Freccia v. Freccia

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Freccia v. Freccia

THERESA K. FRECCIA, EXECUTOR (ESTATE OF
FRANK J. FRECCIA, JR.) v.
GUIN FRECCIA ET AL.
(AC 46037)
THERESA K. FRECCIA, EXECUTOR (ESTATE OF
FRANK J. FRECCIA, JR.) v. FRANK J.
FRECCIA III ET AL.
(AC 46038)
THERESA K. FRECCIA, EXECUTOR (ESTATE OF
FRANK J. FRECCIA, JR.) v.
FRANK J. FRECCIA III
(AC 46040)
Cradle, Suarez and Seeley, Js.*

Syllabus

In each of three summary process cases, the respective defendants appealed
from the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiff, either in her individual
capacity or as representative of the estate of her husband, the decedent.
Each of the defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly failed
to conclude that they had a present right to remain in the respective real
property or that equitable considerations precluded the plaintiff from
obtaining a judgment in her favor. Held:

In each of the three appeals, this court declined to reach the merits of the
respective defendants’ unpreserved claim that the trial court had abused
its discretion and had prejudiced them by consolidating for trial the action
underlying their respective appeal with four other related summary process
actions brought by the plaintiff because the defendants’ attorney did not
articulate that claim with sufficient clarity before the trial court and the
defendants did not demonstrate that it warranted an extraordinary level
of review.

The trial court’s failure to conclude, in each of the three cases, that the
defendants had a present right to remain in the real property or that equitable
considerations precluded the plaintiff from obtaining judgment in her favor
was not improper, as the court did not find credible testimony that the
decedent had promised the defendants that they could remain in the property
beyond his death, this court would not second-guess that determination,

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
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Freccia v. Freccia
and the trust and the will of the decedent did not reflect that he had
contemplated such an outcome.

In the first case and the third case, the plaintiff, in her representative capacity,
had the legal right to seek possession of the real property at issue and,
accordingly, had standing to commence the respective underlying summary
process action.

In the second case, the plaintiff, in her individual capacity, properly invoked
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, despite the fact that the notice
to quit served on the defendants did not accurately identify the plaintiff in
such capacity as the owner of the real property at issue, because the notice
complied with the statute (§ 47a-23), as it accurately identified the plaintiff’s
attorney-at-law.

Argued December 4, 2024—officially released May 6, 2025

Procedural History

Summary process action, in each case, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-
Norwalk, Housing Session, where, in the second case,
Theresa K. Freccia, in her individual capacity, was sub-
stituted as the plaintiff; thereafter, the cases were con-
solidated for trial and tried to the court, Spader, J.;
judgment in each case for the plaintiff, from which the
defendants in each case filed separate appeals with this
court. Affirmed.

John J. Morgan, for the appellants in each case
(defendants in each case).
Joseph DaSilva, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was
Marc J. Grenier, for the appellee in each case (plaintiff).

Opinion

SUAREZ, J. In this opinion, we resolve claims raised
in three separate but related appeals, Docket Nos. AC
46037, AC 46038, and AC 46040. In the summary process
action underlying AC 46037, the plaintiff, Theresa K.
Freccia, in her capacity as the executor of the estate
of Frank J. Freccia, Jr. (decedent), brought a summary
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process action against the defendants, Guin Freccia1
and David D’Andrea, seeking to obtain a judgment of
possession with respect to real property located at 95
Bryam Road in Greenwich. The court rendered a judg-
ment of possession in favor of the plaintiff in that action.
On appeal, the defendants claim that (1) the plaintiff
lacked the power to commence the underlying summary
process action, (2) the court improperly failed to con-
clude that they had a present right to remain in the
subject property or that equitable considerations pre-
cluded the plaintiff from obtaining a judgment in her
favor, and (3) the court prejudiced the defendants by
consolidating five related summary process actions
for trial.
In AC 46038, the plaintiff, Theresa K. Freccia, in her
individual capacity, brought a summary process action
against the defendants, Frank J. Freccia III, Tammie
Freccia, Locksley Freccia, and D’Artagnan Freccia,2
seeking to obtain a judgment of possession with respect
to real property located at ‘‘40 Locust Street, Building
2 and Garage’’ in Greenwich.3 In that action, the court
1
In their principal appellate brief, the defendants in AC 46037 state that,
although the plaintiff brought the notice to quit and complaint against ‘‘Guin
Freccia,’’ that defendant’s proper name is ‘‘Guinevere Freccia.’’ We, however,
will refer to ‘‘Guin Freccia’’ because that is how she is identified in the record.
In the interest of simplicity and in light of the commonality of the surnames
of the majority of the parties in this case, in this opinion we will refer to each
of the Freccias by their respective first names unless otherwise specified.
2
In their principal appellate brief, the defendants in AC 46038 state that
the person identified in the plaintiff’s action as ‘‘D’Artagnan Freccia’’ does
not exist but that ‘‘Dartagnan Freccia,’’ who is also named as a defendant
in a separate action, is the plaintiff’s granddaughter. We, however, will refer
to ‘‘D’Artagnan Freccia’’ because that is how she is identified in the record.
3
The original complaint was brought by the plaintiff in her capacity as the
executor of the estate of the decedent. The plaintiff, still in her representative
capacity, later filed a revised complaint. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a
motion to substitute Theresa K. Freccia, in her individual capacity, in lieu
of Theresa K. Freccia, as the executor of the decedent’s estate, as the
plaintiff. The plaintiff also filed an amended revised complaint, dated Febru-
ary 9, 2022, reflecting the substitution. In support of the motion to substitute,
the plaintiff represented that, upon the death of the decedent, the plaintiff,
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rendered a judgment of possession in favor of the plain-
tiff. On appeal, the defendants claim that (1) the notice
to quit served on them was invalid, (2) the court improp-
erly failed to conclude that equitable considerations
precluded the plaintiff from obtaining judgment in her
favor, and (3) the court prejudiced the defendants by
consolidating five related summary process actions
for trial.
In AC 46040, the plaintiff, Theresa K. Freccia, in her
capacity as executor of the estate of the decedent,
brought a summary process action against the defen-
dant, Frank J. Freccia III, doing business as Freccia
Brothers Auto Sales, seeking to obtain a judgment of
possession with respect to real property located at 246-
248 West Putnam Avenue in Greenwich. In that action,
the court rendered a judgment of possession in favor
of the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant claims that
(1) the plaintiff lacked standing to commence the
action, (2) the court improperly failed to conclude that
he had a present right to remain in the subject property
or that equitable considerations precluded the plaintiff
from obtaining a judgment in her favor, and (3) the
court prejudiced the defendant by consolidating five
related summary process actions for trial. We affirm
the judgments of the court.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of the claims raised in these appeals. In the
case underlying AC 46037, the plaintiff alleged that,
on June 1, 2019, the defendants, Guin and D’Andrea,
entered into an oral lease for the use and occupancy
of 95 Byram Road in Greenwich. It is undisputed that
Guin is the granddaughter of the plaintiff and the dece-
dent and that D’Andrea is Guin’s fiancé. The plaintiff
who had a right of survivorship in the subject property, became the sole
owner of the property. The court granted the motion. Thus, by the time of
trial, Theresa K. Freccia, in her individual capacity, was the plaintiff in the
underlying action.
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alleged that the defendants’ right or privilege to occupy
the premises terminated by means of her service of a
notice to quit on July 23, 2021, which provided notice
to the defendants that they were to quit possession of
the property by August 26, 2021. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendants, however, remain in possession of
the property.
The defendants filed various special defenses. First,
they alleged that ‘‘[i]t would be unconscionable and
inequitable to enforce forfeiture under the circum-
stances.’’ Second, they alleged that the plaintiff failed
to satisfactorily perform the agreement that existed
between them and the decedent, granting the defen-
dants a life tenancy in the subject premises. Third, the
defendants alleged that the notice to quit was a nullity in
light of ‘‘the tenancy or estate’’ granted by the decedent.
By way of counterclaim, the defendants alleged that
the decedent had granted the defendants a life estate
in the subject premises ‘‘in consideration of the defen-
dants performing repairs and/or renovations to the
premises, and paying for certain expenses relating to
the premises, and . . . D’Andrea, accepting below
market compensation for work performed at the auto-
mobile business known as Freccia Brothers Auto
Sales.’’ The defendants alleged that, in reliance thereon,
they ‘‘entered into possession of the premises and per-
formed repairs and/or renovations to the premises and
have paid expenses relating to the premises. . . . D’An-
drea . . . has been working at the business, Freccia
Brothers Auto Sales, and has been paid below market
compensation.’’ The defendants alleged that the plain-
tiff has breached the agreement and ‘‘[i]t would be
against equity and good conscience to deprive the
defendants of the enforcement of the said agreement.’’
In the case underlying AC 46038, the plaintiff, in her
individual capacity,4 alleged in count one of a revised
4
See footnote 3 of this opinion.
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complaint that Frank had entered into a written lease
with the plaintiff for the use and occupancy of 40 Locust
Street, Building 2 and Garage, in Greenwich. The writ-
ten lease set forth a monthly lease payment amount
beginning on June 1, 2019. The plaintiff alleged that
the right to possession enjoyed by Frank terminated
because of lapse of time and that, on August 14, 2021,
she served him, as well as Tammie, Locksley, and D’Ar-
tagnan, with a notice to quit, but the defendants con-
tinue in possession. It is undisputed that Frank is the
son of the plaintiff and the decedent; Tammie is the
wife of Frank; and Locksley and D’Artagnan are the
children of Frank. In count two, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendants originally had a right or privilege
to occupy the subject premises but that such right or
privilege had been terminated by service of the notice
to quit on August 14, 2021.
By way of special defenses, the defendants alleged,
first, that ‘‘[i]t would be unconscionable and inequitable
to enforce forfeiture under the circumstances.’’ Second,
the defendants alleged that the plaintiff had failed to
satisfactorily perform an agreement between her and
the defendants by virtue of which they were granted a
life estate in the subject premises by the decedent.
Third, the defendants alleged that the notice to quit
was a nullity in light of their life estate in the subject
premises. By way of counterclaim, the defendants
alleged that the decedent and Frank had entered into
an agreement whereby the defendants were granted a
life estate in the subject premises ‘‘in consideration of
[Frank] performing renovations to the premises, and
paying for certain expenses relating to the premises,
and [Frank] accepting below market compensation for
work performed at the family automobile business,
known as Freccia Brothers Auto Sales, and for contin-
ued work and operation of the family business.’’ The
defendants alleged that they relied on the agreement
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and have resided at the premises for decades, and that
Frank had performed pursuant to the agreement. The
defendants alleged that the plaintiff had breached the
agreement by commencing this summary process
action and that ‘‘[i]t would be against equity and good
conscience to deprive the defendants . . . of the
enforcement of the said agreement and life tenancy or
estate.’’
In the case underlying AC 46040, the plaintiff, in her
capacity as executor of the estate of the decedent,
alleged in count one that, on September 1, 2019, she
had entered into a nine month lease with Frank, doing
business as Freccia Brothers Auto Sales, for the use
and occupancy of premises known as 246 West Putnam
Avenue in Greenwich. The lease agreement set forth
the monthly payment that became due on the first of
each month, with the lease terminating on May 31, 2020.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s right or privi-
lege to occupy these premises was terminated by a
notice to quit on August 14, 2021, which was duly served
on the defendant, that notified the defendant that he
was to quit possession on or before August 22, 2021.
The defendant, however, continues in possession. The
plaintiff alleged in count two that, on or after September
1, 2019, the defendant also took possession of what she
described as ‘‘[a]dditional [p]remises’’ at 246-248 West
Putnam Avenue in Greenwich and that, although the
defendant originally had a right or privilege to occupy
these premises, such right or privilege had been termi-
nated by the service of a notice to quit on August 14,
2021, notifying the defendant to quit possession on or
before August 22, 2021. The defendant, however, contin-
ues in possession. In count three, the plaintiff alleged
in the alternative that the defendant never had the right
under the lease to occupy the additional premises.
By way of special defenses, the defendant, first,
alleged that the plaintiff failed to satisfy an agreement
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by which he had a life tenancy in the subject premises.
Second, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s notice
to quit was a nullity in light of the defendant’s life
tenancy in the subject premises. Third, the defendant
alleged that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff had made assurances and
representations to the defendant that he may remain
in possession of the premises and operate his business.’’
The defendant also alleged that the plaintiff had ‘‘engaged
in unconscionable and inequitable conduct towards the
defendant.’’ The defendant alleged that ‘‘[a]ny eviction
would cause the defendant to suffer a loss wholly dis-
proportionate to any injury claimed by the plaintiff;
such injury of the plaintiff, if any, would be reparable.’’
The defendant alleged that any breach on his part ‘‘was
neither wilful nor grossly negligent’’ and that ‘‘[i]t would
be unconscionable and inequitable to enforce forfeiture
under the circumstances.’’
By way of counterclaim, the defendant alleged in a
first count that he and the decedent had entered into
an agreement whereby the defendant received a life
tenancy in the subject property in exchange for his
‘‘receiving below market compensation for work per-
formed at the . . . family automotive sales business,
Freccia Brothers Auto Sales, and for continued work
and operation of the family business.’’ The defendant
alleged that the family business, which specializes in
the repair, restoration and sale of vintage Volkswagen
motor vehicles, has operated at the subject premises
since 1922. The defendant alleged that the family busi-
ness has been ‘‘his life’s work’’ and that he continues
business operations at the subject premises in fulfill-
ment of the agreement made with his father, the dece-
dent. In a second count of his counterclaim, the defen-
dant alleged that any written lease that he entered into
with the plaintiff was void in light of the life tenancy,
which he enjoys as part of the agreement he reached
with the decedent. The defendant also alleged that ‘‘the
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plaintiff assured and represented to [him] that he can
stay in possession and occupancy of the premises and
operate his business, acknowledging that was his
father’s intent; reaffirming or ratifying the life tenancy
or estate granted to [him] by his father.’’ The defendant
alleged that ‘‘[i]t would be against equity and good con-
science to deprive [him] of the enforcement of said
agreement with his father . . . .’’
These three underlying cases, and two other related
cases, brought under Docket Nos. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S and
CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, were tried together before the court,
Spader, J., in 2022.5 On November 17, 2022, the court
issued a memorandum of decision, stating: ‘‘The . . .
cases are all essentially claims that any right or privilege
the defendants had to occupy the respective premises
has terminated. . . .
‘‘The defendants provide similar defenses in all mat-
ters alleging that the plaintiff has not properly per-
formed under an alleged life estate the defendants main-
tain in the premises, that the notices to quit are defective
because the defendants have life estates and that these
evictions are inequitable/unconscionable. The defen-
dants claim by way of counterclaim that they should
receive an injunction against forfeiture because of
repairs they performed and/or work performed at sub-
standard wages to the benefit of the Freccia family. . . .
‘‘As an initial matter, before considering the special
defenses or counterclaims, the court has to consider
5
The record reflects that the trial court dismissed the summary process
action brought under Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, and no appeal was taken
from that dismissal. See Freccia v. Freccia, Superior Court, judicial district
of Stamford-Norwalk, Housing Session, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S. The
record further reflects that the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiff in the summary process action brought under Docket No. CV-21-
6006597-S. See Freccia v. Doe, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-
Norwalk, Housing Session, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S. Although the defen-
dants in that action filed an appeal from the judgment, this court dismissed
the appeal on April 4, 2024.
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whether the plaintiff has set forth her case for right
or privilege terminated. To prevail on such claim, the
plaintiff must establish, by a fair preponderance of the
evidence, the following essential elements: (1) that the
plaintiff is the lessor or owner of the various premises
individually or as executor; (2) that the defendants origi-
nally had the right to occupy but that right has been
terminated; (3) the service of the proper notices to quit
and its service date and termination date; and (4) that
the defendants are still in possession of the various
premises.
‘‘The plaintiff has established, by a fair preponder-
ance of the evidence, her ownership individually or as
executor of all of the subject premises; her unequivocal
desire to regain possession through the service of legally
compliant notices to quit with service and termination
dates; that the dates have passed with the occupants
still being in possession and her right to regain posses-
sion.
‘‘Despite the plaintiff setting forth her cases, the court
still needs to consider the special defenses of the defen-
dants.
‘‘The common argument is inequitability—that the
plaintiff has not performed properly her obligations to
acknowledge a life estate in all of the defendants and/
or invalid notices to quit because of the so-called life
estates.
‘‘A life estate, as with any interest in land, can only be
enforceable against subsequent owners/encumbrancers
if they are properly documented in a writing and recorded
on the land records. The defendants have not estab-
lished the legal existence of any life estates. Even if
there is an argument that there was a constructive trust
or constructive life estate based upon promises from
[the decedent] to his son and grandchildren, the court
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does not find the existence of any such lifetime prom-
ises. . . .
‘‘The evidence presented to the court did not indicate
that [the decedent] conveyed, or intended to convey,
the ownership of any of the parcels in question in this
matter to his children/grandchildren in occupancy
thereof. He did not leave any instructions to the plaintiff
to allow possession ‘forever’ to any defendants herein.
There is no unjust enrichment to the plaintiff individu-
ally, or to the estate for the plaintiff to pursue these
actions.
‘‘The defendants all commonly testified to their belief
that these premises would be their ‘lifetime/forever
homes’ in convenient memories after [the decedent’s]
passing. His will/the actual written trusts unequivocally
conveyed these properties to the plaintiff (either indi-
vidually or in trust) without a reservation for the defen-
dants. Even had there been a promise, even implicitly,
to benefit the defendants, it could not extend beyond
[the decedent’s] life.
‘‘The defendants did some repairs—to upkeep the
premises they were occupying. The court does not
believe that they thought they could just live there for-
ever with their mother/mother-in-law/grandmother
footing all of the taxes/insurance, etc.
‘‘Specifically, as to . . . D’Andrea, the testimony of
his fiancée as to his acceptance of substandard pay
from the garage thinking he was being compensated
with a home lacks credibility. If he wasn’t happy with
his pay, or he thought [the decedent] was violating labor
laws (and now Frank is violating labor laws) he had
recourse therein by filing a lawsuit . . . or a Depart-
ment of Labor claim, not by living in a property owned
by [the plaintiff] for life—whoever’s life we are refer-
ring to.
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‘‘As to the garage, if [Frank] truly believed he had a
right to stay at the property forever without payment,
why would he execute the 2019 lease? It was not
because of duress, but because he knew he had no
continual ongoing right and his arguments that he has
a forever right to possession without compensation are
just a convenient legal theory now that the plaintiff is
seeking possession.
‘‘The defendants’ brief is correct in that the court
has struggled in reexamining the testimony on multiple
occasions and reviewing these cases frequently in con-
sidering this decision. There are certainly credibility
issues with EVERY witness that testified—the plaintiff
not exempted. When there are credibility issues, that
creates more weight in the actual written documents
and the conveyances by [the decedent], the trust and
the wills. They simply do not create life estates in the
defendants nor instruct the plaintiff to forever provide
living expenses and upkeep for the defendants. [The
decedent] could have done so, and he did not, leaving
the decision-making ability to the plaintiff. The convey-
ances were not done under duress in a hospital bed,
but years, and in one case a decade and a half, before
his death. The court is aware of the testimony regarding
the friction in the family between the plaintiff and the
defendants that may not be present in other branches
of the family. This friction existed when [the decedent]
was alive, and he had the opportunity to provide for
the defendants but chose not to.
‘‘Equitable factors are always considered by this
court. This is a long-standing family dispute. Equity
does not provide a defense to overcome the plaintiff’s
cases but shall provide a stay of execution for the defen-
dants. Final stays are entered in all matters for March
31, 2023.
‘‘The defendants also counterclaim seeking injunctive
relief against the plaintiff from proceeding herein; the
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defendants have not prevailed by a fair preponderance
of the evidence on their counterclaims. There simply
is no credible support for their life estate theories.’’
These appeals followed.
I
AC 46037
A
First, the defendants in AC 46037 claim that the plain-
tiff lacked standing to commence the underlying sum-
mary process action.6 We are not persuaded.
The fact that this standing claim is being raised for
the first time on appeal is of no consequence to our
analysis ‘‘because standing implicates the court’s sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, the issue of standing is not
subject to waiver and [the issue of standing] may be
raised at any time.’’ Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 310
Conn. 119, 126, 74 A.3d 1225 (2013). It is undisputed
that the plaintiff, in her individual capacity, owns 50
percent of the subject property. The remaining 50 per-
cent was owned by her husband, the decedent, until
6
In their appellate reply brief, the defendants in AC 46037 raise a distinctly
different legal claim, one that was raised in connection with AC 46038 and
does not apply to the facts of the underlying case. Specifically, they claim
that the notice to quit served on them was invalid because it listed the
plaintiff, in her capacity as executor, therein as owner. According to the
defendants, the plaintiff was not the owner of the subject property in her
representative capacity, but in her individual capacity. ‘‘It is axiomatic that
a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal in its reply brief.
. . . Our practice requires an appellant to raise claims of error in his original
brief, so that the issue as framed by him can be fully responded to by the
appellee in its brief, and so that we can have the full benefit of that written
argument. Although the function of the appellant’s reply brief is to respond
to the arguments and authority presented in the appellee’s brief, that function
does not include raising an entirely new claim of error.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Asnat Realty, LLC v. United Illuminating Co., 204 Conn.
App. 313, 329, 253 A.3d 56, cert. denied, 337 Conn. 906, 252 A.3d 366 (2021).
We therefore decline to review this claim.
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the time of his death. The decedent appointed the plain-
tiff as the executor of his will. The estate had not been
closed by the time of the trial. By the terms of his will,
his ownership interest in the subject property ultimately
is to pass to the Frank J. Freccia, Jr., Revocable Trust
(trust). The plaintiff is one of the trustees of the trust.
The defendants acknowledge that, as executor, the
plaintiff ‘‘has . . . the authority to take the assets of
the estate into her possession and administer them to
the point of distribution.’’ The defendants also acknowl-
edge that, under the terms of the trust, the trustees
have authority to dispose of trust assets. The defendants
argue that, by commencing the present summary pro-
cess action, however, the plaintiff is imperfectly per-
forming her obligations under both the will and the
trust of the decedent, thereby violating her obligation
to ‘‘preserve and maintain the assets for the beneficiar-
ies [of those instruments],’’ including the defendant
Guin. Essentially, the defendants argue that the plain-
tiff, by commencing the summary process action, vio-
lated her fiduciary duties as a representative of the
estate in that the action served her self-interests and
was not acting in the best interests of the estate.
The plaintiff alleged in her revised complaint that the
defendants originally had a right or privilege to occupy
the subject property but that such right or privilege had
been terminated by service of a notice to quit on July
23, 2021. ‘‘In a summary process action based on the
plaintiff’s claim that the defendant originally had the
right or privilege to occupy the premises but that any
such right or privilege has terminated, the plaintiff must
prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, all the
elements of the case. The essential elements are: (1) the
plaintiff is the owner of the property; (2) the defendant
originally had a right or privilege to occupy the premises
but such right or privilege has terminated; (3) the plain-
tiff caused a proper notice to quit possession to be
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served on the defendant to vacate the premises on or
before a certain date; and (4) although the time given
the defendant to vacate in the notice to quit possession
has passed, the defendant remains in possession of the
premises. See General Statutes § 47a-23 (a) (3).
‘‘As a threshold issue, in order to prevail, the plaintiff
must prove the essential element of ownership of the
premises, which implicates standing. It is well estab-
lished that [a] party must have standing to assert a
claim in order for the court to have subject matter
jurisdiction . . . . Standing is the legal right to set judi-
cial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke
the jurisdiction of the court unless he . . . has, in an
individual or representative capacity, some real interest
in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title
or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
. . . When standing is put in issue, the question is
whether the person whose standing is challenged is a
proper party to request an adjudication of the issue
. . . .
‘‘Section 47a-23 (a) provides in relevant part: When
the owner . . . desires to obtain possession or occu-
pancy of any land . . . and . . . (3) when one origi-
nally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises
but such right or privilege has terminated . . . such
owner . . . shall give notice to each . . . occupant to
quit possession or occupancy of such land . . . before
the time specified in the notice for the lessee or occu-
pant to quit possession or occupancy. General Statutes
§ 47a-1 (e) defines owner as one or more persons, jointly
or severally, in whom is vested (1) all or part of the
legal title to property, or (2) all or part of the beneficial
ownership and a right to present use and enjoyment of
the premises and includes a mortgagee in possession.
Vested is defined as [h]aving become a completed, con-
summated right for present or future enjoyment; not
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contingent; unconditional; absolute. Black’s Law Dic-
tionary (9th Ed. 2009) p. 1699.
‘‘Where a plaintiff issuing a notice to quit is not the
owner of the property when the notice to quit is served,
the notice to quit is defective, which deprives the court
of subject matter jurisdiction. Before the [trial] court
can entertain a summary process action and evict a
tenant, the owner of the land must previously have
served the tenant with notice to quit. . . . As a condi-
tion precedent to a summary process action, proper
notice to quit [pursuant to § 47a-23] is a jurisdictional
necessity.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Success, Inc. v. Curcio,
160 Conn. App. 153, 159–61, 124 A.3d 563, cert. denied,
319 Conn. 952, 125 A.3d 531 (2015).
‘‘Standing . . . is a practical concept designed to
ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits
brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that
judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others
are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and
vigorously represented. . . . These two objectives are
ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant
makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered
or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative
capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of
concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy. . . .
Where a party is found to lack standing, the court is
consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to
determine the cause.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) North Branford Citizens Against
Bulk Propane Storage v. North Branford, 230 Conn.
App. 335, 342–43, 330 A.3d 196 (2025). ‘‘The general rule
is that one party has no standing to raise another’s
rights. . . . When standing is put in issue, the question
is whether the person whose standing is challenged is
a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue
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. . . . [Standing is] ordinarily held to have been met
when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct
injury he . . . is likely to suffer . . . .’’ (Citations omit-
ted, internal quotation marks omitted.) Delio v. Earth
Garden Florist, Inc., 28 Conn. App. 73, 78, 609 A.2d
1057 (1992).

The court found that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff ha[d] established,
by a fair preponderance of the evidence, her ownership
individually or as executor of all of the subject premises
. . . .’’ Insofar as the defendants challenge the propriety
of this conclusion, we note that it was not in dispute
that the plaintiff, in her individual capacity, has a 50
percent ownership interest in the subject property. As
stated previously, under the terms of the decedent’s
will, which are not in dispute, the executor has the
explicit authority ‘‘[t]o retain, acquire, or sell any prop-
erty . . . .’’ This provision undermines the defendants’
argument that, ‘‘as execut[or], [the plaintiff] has only
the authority to take the assets of the estate into her
possession and administer them to the point of distribu-
tion.’’7

Simply put, the defendants’ arguments do not impli-
cate the plaintiff’s status with respect to the subject
7
Similarly, under the terms of the trust, which are not in dispute, the
trustee has the explicit authority ‘‘[t]o retain, acquire, or sell any property
. . . .’’ The terms of the trust further provide: ‘‘The [t]rustee is authorized
to hold residential real property as part of any trust created under this
[a]greement and shall permit the income beneficiary or eligible income
beneficiaries to reside there rent-free during the trust term. The [g]rantor,
and after the [g]rantor’s death, the [g]rantor’s spouse if the [g]rantor’s spouse
is the income beneficiary or an eligible income beneficiary, may at any time
direct that such residential property shall be sold. In the event of [a] sale,
all or any part of the proceeds thereof may, in the discretion of the [g]rantor,
or, after the [g]rantor’s death, the [g]rantor’s spouse if the [g]rantor’s spouse
is the income beneficiary or an eligible income beneficiary, be applied to
the acquisition of other real property, which, together with any such pro-
ceeds not so applied, shall be held in such trust upon the same terms and
conditions.’’
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property or, more specifically, her authority in her rep-
resentative capacity to vindicate ownership rights over
the property on behalf of the estate. Instead, the defen-
dants’ argument conflates the issue of the plaintiff’s
standing to bring the summary process action with the
issue of whether the plaintiff, either in her role as execu-
tor of the decedent’s will or trustee of the trust estab-
lished by the decedent, is properly exercising her duties
under the will and trust. We agree with the plaintiff
that the narrow issue before us in terms of standing is
whether the plaintiff, in her representative capacity,
had the right to seek possession of the subject property
by commencing the present summary process action.
This issue is legally distinct from whether her conduct
in bringing the action was in derogation of her duties
as executor or as trustee. On the basis of the undisputed
facts, we hold that the plaintiff had the legal right to seek
possession of the subject property and, accordingly,
had standing to commence the underlying action.

B

Next, we address the claim raised by the defendants
in AC 46037 that the court improperly failed to conclude
that they had a present right to remain in the subject
property or that equitable considerations precluded the
plaintiff from obtaining judgment in her favor.8 We are
not persuaded.
8
We note that, in this part I B of the opinion, we have combined multiple
interrelated claims raised by the defendants in AC 46037 into a single claim.
We have done so in the interest of efficiently addressing the interrelated
claims. In their principal appellate brief, the defendants claimed that (1)
‘‘[e]quitable considerations preclude the plaintiff from evicting her son and
the generational family business from its long maintained location,’’ (2)
‘‘[t]he uncontradicted and documentary evidence establishes that both an
actual and an equitable or constructive trust has arisen in favor of [Guin],
with respect to the subject premises pursuant to the will and trust [of the
decedent],’’ and (3) ‘‘[t]he evidence establishes [Guin’s] right to remain in
the family business premises based upon estoppel.’’
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‘‘On appeal, the function of this court is limited solely
to the determination of whether the factual findings of
the trial court are clearly erroneous or whether the
decision is otherwise erroneous in law. . . . Determin-
ing whether a trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous
involves a two part function: where the legal conclu-
sions of the court are challenged, we must determine
whether they are legally and logically correct and
whether they find support in the facts set out in the
memorandum of decision; where the factual basis of
the court’s decision is challenged we must determine
whether the facts set out in the memorandum of deci-
sion are supported by the evidence or whether, in light
of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record,
these facts are clearly erroneous.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Haynes Construc-
tion Co. v. Cascella & Son Construction, Inc., 36 Conn.
App. 29, 32, 647 A.2d 1015, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 916,
648 A.2d 152 (1994). ‘‘The determination of whether
an equitable doctrine applies in a particular case is a
question of law subject to plenary review.’’ Walpole
Woodworkers, Inc. v. Manning, 307 Conn. 582, 588, 57
A.3d 730 (2012).
The defendants set forth three interrelated argu-
ments. First, they argue that Guin has ‘‘at least equitable
title in the subject property as beneficiary under the
will and trust [of the decedent]. [She] also owns at
least an equitable right to occupy the [subject] premises
throughout the duration of the trust term pursuant to
article V of the trust.’’ The defendants further argue
that, pursuant to the trust, the plaintiff ‘‘has no power
to dispossess [Guin] from the subject real estate.’’ In
rejecting these arguments, the court found that the evi-
dence did not support a finding that the decedent
intended to create in any of the defendants a right to
occupy any of the premises passed from his will to his
trust. The court emphasized that none of the testimonial
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evidence ‘‘create[d] life estates’’ in any of the defendants
and that it was appropriate in this case to focus on the
will and the trust as the clearest expression of the intent
of the decedent. It is particularly persuasive that article
VI, paragraph B, of the trust, captioned ‘‘Discretionary
Termination of Trust,’’ provides: ‘‘The [g]rantor recog-
nizes that there may be circumstances in which it is
not in the best interests of the income beneficiary of a
trust established hereunder to continue such trust in
existence, taking into account all relevant factors,
including the costs of administration and any tax bene-
fits or lack thereof. Accordingly, after the [g]rantor’s
death, the [t]rustee is authorized in its discretion and
for any reason to terminate the trust and distribute any
remaining trust property to the income beneficiary. In
exercising its discretion, the [t]rustee shall have no
obligation to consider the interests of any other person
in the trust.’’9 As the court correctly recognized on the
basis of the undisputed evidence of the estate plan of
the decedent, he could have provided greater rights in
the defendants as beneficiaries of his will and trust, but
he did not do so.10
9
The defendants in AC 46037 attach great importance to article IX, para-
graph V, of the trust, which provides in relevant part: ‘‘The [t]rustee is
authorized to hold residential real property as part of any trust created
under this [a]greement and shall permit the income beneficiary or eligible
income beneficiaries to reside there rent-free during the trust term. . . .’’
The defendants, however, fail to acknowledge the very next sentence of
that section, which clearly reflects that the plaintiff, in her discretion, had
the authority to sell any residential real property, by providing: ‘‘The
[g]rantor, and after the [g]rantor’s death, the [g]rantor’s spouse if the [g]rant-
or’s spouse is the income beneficiary or an eligible income beneficiary, may
at any time direct that such residential property shall be sold.’’
10
We briefly respond to the defendants’ reliance in AC 46037 on our
Supreme Court’s decision in Gaynor v. Payne, 261 Conn. 585, 804 A.2d 170
(2002), which they assert is ‘‘ ‘on all fours’ ’’ with the claim before us. In
Gaynor, our Supreme Court concluded that a decedent’s grandchildren,
who were contingent remaindermen by virtue of a trust established by the
decedent’s will, nonetheless held legally cognizable property interests in
the decedent’s estate. Id., 592–93. Therefore, the court concluded, their
rights to bring an action against the former executor of the decedent’s estate
for mismanagement were not extinguished by a release executed by the
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Second, the defendants argue that the circumstances
compel the conclusion that Guin is the beneficiary of
‘‘a classic constructive trust’’ based on promises and
assurances made to her by the decedent. ‘‘The elements
of a constructive trust are the intent by a grantor to
benefit a third person, the transfer of property to
another who stands in a confidential relationship to the
grantor with the intent that the transferee will transfer
the property to the third person, and the unjust enrich-
ment of the transferee if the transferee is allowed to
keep the property. A constructive trust is created by
operation of law when these elements are present.’’
Gulack v. Gulack, 30 Conn. App. 305, 310, 620 A.2d
181 (1993). Here, the court specifically found that the
defendants had not proven the existence of any ‘‘life-
time promises’’ whereby the defendants were promised
the right to occupy the subject premises beyond the
lifetime of the decedent. The court also found that the
defendants did not present evidence indicating that the
decedent had ‘‘conveyed, or intended to convey, the
ownership of any of the parcels in question in this
matter to his children/grandchildren in occupancy
thereof.’’ As the court explained, there was no evidence
that the decedent had ‘‘[left] any instructions to the
plaintiff to allow possession ‘forever’ to any [of the]
defendants herein.’’ As we have stated previously in
this opinion, the fact that the trust clearly afforded the
trustee the discretion to terminate the trust for the sole
benefit of the plaintiff, as income beneficiary, and to
decedent’s children alone, in favor of the former executor. Id., 594. The
issue addressed in Gaynor is not analogous to the issue before us. We
are being asked to determine whether equitable considerations barred the
plaintiff from being awarded immediate possession of the subject property,
not whether the defendants properly may commence an action against the
plaintiff in her role as executor or trustee. We do not conclude that any of
the defendants who are beneficiaries under the will or trust lack interests
in the subject property; instead, we conclude that such interests do not
preclude the plaintiff from obtaining immediate possession of the subject
property.
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do so with ‘‘no obligation’’ to consider any other benefi-
ciary of the trust, undermines the argument that the
court should have recognized the existence of a con-
structive trust.
Third, the defendants argue that the doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel required a determination that Guin was
entitled to remain in the family business. ‘‘[U]nder the
doctrine of promissory estoppel, [a] promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third per-
son and which does induce such action or forbearance
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise. A fundamental element of promis-
sory estoppel, therefore, is the existence of a clear and
definite promise which a promisor could reasonably
have expected to induce reliance. Thus, a promisor is
not liable to a promisee who has relied on a promise
if, judged by an objective standard, he had no reason
to expect any reliance at all. . . . Further, the promise
must reflect a present intent to commit as distinguished
from a mere statement of intent to contract in the future.
. . . [A] mere expression of intention, hope, desire, or
opinion, which shows no real commitment, cannot be
expected to induce reliance . . . . Additionally,
[a]side from demonstrating the existence of a clear and
definite promise, a plaintiff asserting a claim of promis-
sory estoppel must also establish two additional ele-
ments: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must
do or say something calculated or intended to induce
another party to believe that certain facts exist and to
act on that belief; and the other party must change its
position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring
some injury. . . . It is fundamental that a person who
claims an estoppel must show that he has exercised
due diligence to know the truth, and that he not only
did not know the true state of things but also lacked any
reasonably available means of acquiring knowledge.’’
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(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
TD Bank, N.A. v. Salce, 175 Conn. App. 757, 766–67,
169 A.3d 317 (2017).
In this appeal, the defendants argue, as they did
before the trial court, that, by seeking possession of
the subject property, the plaintiff is denying them bene-
fits that they had bargained for with the decedent. The
defendants also argue that the plaintiff is ‘‘upending’’
the decedent’s estate plan. Moreover, the defendants
argue that they are entitled to equitable relief on the
basis of what they consider to be ‘‘uncontradicted’’ evi-
dence that the decedent had made various promises
and assurances to them over the years with respect to
their right to remain in the subject premises following
his death. In furtherance of these arguments, however,
the defendants merely rely on testimony that the court
found not to be credible. Specifically, the defendants
attempted to demonstrate through testimonial evidence
that the decedent had promised them that they could
remain in the subject premises beyond his death, that
they had relied on such representations to their detri-
ment, and that D’Andrea accepted substandard pay in
exchange for the right to remain at the subject premises
beyond the lifetime of the decedent. The court did not
find this testimony credible.
The defendants do not explicitly suggest that this
court should second-guess the trial court’s credibility
determinations, and it is not our role to do so. Indeed,
we could only set aside the court’s factual findings
flowing from those determinations upon a showing that
they are clearly erroneous, and the defendants have
not met that burden. See Haynes Construction Co. v.
Cascella & Son Construction, Inc., supra, 36 Conn. App.
32. Moreover, for reasons already discussed in this opin-
ion, the will and the trust support a finding that the
decedent had not intended to benefit the defendants
following his death with continued occupancy of the
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subject residence, as those instruments do not reflect
that the decedent had contemplated such an outcome.
C
The defendants in AC 46037 also claim that the court
abused its discretion and prejudiced them by consol-
idating for trial the action underlying this appeal with
four other related summary process actions brought by
the plaintiff in either her individual or representative
capacity. We decline to reach the merits of this claim,
as it is unpreserved.
The defendants argue that the court’s decision to
consolidate the summary process actions was made
without any ‘‘significant consideration at all’’ and that
it resulted in a ‘‘procedural ‘mishmash’ . . . .’’ They
also argue that the ruling was prejudicial because,
despite the fact that the cases were related in that they
were all summary process cases brought by the plaintiff
against family members and there was uniformity of
counsel (and, to some degree, uniformity of defenses)
with respect to the cases consolidated, in light of ‘‘the
complexities of the matter, the differences between the
parties, the differences between legal theories, and the
potential antagonism between various claims and
defenses . . . consolidation was inappropriate and
. . . [was an] abuse of discretion.’’
The plaintiff challenges the reviewability of this claim
on the ground that it was not distinctly raised before
the trial court. ‘‘It is well settled that [o]ur case law and
rules of practice generally limit [an appellate] court’s
review to issues that are distinctly raised at trial. . . .
[O]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and
will this court consider a claim, constitutional or other-
wise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial
court. . . . The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit
a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been
raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the
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opposing party to address the claim—would encourage
trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial
court and the opposing party. . . . [T]he determination
of whether a claim has been properly preserved will
depend on a careful review of the record to ascertain
whether the claim on appeal was articulated below
with sufficient clarity to place the trial court [and the
opposing party] on reasonable notice of that very same
claim.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Lowthert v. Freedom of
Information Commission, 220 Conn. App. 48, 56–57,
297 A.3d 218 (2023).
At the outset, we note that the same attorney repre-
sented all of the defendants in these related summary
process actions. The defendants submit that their attor-
ney expressly objected to the court’s decision to consol-
idate the related cases. Our review of the record reflects
that, at the very beginning of the trial, after the court
expressed its belief that it would be ‘‘easier’’ to hear
all of the cases at once, the plaintiff’s attorney acqui-
esced in this view by noting his opinion that the cases
reflected a ‘‘uniformity of defense . . . .’’ The defen-
dants’ attorney responded to that observation as fol-
lows: ‘‘I understand the . . . desire and the need to
conserve judicial resources. I am concerned that . . .
these cases do stand on their facts separately though
[and that] the defenses are similar in three of the four
cases, but there are factual distinctions and there may
be some overlap as my brother [counsel] has indicated,
but there are some very clear distinctions . . . .’’ The
court responded, ‘‘then I have unlimited judicial
resources for you, counsel.’’ The defendants’ counsel
replied, ‘‘Thank you, Your Honor.’’
The statements made by the defendants’ attorney
appear to have been a response to the opinion expressed
by the plaintiff’s attorney that the defenses in the vari-
ous actions were factually indistinct or that there was
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a uniformity of defense in the consolidated cases. The
defendants’ attorney, however, did not distinctly chal-
lenge the court’s ruling to consolidate. Although it is
not dispositive that the defendants’ attorney did not
use the word ‘‘objection,’’ it is nonetheless significant
that he did not refer to the court’s ruling, did not ask
the court to reconsider its ruling, did not proffer any
legal arguments as to why consolidation was improper,
and did not identify any prejudice that the ruling might
have caused his clients. The defendants’ attorney set
forth his belief, which is reasonable, that each case
should be considered on its own merits. It does not
appear that the plaintiff’s attorney considered this belief
to have risen to the level of an objection to the court’s
ruling, for the plaintiff’s attorney did not respond. More-
over, once the court reassured counsel that it was up
to the task of devoting appropriate attention to each
distinct case, the defendants’ attorney thanked the
court, which reasonably reflected that his concerns had
been addressed to his satisfaction. On this record, we
do not conclude that the defendants’ attorney articu-
lated with sufficient clarity before the trial court the
appellate claim that he presently advances before this
court. The defendants have not demonstrated that this
claim warrants an extraordinary level of review, and,
thus, we decline to review it.11
11
Embedded within their briefing with respect to this unpreserved claim,
the defendants in AC 46037 have raised an additional claim in which they
argue that the court prejudiced them by requiring counsel to file ‘‘a single
posttrial brief encompassing all five cases’’ and that the court improperly
limited posttrial briefs to no more than fifteen pages, in derogation of Prac-
tice Book § 4-6. The defendants presently argue that these ‘‘orders’’
amounted to an abuse of the court’s discretion. The defendants do not direct
our attention to what portion of the record reflects these orders. Assuming,
arguendo, that we have a record of these orders, it appears that the defen-
dants are challenging them for the first time on appeal. The defendants have
not identified when they objected, and we are unable to verify, on the basis
of our review of the voluminous record that they objected to these orders
at trial, the distinct grounds for their objection, and the nature of the court’s
response. This court, relying on Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy, 349 Conn. 513,
589–90, 321 A.3d 295 (2024), recently has stated that ‘‘it is the responsibility
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II
AC 46038
A
First, we address the claim raised by the defendants
in AC 46038 that the notice to quit served on them was
invalid. We are not persuaded.
The following additional factual and procedural his-
tory is relevant to this appeal. It is not in dispute that
the notice to quit served on the defendants was signed
by Mark A. Sank, who is identified on the notice to quit
as the attorney for ‘‘Theresa K. Freccia, Executor.’’12 The
original complaint was brought by ‘‘Theresa K. Freccia,
executor of the estate of Frank J. Freccia, Jr.’’ The
of parties, not an appellate court, to clearly identify how and where in the
record the claim that the party is raising on appeal was preserved for review
and where in the record the trial court’s ruling on the claim may be found
. . . . That is especially true in a case . . . in which the pleadings are
voluminous. We, therefore, decline to review this claim.’’ (Citation omitted;
emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State ex rel. Dunn v.
Burton, 229 Conn. App. 267, 294, 327 A.3d 982 (2024). This court’s rationale
in Burton applies equally to the claim before us. Relying on the authority
discussed in this opinion, and because the defendants have not demonstrated
that they are entitled to an extraordinary level of review of this unpreserved
claim, we decline to reach its merits.
12
The notice to quit provides: ‘‘I hereby give you notice that you are to
quit possession of the premises located at 40 Locust Street, Building 2 and
Garage now occupied by you, on or before September 19, 2021, for the
following reasons:
‘‘-Nonpayment of Rent
‘‘-Lapse of Time
‘‘-You never had a right or privilege to occupy the premises or any part
thereof
‘‘-You originally had a right or privilege to occupy the premises, or any
part thereof, but such right or privilege has terminated
‘‘All payments tendered after service of this Notice to Quit will be
accepted as use and occupancy, attorney’s fees and costs without
waiving any rights to proceed with an eviction action.
‘‘Dated at Stamford, Connecticut this 13th day of August, 2021.
‘‘Theresa K. Freccia, Executor
‘‘By Mark A. Sank, Her Attorney.’’
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revised complaint identifies the plaintiff in the same
manner. The record reflects that, on February 10, 2022,
the plaintiff filed a motion to substitute party plaintiff
and to amend the revised complaint to substitute her-
self, in her individual capacity, as the party plaintiff in
light of the fact that the subject property was held jointly
between the plaintiff and the decedent with rights of
survivorship. The plaintiff represented that, upon the
decedent’s death in 2018, she became the sole owner
of the property. On February 14, 2022, the court granted
the motion.
The defendants argue that ‘‘[t]he undisputed evidence
in this case is that the property known as 40 Locust
[Street], Greenwich . . . was conveyed to [the dece-
dent] and [the plaintiff] jointly with rights of survivor-
ship on July 2, 1979. . . . Further, a purported lease
with respect to the premises, dated June 1, 2019, was
entered into evidence. The landlord on that lease was
‘Theresa K. Freccia.’ . . . In other words, everyone
was well aware that the property was never a part of
[the decedent’s] estate.
‘‘The . . . notice to quit [served on the defendants
in this summary process action] was signed by counsel
on behalf of the ‘Executor of the estate of Frank J.
Freccia, Jr.’ The estate was never an owner or manager
or attorney for the owner of 40 Locust [Street]. As such,
the notice to quit is defective on its face.’’ (Citations
omitted.)
The defendants further argue that, once the plaintiff
recognized that the wrong party had initiated the sum-
mary process action, ‘‘it was not enough to merely sub-
stitute [the plaintiff] personally in lieu of the estate. A
new notice to quit needs to be served. . . . The failure
to serve a notice to quit in the name of the actual owner
of the premises renders it defective and invalid.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted.) The defendants contend that, ‘‘[because]
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the notice to quit in this case is defective on its face,
and since a valid notice to quit is a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite to the case, both the Superior Court and this
Appellate Court lack subject matter jurisdiction to enter-
tain the matter.’’13
The plaintiff counters that the defendants are chal-
lenging the validity of the notice to quit for the first
time in this appeal and, thus, that the claim should not
be reviewed. Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that the
alleged defect did not implicate the subject matter juris-
diction of the trial court and that the notice to quit was
not necessarily defective in the manner argued because,
pursuant to § 47a-23 (a), the notice need only have
included the name of the owner’s legal representative,
attorney-at-law, or attorney-in-fact, and ‘‘it is impossible
to know whether the court considered [Sank], who
indisputably issued and signed the notice to quit, [as]
the attorney-at-law for the owner [of the subject prop-
erty], [the plaintiff in her individual capacity], or for
the lessor [of the subject property], [the plaintiff as
executor of the decedent’s estate], or for both.’’
13
The defendants’ argument in AC 46038 is peculiar in that they argue
that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal that they
themselves brought before this court. It cannot be disputed that, if this
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over their appeal, the proper course
of action would be for this court to dismiss the appeal. See, e.g., T.P. Brewer
Construction Co. v. F & G Associates, 34 Conn. App. 714, 716, 643 A.2d 308
(1994) (‘‘[b]ecause this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal, we must
dismiss the appeal’’). It follows, therefore, that in the absence of appellate
jurisdiction, we would be incapable of providing the defendants the remedy
that they explicitly ask us to afford them, namely, to vacate the underlying
judgment granting the plaintiff possession of the subject property and to
direct the trial court to dismiss the action.
The arguments raised by the defendants call into question whether the
plaintiff properly invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court, but they do not
call into question whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the present
appeal from the final judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the
plaintiff. See Herasimovich v. Wallingford, 149 Conn. App. 325, 327 n.2, 87
A.3d 1177 (2014) (‘‘[t]his court has jurisdiction over any final judgment of
the Superior Court even if that court lacked jurisdiction’’).
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First, we address the plaintiff’s contention that the
claim is unreviewable because the defendants did not
raise it before the trial court. As we discussed in part
I A of this opinion, ‘‘[s]ubject matter jurisdiction involves
the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of
controversy presented by the action before it. . . . [A]
court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case
over which it is without jurisdiction . . . .
‘‘There is no doubt that the Superior Court is author-
ized to hear summary process cases; the Superior Court
is authorized to hear all cases except those over which
the probate courts have original jurisdiction. . . . The
jurisdiction of the Superior Court in summary process
actions, however, is subject to [certain] condition[s]
precedent. . . . Our Supreme Court has stated that [a]s
a condition precedent to a summary process action,
proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional necessity. . . .
Simply put, before a landlord may pursue its statutory
remedy of summary process, the landlord must prove
compliance with all of the applicable preconditions set
by state and federal law for the termination of the
lease. . . .
‘‘In general, the conditions that must be met prior to
the commencement of a summary process action are set
forth in § 47a-23. To invoke the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction over a summary process action, a landlord
must therefore, at a minimum, prove compliance with
§ 47a-23, which requires a landlord seeking to terminate
a lease or rental agreement for serious nuisance to
deliver to the occupant or lessee a notice to quit posses-
sion. In contrast to a pretermination notice, which pro-
vides the tenant with an opportunity to remedy viola-
tions and does not terminate a tenancy, service of a
notice to quit possession pursuant to § 47a-23 is typi-
cally an unequivocal act terminating a lease agreement
with a tenant. . . . The notice to quit must be in writ-
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ing, notify the tenant that the tenant must quit posses-
sion or occupancy of the premises on a specified date,
include the address of the property, and state the reason
or reasons for the notice to quit possession or occu-
pancy using the statutory language or words of similar
import. General Statutes § 47a-23 (b).
‘‘It follows that, for purposes of determining whether
it had subject matter jurisdiction over [a] . . . sum-
mary process action, [a trial] court . . . need[s] to
determine only whether the notice to quit issued by [a]
plaintiff complied with § 47a-23. . . .
‘‘[T]o establish subject matter jurisdiction, the court
must determine that it has the power to hear the general
class [of cases] to which the proceedings in question
belong.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Ste-
vens, 209 Conn. App. 569, 577–79, 267 A.3d 927, cert.
denied, 343 Conn. 907, 273 A.3d 234 (2022).
Ordinarily, ‘‘[o]nly in [the] most exceptional circum-
stances can and will [an appellate] court consider a
claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been
raised and decided in the trial court. . . . A claim that
a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, however, may
be raised at any time during the proceedings, including
for the first time on appeal.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mangiafico
v. Farmington, 331 Conn. 404, 429–30, 204 A.3d 1138
(2019). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the
defendants’ claim is not reviewable.
Second, we turn to the merits of the claim, which,
consistent with the principles set forth previously in
this opinion, may be distilled to the issue of whether
the plaintiff strictly complied with § 47a-23.14 We are
14
General Statutes § 47a-23 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) When the owner
or lessor, or the owner’s or lessor’s legal representative, or the owner’s or
lessor’s attorney-at-law, or in-fact, desires to obtain possession or occupancy
of any land or building, any apartment in any building, any dwelling unit,
any trailer, or any land upon which a trailer is used or stands, and (1) when
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guided in our resolution of this claim by the legal princi-
ples set forth and this court’s analysis in U.S. Bank
National Assn. v. Karl, 128 Conn. App. 805, 18 A.3d
685, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 909, 23 A.3d 1249 (2011), a
case on which the plaintiff relies. In U.S. Bank National
Assn., the defendants in a summary process action filed
a motion to dismiss in the trial court on the ground
that the notice to quit that had been served on them
was improper for failure to name the landlord or owner
of the subject property, thereby depriving the court
of subject matter jurisdiction. Id., 807. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss and rendered a judgment
of possession in favor of the plaintiff. Id., 807–808.
On appeal to this court, the defendants in U.S. Bank
National Assn. claimed that the notice to quit was
defective and, thus, that the court improperly denied
the motion to dismiss. Id., 806, 808. This court set forth
a rental agreement or lease of such property, whether in writing or by parol,
terminates for any of the following reasons: (A) By lapse of time . . . or
(3) when one originally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises
but such right or privilege has terminated . . . such owner or lessor, or
such owner’s or lessor’s legal representative, or such owner’s or lessor’s
attorney-at-law, or in-fact, shall give notice to each lessee or occupant to
quit possession or occupancy of such land, building, apartment or dwelling
unit, at least three days before the termination of the rental agreement or
lease, if any, or before the time specified in the notice for the lessee or
occupant to quit possession or occupancy.
‘‘(b) The notice shall be in writing substantially in the following form: ‘I
(or we) hereby give you notice that you are to quit possession or occupancy
of the (land, building, apartment or dwelling unit, or of any trailer or any
land upon which a trailer is used or stands, as the case may be), now
occupied by you at (here insert the address, including apartment number
or other designation, as applicable), on or before the (here insert the date)
for the following reason (here insert the reason or reasons for the notice
to quit possession or occupancy using the statutory language or words of
similar import, also the date and place of signing notice). A.B.’. If the owner
or lessor, or the owner’s or lessor’s legal representative, attorney-at-law or
attorney-in-fact knows of the presence of an occupant but does not know
the name of such occupant, the notice for such occupant may be addressed
to such occupant as ‘John Doe’, ‘Jane Doe’ or some other alias which
reasonably characterizes the person to be served. . . .’’
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relevant principles, stating: ‘‘Before the [trial] court can
entertain a summary process action and evict a tenant,
the owner of the land must previously have served the
tenant with notice to quit. . . . As a condition prece-
dent to a summary process action, proper notice to quit
[pursuant to § 47a-23] is a jurisdictional necessity. . . .
This court’s review of the trial court’s determination as
to whether the notice to quit served by the plaintiff
effectively conferred subject matter jurisdiction is ple-
nary. . . .
‘‘We further observe that [s]ummary process is a spe-
cial statutory procedure designed to provide an expedi-
tious remedy. . . . It enable[s] landlords to obtain pos-
session of leased premises without suffering the delay,
loss and expense to which, under the common-law
actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully
holding over their terms. . . . Summary process stat-
utes secure a prompt hearing and final determination.
. . . Therefore, the statutes relating to summary pro-
cess must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 808–809.
The court then addressed the merits of the claim,
stating: ‘‘The text of § 47a-23 is clear and unambiguous.
The legislature used language indicating that notice
shall be given by ‘owner or lessor, or the owner’s or
lessor’s legal representative, or the owner’s or lessor’s
attorney-at-law, or in-fact.’ In fact, three times in this
statutory section, the legislature identified ‘the owner’s
or lessor’s legal representative, or the owner’s or les-
sor’s attorney-at-law, or in-fact’ as one category of indi-
viduals authorized by the statute to provide notice. The
use of the word ‘or’ in § 47a-23, instead of ‘and,’ suggests
‘in the alternative.’ Because the owner and the owner’s
legal representative both are included in the specific
array of possible individuals who might give notice, we
cannot see how the statute as written requires that the
notice to quit reflect both the owner’s identity and the
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identity of the owner’s legal representative, attorney-
at-law or attorney-in-fact.
‘‘Furthermore, if, in contemplating the content of the
notice to quit, the legislature considered the identity of
the owner to be necessary, it could have included such
requirement in the list of information under § 47a-23
(b) where it provides that ‘notice shall be in writing
substantially in the following form . . . .’ It is well set-
tled that ‘[w]e are not permitted to supply statutory
language that the legislature may have chosen to omit.’ ’’
(Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 809–10.
In the present case, it is not disputed that in these
related summary process actions, Sank represented the
plaintiff, both in her individual capacity and in her repre-
sentative capacity in connection with the estate of the
decedent. Although the notice to quit in the underlying
action identified the party who brought the notice to
quit as ‘‘Theresa K. Freccia, Executor,’’ the notice was
signed by Sank as ‘‘[h]er [a]ttorney.’’ The notice did not
expressly identify the owner of the subject premises,
let alone state that the estate was the owner. The notice,
however, identified Sank, the attorney-at-law for the
owner, the plaintiff. The fact that the notice stated that
it was being brought by the plaintiff as ‘‘[e]xecutor’’ did
not detract from the fact that it identified Sank who
was the plaintiff’s attorney. Because it cannot be dis-
puted that the notice to quit accurately identified the
owner’s attorney-at-law, we do not conclude that it
failed to comply with § 47a-23, despite the fact that it
did not also accurately identify the owner. As U.S. Bank
National Assn. instructs, it is unnecessary for the
owner to be identified as long as the owner’s attorney-
at-law, attorney-in-fact, or legal representative is identi-
fied in the written notice to quit; U.S. Bank National
Assn. v. Karl, supra, 128 Conn. App. 809–10;15 as
15
The defendants in AC 46038 argue that the present claim is governed
by this court’s decision in Success, Inc. v. Curcio, supra, 160 Conn. App.
153. The defendants in Success, Inc., appealed from a judgment of immediate
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occurred here. Accordingly, we conclude that the plain-
tiff properly invoked the court’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion.
B
Next, the defendants in AC 46038 claim that the court
improperly failed to conclude that equitable considera-
tions precluded the plaintiff from obtaining judgment
in her favor. We are not persuaded.
The defendants argue, first, that ‘‘an equitable or con-
structive trust has arisen in favor of Frank and Tammie
. . . regarding their home by virtue of promises and
assurances made by [the decedent] and the plaintiff.’’
The defendants argue: ‘‘[The decedent] made promises
and assurances to Frank that he would always be taken
care of. Did Frank and Tammie not order their lives in
reliance on these assurances? Frank and Tammie clearly
believed, based on the promises made by Frank’s par-
ents and elders that he would live in his home at 40
Locust Street, for life, always, following the traditions
of his father, grandfather, and great grandfather before
him. . . . Frank went to college, but only for a short
time; instead, he worked as a mechanic for the genera-
tional family auto business . . . from which he earned
wages well below market rates for decades . . . . He
works there, continuing the family business, to this day.
‘‘Frank and Tammie expended time and exerted phys-
ical labor to perform major renovations to the home,
as proved in testimony and photographs . . . . Frank
possession rendered in a summary process action, claiming that the plaintiff
lacked standing to pursue the action because it was not the legal owner of
the subject premises. Id., 154–55. This court reversed the judgment of the
trial court after concluding that the court’s finding that the plaintiff suffi-
ciently proved its legal ownership of the subject premises was clearly errone-
ous. Id., 179. Success, Inc., however, unlike the present case, did not involve
a situation in which a notice to quit accurately set forth the attorney-at-law
for the undisputed owner of the subject premises. Thus, Success, Inc., does
not alter our conclusion that the defendants’ claim is not persuasive.
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raised his family in the house his parents gave him,
promised him by his father and mother to be his for
life. Not once was there ever an effort to evict Frank
or move him from his home at 40 Locust Street, before
[the decedent] died in January of 2018. Frank would ask
his father about life insurance and financial questions,
getting retirement accounts, and [the decedent] told
[him], ‘no, you’ll always have the land.’ ’’ (Citations omit-
ted.) The defendants also rely on what they believe to
have been statements made by the plaintiff ‘‘encourag-
ing them’’ to move into the residence at 40 Locust Street.
The defendants argue that Tammie’s testimony demon-
strates that the decedent, Frank, and Tammie ‘‘agreed’’
that Frank would ‘‘dedicate his life to working at the
garage’’ and that his family could live at 40 Locust Street
‘‘ ‘forever.’ ’’ (Emphasis omitted.)
Second, relying on the same alleged facts, the defen-
dants argue that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
applied in the present case because the evidence dem-
onstrated that the decedent had fabricated a ‘‘global
plan’’ on which they relied. In other words, the defen-
dants argue that the decedent led them to believe that
they would enjoy rights over the subject property, the
defendants relied on those representations, and the
plaintiff now seeks to bar them from enjoying what had
been promised to them.
The arguments raised by the defendants in this appeal
are similar to arguments that were raised by the defen-
dants in AC 46037 and addressed in part I B of this
opinion. It would serve no useful purpose to reiterate
the legal principles set forth therein, which likewise
govern this claim. Moreover, although the defendants
in the present appeal rely on evidence distinct to the
underlying action brought against them, the operative
factual findings on which we relied in part I B of this
opinion compel the conclusion that the defendants are
unable to demonstrate that the equitable doctrines on
which they rely apply in this case. The court did not
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find credible the testimony at trial that the decedent
had made promises to the effect that the defendants
could remain in the subject premises beyond his death
and that the defendants had relied on such representa-
tions to their detriment. The court characterized the
representations allegedly made by the decedent as ‘‘con-
venient memories’’ that were unequivocally contra-
dicted by the decedent’s written estate plans. The court
specifically found that the defendants did not believe
that they had the right to remain in the subject premises
‘‘forever’’ and found that, even if an implicit promise
to that extent had been made, it certainly could not
have extended beyond the decedent’s life. The defen-
dants have failed to demonstrate that these critical fac-
tual determinations were clearly erroneous, and, thus,
they have failed to demonstrate that the court erred in
rejecting their equitable defenses.
C
Finally, the defendants in AC 46038 claim that the
court abused its discretion and prejudiced them by con-
solidating for trial the action underlying this appeal
with four other related summary process actions. We
decline to reach the merits of this unpreserved claim
of error.
The present claim and the arguments made by the
defendants in support thereof, are identical to the claim
and arguments that we addressed in part I C of this
opinion. It would serve no useful purpose to reiterate
our discussion of that claim again here. Relying on our
analysis in part I C, we decline to reach the merits of
this unpreserved claim.
III
AC 46040
A
First, the defendant in AC 46040 claims that the plain-
tiff lacked standing to commence the action. We are
not persuaded.
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In support of this unpreserved claim, the defendant
argues that the plaintiff’s commencement of the under-
lying summary process action reflects an abuse of her
authority under the will and trust of the decedent and
that the plaintiff is acting in her own self-interest rather
than acting as a fiduciary on behalf of the estate of
the decedent. Having carefully examined the arguments
raised by the defendant, we conclude that they are
substantially the same as those raised by the defendants
in AC 46037, which we rejected in part I A of this
opinion. It would serve no useful purpose to reiterate
that analysis here. Relying on our analysis in part I A of
this opinion, we conclude that the defendant’s standing
claim is without merit.
B
Next, the defendant in AC 46040 claims that the court
improperly failed to conclude that he had a present
right to remain in the subject property or that equitable
considerations precluded the plaintiff from obtaining
judgment in her favor. We are not persuaded.
The defendant argues that by virtue of his beneficiary
status under the will and trust of the decedent, he has
a ‘‘present, vested right in the real estate subject to this
summary process action . . . .’’ The defendant also
argues that the will and trust executed by the decedent
‘‘reflect oral promises made to Frank to the effect that
he would always be taken care of.’’ The defendant relies
on evidence that, in his view, demonstrated that he
worked for the family business on terms favorable to
the business in reliance on the alleged promises made
by his father. He argues that, ‘‘[w]hether based on the
express promises contained in the will and trust instru-
ments, or the many promises and assurances made by
[the decedent] to Frank over the years . . . the evi-
dence amply establishes that the subject premises must
be maintained in constructive trust for Frank and [the
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decedent’s] other descendants . . . . [The plaintiff’s]
attempt to dispossess the family from the family busi-
ness and liquidate the assets contravenes both [the
decedent’s] express written intent as well as his conduct
over the course of decades.’’ Moreover, the defendant
argues that, in light of promises made to him by the
decedent, and his reliance on those promises to his
detriment, the doctrine of estoppel prohibits the plain-
tiff from obtaining possession of the subject premises.
The arguments raised by the defendant in this appeal
are similar to those raised by the defendants in AC
46037 and addressed in part I B of this opinion. It would
serve no useful purpose to reiterate the legal principles
set forth therein, which likewise govern this claim.
Despite the factual differences involving the underlying
action, the operative factual findings on which we relied
in part I B of this opinion compel the conclusion that
the defendant is unable to demonstrate that he had a
present right to occupy the property forever by virtue
of his beneficiary status under the will or the trust, both
of which authorized the plaintiff to dispossess him from
the property and dispose of it as she saw fit. Moreover,
the defendant is unable to demonstrate that the equita-
ble doctrines on which he relies apply in this case. As
we stated previously in this opinion, the court did not
find credible the testimony at trial that the decedent
made promises to the effect that the defendant could
remain in the subject premises beyond his death and
that the defendant had relied on such representations
to his detriment, characterizing these claimed represen-
tations as ‘‘convenient memories’’ that were unequivo-
cally contradicted by the decedent’s written estate
plans. The court specifically found that the defendant,
did not believe that he had the right to remain in the
subject premises ‘‘forever’’ and found that, even if an
implicit promise to that extent had been made, it cer-
tainly could not have extended beyond the life of the
decedent.
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Moreover, the court reasonably concluded that the
defendant’s conduct, in signing a lease for the subject
premises in 2019, undermined the credibility of his testi-
mony that he believed he had a right to occupy the
subject premises pursuant to promises made by the
decedent. The court stated that, ‘‘if the defendant . . .
truly believed he had a right to stay at the property
forever without payment, why would he execute the
2019 lease? It was not because of duress, but because
he knew he had no continual ongoing right and his
arguments that he has a forever right to possession
without compensation are just a convenient legal theory
now that the plaintiff is seeking possession.’’ The defen-
dant has failed to demonstrate that the court’s factual
determinations were clearly erroneous and, thus, he
has failed to demonstrate that the court erred in
rejecting his equitable defenses.
C
Finally, the defendant in AC 46040 argues that the
court abused its discretion and prejudiced him by con-
solidating for trial the action underlying this appeal
with four other related summary process actions. For
the reasons previously stated in part I C of this opinion,
we decline to reach the merits of this unpreserved claim
of error.
The present claim and the arguments made by the
defendant in support thereof, are identical to the claim
and arguments addressed in part I C of this opinion. It
would serve no useful purpose to reiterate our discus-
sion of that claim again here.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.