J. E. v. J. N.

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J. E. v. J. N.

J. E. v. J. N.*
(AC 47248)
Suarez, Westbrook and Bishop, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant father appealed from the trial court’s judgment awarding
him joint legal custody of the parties’ minor children and issuing certain
other orders on the plaintiff mother’s application for custody. He claimed,
inter alia, that the court improperly required him to proceed with the trial
in the absence of his counsel of record, who had requested and been denied
a continuance. Held:
This court, having determined that the defendant’s unpreserved due process
claim was reviewable pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), con-
cluded that the trial court deprived the defendant of his procedural due
process rights under the test established in Mathews v. Eldridge (424 U.S.
319) by requiring him to proceed with trial in the absence of his counsel
of record, and, thus, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Argued March 12—officially released June 17, 2025

Procedural History

Application for custody of the parties’ minor children,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the
court, Truglia, J., denied the defendant’s motion for a
continuance; thereafter, the case was tried to the court,
Truglia, J.; judgment awarding the parties joint legal
custody and issuing certain orders of visitation, from
which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed;
further proceedings.
J. N., self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
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Opinion

SUAREZ, J. In this custody action, the self-repre-
sented defendant, J. N., appeals following the trial court’s
judgment of custody and orders of visitation with
respect to the parties’ minor children.1 On appeal, the
defendant claims, inter alia, that the court improperly
required the defendant to proceed with the underlying
custody trial in the absence of his attorney.2 We agree
with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judg-
ment of the court.

The following procedural history is relevant to this
appeal. The plaintiff, J. E., and the defendant are the
parents of two minor children. On April 22, 2022, the
plaintiff filed an application for an emergency ex parte
1
The plaintiff, J. E., did not file a brief or otherwise participate in this
appeal. Consequently, on December 10, 2024, this court issued an order
stating that ‘‘the appeal shall be considered on the basis of [the defendant’s]
brief and, if applicable, the appendix, the record, as defined by Practice
Book [§] 60-4, and oral argument . . . .’’
2
In his brief to this court, the self-represented defendant sets forth the
following claims in his statement of issues: ‘‘1. Did the trial court abuse its
discretion when it proceeded with trial in the absence of the defendant’s
attorney? 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing the plaintiff
to present evidence not compliant with the management orders for trials?
3. Did the plaintiff perjure affidavits and deceive the courts to secure child
support? 4. Did the plaintiff perjure financial affidavits and testimony and
commit . . . forgery in the second degree [in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-139] to get more child support than she was supposed to receive? 5.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it gave the plaintiff primary
physical custody? 6. Do the courts lack jurisdiction because the defendant’s
constitutional rights were violated, and Title 42 is not a law?’’ With respect
to his final claim on appeal, the defendant argues that the court lacked
jurisdiction ‘‘because of an impartial trial.’’ We understand the defendant’s
jurisdictional claim to be a due process claim related to his first claim on
appeal and, thus, we will address them simultaneously. Because we agree
with the defendant that the court improperly required the defendant to
proceed without his counsel of record, we need not consider the defendant’s
remaining claims, as the issues raised therein are not likely to arise during
the proceedings on remand. See, e.g., Zheng v. Xia, 204 Conn. App. 302,
308 n.10, 253 A.3d 69 (2021).
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J. E. v. J. N.

order of custody, together with a custody application.3
The court, Heller, J., granted temporary legal and physi-
cal custody of the children to the plaintiff and scheduled
a hearing to be held on May 6, 2022. On May 6, 2022,
the parties agreed that the April 22, 2022 orders would
continue until further order of the court. On the same
day, the court, Hon. Edward R. Karazin, Jr., judge
trial referee, approved the agreement and entered it as
an order of the court.
On May 20, 2022, the defendant filed an appearance
in this matter as a self-represented party. On June 22,
2022, the defendant filed a pendente lite motion for
modification seeking to modify the May 6, 2022 orders.
In his motion, the defendant asserted that the circum-
stances of the case had changed substantially in that a
criminal protective order had been modified to remove
the minor children from protection. On July 13, 2022,
the court, McLaughlin, J., issued a scheduling order
in which the court set forth a time frame for pretrial
discovery. On September 9, 2022, the defendant filed a
motion for a continuance seeking additional time to
obtain counsel. The court, Kowalski, J., granted the
defendant’s motion.
On December 12, 2022, Attorney Darnell D. Crosland
filed an appearance in place of the defendant’s appear-
ance pursuant to Practice Book § 3-8 (a).4 On April 10,
3
In her April 22, 2022 affidavit in support of her application, the plaintiff
averred that, on April 15, 2022, the parties engaged in a physical altercation
during which the defendant struck, punched, and choked the plaintiff, in
addition to throwing her onto the floor and against the minor children’s
cribs. The plaintiff further averred that she feared for her life and that the
minor children were present throughout the altercation.
4
Practice Book § 3-8 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Whenever an attorney
files an appearance for a party, or the party files an appearance for himself
or herself, and there is already an appearance of an attorney or party on
file for that party, the attorney or party filing the new appearance shall
state thereon whether such appearance is in place of or in addition to the
appearance or appearances already on file. . . .’’
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2023, the court, Kowalski, J., issued a new order in
which it scheduled a trial to commence on December
19, 2023. On December 15, 2023, Crosland filed a motion
for a continuance of the scheduled trial, indicating that
he was not available. On the same day, the court, Trug-
lia, J., denied the motion for a continuance and ordered
that ‘‘the trial [would] proceed as scheduled.’’
On December 19, 2023, the court commenced the
trial as scheduled. After the plaintiff’s counsel called
his first witness to testify and prior to the start of that
testimony, the following colloquy occurred between the
defendant, the court, and the plaintiff’s counsel:
‘‘The Defendant: Your Honor, if I may?
‘‘The Court: Yes, sir.
‘‘The Defendant: My attorney was supposed to be
here. I’m not sure where he is. I got a text message
from him saying that he wouldn’t make it today.
‘‘The Court: Okay.
‘‘The Defendant: So, I am supposed to have legal
counsel today.
‘‘The Court: You are?
‘‘The Defendant: Yes. Attorney Crosland is supposed
to be the attorney on the case.
‘‘The Court: Right. I understand that he filed a motion
for continuance.
‘‘The Defendant: That I didn’t know, either. I’m sorry
to interrupt. I wasn’t aware that he filed a continuance.
‘‘The Court: He filed a motion for a continuance on
December [15, 2023] saying that he is out of the country,
and I denied it.
‘‘The Defendant: Okay.
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‘‘The Court: So, you can file an appearance on your
own. . . .
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I think he has one in the
file for himself already, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: Oh, is that true?
‘‘The Defendant: There was one before I retained
counsel.
‘‘The Court: Well, it looks like that was an in lieu of
appearance. That’s strange. . . .
‘‘The Court: Yeah, Attorney Crosland filed an appear-
ance in lieu of your appearance. So, you really should
file another appearance for yourself, sir, today. We’ll
give you that form, all right?5
‘‘The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor. . . .
‘‘The Court: All right. So, counsel, please proceed.’’
(Footnote added.)
Thereafter, the trial proceeded as scheduled. The
record reflects, however, that the defendant did not
have pertinent information that had been provided to
his counsel. For example, the following exchange
occurred between the court and the defendant with
respect to the plaintiff’s proposed orders for custody
and child support:
‘‘The Court: Sir, do you have a copy of these proposed
orders?
‘‘The Defendant: I do not, Your Honor. I don’t have
anything.’’
Similarly, when the plaintiff’s counsel sought to intro-
duce exhibits into evidence, the following colloquy
The record reflects that the defendant did not file an appearance in place
5

of Attorney Crosland until March 6, 2024, approximately three and one-half
months after the custody trial, and after the present appeal was filed. The
defendant has since been self-represented.
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occurred between the defendant, the court, and the
plaintiff’s counsel:
‘‘The Defendant: Your Honor, I just have a . . . ques-
tion of evidence.
‘‘The Court: What’s that?
‘‘The Defendant: To my understanding, was this sup-
posed to be presented prior to court proceedings and
given to Your Honor?
‘‘The Court: Yes.
‘‘The Defendant: So, I object to this evidence, Your
Honor.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And it was given to his
counsel, in accordance with the trial management.
‘‘The Court: If it was given to your counsel, then that
is good enough. Counsel represents to the court that
she gave copies of all of the proposed exhibits to your
lawyer. And I assume you did that in accordance with
the trial management standing orders?
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I did, Your Honor. . . . I
know, certainly, counsel got a copy of [the proposed
exhibits]. And also, the proposed [exhibits] . . . were
sent, once the continuance was denied, to [the defen-
dant] . . . yesterday, as well.
‘‘The Court: Oh.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: So, he had at least notice
of them personally, yesterday.
‘‘The Court: Okay. Objection overruled. Let’s keep
going. . . .
‘‘The Defendant: I just, I don’t see it. How was this
delivered? Was it via email? Was it via fax? . . .
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‘‘The Court: How did you send it to [the defendant],
that’s the question. . . .
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Via email.
‘‘The Court: Via email?
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Yes. It was sent to you via
email from my office . . . .
‘‘The Court: Right. Sir, this . . . document is simply
a copy of the court’s order . . . so, this is already in
the record in this case. I’m going to allow it as a full
exhibit.’’
Moreover, when the plaintiff’s counsel sought to
introduce financial evidence in relation to child support,
the following colloquy ensued in connection with the
defendant’s lack of understanding of the scope of trial:
‘‘The Defendant: Objection, Your Honor—
‘‘The Court: I’m sorry?
‘‘The Defendant: [O]bjection, but in the form of a
question, because I don’t understand the rule of evi-
dence too much. We are here for custody. Is this a . . .
child support trial or a custody trial?
***
‘‘The Defendant: ‘‘I don’t mean to prolong this,
because I don’t have an attorney . . . . I’m sorry, child
support has already been ruled upon by a judge.6 It’s
6
On June 20, 2022, the plaintiff filed a pendente lite motion for support
and maintenance seeking support from the defendant for the parties’ minor
children. On December 20, 2022, the court, Vizcarrondo, J., held a hearing
on the plaintiff’s pendente lite motion. The court issued orders requiring
the defendant ‘‘to pay child support in the amount of $288 per week’’ and
42 percent of any work-related childcare expenses. On January 27, 2023, the
plaintiff filed a pendente lite motion for contempt that sought enforcement
of the December 20, 2022 child support orders. On April 10, 2023, the parties
agreed that the defendant would pay the plaintiff $4008 in child support
arrearages by May 10, 2023, and a further $2284.80 in childcare expenses
arrearages by June 10, 2023. The court, Kowalski, J., approved the agreement
and entered it as an order of the court. On May 23, 2023, the plaintiff filed
a pendente lite motion for contempt that sought enforcement of the April
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been sent over to [the Office of] Child Support Services.
They are deducting the pay. I don’t understand . . . .
I don’t understand . . . .
‘‘The Court: Sir.
‘‘The Defendant: I don’t understand . . . .’’ (Foot-
note added.)
On December 26, 2023, after the conclusion of evi-
dence, the court issued the following orders: ‘‘1. The
parties are awarded joint legal custody of their minor
children. Both parties will have equal decision-making
authority for all major decisions affecting the children.
2. The plaintiff will have primary physical custody of
the minor children and will provide them with their
primary residence. 3. The defendant will have parenting
time with the children three weekends each month from
6 p.m. Friday to 6 p.m. Sunday. . . . 18. . . . Com-
mencing December 25, 2023, and weekly thereafter, the
court orders the defendant to pay weekly child support
to the plaintiff of $288, plus $142.80 for the [children’s]
work-related childcare, plus $58 to be applied to the
arrearage, for a total weekly payment of $488.80. Addi-
tionally, the court orders the defendant to pay the $5000
arrearage ordered by this court, Kowalski, J., on August
21, 2023, to the plaintiff on or before February 1, 2024,
plus the accumulated additional arrearage of $1950.40
on or before February 1, 2024, for a total payment of
$6950.40 due on or before February 1, 2024.’’ This appeal
followed.
As a threshold matter, we address the reviewability
of the defendant’s claim. During the trial, the defendant
10, 2023 child support orders. On August 21, 2023, the court held a hearing
on the plaintiff’s May 23, 2023 motion for contempt. On the same day, the
court issued new orders requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff ‘‘$5000,
in full satisfaction of all weekly child support and childcare arrearages.’’
The court further ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff child support
and work-related childcare expenses in the amount of $430.80 per week.
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did not request a continuance on the grounds that his
attorney should be present, nor did he assert that his
due process rights were being violated. On appeal, how-
ever, the defendant argues that the court abused its
discretion when it proceeded with the trial in the
absence of his counsel of record and that the court
lacked jurisdiction because his constitutional rights
were violated. See footnote 2 of this opinion. We under-
stand the defendant’s claim to be an unpreserved due
process claim. Because the defendant has presented a
record that is adequate for review and has affirmatively
demonstrated that his claim is indeed a violation of a
fundamental constitutional right,7 we review his unpre-
served constitutional claim under State v. Golding, 213
Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by
In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).8
See also State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 754–55, 91 A.3d
862 (2014) (overruling requirement that appellant must
affirmatively request Golding review in its appellate
7
It is well established that ‘‘[a] parent’s right to make decisions regarding
the care, custody, and control of his or her child is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment. . . . Before a parent
can be deprived of her right to the custody, care, and control of her child,
he or she is entitled to due process of law.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Barros v. Barros, 309 Conn. 499, 508, 72 A.3d 367 (2013).
8
‘‘Pursuant to Golding, a [defendant] can prevail on a claim of constitu-
tional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are
met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the
claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental
right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived
the [defendant] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis,
the [opposing party] has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged
constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The first two steps
in the Golding analysis address the reviewability of the claim, [whereas]
the last two steps involve the merits of the claim.’’ (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Gabriella M., 221 Conn. App. 827,
836, 303 A.3d 319, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 925, 304 A.3d 443 (2023). We need
not address the fourth prong of Golding because, even if subject to harmless
error analysis, the plaintiff has the burden to show the harmlessness of
the alleged constitutional violation, and the plaintiff did not file a brief or
otherwise participate in this appeal. See footnote 1 of this opinion.
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brief in order to review unpreserved constitutional
claims).

As we have already indicated, the first two prongs
of Golding are met because the record is adequate for
review, and we construe the claim as implicating the
defendant’s due process rights. Thus, we turn to the
third prong of Golding and consider whether the court
deprived the defendant of his right to due process. ‘‘A
fundamental premise of due process is that a court
cannot adjudicate any matter unless the parties have
been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the
issues involved . . . . Generally, when the exercise of
the court’s discretion depends on issues of fact which
are disputed, due process requires that a trial-like hear-
ing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to
present evidence and to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses. . . . It is a fundamental tenet of due process
of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to
the United States constitution . . . that persons whose
. . . rights will be affected by a court’s decision are
entitled to be heard at a meaningful time and in a mean-
ingful manner. . . . Whe[n] a party is not afforded an
opportunity to subject the factual determinations
underlying the trial court’s decision to the crucible of
meaningful adversarial testing, an order cannot be sus-
tained. . . . Whether a party was deprived of [his] due
process rights is a question of law to which appellate
courts grant plenary review.’’ (Citations omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Kosar v. Giangrande,
228 Conn. App. 749, 758, 326 A.3d 266, cert. denied, 350
Conn. 930, 326 A.3d 556 (2024).

‘‘The United States Supreme Court in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d
18 (1976), established a three part test to determine
whether the actions of the court violated a party’s right
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J. E. v. J. N.

to procedural due process. The three factors to be con-
sidered are (1) the private interest that will be affected
by the state action, (2) the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest, given the existing procedures,
and the value of any additional or alternate procedural
safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest, including
the fiscal and administrative burdens attendant to
increased or substitute procedural requirements. . . .
Due process analysis requires balancing the govern-
ment’s interest in existing procedures against the risk
of erroneous deprivation of a private interest inherent in
those procedures.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Foster v. Foster, 84 Conn. App. 311,
319, 853 A.2d 588 (2004).

‘‘With respect to the first prong of Mathews, [a] defen-
dant has an interest in the custody of his child and,
therefore, in a custody adjudication process that grants
him custody if it is in the child’s best interest. From
a procedural due process standpoint, the defendant’s
custody interest is legitimate only to the extent that
those procedures facilitate an accurate custody deter-
mination, that is, a custody determination consistent
with the child’s best interest. . . . In cases in which
both parents seek custody, [n]either parent has a supe-
rior claim to the exercise of [the] right to provide care,
custody, and control of the children. . . . Effectively,
then, each fit parent’s constitutional right neutralizes
the other parent’s constitutional right, leaving, gener-
ally, the best interests of the child as the sole standard
to apply to these types of custody decisions. Thus, in
evaluating each parent’s request for custody, the par-
ents commence as presumptive equals and a trial court
undertakes a balancing of each parent’s relative merits
to serve as the primary custodial parent; the child’s best
interests [tip] the scale in favor of an award of custody
to one parent or the other. . . .
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‘‘Under the second prong of Mathews, we must evalu-
ate the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [a] defen-
dant’s custody rights under the existing procedures and
the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safe-
guards.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Barros v. Barros, 309 Conn.
499, 509–10, 72 A.3d 367 (2013). Therefore, we must
determine whether the court’s order requiring the
defendant to proceed with the custody trial without
counsel of record created a greater risk that the defen-
dant would not have been granted custody when that
custody is in the best interests of the children and
whether counsel’s presence would have enhanced the
accuracy of the custody determination. See id.
Finally, the third prong of Mathews requires us to
consider ‘‘the [g]overnment’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that . . . additional or substitute procedural
requirement[s] would entail.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Foster v. Foster, supra, 84 Conn. App. 320.
‘‘[T]he government has a paramount interest in custody
adjudication procedures that facilitate an accurate
determination of the child’s best interest.’’ Barros v.
Barros, supra, 309 Conn. 517.
In the present case, the private interest implicated
is the defendant’s fundamental constitutional right to
make decisions regarding his children’s care, control,
education, health, religion, and association. ‘‘It is well
established that the interest of parents in the care, cus-
tody, and control of their children—is perhaps the old-
est of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by
[the United States Supreme] Court. . . . The rights to
conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed
essential . . . basic civil rights of man . . . [r]ights far
more precious . . . than property rights . . . .’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Zakai F., 336 Conn. 272, 291, 255 A.3d 767 (2020).
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J. E. v. J. N.

Under the existing procedures taken in the present
case, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such inter-
est was significant. As stated previously in this opinion,
the defendant had counsel of record, and the defendant
expected his counsel to be present to represent him in
the custody action. The defendant was not aware that
his counsel filed for a continuance of the trial and that
the continuance was denied. The record is clear that
the defendant was not prepared to represent himself
meaningfully. The defendant did not have trial exhibits
or proposed orders and did not seem to understand the
scope of the trial. Under these circumstances, we are
persuaded that counsel’s assistance would have enhanced
the accuracy of the child custody determination.
Finally, we are persuaded that the third prong of
Mathews also weighs in favor of the defendant. The
cost and administrative burden of merely granting a
short continuance to allow the defendant to either hire
substitute counsel or properly prepare to represent him-
self would have been de minimis, while facilitating an
accurate determination of the children’s best interests
by ensuring the defendant had a meaningful opportunity
to be heard.
Applying all the Mathews factors, we conclude that
the court deprived the defendant of his due process
rights by requiring him to proceed with the custody
trial in the absence of his counsel of record.9
9
We note that several postjudgment motions have been filed subsequent
to the December 26, 2023 judgment. In 2024, the defendant filed several
motions to dismiss. These motions seek to dismiss the court’s child support
orders on the basis of allegations that, inter alia, the plaintiff perjured certain
affidavits and testimony in connection with the underlying case, the plaintiff
committed forgery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-139, the defendant’s constitutional rights were violated, and ‘‘Title IV-
D [of the Social Security Act] is unconstitutional.’’ In his March 7, 2024
motion to dismiss, the defendant further alleged that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff refuses
to agree to 50/50 physical custody.’’ On October 18, 2024, the defendant
filed a motion to modify child support. In December, 2024, the plaintiff
filed an application for an emergency ex parte order of custody and a
postjudgment motion for modification of custody. The court, Kowalski, J.,
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The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

granted the ex parte order of custody. On December 18, 2024, following a
hearing, the court, Cirello, J., vacated the ex parte order of custody and
denied the plaintiff’s postjudgment motion for modification of custody. On
January 24, 2025, the defendant filed a motion to modify custody, seeking
to modify the parenting schedule ordered by the court on December 26,
2023. These motions remain pending.