and the existence
of impartiality are both essential elements of a fair
exercise of judicial authority. . . . Nevertheless,
because the law presumes that duly elected or
appointed judges, consistent with their oaths of office,
will perform their duties impartially . . . and that they
are able to put aside personal impressions regarding
a party . . . the burden rests with the party urging
disqualification to show that it is warranted. . . . A
trial court’s ruling on a motion for disqualification is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. . . . In determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every
reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the
correctness of the court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is
required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest
or where injustice appears to have been done.’’ (Foot-
note added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Morton
v. Syriac, 196 Conn. App. 183, 202–203, 229 A.3d 1129,
cert. denied, 335 Conn. 915, 229 A.3d 1045 (2020).
We reject Pattis’ claim that Judge Bellis’ statements
during the August 10, 2022 hearing discussing the
reviewing committee’s dismissal of the June 12, 2019
grievance complaint31 and informing the parties of her
31
Pattis also notes that Judge Bellis, in entering the disciplinary order,
deemed the reviewing committee’s statements criticizing his handling of the
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28 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

decision to conduct the disciplinary proceedings
directly are sufficient to cause a reasonable person to
question her impartiality. Judge Bellis explained on the
record that her recitation of the background of the case,
including the reviewing committee’s dismissal of the
June 12, 2019 grievance complaint, constituted an effort
to conduct ‘‘fair and transparent’’ disciplinary proceed-
ings and to accommodate Pattis’ counsel, who had
recently appeared on behalf of Pattis and who had
requested a continuance of the proceedings for medical
reasons. Judge Bellis further stated that she was notify-
ing the parties of her intent to preside over the disciplin-
ary proceedings directly ‘‘in the interest of candor
. . . .’’ Put simply, on the basis of the record, we cannot
conclude that Judge Bellis’ impartiality might reason-
ably be questioned. Accordingly, we conclude that
Pattis has failed to demonstrate that Judge Bellis abused
her discretion in denying his motion to disqualify.32
Jones’ affidavit to be an aggravating factor. Judge Bellis’ comments during
the August 10, 2022 hearing do not reflect partiality, and we do not discern
her reliance on the reviewing committee’s statements in her decision to
raise the specter of partiality.
32
Pattis also contends that Judge Bellis violated his procedural due process
rights in failing to refer the disciplinary matter to another Superior Court
judge because she had become ‘‘ ‘personally embroiled’ ’’ with him. To sup-
port this assertion, Pattis cites Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91
S. Ct. 499, 27 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1971), in which the United States Supreme
Court vacated a judgment of criminal contempt and remanded the matter
to be heard by another judge when the original judge, having been subjected
to ‘‘slanderous remarks’’ and ‘‘vilified’’ by the defendant, ‘‘necessarily
[became] embroiled in a running, bitter controversy’’ and was not ‘‘likely
to maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication.’’ Id., 465–
66. The court in Mayberry concluded that ‘‘by reason of the [d]ue [p]rocess
[c]lause of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment [to the United States constitution]
a defendant in criminal contempt proceedings should be given a public trial
before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor.’’ Id., 466. Even
if we assume, without deciding, that the rationale of Mayberry extends
beyond criminal contempt proceedings, the record does not support Pattis’
assertion that Judge Bellis had become ‘‘ ‘personally embroiled’ ’’ with him.
See Banks v. Thomas, 241 Conn. 569, 600, 698 A.2d 268 (1997) (‘‘judicial
recusal is necessary only in the unusual case where the apparent effect of
the contemnor’s conduct on the judge against whom the contemptuous
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 29
Lafferty v. Jones

III
Pattis also claims that the trial court improperly
determined that he violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct. We (1) reject Pattis’ claims that the court
improperly determined that he violated rules 1.1, 5.1
(b), and 8.4 (4), as well as rule 5.1 (c) in part, but (2)
conclude that the court improperly concluded that he
violated rules 1.15 (b) and 3.4 (3), as well as rule 5.1
(c) in part.33
The court set forth the following additional facts and
procedural history in its decision that are relevant to
our resolution of Pattis’ claim. ‘‘Utilizing a database
management firm to ensure that discovery materials
were protected and secure, the plaintiffs, beginning in
October of 2021, began a rolling [discovery] production.
This rolling production was released every two weeks
and continued through June of 2022. Every document
that was released was reviewed by one of the plaintiffs’
attorneys. All discovery materials were provided to the
Jones defendants electronically via link, which could
be downloaded. The offices of the plaintiffs’ counsel,
as well as their vendor, had measures in place to keep
the materials secure. Medical records, deposition tran-
scripts, and employment, financial, and professional
conduct was levied is such as to indicate that the judge’s impartiality or
objectivity reasonably may be called into question’’). A careful review of
the record reveals no remarks or actions by Judge Bellis indicating that she
had become entangled personally in a ‘‘running, bitter controversy’’ with
Pattis such that her impartiality or objectivity reasonably could be ques-
tioned. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, supra, 465. Accordingly, we need not
address this contention further.
33
Disciplinary counsel argues that we should decline to review Pattis’
claims regarding the court’s determinations that he violated rules 1.1, 1.15
(b), 5.1 (b), 5.1 (c), and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct because
they are inadequately briefed. See, e.g., Colandrea v. State Dental Commis-
sion, 221 Conn. App. 597, 620 n.25, 302 A.3d 348 (2023) (inadequately briefed
claims are deemed abandoned), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 933, 306 A.3d 475
(2024). We conclude that Pattis’ claims as to these particular rules are
adequately briefed for our review.
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30 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

records were among the records of the plaintiffs that
were designated [pursuant to the protective order] as
Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only. The plaintiffs
produced over 390,000 pages of discovery materials,
approximately 4000 of which were the plaintiffs’ medi-
cal records.
‘‘The concerns of the court with protecting the plain-
tiffs’ medical and confidential information were made
painfully clear to [Pattis] early in the discovery process,
when [on July 1, 2021] he filed a motion to depose
Hillary Clinton, improperly using information desig-
nated as Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only. Most
unusually, [Pattis] filed the motion containing the
Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only information
as [a] deposition was taking place. In fact, the motion
to depose Clinton was filed during the very first of the
plaintiffs’ depositions. In ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion
for sanctions filed in response [on July 6, 2021], the
court, on August 5, 2021, entered in part the following
order: ‘Given the cavalier actions and [wilful] miscon-
duct of [Free Speech Systems, LLC, Infowars, LLC,
Infowars Health, LLC, and Prison Planet TV, LLC, which
were defendants in the underlying consolidated actions]
in filing protected deposition information during the
actual deposition, this court has grave concerns that
their actions, in the future, will have a chilling effect
on the testimony of witnesses who would be rightfully
concerned that their confidential information, including
their psychiatric and medical histories, would be made
available to the public. The court will address sanctions
at a future hearing.’ Beginning in June of 2021, both the
court and the plaintiffs clearly expressed their concerns
with respect to protecting the plaintiffs’ mental health
and other medical and confidential information.
‘‘In late February of 2022, [Pattis] contacted . . .
Reynal, a Texas attorney, regarding Reynal’s potential
representation of Jones and related defendants in five
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 31
Lafferty v. Jones

cases pending in Texas. The expectation was that Rey-
nal would also be working on the three consolidated
Connecticut cases, and that the two would collaborate
on the Texas and Connecticut cases. In March of 2022,
approximately six weeks prior to the then trial date in
Texas, Reynal filed an appearance in the Texas Sandy
Hook defamation lawsuit brought by Scarlett Lewis and
Neil Heslin (Texas case). Reynal was the tenth lawyer
for the Jones defendants in the Texas case, initially
appearing as cocounsel with Jacquelyn Blott. Blott gave
Reynal the files for all five of the Jones defendants’
pending Texas cases.
‘‘Reynal continued to communicate with [Pattis], and
he requested the text messages produced by the Jones
defendants in Connecticut as well as the Jones defen-
dants’ Connecticut deposition transcripts. Neither Rey-
nal nor his office ever requested from [Pattis], or from
anyone else, the . . . plaintiffs’ medical, tax, employ-
ment or financial records. Reynal’s focus was on prepar-
ing for the upcoming Texas trial, which did not require
him to review the . . . plaintiffs’ records.
‘‘On April 13 [and] 14, 2022, emails were exchanged
between [Pattis], Texas attorney . . . Lee, and [prior
counsel for the Jones defendants in the underlying con-
solidated actions, Jay] Wolman, regarding ‘Randazza
emails.’34 On April 17, 2022, on the eve of trial in the
Texas case, Lee filed a petition for bankruptcy on behalf
of [Infowars, LLC, Infowars Health, LLC, and Prison
Planet TV, LLC] in the [United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Texas] (the InfoW bank-
ruptcy case). The plaintiffs’ counsel in the Texas and
Connecticut Sandy Hook cases filed motions to dismiss
the InfoW bankruptcy case, as did the [United States]
34
‘‘Marc Randazza is an attorney admitted in Nevada whose application
for pro hac vice [admission] in the Connecticut cases was denied by the court
on July 7, 2020. Randazza and a Shelby Jordan were copied on the emails.’’
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32 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

Trustee. On April 18, 2022, adversary proceedings were
filed in the [United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Connecticut] . . . and the three consoli-
dated Connecticut cases were removed to Bank-
ruptcy Court.
‘‘On May 2, 2022, Lee emailed Wolman and [Marc]
Randazza, reporting on the status of the InfoW bank-
ruptcy case, reporting that Reynal and [Shelby] Jordan
had provided him with the discovery in the Texas case,
and stating that, when he had asked [Pattis] and [his
associate Cameron] Atkinson about the Connecticut
discovery, Atkinson recommended that Lee contact
Wolman and Randazza directly, as the transfer [of the
Connecticut discovery] from Wolman and Randazza to
[Pattis] and Atkinson was corrupted.35 Lee asked Wol-
man to provide him with all the Connecticut discovery
‘by and for each side,’ in light of the changing number
of lawyers representing the Jones defendants and the
status of discovery in both Texas and Connecticut. Lee
gave no thought as to what the Connecticut discovery
would include and, although he asked for everything,
he had no need for the . . . plaintiffs’ mental health
or other medical records.
‘‘Half an hour later, Wolman responded to Lee by
email, stating that, on March 28, 2022, he had given
Atkinson a new [hard] drive with several hundred giga-
bytes, which Atkinson confirmed worked.36 Wolman
suggested that Atkinson’s office FedEx the hard drive
to Lee and noted that Lee would need to get the . . .
plaintiffs’ recent compliance from ‘[Pattis’] team.’ Six
35
‘‘Randazza was not counsel of record in the three consolidated Connecti-
cut cases and as such was not authorized to possess the . . . plaintiffs’
confidential information. How Randazza improperly came into possession
of the materials was not addressed at the show cause hearing and remains
an open issue at this time.’’
36
‘‘[Pattis], Jordan, Randazza, Adam Rodriguez (of Lee’s firm), and Atkin-
son were all copied on the email.’’
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 33
Lafferty v. Jones

minutes later, Wolman emailed Lee again, copying the
same five individuals, including [Pattis] and Atkinson,
warning that, in light of th[e] court’s protective order,
Lee might not be authorized to access the . . . plain-
tiffs’ confidential documents.37
‘‘Lee responded to Wolman five minutes later, copy-
ing the same five individuals, including [Pattis] and
Atkinson, thanking Wolman and confirming that he
would ‘look into the confidentiality situation in the Con-
necticut litigation.’ A few minutes later, Lee emailed
[Adam] Rodriguez, asking him to locate the confidenti-
ality order, and asking [Pattis] and Atkinson if they
knew what Wolman was referring to.38 Shortly there-
after, Lee responded to Wolman’s email, confirming
that he would follow through with Atkinson and [Pattis].
Later that morning, Rodriguez emailed Lee, (copying
Atkinson, [Pattis], [Marc] Schwartz, [Robert J.] Shan-
non, [Raymond] Battaglia, and Jordan), attaching the
Connecticut protective orders and highlighting the
Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only language.
‘‘Neither [Pattis] nor anyone from his firm advised
of the existence of the protective order, asked Lee to
sign a confidentiality order, or responded to Wolman’s
warning or Lee’s inquiry about the protective order.
Similarly, neither [Pattis] nor anyone from his firm
37
‘‘The entirety of the email is as follows:
‘‘Kyung,
‘‘I should also add a caveat (and a word of precaution to [Pattis]) before
the drive or other files are sent to you. Under the confidentiality order
in the [Connecticut] case[s], I’m not confident you’re eligible to receive
documents marked by the plaintiffs as Confidential or [Highly Confidential-
Attorneys Eyes Only]. As I am not counsel of record, I don’t feel comfortable
making any decisions that would implicate the order and potentially expose
the clients to any liability.
‘‘Sincerely,
‘‘Jay Wolman.’’
38
‘‘Atkinson, [Pattis], one Marc Schwartz, [Robert J.] Shannon [who had
filed a notice of appearance in the InfoW bankruptcy case], one [Raymond]
Battaglia, and Jordan were copied on the email.’’
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34 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

informed Lee that they were sending him the . . .
plaintiffs’ mental health records, medical records, or
other such sensitive information. Instead, shortly after
this May 2, 2022 email exchange, Lee received at his
Houston [Texas] office a white external hard drive in
a bubble wrap envelope, along with an undated cover
letter from Atkinson to Lee, enclosing the hard drive—
the same hard drive that [Pattis] and Atkinson had
obtained from Randazza and Wolman. Neither the enve-
lope nor the hard drive was designated or marked in
any way as confidential or protected by court order,
despite the fact that the hard drive contained the . . .
plaintiffs’ Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only
medical records and discovery. The cover letter was
similarly silent. Lee was unsuccessful in his efforts to
download the hard drive.
‘‘On May 6, 2022, the plaintiffs’ counsel in both the
Texas and Connecticut cases notified Lee of their inten-
tion to withdraw their claims against [Infowars, LLC,
Infowars Health, LLC, and Prison Planet TV, LLC]. On
May 31, 2022, [Pattis] moved to withdraw his and Atkin-
son’s appearances in the Connecticut cases, represent-
ing that they had been discharged.39 On June 1, 2022,
the Connecticut cases were remanded back to state
court. On June 6, 2022, the [United States] Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the
InfoW bankruptcy [case] by agreement of the parties,
including the [United States] Trustee.
‘‘Sometime between June 1 [and] 15, 2022, at the end
of a meeting in [Free Speech Systems, LLC’s] confer-
ence room in Austin [Texas], Lee handed the hard drive,
unmarked, unaltered, and with no envelope, to Reynal.40
It did not occur to Lee to inform Reynal that the hard
39
‘‘The motion to withdraw appearance was ‘withdrawn’ on June 20, 2022.’’
40
‘‘Like Lee, Reynal was prohibited from possessing the . . . plaintiffs’
medical records and other Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only materi-
als, as he was not an attorney of record in the Connecticut cases.’’
September 24, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page iii

225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 35
Lafferty v. Jones

drive contained the . . . plaintiffs’ Highly Confidential-
Attorneys Eyes Only information, and Reynal was not
asked to sign any confidentiality agreement. Reynal,
concerned with what the Jones defendants had pro-
duced in Texas compared to what they had produced
in Connecticut, subsequently transferred it to his own
internal hard drive system. Despite the fact that the
hard drive still contained the . . . plaintiffs’ Highly
Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only documents, abso-
lutely no care was taken to safeguard the information
or to document the details of the transfer of the hard
drive. Lee testified that someone from either Reynal[’s]
or [Pattis’] law firm asked him to transfer the hard drive
to Reynal, and Reynal testified that he either asked for
the hard drive or Lee volunteered it. On June 15, 2022,
Atkinson emailed Lee, asking Lee to ‘make the [hard
drive] available’ to Reynal. Lee responded by saying
that he had already given it to Reynal. A day or two
later, at the request of [Pattis’] office, Reynal had the
hard drive shipped back to [Pattis].41 Thus, the . . .
plaintiffs’ sensitive information, which should have
been safeguarded and which was also protected by the
court order, was carelessly passed around from one
unauthorized person to another, without regard for the
protective order, and with no effort to safeguard the
. . . plaintiffs’ sensitive, confidential documents. The
confidential, court-protected medical and other records
of the . . . plaintiffs were improperly and unsafely
transmitted at the direction of [Pattis] to Lee, and then
improperly and unsafely transferred by Lee to Reynal,
with [Pattis’] approval.
‘‘On July 6, 2022, [Pattis] filed an application for Rey-
nal to appear pro hac vice in the Connecticut cases. The
application was granted on July 20, 2022, with certain
restrictions and the requirement that Reynal file an
appearance by July 30, 2022. On July 26, 2022, the court
41
‘‘Incredibly, both Lee and Reynal deny ever looking at the materials.’’
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36 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

granted [Pattis’] oral motion to ‘withdraw’ Reynal’s pro
hac admission, before Reynal filed his appearance.
‘‘In the meantime, on July 22, 2022, Reynal’s assistant,
at his request, emailed Mark Bankston, lead counsel
[for the plaintiffs] in the Texas case, with a link to a
‘gofile.me’ archive containing supplemental production.
However, the link that was sent mistakenly provided
access to other materials, including Jones’ previously
undisclosed text messages, as well as the . . . plain-
tiffs’ Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only medical
records and discovery. The directory consisted of an
unusually large number of highly disorganized folders
and files. Bankston, having concluded that the materials
contained the . . . plaintiffs’ confidential documents,
as well as [Pattis’] work product, stopped his review
and emailed Reynal, alerting Reynal that the documents
appeared to include records of the . . . plaintiffs and
confidential and work product documents.
‘‘The following morning, Reynal responded to
Bankston by email, telling him to disregard the link,
indicating that a mistake had been made. Reynal
instructed his assistant to deactivate the link but did not
address with Bankston the documents that Bankston’s
office had already downloaded.
‘‘On July 24, 2022, Bankston called . . . Mattei . . .
alerting him of Reynal’s potential disclosure of the . . .
plaintiffs’ confidential documents. Bankston informed
Mattei that, under [rule 193.3 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure], the inadvertent production rule, Bankston
was prohibited from examining the records until the ten
day ‘clawback’ period in the rule had expired. Bankston
reassured Mattei that he had sequestered the records
and would delete them once he came across them.42
42
‘‘Under the [inadvertent production] rule, Reynal had ten days from the
July 22, 2022 notification by Bankston to identify the material inadvertently
produced and assert a privilege.’’
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 37
Lafferty v. Jones

On July 28, 2022, Mattei emailed Reynal, stating that
Reynal remained bound by the court’s protective order,
despite Reynal’s not having filed an appearance; [Pattis]
was copied on this email.

‘‘On July 29, 2022, [Free Speech Systems, LLC] filed
for bankruptcy in the [United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Texas] on the eve of the
Connecticut trial, which was scheduled to commence
jury selection on August 2, 2022. On August 2, 2022, [the
defendants] removed the remnants of the Connecticut]
cases to the [United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Connecticut].

‘‘The ten day clawback period ended on August 1,
[2022] and on August 2, [2022] the privilege having been
waived, Bankston and his staff reviewed the materials,
confirmed that the . . . plaintiffs’ confidential docu-
ments had been transmitted to them,43 and deleted
them.44 On August 3, 2022, during his cross-examination
of Jones in the Texas case, and to Reynal’s surprise,
Bankston used several text messages from Jones’ phone
contained in the documents inadvertently produced by
Reynal. Reynal subsequently reviewed the . . . protec-
tive order for the first time. That same day, Mattei
emailed Reynal regarding Reynal’s disclosure to
Bankston and his staff, requesting that Reynal provide
him with an itemized list of the documents, the date
he received them, the identity of anyone who had access
43
‘‘Had Reynal identified the . . . inadvertently produced documents and
timely asserted a privilege, Bankston would have been required under the
[inadvertent production] rule to surrender all copies of all inadvertently
produced documents pending a ruling by the court in Texas.’’
44
‘‘Pursuant to the sharing provision in the protective order, the plaintiffs’
counsel had previously, and properly, shared other documents with
Bankston. There was no evidence that the records sent by Reynal to
Bankston had all been previously shared with Bankston by the plaintiffs’
counsel, which would not matter anyway under the terms of the protec-
tive order.’’
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38 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

to them, and confirmation of their destruction.45 An
hour after that email, [Pattis] texted Mattei, stating,
‘Chris. Give me a call. I learned moments ago that my
office may have violated protective order. Norm.’
‘‘After trial ended for the day in Texas, Bankston
telephoned Mattei, confirming that he had deleted the
. . . plaintiffs’ confidential documents. That evening,
Reynal emailed Mattei, copying [Pattis], indicating that
he was ‘deeply troubled’ by the ‘inadvertent disclosure.’
Five minutes later, Mattei responded, copying [Pattis]
on the email and reiterating the steps he wanted taken.
[Pattis] then texted Mattei, stating, ‘Hey. So Texas coun-
sel mistakenly turned over stuff to Texas. Do you recall
[one Zimmerman] ever having downloaded [Jones’] text
messages?’
‘‘On August 4, [2022] Reynal filed an emergency
motion for protective order in Texas regarding the inad-
vertent production.46 That morning, Mattei emailed
[Pattis], pointing out that Reynal was never counsel of
record in the Connecticut cases and as such was barred
from accessing the . . . plaintiffs’ confidential infor-
mation and requesting further details from [Pattis].
[Pattis] emailed Mattei back an hour later, conceding
that Reynal was not counsel of record in this case but
positing that Reynal was ‘working on the defense of
this case and related cases’ and therefore authorized
to access the records. [Pattis] explained that they gave
Reynal and Lee a copy of their file, that Lee turned his
over to Reynal and that [Pattis] had asked Reynal to
45
‘‘Bankston was not counsel of record in the Connecticut case[s] and
was prohibited from receiving the . . . plaintiffs’ Highly Confidential-Attor-
neys Eyes Only records from any of Jones’ defense counsel. Bankston was
the third lawyer, after Lee and Reynal, to whom the . . . plaintiffs’ confiden-
tial records were improperly disseminated.’’
46
‘‘The motion was denied, as the court found that the privilege had been
waived under [rule 193.3 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure]. The court
gave Reynal [twenty-four] hours within which to designate any documents
as confidential, but Reynal did not make any such confidential designations.’’
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 39
Lafferty v. Jones

return the file to [Pattis]. [Pattis] stated, ‘I directed an
associate to send our files to the two attorneys who
requested them to defend [Jones]. I did not direct the
associate to withhold the [plaintiffs’ confidential] infor-
mation. If that is an error, responsibility for it falls on
my shoulders.’47 A few minutes later, [Pattis] forwarded
to Mattei an email from Reynal to [Pattis], expressing
Reynal’s embarrassment and reporting that Bankston
represented to the Texas court that he had destroyed
the . . . plaintiffs’ records. Mattei then informed Rey-
nal by email that, according to [Pattis], the materials
that Reynal had been given by Lee were the confidential
materials that [Pattis] had given to Lee, and he requested
a sworn affidavit from Reynal. Mattei also emailed
[Pattis], requesting sworn affidavits from Reynal and
Lee. Reynal emailed Mattei, stating that he was
returning all the files to [Pattis], that he had not shared
the materials with anyone outside his firm, and that,
as he was awaiting the verdict in the Texas case, he
could not prepare the requested affidavit.
‘‘On August 8, [2022] Mattei emailed Reynal, and then
both [Pattis] and [Pattis’] attorney, reiterating his
request for a detailed affidavit. Reynal responded by
email the following day, indicating that he was now
represented by counsel, and Mattei immediately
emailed Reynal’s counsel, repeating his request for an
affidavit.’’ (Footnotes added; footnotes in original; foot-
notes omitted.)
On the basis of these largely undisputed facts, the
court concluded that ‘‘[Pattis] was obligated to safe-
guard the plaintiffs’ sensitive information by identifying
it as such, and, when transmitting such information to
47
‘‘[Pattis] also explained that, pursuant to the Texas court order, he was
directing that every . . . plaintiffs’ deposition, medical record, employment
record or any other record provided by the . . . plaintiffs in discovery be
designated as confidential and Attorneys Eyes Only. As discussed above,
this was never done.’’
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40 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

an authorized recipient, informing the recipient accord-
ingly. Furthermore, [Pattis] was bound to comply with
the provisions of the protective order, which were clear
and unambiguous. [Pattis] was on notice of the need
to safeguard the records by virtue of the court’s written
order stating the court’s ‘grave concerns’ that the . . .
plaintiffs’ confidential mental health and other medical
records would be improperly disseminated, the plain-
tiffs’ counsel’s repeated concerns, both orally and in
writing, regarding [the plaintiffs’] confidential informa-
tion, and Wolman’s written warning to [Pattis] on March
28, 2022. Despite all of this, [Pattis], incredibly, know-
ingly released the records to Lee and Reynal. Not only
did he improperly release the records to Lee and Reynal,
but he did so carelessly, taking no steps to designate
the materials as protected by court order, mark them
as confidential, or inform the recipients that they were
in possession of sensitive and protected documents.
Ultimately, [Pattis’] improper dissemination of the
records, in conjunction with his failure to maintain the
records in a safe and secure manner, led to the . . .
plaintiffs’ most private information being improperly
released to Lee, Reynal, and then Bankston, none of
whom were counsel of record in any of the . . . Con-
necticut cases.’’
Additionally, on January 11, 2023, the court denied
a motion filed by Pattis for a discretionary stay of the
disciplinary order. See footnote 16 of this opinion. On
January 23, 2023, in compliance with an order from this
court, the trial court issued an articulation of its order
denying Pattis’ motion for stay. In the articulation, the
court stated in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he evidence form-
ing the basis for the court’s decision was overwhelming
and largely incontrovertible. The court detailed at great
length the facts giving rise to the misconduct. While
[Pattis] continues to minimize his misconduct by refer-
ring to it as ‘a single instance of misconduct’ and a
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 41
Lafferty v. Jones

‘singular instance of unauthorized disclosure,’ this is
simply untrue. The court found misconduct because of
[Pattis’] abject failure to label or otherwise identify the
hard drive as containing protected medical records, or
protected by court order. Additionally, the court found
that misconduct occurred when [Pattis] intentionally
disseminated the protected documents to . . . Lee
. . . who was not counsel of record in this matter. The
court also found that it was misconduct for [Pattis] to
intentionally distribute the records to . . . Reynal,
who was not counsel of record in this matter . . . .
[Pattis’] references to a ‘mistaken records release’ is
misleading. The only inadvertent record release was by
Reynal to . . . Bankston . . . . Additionally, while
[Pattis] argues that the only harm was potential and
isolated, the court found that the harm was both actual
and potential. The plaintiffs in the underlying litigation
were actually harmed when their sensitive records,
without their consent, were intentionally transmitted
by [Pattis] to Lee and then to Reynal, and then inadver-
tently transmitted by Reynal, who did not know that
he had been given them, to Bankston. . . .’’
Before turning to Pattis’ claims, we set forth the fol-
lowing legal principles and governing standard of
review. ‘‘In matters concerning review of the decisions
of the trial court regarding violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, our role is to determine if the
facts as found are supported by the evidence contained
in the record and whether the conclusions that follow
are legally and logically correct. . . .
‘‘[I]n a matter involving attorney discipline, no sanc-
tion may be imposed unless a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct has been established by clear and
convincing evidence. . . . [C]lear and convincing
proof denotes a degree of belief that lies between the
belief that is required to find the truth or existence of
the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the
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42 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecu-
tion. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces
in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts
asserted are highly probably true, that the probability
that they are true or exist is substantially greater than
the probability that they are false or do not exist.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Sowell v. DiCara, 161 Conn. App. 102, 123–24, 127 A.3d
356, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 909, 128 A.3d 953 (2015).
Insofar as Pattis’ claims require us to interpret the
Rules of Professional Conduct, we employ plenary
review. See Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committee,
339 Conn. 503, 513, 261 A.3d 722 (2021) (‘‘[t]he proper
construction of the Rules of Professional Conduct pre-
sents a question of law over which our review is ple-
nary’’). The rules of statutory interpretation apply when
we construe the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id.; see
also id., 521. ‘‘However, our interpretation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, unlike our interpretation of
our statutes and rules of practice, is complicated by
the fact that the judges of the Superior Court have
also formally adopted the commentary to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.’’ Id., 513–14. ‘‘Because the com-
mentary to the Rules of Professional Conduct has been
formally adopted by the judges of the Superior Court,
the rules must be read together with their commentary.
Thus . . . we are not prevented from considering the
commentary, even if we have not found the relevant
language to be ambiguous.’’ Id., 514–15. ‘‘[A]lthough we
must read the text of the rules and the commentary
together, the commentary is not intended to be defini-
tive, authoritative, or limiting but, rather, is intended
to be illustrative and to guide our interpretation of the
rules.’’ Id., 515; see also Rules of Professional Conduct,
scope, p. 3 (‘‘The [c]ommentary accompanying each
[r]ule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose
of the [r]ule. . . . The [c]ommentaries are intended as
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 43
Lafferty v. Jones

guides to interpretation, but the text of each [r]ule is
authoritative. Commentaries do not add obligations to
the [r]ules but provide guidance for practicing in com-
pliance with the [r]ules.’’).
Mindful of the foregoing caveat, we set forth the
following principles of statutory interpretation that
guide us in interpreting the Rules of Professional Con-
duct. ‘‘The process of statutory interpretation involves
the determination of the meaning of the statutory lan-
guage as applied to the facts of the case . . . . When
construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the
legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine,
in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory
language as applied to the facts of [the] case . . . . In
seeking to determine that meaning . . . [we] consider
the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is
not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpre-
tive guidance to the legislative history and circum-
stances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative
policy it was designed to implement, and to its relation-
ship to existing legislation and common law principles
governing the same general subject matter . . . . We
recognize that terms in a statute are to be assigned
their ordinary meaning, unless context dictates other-
wise . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fer-
nandez v. Commissioner of Correction, 193 Conn. App.
746, 759–60, 220 A.3d 216, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 946,
219 A.3d 376 (2019).
A
First, Pattis claims that the court incorrectly deter-
mined that he violated rule 1.1 of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. Pattis maintains that, as a matter of
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44 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

law, rule 1.1 is inapplicable to the circumstances of this
case. We disagree.
Rule 1.1, titled ‘‘Competence,’’ provides: ‘‘A lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowl-
edge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.’’ The commentary to
rule 1.1 (1) expounds on the requirement that compe-
tent representation necessitates reasonably necessary
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation,48
and (2) discusses an attorney’s ability to retain or con-
tract with other lawyers, as well as an attorney main-
taining competence. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1,
commentary.
In examining the applicability of rule 1.1, the court
stated that, ‘‘[i]n order to competently represent a client
involved in civil litigation, an attorney must be able
to responsibly engage in the discovery process, which
routinely requires an attorney to safely maintain and
securely transmit confidential materials such as medi-
cal records, personal identifying information such as
Social Security numbers, and account numbers for
financial institutions. This obligation to safeguard such
sensitive information extends not only to a client’s dis-
covery materials but to discovery materials produced
by other parties. Additionally, when the court has issued
a protective order in a case, a competent attorney must
be familiar with its terms. . . .
‘‘At a basic level, attorneys must competently and
appropriately handle the discovery of sensitive materi-
als in civil cases. Otherwise, our civil system, in which
48
With respect to thoroughness and preparation, the commentary states
in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he required attention and preparation are determined
in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordi-
narily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity
and consequence. . . .’’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, commentary.
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 45
Lafferty v. Jones

discovery of sensitive information is customary and
routine, would simply collapse. Litigants would under-
standably be unwilling to turn over the sensitive, confi-
dential or protected information that would be needed
to fully and fairly litigate a civil case without the assur-
ance that the attorneys, as officers of the court, would
safeguard their information.’’49 The court proceeded to
determine that Pattis, ‘‘by clear and convincing evi-
dence . . . in the course of his representation of the
Jones defendants, failed to act competently in the han-
dling of the . . . plaintiffs’ confidential records in vio-
lation of rule 1.1, exposing [Pattis’] clients to possible
sanctions and resulting in harm to the plaintiffs, whose
confidential records were distributed without their con-
sent.’’

Pattis contends that, as a matter of law, the court
incorrectly applied rule 1.1 because (1) the rule refers
to an attorney’s representation of a client and makes
no mention of an attorney’s duty to other persons, and
(2) the conduct at issue concerned the release of the
plaintiffs’ confidential records to unauthorized individ-
uals, thereby falling outside of the ambit of the rule.
We reject this construction of rule 1.1. Instead, we agree
with the court that, to provide competent representa-
tion to a client in accordance with rule 1.1, an attorney
must responsibly engage in discovery and safeguard
sensitive discovery materials, whether provided by the
client or produced by an opposing party. Indeed, not-
withstanding that the court pursued disciplinary action
against Pattis, Pattis’ conduct ran the risk of subjecting
49
The court also stated in its analysis concerning Pattis’ violation of rule
1.1: ‘‘While the [underlying consolidated cases], pending on the court’s Com-
plex Litigation Docket, were high profile with significant legal issues and
clearly fall within the ‘major litigation and complex transactions’ contem-
plated by the [commentary to rule 1.1], the complexity of the case played
no part in [Pattis’] misconduct. The obligation to safeguard sensitive records
is a basic one.’’
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46 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

the defendants he represented to sanctions. See Mac-
Calla v. American Medical Response of Connecticut,
Inc., 188 Conn. App. 228, 240, 204 A.3d 753 (2019)
(‘‘Although in some circumstances it may be unduly
harsh to impute counsel’s transgressions to his client,
‘our adversarial system [also] requires that the client
be responsible for acts of the attorney-agent whom [he]
has freely chosen . . . .’ Thode v. Thode, 190 Conn.
694, 698, 462 A.2d 4 (1983); see Sousa v. Sousa, 173
Conn. App. 755, 773 n.6, 164 A.3d 702 (‘[a]n attorney is
the client’s agent and his knowledge is imputed to the
client’ . . .), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 906, 170 A.3d 2
(2017).’’); see also MacCalla v. American Medical
Response of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 239–40 (conclud-
ing that court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
claims of certain plaintiffs on basis of counsel’s
actions); cf. Herrick v. Monkey Farm Cafe, LLC, 163
Conn. App. 45, 52–53, 134 A.3d 643 (2016) (reversing
trial court’s judgment of nonsuit rendered on basis of
counsel’s actions).
In sum, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the
court correctly applied rule 1.1. Accordingly, Pattis’
claim fails.
B
Second, Pattis claims that the court incorrectly deter-
mined that he violated rule 1.15 (b) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Pattis contends that, as a matter
of law, rule 1.15 (b) does not apply to the facts of this
case. We agree.
Rule 1.15, titled ‘‘Safekeeping Property,’’ provides in
relevant part: ‘‘(b) A lawyer shall hold property of cli-
ents or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession
in connection with a representation separate from the
lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate
account maintained in the state where the lawyer’s
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 47
Lafferty v. Jones

client or third person. Other property shall be identified
as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete
records of such account funds and other property shall
be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a
period of seven years after termination of the represen-
tation.’’ The commentary to rule 1.15 provides in rele-
vant part that ‘‘[a] lawyer should hold property of others
with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Secu-
rities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when
some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special
circumstances. All property that is the property of cli-
ents or third persons, including prospective clients,
must be kept separate from the lawyer’s business and
personal property and, if moneys, in one or more trust
accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted
when administering estate moneys or acting in similar
fiduciary capacities. A lawyer should maintain on a
current basis books and records in accordance with
generally accepted accounting practices. . . .’’ Rules
of Professional Conduct 1.15, commentary.
With respect to the applicability of rule 1.15 (b), the
court stated that, ‘‘[w]hile typically this rule is applied
to monetary funds and commingling of funds, the rule
expressly refers to ‘[o]ther property’—property other
than money—and extends to property of third persons,
which would include the plaintiffs.’’ The court pro-
ceeded to determine, by clear and convincing evidence,
that Pattis violated rule 1.15 (b) in failing to safeguard
the plaintiffs’ confidential records.
Pattis asserts that, as a matter of law, the court incor-
rectly applied rule 1.15 (b) because this provision does
not extend to discovery materials, such as the plaintiffs’
confidential records, but, rather, concerns the safe-
guarding of funds and financial information only. Disci-
plinary counsel argues that rule 1.15 (b), ‘‘by its
expressed terms, is not limited to funds or financial
information.’’ We conclude that discovery materials,
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48 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

like the plaintiffs’ confidential records, are not encom-
passed by rule 1.15 (b).
‘‘[P]roperty,’’ as used in rule 1.15 (b), is not defined
in the rules. See Rules of Professional Conduct 1.0 and
1.15. Under such circumstances, we ordinarily ‘‘look to
the ‘commonly approved usage’ of the phrase as found
in dictionaries. See, e.g., General Statutes § 1-1 (a); State
v. Menditto, 315 Conn. 861, 866, 110 A.3d 410 (2015).’’
Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 339
Conn. 521. Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘‘property’’ to
mean (1) ‘‘[c]ollectively, the rights in a valued resource
such as land, chattel, or an intangible’’ and (2) ‘‘[a]ny
external thing over which the rights of possession, use,
and enjoyment are exercised.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th Ed. 2019) p. 1470; see also Black’s Law Dictionary
(6th Ed. 1990) p. 1216 (defining property in relevant
part to be ‘‘commonly used to denote everything which
is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal,
tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or per-
sonal; everything that has an exchangeable value or
which goes to make up wealth or estate’’). As the term
‘‘property’’ is broadly defined, the phrase ‘‘[o]ther prop-
erty’’ in rule 1.15 (b) arguably encompasses discovery
materials, such as the plaintiffs’ confidential records.
The rules of statutory construction, however, instruct
that terms ‘‘are to be assigned their ordinary meaning,
unless context dictates otherwise . . . .’’ (Emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fernandez
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 193 Conn. App.
759–60. Reading rule 1.15 as a whole, we construe
‘‘[o]ther property’’ as used in subsection (b) to exclude
discovery materials, including the plaintiffs’ confiden-
tial records.
Initially, we observe that the vast majority of the
provisions of rule 1.15, along with the lengthy commen-
tary to the rule, expressly address, in whole or in part,
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 49
Lafferty v. Jones

matters that are financial in nature. See Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct 1.15 (a) (defining certain terminology
used in rule); Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15 (b)
(discussing attorney’s obligation to safeguard ‘‘funds’’
and ‘‘[o]ther property,’’ along with retention and preser-
vation of attendant records); Rules of Professional Con-
duct 1.15 (c) (discussing parameters of attorney’s ability
to deposit own funds into client trust account); Rules
of Professional Conduct 1.15 (d) (discussing attorney’s
obligation to deposit legal fees and expenses paid in
advance into client trust account); Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.15 (e) (discussing attorney’s obligations (1)
to provide notice ‘‘[u]pon receiving funds or other prop-
erty’’ in which client or third person has an interest,
(2) to promptly deliver ‘‘any funds or other property
that the client or third person is entitled to receive,’’
and (3) to render full accounting regarding such prop-
erty upon request); Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15
(f) (discussing attorney’s possession of property, which,
per commentary, includes funds, in which two or more
persons have interests); Rules of Professional Conduct
1.15 (g) (discussing attorney’s possession of funds on
behalf of client to which third party asserts claim);
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15 (h) and (i) (dis-
cussing IOLTA accounts); Rules of Professional Con-
duct 1.15 (j) (discussing lawyer’s maintenance and
retention of financial records); Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.15 (k) (discussing client trust accounts);
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15 (l) (discussing for-
mat of records maintained under rule); Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct 1.15 (m) (discussing maintenance of
client trust account records specified in rule upon disso-
lution of law firm or legal professional corporation);
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15 (n) (discussing
maintenance of records specified in rule upon sale of
law practice); Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15, com-
mentary.
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50 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

Returning to the language of rule 1.15 (b), the final
sentence of the provision requires attorneys to retain
and to preserve ‘‘[c]omplete records of . . . account
funds and other property . . . for a period of seven
years after termination of the representation.’’ With
regard to the plaintiffs’ confidential records, there are
no such ‘‘[c]omplete records’’ to retain and to preserve.
Additionally, subsection (j) provides in relevant part
that ‘‘[a] lawyer who practices in this jurisdiction shall
maintain current financial records as provided in this
[r]ule and shall retain [various enumerated] records
for a period of seven years after termination of the
representation . . . .’’ Rules of Professional Conduct
1.15 (j). Considered together, subsections (b) and (j)
indicate that the ‘‘[c]omplete records’’ addressed in sub-
section (b) refer to financial records of the lawyer or law
firm, and not discovery materials produced in litigation.
Subsection (e) of rule 1.15 lends additional support
to the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ confidential records
are not encompassed by subsection (b). Rule 1.15 (e)
provides: ‘‘Upon receiving funds or other property in
which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer
shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except
as stated in this [r]ule or otherwise permitted by law
or by agreement with the client or third person, a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any
funds or other property that the client or third person
is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or
third person, shall promptly render a full accounting
regarding such property.’’ It would make little sense to
apply this rule to discovery materials. Rather, the rule
is clearly intended to capture the receipt of funds or
property by the lawyer to be held in escrow. Moreover,
the final sentence of subsection (e) refers to an attor-
ney, upon request, rendering a ‘‘full accounting’’ of ‘‘any
funds or other property that the client or third person
is entitled to receive . . . .’’ Simply put, there can be
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 51
Lafferty v. Jones

no ‘‘full accounting’’ as contemplated by the rule vis-à-
vis the plaintiffs’ confidential records.
We also observe that the commentary to rule 1.15
does not lend support to the proposition that the plain-
tiffs’ confidential records are included within the mean-
ing of ‘‘[o]ther property’’ in subsection (b). The com-
mentary expressly provides guidance on safekeeping
(1) moneys and (2) securities. See Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.15, commentary. Neither example of ‘‘prop-
erty’’ is similar in nature to discovery materials pro-
duced during litigation.
In sum, we conclude that the court, as a matter of
law, incorrectly applied rule 1.15 (b) to encompass the
plaintiffs’ confidential records. Accordingly, we further
conclude that the court improperly determined that
Pattis violated rule 1.15 (b).
C
Third, Pattis claims that the court incorrectly deter-
mined that he violated rule 3.4 (3) of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. Pattis asserts that there was insufficient
evidence to support the court’s determination. We
agree.
Rule 3.4, titled ‘‘Fairness to Opposing Party and Coun-
sel,’’ provides in relevant part: ‘‘A lawyer shall not . . .
(3) Knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules
of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an
assertion that no valid obligation exists . . . .’’ Rule
1.0 (g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct defines
‘‘[k]nowingly’’ as ‘‘denot[ing] actual knowledge of the
fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred
from circumstances.’’ The commentary to rule 3.4 pro-
vides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he procedure of the adver-
sary system contemplates that the evidence in a case
is to be marshaled competitively by the contending
parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is
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52 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

secured by prohibitions against destruction or conceal-
ment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses,
obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.
. . .’’ Rules of Professional Conduct 3.4, commentary.
With regard to rule 3.4 (3), the court stated that it
‘‘flatly rejects [Pattis’] arguments in his [posthearing]
brief that any noncompliance with the protective order
was an inadvertent mistake or misinterpretation of the
protective order. [Pattis], who on August 3, 2022, admit-
ted that his office may have violated the protective
order, was unconcerned with the plaintiffs’ confidential
information, as evidenced by his use of [the] same in
his motion to depose Clinton, and by his total disregard
of Lee’s question to him about the protective order.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
[Pattis] knowingly disobeyed the protective order by
failing to keep the [plaintiffs’ confidential] records in
a safe and secure manner and by releasing the protected
records to Lee and [to] Reynal, both unauthorized recip-
ients, in violation of rule 3.4 (3).’’
Pattis asserts that the court incorrectly determined
that he violated rule 3.4 (3) because there is not clear
and convincing evidence supporting the court’s finding
that he knowingly violated the protective order. Specifi-
cally, Pattis posits that ‘‘[his] conduct and knowledge
constitute at most negligence. The email communica-
tions [in evidence] show only that he did not inform
the recipients of the protective order; they do not show
that he intended to violate it. He also was not aware
of Lee’s or Reynal’s subsequent disclosures. With [his]
knowledge and mindset not established, it was incor-
rect for the trial court to conclude that he violated [rule]
3.4 (3).’’ Disciplinary counsel argues that the record
establishes that Pattis knowingly violated the protective
order when, notwithstanding the provisions of the pro-
tective order, as well as Wolman’s May 2, 2022 email
addressed to Lee, with Pattis copied, cautioning about
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 53
Lafferty v. Jones

the protective order, Pattis instructed Atkinson to trans-
fer the hard drive containing discovery materials that
included the plaintiffs’ confidential records. We agree
with Pattis.

We iterate that violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct must be established by clear and convincing
evidence, which ‘‘induces in the mind of the trier a
reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly prob-
ably true, that the probability that they are true or exist
is substantially greater than the probability that they
are false or do not exist.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Sowell v. DiCara, supra, 161 Conn. App. 124.
The evidence in the record does not meet this threshold
to support the court’s finding that Pattis knowingly—
that is, with actual knowledge—violated the protective
order, which required him to have actual knowledge of
the fact that the hard drive transferred by Atkinson to
Lee, and later by Lee to Reynal, contained the plaintiffs’
confidential information. Both Lee and Reynal testified
that they had not requested the plaintiffs’ confidential
records from Pattis. Although Pattis, in the August 4,
2022 email addressed to Mattei, acknowledged that he
(1) ‘‘directed an associate to send [their] files’’ to Lee
and to Reynal and (2) ‘‘did not direct the associate
to withhold the plaintiff[s’] [confidential] information,’’
those statements do not constitute clear and convincing
evidence that Pattis had actual knowledge that the dis-
covery materials on the hard drive included the plain-
tiffs’ confidential records. Similarly, Wolman’s May 2,
2022 email to Lee, on which Pattis was copied, warning
about the protective order, does not show that Pattis
knew he was violating the protective order when he
directed his associate to send the hard drive to Lee and
to Reynal. Moreover, Pattis’ August 3, 2022 text message
to Mattei, stating that he had ‘‘learned moments ago that
[his] office may have violated [the] protective order,’’
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54 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

is not indicative of Pattis having knowingly authorized
the release of the plaintiffs’ confidential records.
In sum, we conclude that the record does not estab-
lish by clear and convincing evidence that Pattis know-
ingly violated the protective order. Accordingly, we fur-
ther conclude that the court incorrectly determined that
Pattis violated rule 3.4 (3).
D
Fourth, Pattis claims that the court improperly deter-
mined that he violated subsections (b) and (c) of rule
5.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. We agree in
part with Pattis’ claim that the court improperly deter-
mined that he violated rule 5.1 (c).
Rule 5.1 is titled ‘‘Responsibilities of Partners, Manag-
ers, and Supervisory Lawyers.’’ Subsection (b) of rule
5.1 provides: ‘‘A lawyer having direct supervisory
authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the
Rules of Professional Conduct.’’ Rule 1.0 (i) defines
‘‘ ‘[r]easonable’ or ‘reasonably,’ when used in relation
to conduct by a lawyer, [to denote] the conduct of a
reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.’’
Subsection (c) of rule 5.1 provides: ‘‘A lawyer shall
be responsible for another lawyer’s violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct if: (1) The lawyer orders
or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the
conduct involved; or (2) The lawyer is a partner or
has comparable managerial authority in the law firm
in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct super-
visory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of
the conduct at a time when its consequences can be
avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable reme-
dial action.’’ Under the rules, the term ‘‘ ‘knows’ denotes
actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 55
Lafferty v. Jones

knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.’’ Rules
of Professional Conduct 1.0 (g).
The commentary to rule 5.1 provides in relevant part
that ‘‘[s]ubsection (c) expresses a general principle of
personal responsibility for acts of another. See also
Rule 8.4 (1).50 Subsection (c) (2) defines the duty of a
partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial
authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has
direct supervisory authority over performance of spe-
cific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer
has supervisory authority in particular circumstances
is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with compa-
rable authority have at least indirect responsibility for
all work being done by the firm, while a partner or
manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also
has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm
lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial
action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend
on the immediacy of that lawyer’s involvement and the
seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required
to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of mis-
conduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct
occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a
subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing
party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subor-
dinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehen-
sion.
‘‘Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervi-
sion could reveal a violation of subsection (b) on the
part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not
entail a violation of subsection (c) because there was
no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation.
50
Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part:
‘‘It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (1) Violate or attempt to
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another
to do so, or do so through the acts of another . . . .’’
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56 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

. . .’’ (Footnote added.) Rules of Professional Conduct
5.1, commentary.

In its decision, the court stated that ‘‘Atkinson, an
associate at [Pattis’] firm and a member of his ‘team,’
transferred the [plaintiffs’] confidential documents to
Lee at the direction of [Pattis]. [Pattis] admitted in his
August 4, 2022 email to Mattei that he directed ‘an
associate’ to send their files to ‘the two attorneys who
requested them’ and that he did not instruct the associ-
ate to withhold the . . . plaintiffs’ confidential infor-
mation. The court finds by clear and convincing evi-
dence that [Pattis] violated rules 5.1 (b) and 5.1 (c) by
directing his associate to transfer the plaintiffs’ pro-
tected records to Lee and [to] Reynal, both unautho-
rized recipients, without proper safeguards and without
properly notifying Lee and Reynal that the plaintiffs’
sensitive and protected information was being trans-
ferred. Additionally, the court finds by clear and con-
vincing evidence that [Pattis] violated rule 5.1 (c) as
[Pattis], as sponsoring attorney for Reynal, assumed
responsibility for Reynal’s actions in connection with
said records—specifically, Reynal’s failure to ‘claw
back’ the records—that [Pattis] had improperly trans-
mitted to Reynal.’’51
51
The court further stated in its decision: ‘‘Reynal was admitted to practice
in Connecticut pro hac vice by th[e] court on July 20, 2022, and, at that
point, [Pattis], as the sponsoring attorney, assumed full responsibility for
the actions of Reynal in connection with the matters. Had Reynal filed an
appearance, he would have been counsel of record in these actions and, as
such, authorized at that point to receive the plaintiffs’ confidential records.
In fact, [Pattis] skirted the rules and allowed Reynal access to the confidential
records before Reynal filed an appearance—in fact, before [Pattis] even
filed the application for pro hac vice. [Pattis] cannot escape responsibility
here for Reynal’s actions in connection with the plaintiffs’ protected records,
when [Pattis] was the sponsoring attorney for Reynal, allowed Reynal to
have the records before Reynal was counsel of record, and took no action
to retrieve the records following the July 26, 2022 ‘withdrawal’ of Reynal’s
pro hac admission.’’
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 57
Lafferty v. Jones

With respect to the court’s determination that he
violated subsections (b) and (c) of rule 5.1 while exer-
cising supervisory authority over Atkinson,52 Pattis con-
tends that, as a matter of law, the court incorrectly
applied those provisions because Atkinson was never
charged with any misconduct. We disagree, as we do
not construe rule 5.1 (b) or (c) to require a predicate
showing that Atkinson was charged with violating the
Rules of Professional Conduct. On the basis of its find-
ings, we construe the court to have determined implic-
itly on the record before it that, in light of the improper
and unsafe transmission of the plaintiffs’ confidential
records by Atkinson to Lee at Pattis’ direction, (1) Pattis
did not make reasonable efforts to ensure that Atkinson
conformed to the Rules of Professional Conduct for
purposes of rule 5.1 (b), and (2) Atkinson violated the
rules for purposes of rule 5.1 (c).53 Thus, we reject
Pattis’ contention that the court improperly applied rule
5.1 (b) and (c) vis-à-vis his exercise of supervisory
authority over Atkinson.
With regard to the court’s determination that he vio-
lated rule 5.1 (c) in acting as Reynal’s sponsoring attor-
ney in Connecticut, Pattis contends that there is insuffi-
cient evidence supporting the court’s determination
because he ‘‘did not have any involvement in Reynal’s
inadvertent disclosure to Bankston’’ and ‘‘[h]e only
found out about the potential disclosures after the fact.’’
We agree with Pattis.
As the commentary to rule 5.1 reflects, unlike subsec-
tion (b), subsection (c) requires evidence of ‘‘direction,
ratification or knowledge of the [supervised attorney’s]
52
Pattis concedes that he exercised supervisory authority over Atkinson.
53
We recognize that Atkinson was not accused by Judge Bellis of violating
the Rules of Professional Conduct and that he has not had the opportunity
to defend personally against any allegation of a violation. Our discussion
herein will have no preclusive effect outside the context of these disciplinary
proceedings against Pattis.
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58 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

violation.’’ Rules of Professional Conduct 5.1, commen-
tary. To support a violation of rule 5.1 (c) (1), the record
must demonstrate that Reynal’s conduct was (1)
ordered by Pattis or (2) ratified by Pattis ‘‘with knowl-
edge of the specific conduct . . . .’’ To support a viola-
tion of rule 5.1 (c) (2), the record must establish that
Pattis knew of Reynal’s conduct ‘‘at a time when its
consequences [could] be avoided or mitigated but
fail[ed] to take reasonable remedial action.’’ There is
no evidence demonstrating that Pattis either (1) gave
Reynal any directions with regard to the plaintiffs’ confi-
dential records, other than requesting that Reynal
return the file with the records to him, or (2) ratified
Reynal’s conduct with knowledge thereof. Moreover,
there is not clear and convincing evidence that Pattis
knew of Reynal’s conduct at a time when the conse-
quences thereof could have been avoided or mitigated
by reasonable remedial action. As we explained in part
III C of this opinion, there is insufficient evidence to
establish that Pattis knowingly authorized the transfer
of the plaintiffs’ confidential records. Moreover, there
is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Pattis knew,
prior to sending the August 3, 2022 text message to
Mattei, that the plaintiffs’ confidential records had been
released. By August 3, 2022, however, as the court
found, the ten day clawback period of the inadvertent
production rule applicable to the plaintiffs’ confidential
records in Texas had expired. Accordingly, the evidence
is not adequate to support the court’s determination
that Pattis violated rule 5.1 (c) insofar as he served as
Reynal’s sponsoring attorney in Connecticut.

In sum, we (1) reject Pattis’ claim that the court
incorrectly determined that he violated rule 5.1 (b) and
(c) insofar as Pattis exercised supervisory authority
over Atkinson but (2) conclude that the court improp-
erly determined that Pattis violated rule 5.1 (c) to the
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 59
Lafferty v. Jones

extent that Pattis acted as Reynal’s sponsoring attorney
in Connecticut.
E
Fifth, Pattis claims that the court improperly deter-
mined that he violated rule 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. Pattis asserts that, as a matter of law,
his conduct did not fall within the scope of rule 8.4 (4).
We disagree.
Rule 8.4, titled ‘‘Misconduct,’’ provides in relevant
part: ‘‘It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . .
(4) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice . . . .’’ The commentary to rule 8.4
provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[a]lthough a lawyer is
personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a law-
yer should be professionally answerable only for
offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics rele-
vant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dis-
honesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with
the administration of justice are in that category. . . .’’
Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4, commentary.
With respect to rule 8.4 (4), the court determined
‘‘by clear and convincing evidence that [Pattis’] abject
failure to safeguard the plaintiffs’ sensitive records, as
well as [Pattis’] inexcusable disregard and violation of
the clear and unambiguous terms of the protective
order, which limited access to the plaintiffs’ Highly Con-
fidential-Attorneys Eyes Only documents to counsel of
record in the Connecticut state court actions, and which
limited the use of said records to ‘the preparation and
trial of this case, all cases consolidated with this case,
and in any appeal taken from any order or judgment
herein’ violated rule 8.4 [(4)].’’
Pattis maintains that the court incorrectly applied
rule 8.4 (4) because ‘‘[t]he potential failures to properly
maintain records or to follow court orders can be
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60 MAY, 2024 225 Conn. App. 552
Lafferty v. Jones

ground[s] for misconduct, but neither affects the trial
process or [the] court’s own administration of justice’’
as implicated by rule 8.4 (4). He further posits that
there is no evidence establishing that he (1) criticized,
insulted, or otherwise attacked the court or (2)
attempted to hinder or to obstruct the disciplinary
investigation, evidence of which would support finding
a violation of rule 8.4 (4). This restrictive interpretation
of rule 8.4 (4) is untenable.
Rule 8.4 (4) ‘‘prohibits an attorney from engaging in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice . . . . It is well established that members of the
bar [must] conduct themselves in a manner compatible
with the role of courts in the administration of justice.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. State-
wide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 235, 890
A.2d 509, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823, 127 S. Ct. 157, 166
L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006). ‘‘[R]ule 8.4 (4) casts a wide net over
an assortment of attorney misconduct. . . . Further-
more, our sister states have consistently held that an
attorney’s mere misrepresentation to a court may result
in a violation of rule 8.4 (4).’’ (Citation omitted; footnote
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Henry v.
Statewide Grievance Committee, 111 Conn. App. 12,
24, 957 A.2d 547 (2008); see id., 24 n.11 (summarizing
cases in which Connecticut courts and courts in other
states upheld findings of rule 8.4 (4) violations). In
the present case, Pattis’ misconduct in permitting the
disclosure to unauthorized individuals of the plaintiffs’
personal and sensitive information unilaterally imposed
a significant cost on the plaintiffs in their attempt to
obtain justice in this matter. In short, Pattis’ mishan-
dling of the plaintiffs’ confidential records falls within
the expansive range of misconduct encompassed by
rule 8.4 (4).
In sum, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the
court correctly applied rule 8.4 (4). Accordingly, we
reject Pattis’ claim.
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225 Conn. App. 552 MAY, 2024 61
Lafferty v. Jones

IV
Pattis’ final claim is that the trial court’s disciplinary
order suspending him from the practice of law for a
period of six months was arbitrary and disproportion-
ate. In light of our conclusion in part III of this opinion
that the court improperly determined, in whole or in
part, that Pattis violated rules 1.15 (b), 3.4 (3), and 5.1
(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, we further
conclude that (1) the court’s disciplinary order, which
was not predicated on Pattis’ violation of any particular
rule, cannot stand, and (2) we must remand the case
for a new hearing on sanctions before a different judge.
See General Statutes § 51-183c;54 Practice Book § 1-22
(a); see also O’Brien v. Superior Court, 105 Conn. App.
774, 797 and n.27, 939 A.2d 1223 (citing Practice Book
§ 1-22 (a) in remanding case to trial court for further
hearing on certain sanctions after concluding that evi-
dence did not establish that plaintiff in error violated
two out of four Rules of Professional Conduct), cert.
denied, 287 Conn. 901, 947 A.2d 342 (2008).55

The writ of error is granted in part and the case
is remanded with direction to vacate the trial court’s
findings that the plaintiff in error violated Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct 1.15 (b), 3.4 (3), and 5.1 (c) in part,
as well as the court’s disciplinary order, and for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion; the writ of
error is denied in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.
54
General Statutes § 51-183c provides: ‘‘No judge of any court who tried
a case without a jury in which a new trial is granted, or in which the judgment
is reversed by the Supreme Court, may again try the case. No judge of any
court who presided over any jury trial, either in a civil or criminal case, in
which a new trial is granted, may again preside at the trial of the case.’’
55
To be clear, our decision to remand the matter to a different judge
should not be construed in any manner as calling into question Judge Bellis’
impartiality in conducting the disciplinary proceedings against Pattis.