Worth v. Picard

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Worth v. Picard

KEYIN WORTH v. CHRISTOPHER J.
PICARD ET AL.
(AC 46144)
Moll, Cradle and Clark, Js.*

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her
action against the defendants for damages arising from her ejection from
a residence during the enforcement of a summary process execution for
possession. During the pendency of the appeal, the parties entered into a
settlement agreement, and the trial court granted the defendants’ motions
to enforce the agreement, from which the plaintiff filed an amended appeal.
She claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly granted the defendants’
motions because the draft settlement documents the defendants submitted
to her did not reflect material aspects of the parties’ agreement. Held:

The trial court properly granted the defendants’ motions to enforce the
settlement agreement, as any dispute as to purported deficiencies in the draft
settlement documents was immaterial to the formation of the settlement
agreement, and, thus, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court
dismissing the plaintiff’s action.

Argued February 11—officially released June 3, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, conversion,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Waterbury, where the court,
D’Andrea, J., granted the motion to dismiss filed by the
named defendant et al. and rendered judgment thereon,
from which the plaintiff appealed to this court; there-
after, the court, Cordani, J., granted the defendants’
motions to enforce a settlement agreement, and the
plaintiff filed an amended appeal. Affirmed.

Keyin Worth, self-represented, the appellant (plain-
tiff).
* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
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Worth v. Picard

Benjamin T. Staskiewicz, for the appellees (named
defendant et al.).

Peter T. Fay, for the appellee (defendant AllPoints
Realty, Inc.).

David S. Doyle, for the appellee (Mortgage Con-
tracting Services, LLC).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The dispositive issue in this appeal
filed by the self-represented plaintiff, Keyin Worth, is
whether the trial court, following an Audubon hearing,1
properly granted motions to enforce a settlement agree-
ment filed by the defendants, Christopher J. Picard,
AllPoints Realty, Inc. (AllPoints), Mortgage Contracting
Services, LLC (MCS), Silver and Oak Realty CT, LLC
(Silver and Oak), Jonathan Gineo, and Michael Garcarz.2
We conclude that the trial court properly granted the
motions to enforce the settlement agreement and, there-
fore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. In 2018, the plaintiff com-
menced an action against Picard, Edward DiLieto, and
1
‘‘An Audubon hearing is conducted to decide whether the terms of a
settlement agreement are sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to be
enforceable as a matter of law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 307
White Street Realty, LLC v. Beaver Brook Group, LLC, 216 Conn. App. 750,
757 n.5, 286 A.3d 467 (2022); see also Audubon Parking Associates Ltd.
Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 811–12, 626 A.2d
729 (1993).
2
The plaintiff also named as defendants in the present action (1) Gail
Caroll, in her capacity as the fiduciary of the estate of Laura G. Urban,
against whom the plaintiff subsequently withdrew the present action, and
(2) four nonappearing Doe defendants. In the interest of simplicity, we refer
to Picard, AllPoints, MCS, Silver and Oak, Gineo, and Garcarz individually
by name and collectively as the defendants.
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Willie Davis, Jr. See Worth v. Picard, Superior Court,
3

judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-18-
5021726-S (2018 action).4 The plaintiff asserted various
claims predicated on allegations that, on or around
March 27, 2018, during the enforcement of a summary
process execution for possession that resulted in her
ejection from a Wolcott property at which she resided,5
some of her personal possessions were misappropri-
ated.
Meanwhile, in June, 2021, while the proceedings in
the 2018 action were ongoing, the plaintiff commenced
the present action. In her revised first amended verified
complaint dated October 24, 2021, the plaintiff asserted
various claims predicated on allegations that some of
her personal possessions were misappropriated in con-
nection with her eviction from the Wolcott property.
On December 30, 2021, Picard, Silver and Oak, Gineo,
and Garcarz filed an amended motion to dismiss the
present action,6 inter alia, on the basis of the prior
pending action doctrine. On January 5, 2022, the plain-
tiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the
3
The plaintiff named Picard, who is a member of the bar of this state, as
a defendant in the 2018 action ‘‘as attorney and as individual.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Worth v. Picard, 218 Conn. App. 549, 550 n.2,
292 A.3d 754 (2023). Additionally, the plaintiff named DiLieto and Davis,
Jr., both of whom are state marshals, as defendants in the 2018 action
in their respective individual and official capacities. Id. In the interest of
simplicity, we do not distinguish between these various capacities when
referring to these individuals.
4
The plaintiff also named as defendants in the 2018 action (1) Edmar
Services, LLC, against which the plaintiff subsequently withdrew the 2018
action, and (2) nonappearing entities identified only as ‘‘Trucking and Moving
Providers.’’
5
In 2016, nonparty Bank of New York Mellon, formerly known as the
Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificateholders of CWALT, Inc.,
Alternative Loan Trust 2007-OH1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-OH1, commenced a summary process action against the plaintiff
with respect to the Wolcott property. On May 19, 2017, the trial court,
Avallone, J., rendered a judgment of possession against the plaintiff, and,
on March 15, 2018, a summary process execution for possession was issued.
6
On June 23, 2021, Picard, alone, filed a motion to dismiss the present
action, which motion was later amended on September 8, 2021.
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amended motion to dismiss. On December 16, 2022, the
trial court, D’Andrea, J., granted the amended motion
to dismiss pursuant to the prior pending action doctrine,
dismissing the present action in its entirety.7 On January
4, 2023, the plaintiff filed this appeal.8
7
Additionally, the moving defendants requested a prohibitory order pre-
venting the plaintiff from commencing any new actions associated with the
Wolcott property or any alleged losses from the disposition of her personal
belongings in connection with her eviction from the Wolcott property. In
granting the amended motion to dismiss, the court entered the following
order: ‘‘The plaintiff . . . is precluded from filing any new actions against
the defendants. Should the plaintiff attempt to file any new actions, all
proposed filings will be reviewed by this court. If the court, after review,
deems the filings to contain frivolous allegations or should they obviously fail
to state claims upon which relief can be granted, or they contain allegations
similar to the allegations contained in this case and previous case so that
they are in effect adjudicating the same underlying rights, any proposed
actions will be rejected by the clerk’s office at the direction of the court
and returned to the plaintiff. The court will not open a file as an official
record within the Judicial Branch as it has been done in the past without
this review. In the event that the proposed filing is not one as described
above and states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court will
process the filings in the usual manner.’’
In her principal appellate brief, the plaintiff makes a brief reference to the
court’s ‘‘filing injunction’’ with no accompanying substantive legal analysis
challenging its propriety. Thus, insofar as the plaintiff attempts to raise a
claim of error as to the court’s prohibitory order, we deem any such claim
to be abandoned as inadequately briefed. See Long Manor Owners’ Assn.,
Inc. v. Alungbe, 218 Conn. App. 415, 422–23, 292 A.3d 85 (‘‘Both this court
and our Supreme Court repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through
an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue
properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims
of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth
their arguments in their briefs. . . . The parties may not merely cite a legal
principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case
and the law cited. . . . In addition, although we acknowledge that self-
represented litigants are afforded some latitude, the right of self-representa-
tion provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 909, 303 A.3d 10 (2023); see also
Worth v. Picard, 218 Conn. App. 549, 551 n.3, 292 A.3d 754 (2023).
8
On December 28, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue/reconsider
the judgment of dismissal, which the court summarily denied thereafter.
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In connection with this appeal, appellate preargu-
ment conferences (PACs) were held by the Honorable
Richard N. Palmer on April 13, May 23 and June 14, 2023.
On October 13, 2023, DiLieto and Davis, Jr. (marshal
defendants) filed in the 2018 action a motion to enforce
an alleged settlement agreement that had been reached
during the course of the PACs and requested that the
court conduct an Audubon hearing. On November 3,
2023, AllPoints filed in the present action a motion to
enforce the alleged settlement agreement, which MCS
adopted in its own motion on November 14, 2023. On
November 27, 2023, Picard, Silver and Oak, Gineo, and
Garcarz filed a separate motion to enforce the alleged
settlement agreement. The plaintiff filed objections to
these motions to enforce.
On January 26, 2024, the court, Cordani, J., held an
Audubon hearing encompassing the motions to enforce
the settlement agreement filed in both the present
action and the 2018 action. The hearing was attended
by respective counsel for (1) the marshal defendants,
(2) MCS, (3) AllPoints, and (4) Picard, Garcarz, Gineo,
and Silver and Oak. The plaintiff did not attend the
hearing; nevertheless, the court decided to ‘‘proceed in
her absence, finding that she’s apparently intentionally
waived the right to participate in the hearing.’’9 Several
exhibits, including email correspondence, were admit-
ted into the record, and the court heard testimony from
(1) Attorney Joseph B. Burns, the marshal defendants’
counsel, and (2) Attorney Peter T. Fay, AllPoints’ coun-
sel.
On February 7, 2024, the court issued a memorandum
of decision granting the defendants’ motions to enforce
9
On January 25, 2024, the plaintiff filed a notice indicating that she would
not participate in the Audubon hearing in light of this pending appeal, as
well as an amended appeal that she intended to file. Notwithstanding the
plaintiff’s failure to attend the hearing, the court stated in its decision grant-
ing the defendants’ motions to enforce the settlement agreement that it had
considered the plaintiff’s written objections to the motions.
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the settlement agreement.10 The court made the follow-
ing factual findings. Although they were not parties to
the present action, the marshal defendants were invited
to attend the May 23 and June 14, 2023 PACs to deter-
mine ‘‘whether a global resolution could be achieved
because the [2018 action and the present action] were
closely related.’’ At the June 14, 2023 PAC, the plaintiff,
the defendants, and the marshal defendants agreed to
‘‘a full and final settlement agreement,’’ pursuant to
which (1) the defendants and the marshal defendants,
collectively, would pay the plaintiff a total of $168,000,
(2) the plaintiff would execute a full and final general
release in favor of (a) the defendants, including their
(i) attorneys and law firms and (ii) insurers, (b) the
marshal defendants, including their (i) attorneys and
law firms and (ii) insurers, and (c) the Bank of New
York (BNY),11 including its affiliates, subsidiaries, pre-
decessors, and successors,12 (3) the defendants and the
10
The court simultaneously granted the marshal defendants’ motion to
enforce the settlement agreement, which is not at issue in this appeal. See
footnote 17 of this opinion.
Additionally, we note that the court’s decision, as well as the trial court
case detail, appear to indicate that the court granted only AllPoints’ motion
to enforce the settlement agreement, with no accompanying grants of the
separate motions filed by (1) MCS (which had adopted AllPoints’ motion)
and (2) Picard, Garcarz, Gineo, and Silver and Oak. The court stated, how-
ever, that its decision ‘‘applie[d] to the defendants’ motions to enforce a
settlement agreement in both [the 2018 action and the present action] . . . .’’
We interpret the court’s decision to have granted all of the respective motions
to enforce the settlement agreement filed by the defendants in the pres-
ent action.
11
This entity’s full name is the Bank of New York Mellon, formerly known
as the Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificateholders of CWALT,
Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2007-OH1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-OH1. See footnote 5 of this opinion.
12
The court further found that the settlement agreement ‘‘provided for a
standard general release from the plaintiff to the specified parties as follows:
‘The plaintiff hereby forever releases each defendant in the 2018 [action]
and in the [present action], the attorneys and law firms representing each
of the foregoing defendants in the foregoing litigations, each insurance
company insuring the foregoing defendants and/or attorneys, and [BNY],
its affiliates, subsidiaries, predecessors, and successors from all claims,
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marshal defendants would execute a full and final gen-
eral release in favor of the plaintiff,13 and (4) the terms
of the settlement would be confidential.14 Following the
June 14, 2023 PAC, ‘‘the parties went away to document
the foregoing agreement. The terms of the agreement
were simple, clear and unambiguous. All parties under-
stood the simple, unambiguous terms of the settlement
agreement. The settlement agreement was also consis-
tent with the situation that the parties found themselves
in and represented a reasonable and standard resolution
to the situation.’’ As the court further determined, ‘‘[t]he
settlement agreement was voluntarily and knowingly
reached by the parties at the [June 14, 2023] PAC. There
was a meeting of the minds of all parties that a full and
final settlement agreement on the terms found by the
court was reached. The settlement agreement was com-
pletely made in the presence of [Justice Palmer] during
a PAC wherein the very purpose of the PAC was to strive
for a settlement. Accordingly, the settlement agreement
was made directly and completely within the confines
of the court processes and in the presence of Justice
Palmer.’’ The defendants and the marshal defendants
drafted and submitted proposed releases to the plaintiff;
causes of action, damages, and demands that the plaintiff had, whether
known or unknown, as of June 14, 2023, including without limitation all
claims and causes of action asserted in the 2018 [action] and the [present
action].’ ’’
13
The court further found that the settlement agreement ‘‘provided for a
standard general release from the defendants [and the marshal defendants]
to the plaintiff as follows: ‘Each defendant in the 2018 [action] and in the
[present action] forever releases the plaintiff from all claims, causes of
action, damages, and demands that each such defendant had, whether known
or unknown, as of June 14, 2023, including without limitation all claims and
causes of action arising out of the 2018 [action] and the [present action].’ ’’
14
The court further found that (1) a ‘‘potential settlement agreement’’ had
been reached during the May 23, 2023 PAC, pursuant to which the plaintiff
would have been paid a total of $120,000, but a dispute arose as to whether
the plaintiff would execute a general release in favor of BNY, and (2) ‘‘the
payment was specifically increased [from $120,000 to $168,000 in the full
and final settlement agreement] as further compensation for the inclusion
of [BNY] and its related parties in the release.’’
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however, upon receipt of the proposed releases, the
plaintiff refused to proceed with the settlement.

Following the Audubon hearing, ‘‘the court [was] con-
vinced that the parties voluntarily and knowingly agreed
to a definitive settlement of the 2018 [action] and the
[present action] on the terms specified by the court in
its factual findings, namely, a total aggregate payment
of $168,000, the exchange of general releases as speci-
fied in the [court’s] findings of fact, and confidentiality.
The terms of the settlement were definitive, simple,
clear, and unambiguous. [The motions to enforce raised
matters] in equity and ask[ed] that the court use its
equitable powers to enforce a settlement agreement
reached in a mediation of this ongoing litigation. . . .
Enforcing a settlement such as this [would preserve]
the integrity of the litigation process, as well as the use
of settlements as a meaningful and predictable way of
settling litigation. When parties settle a litigation, they
are in effect contracting for the right to avoid trial.
. . . Accordingly, the court will enforce the settlement
agreement reached.’’ (Citations omitted.) The court
ordered (1) the settlement agreement to be consum-
mated per the terms found by the court and (2) the
plaintiff to withdraw the 2018 action and the present
action within thirty days.15 On February 13, 2024, the
plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, which the court
denied on February 20, 2024. On March 1, 2024, the
plaintiff amended this appeal to encompass, inter alia,
15
The court further ordered that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff must also withdraw any
other litigation or claims wherein the claims are released by the general
release contained within the settlement agreement.’’
Additionally, on April 10, 2024, in response to a motion for articulation
filed by the plaintiff, the court issued an articulation stating in relevant part
that ‘‘nothing in the court’s decision comments upon or impacts the plaintiff’s
ability to make reports to the Connecticut Grievance Committee. Further,
nothing in the settlement agreement reached between the parties inhibits
the plaintiff’s ability to file grievances.’’
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the February 7, 2024 decision.16 Additional facts and
procedural history will be set forth as necessary.17
The plaintiff raises several claims of error, including
that the court improperly granted the defendants’
motions to enforce the settlement agreement. For the
reasons that follow, we conclude that the court properly
granted the defendants’ motions to enforce the settle-
ment agreement,18 which conclusion is dispositive of
16
In January, 2024, the plaintiff filed two additional amended appeals,
which indicated that she was challenging various decisions issued prior to
the February 7, 2024 decision.
Additionally, on March 4, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate and
to set aside the February 7, 2024 decision, which the court summarily denied
on March 18, 2024. On April 2, 2024, the plaintiff amended this appeal to
encompass the court’s denial of her motion to vacate and to set aside.
Although the plaintiff acknowledges this fourth amended appeal in her
supplemental appellate brief filed, with permission from this court, on June
3, 2024, as well as in her reply brief filed on October 1, 2024, she raises no
cognizable claim of error as to the denial of her motion to vacate and to
set aside, thereby abandoning any such claim. See New Milford v. Standard
Demolition Services, Inc., 212 Conn. App. 30, 34 n.1, 274 A.3d 911 (claims
of error not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned), cert. denied, 345
Conn. 908, 283 A.3d 506 (2022).
17
On January 26, 2024, the plaintiff filed an appeal in the 2018 action,
which she later amended to encompass the court’s grant of the marshal
defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement. On March 27, 2024,
this court dismissed the original appeal filed in the 2018 action for lack of
a final judgment and consolidated the amended appeal filed in the 2018
action with this appeal. On April 8, 2024, the plaintiff withdrew the amended
appeal filed in the 2018 action. Thus, the plaintiff is not pursuing any claim
of error in this appeal with regard to any decision in the 2018 action.
18
In its appellate brief, AllPoints argues that this appeal is moot as to the
grant of the defendants’ motions to enforce the settlement agreement
because the plaintiff withdrew her appeal from the simultaneous grant of
the marshal defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement in the
2018 action; see footnote 17 of this opinion; such that, ‘‘even if the plaintiff
were to prevail on this issue in the present action, the . . . decision in the
[2018 action] remains in effect.’’ See Bongiorno v. J & G Realty, LLC,
211 Conn. App. 311, 322, 272 A.3d 700 (2022) (‘‘Mootness is a question of
justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it
implicates [this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . A determination
regarding . . . [this court’s] subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law
. . . [and, therefore] our review is plenary. . . . [I]t is not the province of
appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting
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this appeal. 19

We begin by setting forth the following applicable
legal principles and standard of review. ‘‘A trial court
has the inherent power to enforce summarily a settle-
ment agreement as a matter of law when the terms of
the agreement are clear and unambiguous. . . . Agree-
ments that end lawsuits are contracts, sometimes
enforceable in a subsequent suit, but in many situations
enforceable by entry of a judgment in the original suit.
. . . Summary enforcement is not only essential to the
efficient use of judicial resources, but also preserves
the integrity of settlement as a meaningful way to
resolve legal disputes. When parties agree to settle a
case, they are effectively contracting for the right to
avoid a trial. . . . Nevertheless, the right to enforce
summarily a settlement agreement is not unbounded.
The key element with regard to the settlement agree-
ment in [Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership
v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 812, 626 A.2d
729 (1993) (Audubon)] . . . [was] that there [was] no
of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can
follow. . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether
a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also id., 320–21 (‘‘[o]nce the ques-
tion of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be resolved
before the court addresses the merits of the plaintiff’s claims’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). AllPoints, however, is not a party to the 2018
action, and, thus, if the plaintiff were to prevail in this appeal, AllPoints
would have no standing to seek to enforce the decision granting the marshal
defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement in the 2018 action.
See, e.g., In re Leeanna B., 142 Conn. App. 60, 66, 62 A.3d 1135 (2013)
(nonparty lacked standing to file motion for contempt). As such, we reject
AllPoints’ mootness argument. Moreover, to the extent AllPoints claims that
the decision in the 2018 action has a preclusive effect in this action, it has
failed to brief adequately that issue.
19
Additionally, the plaintiff raises claims challenging various decisions
that preceded and are unrelated to the grant of the defendants’ motions to
enforce the settlement agreement. In light of our conclusion that the court
properly granted the defendants’ motions to enforce the settlement agree-
ment, it is unnecessary to address these additional claims.
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factual dispute as to the terms of the accord. Generally,
[a] trial court has the inherent power to enforce sum-
marily a settlement agreement as a matter of law [only]
when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambig-
uous . . . and when the parties do not dispute the
terms of the agreement. . . . The rule of Audubon
effects a delicate balance between concerns of judicial
economy on the one hand and a party’s constitutional
rights to a jury and to a trial on the other hand. . . .
To use the Audubon power outside of its proper context
is to deny a party these fundamental rights and would
work a manifest injustice. . . .
‘‘A settlement agreement is a contract among the
parties. . . . In order to form a binding and enforceable
contract, there must exist an offer and an acceptance
based on a mutual understanding by the parties . . . .
The mutual understanding must manifest itself by a
mutual assent between the parties. . . . In other
words, [i]n order for an enforceable contract to exist,
the court must find that the parties’ minds had truly met.
. . . If there has been a misunderstanding between the
parties, or a misapprehension by one or both so that
their minds have never met, no contract has been
entered into by them and the court will not make for
them a contract which they themselves did not make.
. . . Meeting of the minds is defined as mutual agree-
ment and assent of two parties to contract to substance
and terms. It is an agreement reached by the parties to
a contract and expressed therein, or as the equivalent
of mutual assent or mutual obligation. . . . This defini-
tion refers to fundamental misunderstandings between
the parties as to what are the essential elements or
subjects of the contract. It refers to the terms of the
contract, not to the power of one party to execute a
contract as the agent of another. . . .
‘‘A contract is not made so long as, in the contempla-
tion of the parties, something remains to be done to
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establish the contractual relation. The law does not
. . . regard an arrangement as completed which the
parties regard as incomplete. . . . In construing the
agreement . . . the decisive question is the intent of
the parties as expressed. . . . The intention is to be
determined from the language used, the circumstances,
the motives of the parties and the purposes which they
sought to accomplish. . . . Furthermore, [p]arties are
bound to the terms of a contract even though it is not
signed if their assent is otherwise indicated. . . .
‘‘Finally, [t]he fact that parties engage in further nego-
tiations to clarify the essential terms of their mutual
undertakings does not establish the time at which their
undertakings ripen into an enforceable agreement . . .
[and we are aware of no authority] that assigns so
draconian a consequence to a continuing dialogue
between parties that have agreed to work together. We
know of no authority that precludes contracting parties
from engaging in subsequent negotiations to clarify or
to modify the agreement that they had earlier reached.
. . . More important . . . [when] the general terms on
which the parties indisputably had agreed . . .
included all the terms that were essential to an enforce-
able agreement . . . [u]nder the modern law of con-
tract . . . the parties . . . may reach a binding agree-
ment even if some of the terms of that agreement are
still indefinite.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Edgewood Properties, LLC v. Dynamic
Multimedia, LLC, 226 Conn. App. 583, 611–14, 319 A.3d
123, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 905, 323 A.3d 344 (2024).
‘‘The test of disputation . . . must be applied to the
parties at the time they entered into the alleged settle-
ment. To hold otherwise would prevent any motion to
enforce a settlement from ever being granted.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Meridian Partners, LLC v.
Dragone Classic Motorcars, Inc., 171 Conn. App. 355,
364–65, 157 A.3d 87 (2017).
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‘‘When a party challenges the trial court’s legal con-
clusion that the agreement was summarily enforceable,
we must determine whether that conclusion is legally
and logically correct and whether [it finds] support in
the facts set out in the memorandum of decision . . . .
In addition, to the extent that the [party’s] claim impli-
cates the court’s factual findings, our review is limited
to deciding whether such findings were clearly errone-
ous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when
there is no evidence in the record to support it . . .
or when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. . . . In making this determination, every
reasonable presumption must be given in favor of the
trial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Kinity v. US Bancorp, 212 Conn. App. 791, 824, 277
A.3d 200 (2022).
We discern the plaintiff’s principal claim as to the
court’s grant of the defendants’ motions to enforce the
settlement agreement to be that no agreement was
reached because the draft settlement documents sub-
mitted by the defendants to the plaintiff following the
June 14, 2023 PAC did not reflect material aspects of
the agreement, such as the parties executing mutual
releases. The plaintiff contends that (1) ‘‘[t]here was
absolutely no meeting of the mind[s] after the opposing
attorneys represented their proposed settlements [fol-
lowing the June 14, 2023 PAC], as such [she] called for
an IMPASSE’’; (emphasis added); and (2) the purported
‘‘[o]ne-sided’’ draft settlement documents ‘‘attempt[ed]
to alter the agreed-upon terms [and] prompt[ed] [her
to call] an IMPASSE since the proposed document[s]
[did not] reflect their original understanding of the set-
tlement.’’ (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff’s contention
that there was no meeting of the minds after the parties
entered into the settlement at the June 14, 2023 PAC
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ignores the principle, as stated herein, that ‘‘[t]he test
of disputation . . . must be applied to the parties at the
time they entered into the alleged settlement.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Meridian Partners, LLC v.
Dragone Classic Motorcars, Inc., supra, 171 Conn. App.
364–65. Therefore, any dispute as to purported deficien-
cies in the draft settlement documents is immaterial to
the formation of the settlement agreement at the June
14, 2023 PAC, as found by the court.20 Moreover, the
plaintiff cites to no evidence to support her claim that
releases beyond those found by the trial court were
contemplated at the PAC, and the record in fact sup-
ports the court’s related findings. In short, we reject
the plaintiff’s contention that the defendants’ draft set-
tlement documents circulated following the June 14,
2023 PAC undermined the formation of the settlement
agreement, with the terms detailed by the court, at the
June 14, 2023 PAC.
We briefly address two other cognizable claims that
we distill from the plaintiff’s appellate briefs, which are
not models of clarity.21 First, the plaintiff contends that,
20
Insofar as the plaintiff is under the misapprehension that the court’s
decision required her to execute the draft settlement documents submitted
by the defendants, we note that the court’s decision did not direct the parties
to execute any particular documents; rather, the court ordered the parties
to consummate the settlement agreement per the terms found by the court,
which included the execution of releases, ostensibly leaving it to the parties
to cooperate in drafting and executing documents attendant to the agree-
ment.
21
Insofar as the plaintiff attempts to raise any other claims of error atten-
dant to the grant of the defendants’ motions to enforce the settlement
agreement, we deem them to be abandoned as inadequately briefed. See
Long Manor Owners’ Assn., Inc. v. Alungbe, 218 Conn. App. 415, 422–23,
292 A.3d 85 (‘‘Both this court and our Supreme Court repeatedly have
stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly
presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather
than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an
issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously
and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties
must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. . . . The
parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relation-
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following the June 14, 2023 PAC, ‘‘there was a proposed
resolution, some of which the parties tentatively agreed
upon, subject to opposing attorneys’ further submission
of proposed written settlement agreements for [her]
review,’’ but that ‘‘[n]o specific terms and conditions
were agreed [to], nothing was in writing for confirma-
tion, nothing was signed, no written term sheet or other
written agreement was created at the end of the [June
14, 2023] PAC . . . and nothing was reported to any
court to be placed on the record.’’ To the extent that
the plaintiff attempts to challenge the court’s factual
findings regarding the formation of the agreement, the
evidence admitted into the record during the Audubon
hearing supports the court’s determination that the par-
ties entered into a settlement agreement with specific
terms. Moreover, ‘‘the fact that the settlement agree-
ment was not reduced to writing or signed by the parties
does not preclude it from binding the parties.’’ Nanni v.
Dino Corp., 117 Conn. App. 61, 67, 978 A.2d 531 (2009).
Second, the plaintiff contends that the court (1)
admitted exhibits into the record during the Audubon
hearing ‘‘without foundation and testimon[y]’’ and (2)
improperly entered into evidence her ‘‘copyrighted pro-
fessional webpage . . . .’’ These claims are unavailing.
‘‘The trial court’s ruling on evidentiary matters will be
overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the
court’s discretion. . . . We will make every reasonable
presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s rul-
ing, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edgewood Proper-
ties, LLC v. Dynamic Multimedia, LLC, supra, 226
ship between the facts of the case and the law cited. . . . In addition,
although we acknowledge that self-represented litigants are afforded some
latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not
to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 909,
303 A.3d 10 (2023); see also Worth v. Picard, 218 Conn. App. 549, 551 n.3,
292 A.3d 754 (2023).
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Conn. App. 607. Prior to considering the admission of
exhibits during the Audubon hearing, the court stated
that, because the hearing was not a contested hearing
and no exhibits were being admitted by agreement, the
defendants would be required to lay a foundation for
their proposed exhibits through testimony. The court
proceeded to admit several exhibits offered by the
defendants after proper foundations, through testi-
mony, had been laid. Thus, the plaintiff’s contention
that the court admitted exhibits at the Audubon hearing
‘‘without foundation and testimon[y]’’ fails. Addition-
ally, contrary to the plaintiff’s second contention, her
‘‘copyrighted professional webpage’’ was not admitted
into evidence; rather, the exhibit at issue—exhibit I—
was marked as, and remained, an exhibit for identifica-
tion only because the court determined that the defen-
dants had failed to lay an appropriate foundation for
its admission.
The judgment is affirmed.