State v. Sharpley

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State v. Sharpley

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SHAMON SHARPLEY
(AC 47242)
Elgo, Moll and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of
assault in the third degree, the defendant appealed. He claimed that the
trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss because the state’s ten
month delay in executing the arrest warrant constituted an unreasonable
delay that violated his right to due process. Held:

The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, as the
defendant failed to demonstrate that the state’s delay in executing the arrest
warrant caused actual substantial prejudice and was wholly unjustifiable.

Argued March 10—officially released April 29, 2025

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with the crimes
of assault in the third degree and violation of a protec-
tive order, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New London, geographical area number ten,
where the court, Caruso, J., denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss; thereafter, the defendant was pre-
sented to the court, Caruso, J., on a conditional plea
of nolo contendere to the charge of assault in the third
degree; subsequently, the state entered a nolle prosequi
as to the remaining charge; judgment of guilty in accor-
dance with the plea, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Chad L. Edgar, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Lena A. Arnold, special deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, with whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Narducci,
state’s attorney, Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assis-
tant state’s attorney, and Kaila Calling, assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
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State v. Sharpley

Opinion

MOLL, J. The defendant, Shamon Sharpley, appeals
from the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial
court following his conditional plea of nolo contendere
to the charge of assault in the third degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-61.1 On appeal, the defendant
claims that the court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss because the state’s delay in the execution of
the arrest warrant violated his due process rights under
the Connecticut constitution and the United States con-
stitution.2 We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court.
The defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo
contendere to the state’s recitation of the following
facts. In November, 2022, the defendant visited the
home of the victim, in violation of a protective order,
and struck her in the eye, causing it to bleed.3 On
November 30, 2022, Officer Hunter Obermann of the
New London Police Department filed an application for
1
General Statutes § 53a-61 provides: ‘‘(a) A person is guilty of assault in
the third degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical injury to another
person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2)
he recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person; or (3) with
criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of
a deadly weapon, a dangerous instrument or an electronic defense weapon.
‘‘(b) Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person
found guilty under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year which may not be sus-
pended or reduced.’’
2
In his principal appellate brief, the defendant also claimed that the court
erred by denying his motion to dismiss on the basis of statute of limitations
principles. In his reply brief and during oral argument, however, the defen-
dant abandoned this claim.
3
The arrest warrant also stated that the defendant had struck the victim
a few days prior, causing her to suffer a swollen lip. The arrest warrant
states in relevant part: ‘‘It should be known that officers were unable to
determine when the injuries were sustained due to the witness and the
victim mentioning the injuries occurred a few days ago regarding the victim’s
eye and the swollen lip. The injuries sustained to the victim’s right eye and
her swollen lip are reported to be [from] different days.’’
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State v. Sharpley

an arrest warrant seeking to arrest the defendant for
(1) assault in the third degree in violation of § 53a-61
(count one) and (2) violation of a protective order in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-2234 (count two). On
December 3, 2022, the arrest warrant was signed by the
court, S. Murphy, J. At that time, the defendant was
incarcerated in a pretrial capacity in connection with
six unrelated pending cases. On June 30, 2023, the
defendant and the state entered into a global plea agree-
ment that disposed of those six cases.
On September 28, 2023, the defendant was served
with the arrest warrant. On October 24, 2023, the defen-
dant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him
arguing, inter alia, that (1) the ten month lapse between
the signing of the warrant and its execution constituted
an unreasonable delay that did not comport with statute
of limitations principles, and (2) that delay violated his
right to due process.
On November 7, 2023, after having heard argument
from the parties, the court, Caruso, J., denied the defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss. The court stated: ‘‘I find that
[the defendant] engaged in no elusive or evasive con-
duct to try to thwart the state’s ability to serve the
warrant on [the defendant]. So, therefore I find it is the
4
General Statutes § 53a-223 provides: ‘‘(a) A person is guilty of criminal
violation of a protective order when an order issued pursuant to subsection
(e) of section 46b-38c, subsection (f) of section 53a-28, or section 54-1k
or 54-82r has been issued against such person, and such person violates
such order.
‘‘(b) No person who is listed as a protected person in such protective
order may be criminally liable for (1) soliciting, requesting, commanding,
importuning or intentionally aiding in the violation of the protective order
pursuant to subsection (a) of section 53a-8, or (2) conspiracy to violate
such protective order pursuant to section 53a-48.
‘‘(c) Criminal violation of a protective order is a class D felony, except
that any violation of a protective order that involves (1) imposing any
restraint upon the person or liberty of a person in violation of the protective
order, or (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting
or attacking a person in violation of the protective order is a class C felony.’’
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State v. Sharpley

state’s burden here to establish reasonable diligence in
serving the warrant. So, the question becomes did [the
state] satisfy that burden? I’m going to find that [it has].
I’m going to deny the motion . . . . Although there
was a delay here, I don’t find that it was unreasonable
under the totality of the circumstances. There’s cer-
tainly nothing here about the facts of this case that
shocks the conscience; that some of the language that
courts have used in determining whether there’s been
a constitutional violation; I don’t find that at play in
this case. Some of the other cases relied upon by the
defendant, the facts of those cases are distinguishable,
at least in part, because they involved a much longer
delay. One case had an eight and a half year delay, one
case had a two and a half year delay. Some of the cases
contemplate, or use language contemplating, extreme
delays. I don’t find the delay here was extreme or that
it shocked the conscience . . . [and] there’s no dispute
how long the delay was. It was roughly ten months on
a case for which the statute of limitations was five
years. One of the other cases cited had a delay of five
years, which again informs the court’s decision in this
case; we’re not approaching that length of a delay here.’’
The court also noted that the present case was not a
situation in which the state took no efforts to serve the
warrant, as the state made ‘‘at least one effort to serve
[the warrant],’’ thereby making the case distinguishable
from those raised in the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Finally, the court stated that it ‘‘[took] seriously
whether . . . the defendant was prejudiced by the
delay. It is a fair point that defense counsel would have
had an opportunity at least to pursue a global resolution
had the warrant been served prior to the time when
the defendant pled . . . on or about [June 30, 2023].
While it is often the case that defendants are given plea
offers that contemplate global resolutions, there’s really
no guarantee that that would have been the case here.
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State v. Sharpley

So, to some extent, that harm, which is really the one
that stands out to the court, it’s at least somewhat
speculative, though I certainly note that is not an
uncommon practice at all that we have global resolu-
tions. I don’t find that the court system has itself been
harmed by the delay here in this case, so for those
reasons, the motion [to dismiss] is denied.’’
Subsequently, the defendant entered a conditional
plea of nolo contendere as to count one, reserving his
right to file an appeal from the court’s denial of his
motion to dismiss pursuant to General Statutes § 54-
94a.5 After a canvass, the court accepted the conditional
plea, entered a finding of guilty on count one, and sen-
tenced the defendant to an unconditional discharge.
Thereafter, the state entered a nolle prosequi on count
two. This appeal followed. Additional facts and proce-
dural history will be set forth as necessary.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of
review and legal principles that are relevant to our
resolution of the defendant’s claim. ‘‘We initially
address the standard of review for a trial court’s denial
of a motion to dismiss. Because a motion to dismiss
effectively challenges the jurisdiction of the court,
asserting that the state, as a matter of law and fact,
cannot state a proper cause of action against the defen-
dant, our review of the court’s legal conclusions and
resulting denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss is
5
General Statutes § 54-94a provides: ‘‘When a defendant, prior to the
commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the
right to take an appeal from the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion
to suppress or motion to dismiss, the defendant after the imposition of
sentence may file an appeal within the time prescribed by law provided a
trial court has determined that a ruling on such motion to suppress or motion
to dismiss would be dispositive of the case. The issue to be considered in
such an appeal shall be limited to whether it was proper for the court to
have denied the motion to suppress or the motion to dismiss. A plea of nolo
contendere by a defendant under this section shall not constitute a waiver
by the defendant of nonjurisdictional defects in the criminal prosecution.’’
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State v. Sharpley

de novo. . . . Factual findings underlying the court’s
decision, however, will not be disturbed unless they
are clearly erroneous. . . . The applicable legal stan-
dard of review for the denial of a motion to dismiss,
therefore, generally turns on whether the appellant
seeks to challenge the legal conclusions of the trial
court or its factual determinations.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Crosby, 182 Conn. App. 373,
383, 190 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 911, 193 A.3d
559 (2018).
Because the defendant asserts that his due process
rights were violated by the state’s delay in serving the
arrest warrant, we note that ‘‘[t]he role of due process
protections with respect to preaccusation delay has
been characterized as a limited one. . . . [T]he [d]ue
[p]rocess [c]lause does not permit courts to abort crimi-
nal prosecutions simply because they disagree with a
prosecutor’s judgment as to when to seek an indict-
ment. . . . This court need only determine whether the
action complained of . . . violates those fundamental
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil
and political institutions . . . and which define the
community’s sense of fair play and decency . . . . The
due process clause has not replaced the applicable stat-
ute of limitations . . . [as] . . . the primary guarantee
against bringing overly stale criminal charges. . . .
‘‘[T]o establish a due process violation because of
preaccusation delay, the defendant must show both that
actual substantial prejudice resulted from the delay and
that the reasons for the delay were wholly unjustifiable,
as where the state seeks to gain a tactical advantage
over the defendant. . . . [P]roof of prejudice is gener-
ally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due
process claim . . . . [Additionally] the due process
inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well
as the prejudice to the accused.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Coleman, 199 Conn. App. 172,
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State v. Sharpley

180, 235 A.3d 655, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 966, 240 A.3d
281 (2020).
With these legal principles in mind, we turn to the
merits of the defendant’s sole remaining claim on
appeal. The defendant claims that the court improperly
denied his motion to dismiss because the state violated
his right to due process when it served him with an
arrest warrant ten months after the alleged conduct
that formed the basis for the warrant had occurred. In
support of this claim, the defendant argues that (1) ‘‘he
was actually and substantially prejudiced by the state’s
preaccusation delay in bringing the criminal charge
against him after he had previously obtained a global
resolution of six other pending cases’’ and (2) although
the state’s failure to execute the defendant’s warrant
in a timely manner was the result of negligence rather
than recklessness, the burden of proof should be allo-
cated to the state to show that the delay was not wholly
unjustifiable.6
As was iterated earlier in this opinion, with respect to
the defendant’s requisite showing of actual substantial
prejudice; see State v. Coleman, supra, 199 Conn. App.
180; the court stated: ‘‘It is a fair point that defense
counsel would have had an opportunity at least to pur-
sue a global resolution had the warrant been served
prior to the time when the defendant pled . . . on or
about [June 30, 2023]. While it is often the case that
defendants are given plea offers that contemplate global
resolutions, there’s really no guarantee that that would
6
Additionally, the defendant appears to argue that the court erred (1) in
not stating the legal standard it would be using to decide the defendant’s
motion to dismiss and (2) in applying the wrong legal standard. Insofar as
the defendant raises this claim, we disagree. Notwithstanding that the court
did not use the words ‘‘actual substantial prejudice,’’ we conclude that,
because the court explicitly determined that the defendant failed to establish
that the state’s delay in serving the arrest warrant prejudiced him, the court
applied the proper standard as to the defendant’s due process claim.
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State v. Sharpley

have been the case here. So, to some extent, that harm,
which is really the one that stands out to the court, it’s
at least somewhat speculative . . . .’’
The defendant argues that, contrary to the court’s
determination, he has demonstrated actual substantial
prejudice because the prosecutor involved in his other
pending cases stated on the record that she would have
incorporated the case at issue into the global resolution
for the defendant’s other pending cases. The defendant
also contends that a global resolution encompassing
the charges underlying this appeal would have resulted
in an earlier release or an earning of jail credit because
there would have been no pending charges against him,
and, therefore, harm could be assumed and was not
speculative. We are not persuaded.
To begin, we conclude that the court did not err in
concluding that the alleged loss of an opportunity for
the present case to be incorporated into the global
resolution of all of the cases pending against the defen-
dant was speculative and, therefore, this purported
result was not a proper basis to show that the defendant
was actually substantially prejudiced by the delay.
Although the state indicated on the record that it would
have included the present case in the global resolution
of all of the cases pending against the defendant, the
state correctly notes that a global resolution was not
a guarantee and the court would not have been bound
to accept the potential plea agreement. See Practice
Book § 39-10 (‘‘[i]f the judicial authority rejects the plea
agreement, it shall inform the parties of this fact; advise
the defendant personally in open court or, on a showing
of good cause, in camera that the judicial authority is
not bound by the plea agreement; afford the defendant
the opportunity then to withdraw the plea, if given; and
advise the defendant that if he or she persists in a guilty
plea or plea of nolo contendere, the disposition of the
case may be less favorable to the defendant than that
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State v. Sharpley

contemplated by the plea agreement’’). Moreover, this
court has rejected similar arguments in the past, holding
that a mere potential consequence of a preaccusation
delay is distinguishable from a violation of the defen-
dant’s due process rights. See State v. Coleman, supra,
199 Conn. App. 182 n.7 (‘‘The defendant also argues
that the preaccusation delay prevented him from includ-
ing the charges in this case with his federal charges
in negotiating a global resolution of them. He further
contends that the state was able to use the federal
charges against him at his state sentencing hearing and
that the preaccusation delay prevented him from partic-
ipating in rehabilitative programs in federal prison that
otherwise might have been available to him. Although
these may have been consequences of the defendant’s
arrest in this case, they cannot reasonably be construed
as due process violations arising from the preaccusation
delay.’’).
The defendant’s argument that he was actually sub-
stantially prejudiced because he would have been eligi-
ble for early release or an earning of jail credit on the
six other pending cases if the arrest warrant were not
outstanding is likewise unavailing. The notion that the
defendant was deprived of the possibility of early
release or earning jail credit is not supported by the
record before this court, which the defendant’s counsel
conceded during oral argument. Without a factual basis
to support this argument, or any evidence showing prej-
udice to the defendant in any other manner, we cannot
conclude that the court erred in its determination that
the defendant failed to establish actual substantial prej-
udice. See State v. Morrill, 197 Conn. 507, 522, 498 A.2d
76 (1985) (‘‘[W]e have found nothing in the record that
would substantiate either [(1) actual substantial preju-
dice from the delay or (2) that the delay was wholly
unjustifiable]. There is a complete absence of proof
concerning the cause or effect of the pretrial delay.’’).
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State v. Sharpley

We also agree with the state that the defendant was
not actually substantially prejudiced because his period
of incarceration did not increase as a result of the state’s
delay in serving the warrant, as he was ultimately sen-
tenced to an unconditional discharge.
Even assuming arguendo that the defendant success-
fully demonstrated actual substantial prejudice, his due
process claim would still fail because he has not met
his burden of demonstrating that ‘‘the reasons for the
delay were wholly unjustifiable . . . .’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Coleman, supra, 199 Conn.
App. 180. In order to demonstrate that the delay was
wholly unjustifiable, the defendant must show that the
delay was a product of more than mere negligence and,
instead, was caused by recklessness on the part of the
state or was a tactical decision to disadvantage the
defendant. See id., 183.
The defendant concedes that he has not met this
burden and acknowledges that ‘‘[w]hat appears to be
the case is that [the defendant’s] arrest warrant fell
between the proverbial cracks in the system. In other
words, the state’s failure to execute [the defendant’s]
warrant in a timely manner, if we are to believe the
[state’s] representations, was due to negligence rather
than recklessness.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
The defendant advocates, however, for this court to
depart from our Supreme Court’s precedent establish-
ing the standard for analyzing due process claims in
the context of preaccusation delays and, contrary to
such precedent, to allocate the burden of proof to the
state to show that the delay was not wholly unjustifi-
able. As the defendant notes, such an approach would
be similar to how courts analyze statute of limitations
challenges. See State v. Swebilius, 325 Conn. 793, 807,
159 A.3d 1099 (2017) (‘‘Once the defendant has pre-
sented evidence of his availability for arrest, it is reason-
able and proper that the burden should then shift to the
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State v. Sharpley

state to explain why, notwithstanding the defendant’s
availability during the statutory period, the delay in
his arrest was reasonable. Doing so allocates burdens
efficiently by requiring each party to bring forth evi-
dence uniquely within its knowledge.’’). The defendant
also argues that, if the burden were to be shifted in the
present case, then the matter should be remanded for
additional proceedings because ‘‘the state did not pro-
duce any competent evidence that its delay in executing
[the defendant’s] arrest warrant was not ‘wholly unjusti-
fiable.’ ’’ We reject the defendant’s argument, as we
are bound by the well settled law that, ‘‘[i]n order to
establish a due process violation because of pre-accusa-
tion delay, the defendant must show both that actual
substantial prejudice resulted from the delay and that
the reasons for the delay were wholly unjustifiable, as
where the state seeks to gain a tactical advantage over
the defendant.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Morrill,
supra, 197 Conn. 522; see also State v. Vasquez, 194
Conn. App. 831, 839–40, 222 A.3d 1018 (2019) (this court
is ‘‘not at liberty to overrule or discard the decisions
of our Supreme Court but are bound by them’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 922,
223 A.3d 61 (2020).
In sum, we conclude that the defendant’s due process
claim must fail, as he has not demonstrated that the
state’s delay in executing the arrest warrant (1) caused
actual substantial prejudice and (2) was wholly unjusti-
fiable.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.