Thomas v. Cleary

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Thomas v. Cleary

KENNETH L. THOMAS v. MEGHAN M. CLEARY
(AC 46365)
Alvord, Suarez and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment adjudicating several
postjudgment motions in the underlying custody action involving the parties’
minor children. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court
improperly granted the plaintiff’s postjudgment motion for the modification
of custody. Held:

This court declined to consider the propriety of certain factual findings
made in connection with the trial court’s earlier judgment because the
defendant’s challenge to those findings amounted to an impermissible collat-
eral attack on the prior judgment.

The trial court’s finding that the defendant had made another false accusation
of abuse against the plaintiff was supported by abundant evidence and, thus,
was not clearly erroneous.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff’s motion
for modification because the court’s factual findings supported a determina-
tion that there was a material change in circumstances and that it was in
the best interests of the parties’ children to grant the motion.

This court declined to review the defendant’s inadequately briefed claim
that the trial court improperly denied her motion to disqualify the judi-
cial authority.

Submitted on briefs May 29—officially released November 5, 2024

Procedural History

Application for custody of the parties’ minor children,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, and transferred
to the judicial district of New Haven, where the case
was tried to the court, Grossman, J.; judgment granting
joint legal custody of the minor children to the parties
and primary physical custody to the plaintiff; thereafter,
the plaintiff and the defendant each filed a motion for
modification of custody; subsequently, the court, Hon.
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James G. Kenefick, judge trial referee, denied the defen-
dant’s motion to disqualify the judicial authority, Gross-
man, J.; thereafter, Grossman, J., rendered judgment
granting the plaintiff’s motion to modify custody and
denying the defendant’s motion to modify custody, from
which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Meghan M. Cleary, self-represented, filed a brief as
the appellant (defendant).
John J. Mager filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. In this custody matter, the self-repre-
sented defendant, Meghan M. Cleary, appeals from the
judgment of the trial court adjudicating several post-
judgment motions.1 On appeal, the defendant claims
that the court improperly (1) granted a postjudgment
motion for modification of custody brought by the plain-
tiff, Kenneth L. Thomas, (2) ‘‘displayed consistent bias’’
against her, and (3) found that she had an imputed
earning capacity of $90,000.2 We affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
1
During the initial custody action, the defendant was represented by
counsel. The defendant has represented herself in connection with all post-
judgment motions. The plaintiff, Kenneth L. Thomas, has been represented
by counsel in all proceedings in this matter. A guardian ad litem has been
appointed to represent the interests of the children throughout this litigation.
2
In the statement of issues in her appellate brief, the defendant character-
izes her claims of error as follows: ‘‘(1) Whether custody and visitation
rulings with no support of any kind in the trial record require reversal. . . .
(2) Whether financial rulings in a domestic relations case, with no support
of any kind in the trial record, require reversal. . . . (3) Whether reversal
is required when the trial court systematically ignores all evidence favorable
to one party, no matter how credible. . . . (4) Whether reversal is required
by the trial court’s manifest bias against the [defendant]. . . . (5) Whether
a trial court may use child custody/visitation as a means to ‘punish’ a litigant
rather than determining these issues on the basis of the children’s best
interest.’’ We have reframed the defendant’s claims, in some instances con-
densing closely related claims, to more accurately reflect the arguments in
her brief. See, e.g., Doe v. Quinnipiac University, 218 Conn. App. 170, 173
n.4, 291 A.3d 153 (2023).
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The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to the resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff and
the defendant are the parents of three minor children.
The plaintiff first initiated a custody action in 2019. On
July 25, 2022, after a fully contested hearing, the court,
Grossman, J., made the following oral findings regard-
ing the defendant: ‘‘[V]arious professionals have
expressed concern with the [defendant’s] ability to
address the children’s emotional needs appropriately.
. . . [They] reported that the [defendant] appeared dis-
connected from the children at times, unable to respond
to them or redirect them appropriately. . . . Those
same individuals noted examples of the [defendant]
repeatedly taking a small, otherwise normal or not espe-
cially concerning behavior by the children or a child and
misreading it and creating a bigger, alarming meaning
to that behavior. This tendency led the [defendant] to
claim that the [plaintiff] was molesting the children,
taking pornographic pictures of the children, and using
drugs when it turns out that none of these things were
true. This tendency by the [defendant] is well docu-
mented and it is harmful for the children. These events
are exaggerated and they are inaccurate. They distract
the [defendant] from focusing on what the children
actually need in the moment. They also caused her
to have the children examined and interviewed and
separated from [the plaintiff] for long periods of
time. . . .
‘‘The [defendant] has repeatedly and falsely accused
the [plaintiff] of sexually molesting the children. She
withheld the children from him on this basis for six
months. The police, the Department of Children and
Families [(DCF)], [various professionals evaluating the
children in clinical settings], and the [guardian ad litem
(GAL)] determined that these allegations were not true.
However, even in her testimony the [defendant] was
unable to satisfactorily explain these events to the
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court. She indicated no understanding, to this court or
to anyone else that this court heard from, about the
negative impact this behavior had on her children. Her
historical willingness to cut the children off from their
father is troubling. . . .
‘‘An especially important . . . item or statutory cri-
teria for [custody] decision[s] is the mental and physical
health of all the individuals involved. . . . [T]he [defen-
dant’s] mental health has been an area of concern
throughout this case. Such an area of concern that she
submitted to a psychological evaluation . . . . [The
evaluator’s] report codifies what the [GAL] and other
engaged professionals and the court observed about
the [defendant] and that is that her demeanor can be
quite unusual. She is sometimes emotionally elevated;
sometimes grandiose. She’s highly reactive. Her think-
ing is sometimes tangential. Her thought processes
were difficult to follow. This court struggled to under-
stand some of her testimony because the connections
between her ideas were so tenuous. . . .
‘‘The [defendant’s] history of substance abuse is also
relevant for this custody determination. And this is a
concern raised by many professionals throughout the
history of this case . . . . I don’t think that [the evalua-
tor] made this question, but the other professionals did,
questioned whether or not the [defendant] was actually
under the influence of medication or drugs on the occa-
sions when they saw her. . . . There is good reason
for this concern. The [defendant] was arrested in Sep-
tember, 2019, on several counts of larceny and posses-
sion of controlled substances. These charges relate to
accusations that she was in possession of opiates pre-
scribed to patients at the nursing home where she
worked. These charges are still pending. She tested
positive for opiates and cocaine in September of 2019.
She is presently enrolled in and compliant with a five
year program called the HAVEN program, which stands
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for the Health Assistance Intervention Education Net-
work, though the Department of Public Health. . . .
[A]s part of her participation in this program, the [defen-
dant] is drug tested and attends eight [Narcotics Anony-
mous] meetings per month. She told the court that she
used the same five year program in 2010 incident to
similar criminal charges. Despite these two arrests
[and] the positive drug tests . . . the [defendant]
denied to the court that she has a drug problem. She
blames others, including the [plaintiff] and his father,
for the criminal charges. And she says that any inconclu-
sive drug tests at the HAVEN were a result of her . . .
diabetes treatment. This testimony is simply not credi-
ble.
***
‘‘The evidence before this court indicated strongly
that the [defendant] has untreated mental health and
substance abuse issues. Despite this evidence, the
[plaintiff] and the [GAL] have requested the court to
order joint legal custody and a shared parenting plan.
This—this court is going to grant that request, but future
modifications should take into account the court’s
observations about the needs of the [defendant] for
additional treatment.’’
On the basis of these facts, the court issued the fol-
lowing orders: ‘‘The parties will share joint legal cus-
tody. In the event of a dispute, and after consultation
and discussion with the [defendant], the [plaintiff] may
make a final decision in all issues regarding the children.
. . . The children will reside primarily with [the plain-
tiff]. If he deems it appropriate, he may change the
school district the children attend.’’3
The defendant appealed from the July 25, 2022 judgment. On November
3

21, 2022, that appeal was dismissed due to the defendant’s failure to submit
certain preliminary documents. On December 5, 2022, the defendant filed
a motion to reconsider the dismissal. On March 27, 2023, this court dismissed
the defendant’s motion to reconsider as moot, as subsequent custody orders
had superseded the July 25, 2022 judgment and, thus, the court could not
offer the defendant any practical relief.
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On August 29, 2022, the defendant refused to return
the children to the plaintiff at the end of her scheduled
parenting time, in order for the children to attend their
first day of school in a new school district selected by
the plaintiff. As a result, on the same day, the plaintiff
filed an application for an emergency ex parte order of
custody and a postjudgment motion for modification
of custody. In an affidavit in support of his August 29,
2022 ex parte application, the plaintiff averred that,
pursuant to the July 25, 2022 custody order, the defen-
dant was supposed to bring the children to school on
the morning of August 29, 2022, but failed to do so. The
court, Price-Boreland, J., denied the plaintiff’s emer-
gency ex parte application but issued an order that the
defendant return the children to the plaintiff ‘‘immedi-
ately’’ and scheduled an expedited hearing on the appli-
cation.
On September 9, 2022, the court, Grossman, J., com-
menced a hearing on the plaintiff’s August 29, 2022 ex
parte application. At the conclusion of the first day
of evidence, the court issued the following temporary
orders: ‘‘The [plaintiff] will have sole legal and physical
custody of the minor children. . . . The children will
be in the physical custody of the [plaintiff] at all times
but for every Saturday from noon to Sunday at 5 p.m.
. . . The [plaintiff] has sole decision-making authority
regarding the education of the children, including deci-
sions regarding their transportation to and from
school.’’ The hearing continued on October 3 and
November 4, 2022.
On November 8, 2022, the court issued the following
written orders: ‘‘The [plaintiff] has sole physical and
legal custody of the minor children. . . . The [defen-
dant’s] parenting time will be [1] Every other weekend
from after school on Friday to Sunday at 5 p.m. [2]
Every week on Wednesdays from after school to 7 p.m.
. . . The parents will have reasonable phone and/or
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video call access with the children when they are not
in their care. . . . The [defendant] may not interfere
with the children’s school, activities and transportation
to and from school.’’
On November 14, 2022, the defendant filed an applica-
tion for an emergency ex parte order of custody and a
postjudgment motion for modification. In support of
her application, the defendant once again alleged that
the plaintiff had been sexually abusing the children.
The court denied the ex parte application the same
day. On November 15, 2022, the plaintiff filed a new
application for an emergency ex parte order of custody
and a postjudgment motion for modification. In an affi-
davit in support of this ex parte application, the plaintiff
averred that, on November 13, 2022, the Orange Police
Department and DCF informed him that the defendant
once again had alleged that he had sexually assaulted
one or more of the children. The plaintiff’s application
for an ex parte order of custody was granted the same
day, and the court issued temporary orders suspending
the defendant’s visitation unless clinically supervised.
A consolidated hearing on the parties’ ex parte appli-
cations and motions for modification of custody was
scheduled for November 29, 2022. On November 28,
2022, the defendant filed a motion for the disqualifica-
tion of Judge Grossman. In her motion, the defendant
alleged that Judge Grossman was biased and prejudiced
against her. The motion to disqualify was referred to
the court, Hon. James G. Kenefick, Jr., judge trial ref-
eree, and a hearing on that motion was held on Decem-
ber 22, 2022. In its memorandum of decision dated
January 3, 2023, the court denied the motion.
A fully contested hearing on the parties’ ex parte
applications and motions for modification of custody
was held on January 6, 2023. In a memorandum of
decision dated March 13, 2023, the court, Grossman,
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J., made the following factual findings: The defendant
has ‘‘initiated new investigations into the [plaintiff]. She
accused him, again, of sexually abusing the children.
As in the past, she withheld the children from [the
plaintiff] and subjected them to interviews and invasive
evaluations. [DCF] and the Orange Police Department
were compelled to investigate this complaint, as they
have on many prior occasions. They quickly closed their
investigations, concluding that the complaint was
unfounded.
‘‘At the time of the hearing, the children had not seen
[the defendant] in six weeks. On November 15, 2022,
the GAL recommended, and the court ordered, that
contact take place in a supervised clinical setting. This
was intended as a temporary order until the [defendant]
complied with a full psychological assessment and
treatment. The GAL immediately identified a suitable
provider for these services. The [plaintiff] consented to
this person. The defendant had not, as of January 6,
2023, contacted this provider. . . . The [defendant]
refuses to contact this provider because she believes
that using a paid provider for this purpose would make
her ineligible for her HUSKY medical coverage. No cred-
ible evidence was offered in support of this assertion.
However, the GAL offered multiple solutions to this
stalemate, and the court solicited suggestions from the
[defendant]. The [defendant] rejected the GAL’s sugges-
tions and offered no [alternatives] to the court.
‘‘The [defendant] has a substance abuse disorder. The
[plaintiff] and the GAL are concerned she may have
relapsed. Her criminal charges from 2019 are not
resolved. She was admitted into a diversionary program
for the drug charges but still faces the related larceny
charge. She is enrolled in a five year HAVEN program
. . . . This is the second time she has utilized this pro-
gram to keep her nursing license. HAVEN provides
alternatives to discipline for healthcare workers with
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physical, mental, emotional or addiction issues. As part
of her participation, she is drug tested and attends eight
Narcotics Anonymous meetings per month. She told
the court she is compliant with this program and the
conditions of release set by the criminal court; however,
she declined to give the GAL access to her drug testing
records.
‘‘The [defendant’s] presentation and demeanor in
court was concerning. She appeared disassociated from
the events taking place; her responses were inconsis-
tent with the courtroom discussions. Her mood fluctu-
ated throughout the hearing from disinterested to angry
and agitated. At times it appeared she could not differ-
entiate between her fears and actual events. At the
outset of the hearing, she told the court that the ex
parte orders should not be extended and that she had
evidence to offer as a basis for that assertion. However,
when the time came to offer her evidence, she initially
refused. When she did testify, it was inconsistent with
testimony she offered previously, particularly about
. . . how [DCF] was notified of her most recent allega-
tions of sexual abuse by the [plaintiff] and her efforts
to find work. She did not appear to recognize these
inconsistencies. Her explanations for refusing the GAL
access to her drug tests and refusing to engage in a
psychological evaluation were difficult to follow and
unconvincing. The court could not rely on her testi-
mony.
‘‘The [defendant’s] actions over the last six months
have negatively impacted the children. Their education
was disrupted: they were deprived of their first day of
school experience and missed several days after that.
The stability of their day-to-day routine was upended.
Their relationship with [the plaintiff] was interrupted
for two weeks during the latest DCF investigation; he
had to leave the home, and the paternal grandparents
moved into the home to care for [the] children. Their
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relationship with the [defendant] remains interrupted
as she refuses to participate in evaluation, treatment
or the current access schedule.
‘‘Notwithstanding these events, all parties agree that
the children should have contact with [the defendant].
They are bonded to her and benefit from their time
with her, but only when she is able to parent them
appropriately. The evidence indicates that she cannot
do so at this time. She appears to be struggling with
her mental health or her drug [addiction] or both.’’
On the basis of these findings, the court denied the
defendant’s November 14, 2022 motion for modification
of custody, granted the plaintiff’s November 15, 2022
motion for modification of custody, and issued the fol-
lowing orders: ‘‘The [plaintiff] has sole physical and
legal custody of the minor children. . . . The [defen-
dant] will see the children in a therapeutic setting with
the individual recommended by the GAL . . . or
another agreed upon individual recommended by the
GAL. . . . Any additional parenting time with the
[defendant] will be by agreement of the parties. The
[defendant’s] parenting time must be in the presence
of an agreed upon third party until the [defendant] dem-
onstrates compliance with the recommendations in [a
previous] evaluation,’’ including seeking assessment
and treatment for psychiatric disorders, substance
abuse issues, or, if necessary, both. This appeal fol-
lowed. Additional facts and procedural history will be
set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly
granted the plaintiff’s motion for modification of cus-
tody. Specifically, she argues that (1) the ‘‘court’s rul-
ings on custody and visitation were unsupported by the
evidence’’ in that ‘‘there was no competent evidence
that [the defendant] made false allegations against [the
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plaintiff]’’ and the ‘‘court prejudged the critical issue of
[the plaintiff’s] alleged sexual abuse,’’ (2) the court’s
‘‘findings regarding [the defendant’s] ‘substance abuse
problem’ were unsupported by any evidence,’’ and (3)
the ‘‘court’s custody related rulings were contrary to
the clear weight of evidence.’’ We are not persuaded.
We begin by setting forth the relevant principles of
law and our standard of review. General Statutes § 46b-
56 bestows upon the trial court the statutory authority
to modify an order of custody or visitation. The statute
directs the court to ‘‘consider the best interests of the
child’’ and, while not requiring the court to assign
weight to any of the factors that it considers, sets forth
seventeen enumerated factors that the court may con-
sider with respect to the modification.4 General Statutes
§ 46b-56 (c).
4
General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) provides that the court, in making an order
for custody, ‘‘shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so,
may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors:
(1) The physical and emotional safety of the child; (2) the temperament and
developmental needs of the child; (3) the capacity and the disposition of
the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child; (4) any relevant
and material information obtained from the child, including the informed
preferences of the child; (5) the wishes of the child’s parents as to custody;
(6) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each
parent, the child’s siblings and any other person who may significantly affect
the best interests of the child; (7) the willingness and ability of each parent
to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship
between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compli-
ance with any court orders; (8) any manipulation by or coercive behavior
of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents’ dispute; (9)
the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child;
(10) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and community
environments; (11) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable
and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity
in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent
who voluntarily leaves the child’s family home pendente lite in order to
alleviate stress in the household; (12) the stability of the child’s existing or
proposed residences, or both; (13) the mental and physical health of all
individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent
or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless
the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child;
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‘‘Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision
regarding custody, visitation and relocation orders is
one of abuse of discretion. . . . [T]he trial court’s deci-
sion on the matter of custody is committed to the exer-
cise of its sound discretion and its decision cannot be
overridden unless an abuse of that discretion is clear.
. . . The controlling principle in a determination
respecting custody is that the court shall be guided by
the best interests of the child. . . . In determining what
is in the best interests of the child, the court is vested
with a broad discretion. . . . [T]he authority to exer-
cise the judicial discretion [authorized by § 46b-56] . . .
is not conferred [on] this court, but [on] the trial court,
and . . . we are not privileged to usurp that authority
or to substitute ourselves for the trial court. . . . A
mere difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify
our intervention. Nothing short of a conviction that the
action of the trial court is one [that] discloses a clear
abuse of discretion can warrant our interference. . . .
‘‘The trial court has the opportunity to view the par-
ties [firsthand] and is therefore in the best position to
assess the circumstances . . . in which such personal
factors as the demeanor and attitude of the parties are
so significant. . . . [E]very reasonable presumption
should be given in favor of the correctness of [the trial
court’s] action. . . . We are limited in our review to
determining whether the trial court abused its broad
discretion to award custody based upon the best inter-
ests of the child as reasonably supported by the evi-
dence.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
(14) the child’s cultural background; (15) the effect on the child of the
actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence, as defined in section 46b-1,
has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual
or the child; (16) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused
or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120; and (17) whether
the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education
program established pursuant to section 46b-69b. The court is not required
to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers, but shall articulate
the basis for its decision.’’
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Thomas v. Cleary

omitted.) Dolan v. Dolan, 211 Conn. App. 390, 399–400,
272 A.3d 768, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 924, 275 A.3d 626
(2022). In employing our abuse of discretion standard,
‘‘[t]he trial court’s findings are binding upon this court
unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence
and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lambert v.
Donahue, 78 Conn. App. 493, 498, 827 A.2d 729 (2003).
‘‘Before modifying a custody order, a court must sat-
isfy two requirements. First, modification of a custody
award must be based upon either a material change
[in] circumstances which alters the court’s finding of
the best interests of the child . . . or a finding that the
custody order sought to be modified was not based
upon the best interests of the child. . . . Second, the
court shall consider the best interests of the child and
in doing so may consider several factors. . . .
‘‘The power of the trial court to modify the existing
order does not . . . include the power to retry issues
already decided . . . or to allow the parties to use a
motion to modify as an appeal. . . . Rather, the trial
court’s discretion includes only the power to adapt the
order to some distinct and definite change in the circum-
stances or conditions of the parties. . . . [I]ts inquiry
is necessarily confined to a comparison between the
current conditions and the last court order.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) J. Y. v. M.
R., 215 Conn. App. 648, 658, 283 A.3d 520 (2022).
A
The defendant first argues that there was no compe-
tent evidence to support the court’s finding that she
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has a history of making false allegations against the
plaintiff, including that he sexually abused their chil-
dren.
Our careful review of the defendant’s brief and the
record, however, reflects that the factual finding being
challenged by the defendant was made in connection
with the court’s July 25, 2022 judgment.
The defendant’s challenge to a finding made in con-
nection with a prior judgment amounts to an impermis-
sible collateral attack on the prior judgment. ‘‘Unless
a litigant can show an absence of subject matter juris-
diction that makes the prior judgment of a tribunal
entirely invalid, he or she must resort to direct proceed-
ings to correct perceived wrongs . . . . A collateral
attack on a judgment is a procedurally impermissible
substitute for an appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Weyher v. Weyher, 164 Conn. App. 734, 746,
138 A.3d 969 (2016). ‘‘A collateral attack on a judgment
is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny
its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not
provided by law for the express purpose of attacking
it. . . . On the other hand, [a] direct attack on a judg-
ment or decree is an attempt, for sufficient cause, to
have it annulled, reversed, vacated, corrected, declared
void, or enjoined, in a proceeding instituted for that
specific purpose, such as an appeal, writ of error, bill
of review, or injunction to restrain its execution; distin-
guished from a collateral attack, which is an attempt
to impeach the validity or binding force of the judgment
or decree as a side issue or in a proceeding instituted
for some other purpose.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Planning & Zoning
Commission, 49 Conn. App. 684, 688 n.5, 717 A.2d 246
(1998). Accordingly, we decline to consider the propri-
ety of factual findings made in connection with the
earlier judgment.
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Thomas v. Cleary

Beyond arguing that the court erred in finding that
she had a history of making false accusations against
the plaintiff, the defendant also argues that it was clearly
erroneous for the court to find that her latest accusation
of sexual abuse against the plaintiff was another false
allegation. The following additional facts and proce-
dural history are relevant to the resolution of this claim.
As previously mentioned in this opinion, on Novem-
ber 14, 2022, the defendant filed an emergency ex parte
application for custody alleging that the children had
been sexually abused by the plaintiff. On the same day,
the GAL filed a request for an emergency status confer-
ence before the court and a hearing was held on Novem-
ber 15, 2022. At that hearing, the GAL informed the
court that the purpose of his request was to inform the
court of events in the case that were brought to his
attention. The GAL reported to the court that, ‘‘based
on the information that I have received, there was a
call made to the Middlebury Police Department by [the
defendant] indicating that there was an allegation of
sexual abuse on [one of the children] . . . .
‘‘And that led to a DCF referral by the Middlebury
[Police Department] to the Careline as well as instruc-
tions that the jurisdiction would be the Orange Police
Department, not the Middlebury Police Department, as
the site of the alleged activity. So a call was also made
to the Orange Police Department at that point in time
or soon thereafter.
‘‘The Careline did respond on Sunday. And the Care-
line worker did interview the children at [the defen-
dant’s] home. . . .
‘‘The DCF Careline worker then appeared at [the
plaintiff’s] home later in the day. And [the plaintiff], at
that point in time, agreed to a safety plan which included
[the plaintiff’s] parents being present at all times and
him not being able to spend the overnight with his
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children. He was also instructed to have [his] parents
pick up the children from [the defendant’s] home
. . . .
‘‘And I have had the opportunity to speak to the DCF
supervisor in the Milford office who was the individual
who had provided me the information from the notes
from the Careline. I also had occasion to speak with
the now assigned investigating DCF office who received
the case late yesterday. So she will be setting up inter-
views with the children. This will be the third DCF
worker these children have met in the last ninety days
because this comes right on the heels of an unsubstanti-
ation from the August referral that happened during
the custodial exchange at the end of August. So this
would be the third DCF worker.
‘‘I spoke to the investigating detective . . . of the
Orange [Police Department] to learn what the status of
their investigation was. That has also recently been
assigned to [that detective]. [That detective] indicated
that she has been in preliminary discussions with DCF.
And both DCF and the detective are trying to determine
whether or not they will be seeking permission to do
yet another forensic evaluation and interview of the
minor child . . . .
‘‘[T]he issue or the allegation of digital penetration
of the anus has been ongoing since 2019. It has arisen
multiple—on multiple occasions. There have been mul-
tiple DCF investigations in regards [to] that including
the most recent one where the disclosure was from
[one of the parties’ other children].
‘‘Both boys, at various points in time . . . have gone
through forensic interview at Yale. And all of these
cases have been unsubstantiated.’’
On the basis of the GAL’s report to the court, the court
granted the plaintiff’s November 15, 2022 emergency
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ex parte application for custody, suspended the defen-
dant’s access to the children and scheduled a hearing
on the merits of the application for November 29, 2022.
The court explained: ‘‘I am doing that because the alle-
gations that she’s making today are the exact same
allegations that were made in the course of the trial,
and they were so thoroughly and completely debunked
during the course of that trial that the fact that [the
defendant] is still latching on to those . . . is just too
much for the court to be expected to withstand.’’
During the January 6, 2023 hearing on the parties’
motions for modification of custody, the court heard
testimony from the GAL that DCF had closed their
investigation regarding the plaintiff’s alleged sexual
abuse of the children as unsubstantiated. Moreover, the
GAL testified that, as of January 6, 2023, the Orange
Police Department had closed its investigation.
After a careful review of the record, we conclude
that the court’s finding that the defendant made yet
another false accusation of sexual abuse against the
plaintiff was supported by abundant evidence in the
record and, thus, was not clearly erroneous.
B
The defendant next contends that it was clearly erro-
neous for the court to reiterate, in its March 13, 2023
memorandum of decision, that she had ongoing strug-
gles with substance abuse. We disagree.
In finding that the defendant had ongoing struggles
with substance abuse, the court relied on the prior
finding of substance abuse made in connection with
the July 25, 2022 judgment. For the reasons set forth
in part I A of this opinion, we decline to consider the
propriety of the court’s finding made in connection with
the earlier judgment because the claim amounts to an
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Thomas v. Cleary

impermissible collateral challenge to the earlier judg-
ment.
C
The defendant’s final argument is that the court’s
custody rulings were contrary to the clear weight of
the evidence. We disagree.
In a modification of custody, a court must satisfy two
requirements. ‘‘First, modification of a custody award
must be based upon either a material change [in] cir-
cumstances which alters the court’s finding of the best
interests of the child . . . or a finding that the custody
order sought to be modified was not based upon the
best interests of the child. . . . Second, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child and in doing so
may consider [the] several factors [set forth in § 46b-
56 (c)].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J. Y. v. M.
R., supra, 215 Conn. App. 658.
In the present case, the court found that there had
been a material change of circumstances since the ini-
tial custody order. The court found that ‘‘the [defen-
dant’s] condition has deteriorated dramatically’’ in ways
that ‘‘ha[d] negatively impacted the children.’’ In its
July 25, 2022 judgment, the court found that various
professionals had expressed concerns regarding the
defendant’s ability to address the children’s emotional
needs. The court found that those professionals ‘‘noted
examples of the mother repeatedly taking a small, other-
wise normal or not especially concerning behavior by
the children . . . and misreading and creating a bigger,
alarming meaning to that behavior.’’ The court found
that ‘‘[t]his tendency led the mother to claim that the
[defendant] was molesting the children, taking porno-
graphic pictures of the children, and using drugs when
it turns out that none of these things were true. This
tendency by the [defendant] is well documented and it
is harmful for the children.’’ The court ultimately found
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that the defendant had ‘‘untreated mental health and
substance abuse issues’’ and noted that ‘‘future modifi-
cations should take into account the court’s observa-
tions about the needs of the [defendant] for additional
treatment.’’
In its March 13, 2023 memorandum of decision, the
court found that the defendant withheld the children
from the plaintiff, which required police and court inter-
vention, and further found that the defendant ‘‘initiated
new investigations into the [plaintiff]. She accused him,
again, of sexually abusing the children. As in the past,
she withheld the children from [the plaintiff] and sub-
jected them to interviews and invasive evaluations.
[DCF] and the Orange Police Department were com-
pelled to investigate this complaint, as they have on
many prior occasions. They quickly closed their investi-
gations, concluding that the complaint was unfounded.’’
Additionally, the court found that, although the defen-
dant was participating in a drug treatment program, the
plaintiff and the GAL were concerned that she may have
relapsed. The defendant testified that ‘‘she is compliant
with this program and the conditions of release set by
the criminal court; however, she declined to give the
GAL access to her drug testing records.’’
Moreover, the court noted in its memorandum of
decision that the defendant’s ‘‘presentation and demeanor
in court was concerning.’’ The court recounted that
the defendant ‘‘appeared disassociated from the events
taking place; her responses were inconsistent with the
courtroom discussions. Her mood fluctuated through-
out the hearing from disinterested to angry and agitated.
At times it appeared she could not differentiate between
her fears and actual events. At the outset of the hearing,
she told the court that the ex parte orders should not
be extended and that she had evidence to offer as a
basis for that assertion. However, when the time came
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Thomas v. Cleary

to offer her evidence she initially refused. When she did
testify it was inconsistent with testimony she offered
previously . . . . Her explanations for refusing the
GAL access to her drug tests and refusing to engage in
a psychological evaluation were difficult to follow and
unconvincing. The court could not rely on her testi-
mony.’’
On the basis of the testimony of the plaintiff, the
GAL, and the court’s own observations, it concluded
that the children’s education was disrupted and that
the stability of their day-to-day routine was upended.
The latest DCF investigation had interrupted their rela-
tionship with the plaintiff for two weeks, and their rela-
tionship with the defendant remains interrupted because
‘‘she refuses to participate in evaluation, treatment or
the current access schedule.’’ In light of these findings
and conclusions, the court modified the custody and
access orders.
The court’s factual findings, all of which find support
in the record, support a determination that there was
a material change in circumstances and that it was in
the best interests of the parties’ children to grant the
motion for modification. Thus, the defendant has not
proven that the court’s ruling reflects an abuse of its
discretion.
II
The defendant’s next claim is that the court ‘‘dis-
played consistent bias’’ against her. We conclude that
this claim is inadequately briefed.
‘‘We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented
to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analy-
sis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in
order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in
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the statement of issues but thereafter receives only
cursory attention in the brief without substantive dis-
cussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be
abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously
and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on
appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth
their arguments in their briefs. . . .
‘‘In addition, briefing is inadequate when it is not only
short, but confusing, repetitive, and disorganized. . . .
We are mindful that [i]t is the established policy of the
Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented]
litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights
of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally
in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . . Nonethe-
less, [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants
some latitude, the right of self-representation provides
no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules
of procedural and substantive law.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630,
273 A.3d 271 (2022).
In the present case, the defendant maintains that
Judge Grossman was biased against her and, therefore,
the ‘‘judge was predisposed to rule against [her] regard-
less of what the evidence showed.’’ As previously noted
in this opinion, the defendant filed a motion to disqualify
Judge Grossman, and that motion was referred to Judge
Kenefick for a hearing. In its memorandum of decision
dated January 3, 2023, the court noted that, with respect
to the motion to disqualify Judge Grossman, ‘‘this court
has carefully reviewed the defendant’s memorandum
in support thereof with its exhibits and does not find
that Judge Grossman was in any way biased, [partial]
or prejudiced against the defendant.’’
The court further noted that, in ‘‘the defendant’s
motion and memorandum of law, she accuses Judge
Grossman of having ‘an extreme prejudice and bias
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against self-represented litigants.’ I find no basis for
that accusation in these proceedings. It would appear
to be just the opposite. Judge Grossman went out of
her way to show concern for this defendant.’’ The court
concluded: ‘‘There is no credible evidence that Judge
Grossman’s conduct toward the defendant could give
rise to an appearance of impropriety. There is no evi-
dence of bias, [partial] conduct or prejudice against the
defendant.’’ On that basis the court denied the motion.
The defendant, however, does not challenge the
court’s January 3, 2023 findings. The defendant makes
only the following two references to her motion to
disqualify Judge Grossman: ‘‘As shown above, [the
defendant’s] attempts to disqualify Judge Grossman
were unsuccessful’’ and, ‘‘[a]s noted above, [the defen-
dant’s] motion to disqualify Judge Grossman for bias
was denied.’’ In her brief to this court, the defendant
merely restates the claim of bias she made before the
trial court. She does not provide any legal authority or
analysis to support her claim on appeal.
Although we allow the defendant some latitude as a
self-represented litigant, the sparsity and lack of sub-
stantive argument cause her brief to be ‘‘inadequate for
us to conduct any meaningful review of’’ this claim. C.
B. v. S. B., supra, 211 Conn. App. 630–31 (declining to
review claim when briefing was sparse, conclusory,
disorganized, and confusing). Because the defendant
has failed to challenge, in any meaningful way, the
court’s denial of her motion to disqualify, we decline
to review this claim.
III
The defendant’s final claim on appeal is that the court
erred in finding that she had an imputed earning capac-
ity. After careful review of the court’s decision, we
decline to reach the merits of this claim.
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In its July 25, 2022 orders, the court found that the
defendant had an imputed earning capacity of $90,000.
The defendant attempted but failed to bring a successful
appeal of the July 25, 2022 orders. See footnote 3 of
this opinion. In its March 13, 2023 memorandum of
decision granting the plaintiff’s motion for modification,
the court ordered that ‘‘[a]ll prior orders not specifically
modified by these orders remain in effect.’’ In that mem-
orandum of decision, which is the subject of this appeal,
the court did not revisit or alter its earlier finding with
respect to the defendant’s imputed earning capacity.5
The defendant’s present attempt to challenge the
court’s finding with respect to her earning capacity,
which was made in connection with its July 25, 2022
orders, amounts to an improper collateral attack on
that earlier judgment that is not a proper subject of this
appeal. For the foregoing reasons and on the basis of
the authority set forth in part I A of this opinion, we
decline to reach the merits of this claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

5
We note that, on January 18, 2024, the court issued subsequent orders
that superseded the July 25, 2022 order and required that the defendant pay
the plaintiff $337 per week in child support. In connection with the January
18, 2024 order, the court similarly did not revisit or alter its earlier finding
with respect to the defendant’s imputed earning capacity.