In re Tiara E.

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In re Tiara E.

IN RE TIARA E.*
(AC 48130)
Elgo, Moll and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the judgment of the trial court for
the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating his
parental rights as to his minor child. He claimed, inter alia, that the court,
in making its determination that the Department of Children and Families
had made reasonable efforts to reunify him with his child, improperly relied
on information contained in a social study that had been admitted into
evidence and that he claimed was tinged with possible bias. Held:

There was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s
conclusion that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the
respondent father with the child, as the father merely alleged that the social
studies report was possibly biased and did not object to or challenge at
trial any of the subordinate factual findings in the report, and there was no
evidence that the department did not make the reasonable efforts it claimed
to have made.

The trial court did not err in its determination that the respondent father
was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s proffered services,
as the father failed to demonstrate that the facts alleged in the termination
petition were insufficient to sustain the court’s judgment.
Argued March 10—officially released April 10, 2025**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** April 10, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Tiara E.

respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Child Protec-
tion Session, and tried to the court, Conway, J.; judg-
ment terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from
which the respondent father appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent father).
Andrew M. Ammirati, assistant attorney general,
with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney
general, and Nisa J. Khan, assistant attorney general,
for the appellee (petitioner).
Rachel T. Crane, assigned counsel, for the minor
child.
Opinion

ELGO, J. The respondent father, Anthony E., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor
of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families, terminating his parental rights with respect
to his minor child, Tiara E. On appeal, the respondent
claims that the court improperly (1) relied on informa-
tion contained in a social study that was admitted into
evidence in determining that the petitioner had fur-
nished sufficient evidence that the Department of Chil-
dren and Families (department) had made reasonable
efforts to reunify him with Tiara and (2) determined
that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from the
services offered by the department.1 We affirm the judg-
ment of the court.
1
The respondent’s counsel has also briefed, at some length, a claim related
to the allegedly unconstitutional framework of our statutory scheme, arguing
that ‘‘the statutory interplay’’ between General Statutes §§ 17a-112 (j) and
17a-111b allows for ‘‘an impermissible end run around the clear and convinc-
ing evidentiary standard.’’ We declined to review an identical claim advanced
by the same counsel in In re Jadiel B., 228 Conn. App. 290, 295–96 n.6, 324
A.3d 211, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 921, 325 A.3d 217 (2024). For reasons we
have already made clear, we again decline to address that constitutional
claim.
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In re Tiara E.

The following undisputed facts, which the court
found by clear and convincing evidence, and procedural
history are relevant to this appeal. Tiara was born in
January, 2021.2 The respondent was incarcerated at the
time of the birth, and Tiara spent her first four weeks
in the hospital due to drug withdrawal symptoms. In
February, 2021, while the respondent was still incarcer-
ated, the petitioner sought and obtained a temporary
custody order for Tiara. After an initial placement with
the paternal great-grandmother, Tiara was then adjudi-
cated neglected and committed to the petitioner’s care.3
At that time, the respondent had been released from
incarceration but was unhoused, unemployed, and
believed to be using illicit substances.
In October, 2021, the court issued specific steps that
required the respondent, inter alia, to take part in coun-
seling, submit to random drug testing, procure adequate
housing and income, and cooperate with any services
provided by the department.4 Tiara’s permanency plan
at that time called for reunification.
2
Tiara’s mother, whose parental rights were also terminated, did not
appear during the termination proceedings and has not participated in
this appeal.
3
Tiara was reunified with her mother for several months in 2021, while
they were both residing at an inpatient substance abuse treatment program.
As the court noted, ‘‘[u]pon the mother and [Tiara’s] discharge from the
program, they resided with the mother’s aunt until the mother left the home
and failed to return after several days.’’ The respondent’s whereabouts were
unknown at the time, and the petitioner sought and regained custody of
Tiara in October, 2021. The child has remained committed to the petitioner’s
care ever since.
4
The specific steps ordered for the respondent in October, 2021, were as
follows: Keep all appointments set by the department; inform the department
as to location of his residence and of any changes to his contact information;
inform the department as to any changes in the makeup of his household
to confirm that such change does not negatively impact the health and safety
of Tiara; take part in counseling and make progress toward treatment goals,
including in the areas of parenting, individual, and family as well as to make
progress toward recognizing ‘‘the impact of substance abuse and mental
health on parenting’’; accept in-home support services provided by the
department and cooperate with them; submit to substance abuse evaluation
and follow any treatment recommendations; submit to random drug testing;
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As the court noted in its memorandum of decision,
the respondent was, in the fall of 2021, ‘‘abusing drugs
and his drugs of choice included heroin, cocaine and
fentanyl.’’ During this time, the respondent was ‘‘sub-
stantively homeless, living from place to place and at
times in an auto/truck repair garage.’’ From approxi-
mately November, 2021, through March, 2022, the
respondent was undergoing methadone treatment. Dur-
ing that time, he tested positive for benzodiazepines,
cocaine, and fentanyl. Although the department pro-
vided him with a list of providers, ‘‘he ultimately never
followed through with entering inpatient treatment.’’
The respondent began visiting with Tiara in January,
2022, after not communicating with the department for
several months, and he had three subsequent visits in
the months that followed. Tiara was the respondent’s
only child, and he reported that he had no parenting
skills. The respondent also ‘‘demonstrated insight into
his inability to provide a safe, stable, and sober home
for Tiara.’’ The department also reported, however, that,
during the visits in early 2022, the respondent was
observed to be ‘‘loving, gentle, and receptive to learning
how to care for Tiara.’’ According to the department,
despite these promising signs, the respondent was
‘‘inconsistent with his visits and his communication
with the department’’ during this time.
In September, 2022, the department met with the
respondent and discussed the possibility of supervised
do not use illegal drugs or prescription drugs not legally prescribed, or
abuse alcohol or medicine; get and/or maintain adequate housing and legal
source of income; do not break any law and, if involved with the criminal
justice system, comply with any criminal court orders and follow conditions
of probation/parole; visit Tiara as often as permitted and keep her in Connect-
icut; provide to the department the names and contact information of any
individuals who should be considered as a placement resource for Tiara;
sign appropriate releases of information with service providers; and cooper-
ate with service providers concerning recommendations for parenting/indi-
vidual/family counseling, including substance abuse assessment/treatment.
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In re Tiara E.

parent-child visitation services. The respondent
informed the social worker that ‘‘he did not want to
engage in services and that he was living from place to
place trying to avoid being arrested on an outstanding
warrant.’’ As to supervised parent-child visits, the respon-
dent ‘‘told the social worker that he wanted one super-
vised visit to see how it went but he first wanted to
discuss the issue with his great-grandfather and he
would get back in touch with the department.’’ The
respondent indicated that he wanted to have one visit
with Tiara the following week but that he was not will-
ing to have ongoing, weekly visits.
The respondent was arrested again in October, 2022.
While he was incarcerated, the department brought
Tiara to the correctional institution, at which point the
respondent consistently attended monthly supervised
parent-child visits beginning in December, 2022. The
respondent also completed a Tier II substance abuse
program while incarcerated.
In December, 2022, Tiara was placed in relative foster
care with a distant paternal cousin. She has remained
there throughout all the relevant periods leading up to
this appeal, and she ‘‘enjoys a strong and healthy child-
parent attachment to her foster parents.’’
In May, 2023, the petitioner filed a motion to approve
a change in the permanency plan for Tiara, from reunifi-
cation to termination of parental rights. The petitioner
cited the inability of the respondent or the mother to
‘‘sustain their mental health or a willingness to sustain
sobriety when in the community.’’ At that point, Tiara
had been in the custody of the petitioner for two years,
but neither parent had ‘‘sustained stable housing, legal
nor stable employment and [had] not been consistent
with visiting their child.’’ The petitioner recommended
Tiara’s adoption by her current foster parents, noting
that Tiara ‘‘presents to be bonded with the family and
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In re Tiara E.

relies on the adults in the home for her needs to be
met.’’ Although the petitioner reported that the respon-
dent was initially unopposed to the termination of his
rights, the respondent later objected to the proposed
permanency plan, citing the best interests of Tiara, as
well as a purported lack of reasonable efforts on the
part of the department to achieve reunification.
In June, 2023, the department was made aware of
allegations that the respondent had been charged with
breach of the peace in the second degree for an incident
in which, while still incarcerated, he threatened to ‘‘burn
down’’ the foster mother’s house, with her in it. As
a result of these actions, the respondent received an
additional six month sentence, which ran concurrent
to his ongoing sentence.
After a hearing in August, 2023, the court approved
the revised permanency plan. Subsequently, the peti-
tioner, in October, 2023, filed a petition seeking to termi-
nate the parental rights of both the mother and the
respondent, alleging that the department had made rea-
sonable efforts to reunify and that the respondent had
failed to achieve a sufficient level of rehabilitation pur-
suant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). In the
petition, the petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the
department had made reasonable efforts at reunifica-
tion, that the respondent was unable or unwilling to
benefit from reunification efforts, and that reasonable
efforts were no longer necessary because the trial court
already had approved a plan other than reunification.
On his release from incarceration in May, 2024, the
respondent was referred by the department to father-
hood engagement services (FES), a program that con-
nects fathers with services including parent education
and assistance in obtaining employment. He attended
only a few sessions and was unsuccessfully discharged
from that program. The respondent was also referred
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In re Tiara E.

to substance abuse assessment and relapse prevention
treatment but failed to follow through with those ser-
vices.

The trial for the termination of parental rights was
held over two days in the summer of 2024. The petitioner
called three social workers: Rodney Moore (Moore),
Luigina Allen, and Angel Moore (Angel). The petitioner
also submitted into evidence the specific steps issued
to both the mother and the respondent, a social study
submitted in support of the termination of parental
rights and a supplement thereto, two department status
reports from December, 2023, and May, 2024, two stud-
ies in support of the motions to review the permanency
plan from May, 2023, and April, 2024, the October 12,
2021 affidavit of Lauren Papagoda, a social worker
employed by the department, the social study that was
filed in support of the neglect petition, and certified
copies of the respondent’s and the mother’s criminal
histories. The respondent called Stephen Humphrey, a
clinical psychologist, as a witness and submitted his
written report into evidence. The respondent also testi-
fied on his own behalf.

Moore testified that he was assigned to work the case
in March, 2021. At the time that the case was transferred
to him, Moore testified that there were ongoing issues
with the respondent’s homelessness, substance abuse,
and parenting ability. On cross-examination, Moore tes-
tified that Papagoda, who had also been assigned to
Tiara’s case, had ‘‘identified herself as a possible
resource for Tiara once [the department was not] able
to establish a permanent placement for [Tiara].’’5 Moore
subsequently testified, under questioning from the peti-
tioner’s counsel, that Papagoda had been removed from
the case due to her interest in adopting Tiara. Moore
5
The testimony at trial was that Tiara was not placed with Papagoda.
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In re Tiara E.

further testified that Papagoda had disclosed her inter-
est in adopting Tiara in September, 2022, and that the
case was transferred to another office in October that
same year. When asked if there were any concerns
about Papagoda’s bias in handling the case due to her
interest in adopting Tiara, Moore responded, simply,
‘‘No.’’
Allen testified that she was assigned to the case in
July, 2022. Allen further testified that, in October, 2022,
the respondent was incarcerated on a warrant for fail-
ure to appear at a court hearing. She also testified that
the respondent had informed her that, as of the time
of the termination trial, he did not have adequate hous-
ing for Tiara.
Angel testified that she was assigned to the case in
October, 2022. She further testified that the respondent
had become upset on hearing Tiara identify the foster
father as ‘‘dad’’ and subsequently threatened to burn
down Tiara’s foster home.
Humphrey testified that he had evaluated the interac-
tion and bonding between the respondent and Tiara in
his office. Humphrey’s report detailed the one hour
session in his office, noting that the respondent pre-
sented as ‘‘skilled with regard to various positive parent-
ing skills, including active listening, following Tiara’s
lead, asking interesting and age appropriate questions,
setting limits, and maintaining a warm and nurturing
demeanor.’’ Humphrey’s report concluded that the
respondent ‘‘exhibited healthy attachment promoting
behaviors, and Tiara appeared comfortable and pleased
in her interactions with her father. Continued interac-
tion is likely to strengthen the parent-child bond. The
bond between the two is currently strong and healthy.’’
The respondent testified that he had not used drugs
for the previous two years and that he had gone ‘‘cold
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In re Tiara E.

turkey’’ rather than attend a methadone treatment pro-
gram, which he left on his own accord. The respondent
further testified that he attended a parenting class, ‘‘a
few times,’’ which had been recommended by the
department, but that ‘‘all the guys just sat there and
talked about their problems, and I just really didn’t see
any parenting skills being taught.’’ The respondent also
testified that, since he was released from prison, his
visits with Tiara had increased to once a week for two
hours. As for employment, the respondent testified that
he worked for his grandfather, but the job was ‘‘not on
the books.’’ The court inquired as to what steps he
had taken to work on reunification efforts, and the
respondent replied that he was looking for employment,
having recently submitted two applications, but that his
status as a convicted felon was interfering with his
ability to secure employment. The court also inquired
as to whether the respondent had been prescribed psy-
chiatric medication, to which the respondent testified
that, while he had been incarcerated, he had been pre-
scribed psychiatric medication but that, when he was
moved to a different facility, another psychiatrist took
him off the medication. The respondent then testified
that, ‘‘I remember talking to the psychiatrist and the
psychiatrist saying oh, you don’t have psychiatric prob-
lems . . . you’re a drug addict.’’

In its memorandum of decision, the court found, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the department had
made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with
Tiara.6 Pointing to the department’s efforts since the
6
‘‘A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two
phases, adjudication and disposition. . . . If the trial court determines that
a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional
phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termina-
tion is in the best interest of the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Timothy B., 219 Conn. App. 823, 835, 296 A.3d 342, cert. denied, 349
Conn. 919, 318 A.3d 439 (2023).
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inception of the case, the court found that the depart-
ment had ‘‘diligently attempted to locate and/or main-
tain contact and communication with the respondent.’’
The court also found that the respondent was unwilling
or unable to benefit from reunification efforts and had
remained so since the adjudication date in October,
2023. The court noted that, since his release from prison
in May, 2024, ‘‘housing continues to be an issue’’ and
that the respondent ‘‘concedes his housing situation
is not suitable for a child.’’ The court also noted the
respondent’s failure to engage with substance abuse
evaluation, as well as his unwillingness to complete
the FES sessions and his inability to secure gainful
employment. The court explained that, although the
respondent asked for more time to rehabilitate, he had
offered ‘‘no definitive timeline or articulated plan to
achieve stable, appropriate housing or gainful employ-
ment.’’

The court also quoted at length from the December,
2023 status report admitted into evidence, which states
in relevant part: ‘‘[The respondent] was seen by the
psychiatrist. Medications were stopped. He does not
have an [a]xis 1 diagnosis. He has an extreme substance
abuse disorder. He makes light of this. He often refuses
groups. His engagement with [mental health] services
is minimal . . . . Sobriety is the key to his doing well
when he leaves in the spring.’’ The status report further
noted that the nurse ‘‘reports that when asked about the
connection between his substance abuse and criminal
involvement, [the respondent] presented [as] amused
as he slightly laughed.’’ The court concluded that, espe-
cially in light of the recent events including his threats
against the foster mother, the respondent’s ‘‘prior and
severe abuse of substances, his years of cycling in and
out of the criminal justice system . . . and his behav-
ioral challenges and decision making during his most
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In re Tiara E.

recent period of incarceration, an assessment/evalua-
tion of [the respondent’s] need, if any, for ongoing sub-
stance abuse treatment was and remains warranted.’’
The court noted that the respondent believes that he
does not need any treatment, but that this belief ‘‘is not
consistent with the credible evidence and testimony
put forth at trial. Affording [the respondent] additional
time will not change his intransigence. . . . [The
respondent] is adrift in the community and without
reliable and effective support people and systems. [The
respondent’s] level of rehabilitation falls far short of
what is required for this court to conclude that he will
be able to assume a responsible position in Tiara’s life
within a reasonable period of time. Accordingly, the
petitioner has proven [the respondent’s] failure to reha-
bilitate.’’
The court further found, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that termination of the respondent’s parental
rights was in Tiara’s best interest,7 and emphasized that
Tiara ‘‘needs and deserves caregivers who are stable,
sober, and capable of maintaining a safe and nurturing
home environment for her.’’ The court thus terminated
the parental rights of both the respondent and the
mother, and this appeal followed.8
I
On appeal, the respondent argues that there was
insufficient evidence to support the court’s determina-
tion that the department made reasonable efforts at
reunifying Tiara with the respondent. More specifically,
the respondent claims that the court improperly relied
on information contained in the social study—despite
7
The respondent does not challenge the propriety of the court’s best
interest determination in this appeal.
8
Pursuant to Practice Book §§ 67-13 and 79a-6 (c), the attorney for the
minor child filed a statement adopting the brief of the petitioner and support-
ing the affirmance of the judgment terminating the respondent’s parental
rights.
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the fact that the social study was admitted into evidence
without objection.9 According to the respondent, the
trial court should not have relied on information in that
report simply because the department’s social worker,
Papagoda, had developed an interest in becoming a
permanent resource for Tiara.10 Papagoda’s role in the
case, the respondent contends, ‘‘tinged’’ the social study
with ‘‘possible bias’’ such that the court could not, as
a matter of law, make the appropriate finding by clear
and convincing evidence.
In response, the petitioner emphasizes the undis-
puted facts that the respondent, through his trial coun-
sel, did not subpoena Papagoda’s testimony, did not
object at trial to the admissibility of the social study,
and did not argue to the court that it should consider
Papagoda’s alleged ‘‘bias’’ when weighing the factual
findings contained in the social study. The petitioner
thus contends that the respondent is unable to demon-
strate any actual bias that should erode our confidence
in the court’s determination that the department made
reasonable efforts to reunify Tiara with the respondent.
9
Social studies routinely are relied on by our trial courts in termination
proceedings. See, e.g., In re Jadiel B., 228 Conn. App. 290, 301–303, 324
A.3d 211 (trial court relied on social study admitted into evidence in conclud-
ing that respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from department’s
reunification efforts), cert. denied, 350 Conn. 921, 325 A.3d 217 (2024); In
re Prince S., 219 Conn. App. 629, 642, 296 A.3d 296 (‘‘[b]ecause that social
study was admitted as a full exhibit at trial without objection, the court
was entitled to rely on it in making its findings’’), cert. denied, 347 Conn.
907, 297 A.3d 1011 (2023); In re Gabriel C., 196 Conn. App. 333, 357, 229
A.3d 1073 (noting that ‘‘the court was obligated by statute to consider
the social studies before judgment on the [termination] petitions could be
rendered’’), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 938, 248 A.3d 708 (2020).
10
The respondent concedes that Papagoda was removed from the case
after informing her supervisors of her interest in becoming a permanent
resource for Tiara. At oral argument before this court, the respondent also
conceded that all the pertinent records created during Papagoda’s participa-
tion in the case, including documenting those services that were offered to
the respondent, had been made available to counsel and that counsel did
not challenge any of these records.
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In re Tiara E.

Significantly, the respondent concedes that he is ‘‘not
able to demonstrate actual bias in social worker Papa-
goda’s reporting’’ and confines his claim ‘‘to whether
the document, tinged with possible bias, could rise to
the level of clear and convincing evidence.’’11 In essence,
the respondent asks us to conclude, as a matter of law,
that a social study that is admitted into evidence without
objection at trial should nonetheless be found deficient
on appeal if a party can demonstrate that there is ‘‘possi-
ble bias’’ in the report. In response, the petitioner urges
us to decline the respondent’s novel request and con-
clude that the court had ample evidence that the depart-
ment made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent
with Tiara. We agree with the petitioner.
The following legal principles and standard of review
are relevant to our resolution of this claim. ‘‘Section
17a-112 (j) (1) requires that before terminating parental
rights, the court must find by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the department has made reasonable efforts
to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the
parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that
the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunifi-
cation efforts provided such finding is not required if
the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such
efforts are not appropriate . . . . Thus, the depart-
ment may meet its burden concerning reunification in
one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such
efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or
unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by
11
We note that the only document before the trial court that is attributed
to Papagoda, namely, her October 13, 2021 affidavit, is focused almost
exclusively on the mother, noting with regard to the respondent only that
the department had tried to contact him during the mother’s brief reunifica-
tion with Tiara in 2021, and that his whereabouts were ‘‘unknown.’’ Papagoda
was not listed as a possible permanent resource in the department’s May,
2023 study in support of changing the permanency plan for Tiara from
reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption. Her role in the
case, by all accounts, ended in 2022.
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In re Tiara E.

a previous judicial determination that such efforts were
not appropriate. . . . [I]n determining whether the
department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a
parent and a child . . . the court is required in the
adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis
of events preceding the date on which the termination
petition was filed. . . . This court has consistently held
that the court, [w]hen making its reasonable efforts
determination . . . is limited to considering only those
facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or
the most recent amendment to the petition . . . .’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Ryder M., 211 Conn. App. 793, 808–809, 274 A.3d
218, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 931, 276 A.3d 433 (2022).
‘‘The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the
department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances
are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the
word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or
by the federal act from which the requirement was
drawn. . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing every-
thing reasonable, not everything possible.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Jah’za G., 141 Conn.
App. 15, 31, 60 A.3d 392, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 926,
64 A.3d 329 (2013).

Our review of the court’s reasonable efforts determi-
nation is subject to the evidentiary sufficiency standard
of review. See In re Ryder M., supra, 211 Conn. App.
809. The appropriate question, then, is ‘‘whether the
trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon the
facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence
was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . .
When applying this standard, we construe the evidence
in a manner most favorable to sustaining the judgment
of the trial court. . . . We will not disturb the court’s
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In re Tiara E.

subordinate factual findings unless they are clearly erro-
neous. . . . A factual finding is clearly erroneous when
it is not supported by any evidence in the record or
when there is evidence to support it, but the reviewing
court is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Phoenix A., 202 Conn. App. 827, 842,
246 A.3d 1096, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 932, 248 A.3d
1 (2021).

At oral argument, the respondent’s counsel conceded
that, at the termination trial, the respondent did not
object to or challenge any of the subordinate factual
findings contained in the department’s social study in
support of the petition to terminate his parental rights.
The respondent’s counsel further conceded that there
was no attempt at trial to challenge the representations
contained in the social study as to what services the
department provided to the respondent and that there
is no evidence that the department did not make the
reasonable efforts that were claimed to have been
made.12 The respondent has also not challenged any
of the factual findings that supported the petition to
terminate his parental rights that related to his status
after Papagoda’s involvement with the case but prior
to the adjudicatory date—such facts including his incar-
cerated status, his long history of substance abuse, and
his lack of employment or adequate housing.

The respondent, nonetheless, argues that ‘‘[t]he trial
court’s reliance on the social study, which relied on the
earlier reports of social worker Papagoda, caused it to
make a decision based on evidence that is insufficient
to meet the clear and convincing standard of proof
12
At trial, the respondent did not argue that Papagoda biased the proceed-
ings in any way or even that the department had not made sufficient efforts
to reunify him with Tiara.
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In re Tiara E.

applicable in this case. Any conclusions as to the depart-
ment’s efforts or the respondent’s willingness to partici-
pate prior to October, 2022, are tinged by the potential
bias of the department’s social worker.’’13
We do not reverse trial court rulings based on poten-
tials—and the respondent’s argument lacks any demon-
stration that there was actual bias that impacted the
composition of the social study or the ultimate findings
of the court. The respondent points to four specific
representations that were made in the social study that
allegedly are ‘‘tinged’’ by Papagoda’s ‘‘potential for
bias’’: (1) that the respondent reported to the depart-
ment that he has ‘‘no parenting skills’’ but that he
planned to learn from his great-grandmother until she
died in September, 2021; (2) that the respondent
accepted the department’s offer for supervised visita-
tion in January, 2022, after not seeing Tiara or communi-
cating with the department for several months; (3) that,
despite several positive visits with Tiara, the respondent
was ‘‘inconsistent with his visits and his communica-
tion’’ with the department; and (4) that the respondent
reported that he was not willing to have ongoing weekly
visits with Tiara. These simply are, though, facts that
are unfavorable to the respondent. The respondent pro-
vides no analysis of these events that demonstrates
bias, nor does he point to anything in the record that
contradicts the validity of these facts. The only mention
of bias at trial was during the cross-examination of
Moore, who, when asked whether there were any con-
cerns about bias influencing the findings of the social
study, simply stated, ‘‘No.’’ We reiterate that, until this
appeal, the respondent has not asserted that this testi-
mony should not have been credited by the court. In
the absence of an objection, the court was free to credit
13
We note that the social study, filed one year after Papagoda was removed
from the case, was submitted, reviewed, and approved by three different
department employees—none of whom was Papagoda.
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In re Tiara E.

the findings of the report ‘‘without limitation.’’ In re
Kasmaesha C., 148 Conn. App. 666, 678, 84 A.3d 1279,
cert. denied, 311 Conn. 937, 88 A.3d 549 (2014).14
In light of the foregoing, we reject the respondent’s
claim that the ‘‘possible bias’’ in the social study pre-
cluded the court from determining that the department
made reasonable reunification efforts, as required by
§ 17a-112 (j) (1). We therefore conclude that the evi-
dence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the
court’s determination that the department made reason-
able efforts at reunifying the respondent with Tiara.
II
The respondent also argues that ‘‘the same reasons’’
that support his argument that the department did not
engage in reasonable efforts apply to his claim that the
court erred in determining that the respondent was
unable or unwilling to benefit from proffered services.
The respondent argues that the record does not support
14
We also note that Papagoda had been removed from the case by October,
2022—one full year before the adjudicatory date—October 17, 2023—in this
case. From that point, through the adjudicatory date of the petition, the
respondent was incarcerated. As the court noted in its memorandum of
decision, while he was incarcerated the respondent successfully completed
a Tier II substance abuse treatment program and the department brought
Tiara to the facility for supervised visits with the respondent. The respondent
also testified that he went ‘‘cold turkey’’ while incarcerated, but he never
submitted to a substance abuse evaluation—what the court called a ‘‘reason-
able and prudent’’ request predicated on the respondent’s specific steps. At
oral argument before this court, the respondent’s counsel conceded that
the ability of the department to provide services to incarcerated individuals
is limited. As we have repeatedly iterated, the mere fact that an individual is
incarcerated is an insufficient ground to terminate that individual’s parental
rights. At the same time, ‘‘the reality is that incarceration imposes limitations
on what the department and its social workers can do and what services
it can provide for an incarcerated parent facing termination of his or her
parental rights. . . . The reasonableness of the department’s efforts must
be viewed in the context of these limitations.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Karter F., 207 Conn. App. 1, 15–16, 262
A.3d 195, cert. denied, 339 Conn. 912, 261 A.3d 745 (2021).
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In re Tiara E.

the court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence
that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from services
as of the adjudication date because, ‘‘immediately after
incarceration, the respondent . . . engaged in as many
substantive services as possible, including substance
abuse treatment, mental health treatment, and monthly
visitation with his child.’’ The petitioner contends that
the court had ample evidentiary support for the conclu-
sion that the respondent was unable or unwilling to
benefit from services offered by the department. We
agree with the petitioner.

‘‘[I]n determining whether the department has made
reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child or
whether there is sufficient evidence that a parent is
unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts,
the court is required in the adjudicatory phase to make
its assessment on the basis of events preceding the date
on which the termination petition was filed. See also
Practice Book § 35a-7 (a).’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Kyara H., 147 Conn. App. 855, 870, 83
A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86 A.3d 468
(2014). We review the court’s ‘‘subordinate factual find-
ings for clear error and then we review the trial court’s
ultimate determination that a respondent parent was
unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification ser-
vices for evidentiary sufficiency . . . .’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Cameron W., 194 Conn. App.
633, 662–63, 221 A.3d 885 (2019), cert. denied, 334 Conn.
918, 222 A.3d 103 (2020). Put differently, we ask
‘‘whether the trial court could have reasonably con-
cluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect
of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate
conclusion]. . . . When applying this standard, we
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the judgment of the trial court. . . . [An
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In re Tiara E.

appellate court does] not examine the record to deter-
mine whether the trier of fact could have reached a
conclusion other than the one reached. . . . [Rather]
every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the
trial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 667–68.
The court concluded that, as of the adjudicatory date
of October 17, 2023, the respondent was unable or
unwilling to benefit from reunification and that he
remained so in August, 2024.15 As of the adjudicatory
date, the respondent was incarcerated, having been
arrested in October, 2022. As discussed in part I of this
opinion, the respondent merely alleges, in conclusory
fashion, that certain facts alleged in the petition were,
by virtue of Papagoda’s participation in the events lead-
ing up to the filing of the petition to terminate the
respondent’s parental rights, ‘‘tinged’’ with ‘‘possible
bias.’’ We cannot help but conclude that the court had
ample evidence before it by which to find that, as of
October, 2023, the respondent was unwilling or unable
to benefit from services offered by the department,
including the social study in support of the petition to
terminate parental rights and the May, 2023 study in
support of the motion to review the permanency plan.
The May, 2023 study noted that the respondent had
been inconsistent or noncompliant with his specific
steps, failing to communicate with the department on
a regular basis and failing to engage in outpatient sub-
stance abuse treatment. As we noted previously in this
opinion, the respondent has not challenged the factual
findings of the court, instead taking a strategy at trial
to beg the court for more time in order to rehabilitate.
15
We note that, in February, 2024, the petitioner provided the court with
an addendum to the termination of parental rights petition. That addendum
reported that the respondent had been engaging in monthly in-person visits
with Tiara, and that, despite early challenges, Tiara was willing to play
with the respondent and, although she did not ‘‘appear bonded,’’ she was
nonetheless ‘‘familiar’’ with the respondent.
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In re Tiara E.

As a matter of law, conclusory allegations such as these,
especially when raised for the first time on appeal,
simply cannot serve as a sufficient basis to overturn
the court’s finding that the respondent was unable or
unwilling to benefit from the services provided by the
department—services that he does not dispute were
offered to him.
We must consider the evidence in the light most favor-
able to sustaining the judgment of the court. In the
absence of any demonstration that the facts alleged in
the petition to terminate the respondent’s parental
rights were insufficient to sustain the judgment of the
court, we simply cannot determine that the court’s rul-
ing was erroneous.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.