Khan v. Khan

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

ADAM KHAN ET AL. v. LISA C. KHAN ET AL.
LISA C. KHAN v. AHMED KHAN
(AC 46664)
Elgo, Clark and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The named defendant in the first action and the plaintiff in the second
action, L, the trustee of a family trust established by her former husband
as grantor, appealed from the trial court’s judgments in two separate actions
that were consolidated for trial. In the first action, the court rendered
judgment for the plaintiffs, several of L’s children who were beneficiaries
of the trust, on their claims of, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty with
respect to L’s termination of an insurance policy held by the trust and the
transfer of the policy proceeds to her personal bank and investment
accounts. In the second action, the trial court denied L’s claim for indemnifi-
cation under the trust agreement for damages awarded in the first action.
L claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly concluded that she was
liable for wilful misconduct. Held:

The trial court properly concluded in the first action that L breached her
fiduciary duty to the trust, as the evidence was sufficient to support the
court’s findings that L knowingly misrepresented to the insurance company
that the bank account to which she transferred the policy proceeds was
titled in the name of the trust when she knew that she was directing the
funds to her personal account, that L did not advise the plaintiffs or the
grantor that the policy had been terminated or that the policy proceeds had
been invested in her personal accounts, and that L opened a trust account
for the policy proceeds only after being advised by the grantor’s attorneys
that she had improperly transferred the policy proceeds to her personal
accounts, and, thus, the court’s resulting damages award was not clearly
erroneous.

The trial court’s findings supported its conclusion in the first action that
L’s conduct was wilful, as, although the court found that L did not have the
requisite intent to deprive the plaintiffs of the policy proceeds for purposes
of the statutory theft count in their complaint, that finding did not require
a conclusion that L’s conduct was not wilful.

L could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erroneously awarded
punitive damages to the plaintiffs in the first action because the court found
that she did not have the requisite intent to deprive the plaintiffs of the
policy proceeds for purposes of the statutory theft count, as that finding
did not compel a conclusion that L’s conduct was not wilful and the court
made numerous findings showing that L exhibited a reckless indifference
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
Khan v. Khan
to the rights of the plaintiffs or an intentional and wanton violation of
those rights.

The trial court in the first action did not improperly remove L as a trustee
or act contrary to the terms of the trust in establishing procedures regarding
the appointment of a successor trustee, as the court’s findings regarding
L’s removal as trustee were supported by the record and supported the
court’s conclusion that, pursuant to statute (§ 45a-499ww), removal was
necessary to prevent future harm to the trust, and the court properly applied
the provisions of the statute (§ 45a-499uu) governing the procedures to
appoint a successor trustee.

The trial court in the first action did not abuse its discretion in denying L’s
request for a trustee fee, as the court’s factual findings were supported by
the record and were not clearly erroneous, and the court properly considered
the factors set forth in Hayward v. Plant (98 Conn. 374) in making its
determination.

The trial court in the second action properly concluded that L was not
entitled to indemnification under the circumstances of this case, as her
conduct did not fall within the parameters of the indemnification clause in
the trust.

Argued February 10—officially released August 12, 2025

Procedural History

Action, in the first case, to recover damages for, inter
alia, breach of fiduciary duty, and for other relief, and
action, in the second case, seeking indemnification for
the plaintiff trustee pursuant to the terms of a certain
trust agreement, and other relief, brought to the Supe-
rior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the
cases were consolidated for trial to the court, Rosen,
J.; judgment for the plaintiffs in the first case and judg-
ment for the defendant in the second case, from which
the named defendant in the first case and the plaintiff
in the second case appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Lisa C. Khan, self-represented, the appellant (named
defendant in the first case, plaintiff in the second case).
Carmine Perri, with whom, on the brief, was Andrew
R. Veale, for the appellees (plaintiffs in the first case,
defendant in the second case).
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

Opinion

ELGO, J. These consolidated appeals involve a family
trust established by the grantor, Ahmed M. Khan
(grantor), and Lisa C. Khan (Khan), who is a defendant
in the first action (trust action)1 and the plaintiff in the
second action (indemnification action). Khan appeals
from the judgments of the trial court in favor of the
plaintiffs in the trust action2 and the grantor in the
indemnification action. On appeal, Khan claims that the
court improperly (1) found that she had breached her
fiduciary duty, (2) concluded that she was liable for
wilful misconduct, (3) ordered her to pay punitive dam-
ages to the plaintiffs, (4) removed her as the trustee of
the trust, (5) failed to award her a reasonable trustee
fee, and (6) failed to uphold the plain and unambiguous
language of the trust’s indemnification clause. We
affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history, as set
forth by the trial court or as undisputed in the record,
are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On April
19, 2007, the grantor and Khan, who were married,
entered into an agreement establishing the Khan Family
Trust (trust). Khan was the sole trustee and the primary
beneficiary of the trust and the six children of the
grantor and Khan were the eligible beneficiaries. In
1
Khan was named as a defendant individually and as trustee of the Khan
Family Trust in the trust action. Aaron Khan and Alexander Khan, who are
also children of the grantor and Khan, also were named as defendants in
the trust action because of their potential interests in the trust. Aaron Khan
and Alexander Khan did not appear in the trial court. In her amended
appeal form, Khan, who was a licensed Connecticut attorney, listed herself,
Alexander Khan and Aaron Khan as the appellants. In her appellate briefs,
however, Khan has listed only herself as the appellant, and she retired as
an attorney on May 27, 2025.
2
The plaintiffs in the trust action are Adam Khan; Eleanor Khan; Emma
Khan, now known as Emmett Khan; and Erica Khan. They are all children
of the grantor and Khan, and we refer to them in this opinion as the plaintiffs.
At the time this action was commenced, Eleanor, Emmett and Erica, all
minors, appeared through their father, the grantor, as their next friend.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
Khan v. Khan

connection with the establishment of the trust, Khan
purchased a $2 million whole life insurance policy (pol-
icy) on the grantor from Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance Company (Northwestern Mutual). The policy
paid annual dividends in the form of interest accrual
at an annual rate of 3.5 percent. The grantor initially
was the named insured and owner under the policy;
the trust thereafter became the owner of the policy.
The annual premium for the policy was $36,210. The
grantor paid the policy premiums until 2012, when the
grantor and Khan divorced.3 To ensure that the policy
remained in effect for the benefit of her children, Khan
thereafter paid the monthly policy premiums from 2013
until 2018, in an amount totaling $220,624.58. Khan con-
sidered each monthly premium payment to be a loan
from her to the trust.
On October 5, 2018, Khan submitted a form titled
‘‘Surrender of Policy for Cash Value/Term’’ to North-
western Mutual, instructing Northwestern Mutual to
electronically transfer the net cash surrender value of
the policy to her personal bank account at Farmington
Bank, now known as People’s United Bank (People’s
United). Section 3 of the policy surrender form prohibits
disbursements to a trustee in his or her individual capac-
ity.4
Northwestern Mutual thereafter issued a confirma-
tion of policy surrender, effective October 6, 2018, con-
firming the electronic transfer of the policy’s net pro-
ceeds in the amount of $377,264.13 ‘‘to the credit of
3
We note that Khan has filed a separate appeal from certain postjudgment
orders entered on February 16, 2024, in the dissolution action. That appeal
is pending in this court. See Khan v. Khan, Connecticut Appellate Court,
Docket No. 47435 (appeal filed March 7, 2024).
4
The ‘‘Surrender of Policy for Cash Value/Term’’ form provides in relevant
part: ‘‘Disbursements from trust owned contracts will be made payable to
either the insured, owner or payer so long as the trustee is not the payee
in his/her individual capacity.’’
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

Farmington Bank . . . for deposit to [the] checking
account number . . . of [the] Khan Family Trust.’’ The
policy proceeds, however, were not transferred to a
trust account; they were posted in Khan’s personal
account at People’s United on October 10, 2018,
resulting in an account balance of more than $400,000.
On October 11, 2018, Khan made two transfers, totaling
$400,000, from her People’s United account to her per-
sonal brokerage accounts at Fidelity Investments
(Fidelity). She thereafter purchased a number of securi-
ties during the period from October 12, 2018, to May
10, 2019, with a value of approximately $380,000.
Khan did not inform the children or the grantor that
she had terminated the policy or that the proceeds of
the policy had been invested in her personal accounts.
In December, 2019, after being informed by the grantor’s
attorneys that her conduct was improper, Khan opened
a trust account at Fidelity in the name of the trust and
funded it with $180,866.62 that she had transferred from
her personal brokerage accounts.
In April, 2020, the plaintiffs commenced the trust
action against Khan claiming breach of fiduciary duty,
conversion, statutory theft pursuant to General Statutes
§ 52-564,5 and imposition of a constructive trust due to
Khan’s alleged mismanagement of trust assets. In the
operative complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Khan
improperly deposited the proceeds of the trust, specifi-
cally, the cash surrender value of the policy, into her
personal account.6 The plaintiffs sought as relief money
General Statutes § 52-564 provides: ‘‘Any person who steals any property
5

of another, or knowingly receives and conceals stolen property, shall pay
the owner treble his damages.’’
6
Although the operative complaint in the trust action, filed on August 5,
2021, contains the same four counts as the original complaint, the plaintiffs
withdrew their allegation that Khan had breached her fiduciary duty by
surrendering the life insurance policy. Instead, the plaintiffs alleged that
she had breached her duty by distributing the cash value to herself without
authorization from an independent trustee.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
Khan v. Khan

damages, common-law punitive damages, treble dam-
ages, the removal of Khan as a trustee and the appoint-
ment of a successor trustee, and imposition of a con-
structive trust, as well as attorney’s fees, costs and
interest.
Khan filed an answer in the trust action denying the
material allegations of the complaint. She also filed a
special defense that asserted, in part, that she had the
authority to surrender the policy for its cash value pur-
suant to the terms of the trust. Further, she asserted
that, despite having no obligation to pay the policy
premiums from 2013 to 2018, she did so because her
children were young enough that the potential of the
death benefit was worth the substantial cost of the
annual premium. According to Khan, the policy premi-
ums that she paid after the grantor stopped paying the
premiums were a loan to the trust. The plaintiffs filed
a reply to Khan’s special defense.
In May, 2021, Khan commenced the second action,
the indemnification action against the grantor, claiming
that the actions she took regarding the policy were
within the scope of powers identified in the trust as
‘‘Insurance Powers,’’ including the powers to ‘‘surren-
der any policy for its cash value,’’ to ‘‘borrow money for
any purpose,’’ and ‘‘to rely on others to pay [premiums],
with no obligation . . . to make such payments or take
any action to keep any policy in force . . . .’’ She
sought a declaration that, if she were found liable to the
plaintiffs in the trust action, the grantor was required
to indemnify her and hold her harmless for any damages
the plaintiffs recover. Khan also sought an order that
the grantor reimburse her for attorney’s fees and expert
fees incurred in defending the trust action. The grantor
filed an answer and special defenses asserting that Khan
had breached the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing and had unclean hands. Khan filed a reply
to the special defenses.
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

The trust action and the indemnification action were
consolidated and tried to the court, Rosen, J., in August,
2022. On May 23, 2023, the court issued one memoran-
dum of decision for both cases, finding in favor of the
plaintiffs in the trust action on their claims of breach
of fiduciary duty, conversion and imposition of con-
structive trust and in favor of Khan on the plaintiffs’
claim of statutory theft. As to the statutory theft count,
the court found that, although Khan’s conduct was
improper, the plaintiffs did not prove that she had the
requisite intent to deprive the plaintiffs of the policy
proceeds. The court further ordered that Khan be
removed as trustee upon the appointment of a succes-
sor trustee. The court found in favor of the grantor with
respect to Khan’s indemnification action.

In the trust action, the court awarded the plaintiffs
both money damages and prejudgment interest totaling
$295,738.67 but credited against that amount the
$220,624.58 it found that Khan loaned to the trust
between 2013 and 2018, resulting in a net damage award
to the plaintiffs of $75,114.09.7 It stated that it would
conduct a hearing at a later date to appoint a successor
trustee, at which time it would address the plaintiffs’
claims for attorney’s fees, costs, and offer of compro-
mise interest.

Khan filed a motion to reargue in the indemnification
action, which the court denied. Khan also filed a motion
to reargue in the trust action, which the court granted
in part, stating: ‘‘The court will issue a corrected memo-
randum of decision with respect to the calculation of
7
In its May 23, 2023 memorandum of decision, the court stated that Khan
had loaned the trust $217,260, resulting in a net damage award to the plaintiffs
of $78,478.67. In its July 25, 2023 corrected memorandum of decision, the
court changed the amount that Khan loaned to the trust from $217,260
to $220,624.58, thus changing the net damage award from $78,478.67 to
$75,114.09.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
Khan v. Khan

the monthly loans for payment of the insurance policy
premiums and the resulting damages award. The court
will hear argument on [Khan’s] contention that she
remained the primary beneficiary of the [trust] after
her divorce from the grantor. The remainder of [Khan’s]
motion to reargue is denied.’’
The court issued a corrected memorandum of deci-
sion on July 25, 2023, in which it corrected its prior
decision to reflect that Khan was the primary benefi-
ciary of the trust, and the children are the eligible benefi-
ciaries.8 The court also corrected the amount that Khan
loaned to the trust from $217,260 to $220,624.58. See
footnote 7 of this opinion. Additionally, the court entered
an order on July 25, 2023, awarding to the plaintiffs
$182,374.50 in attorney’s fees and $12,785.27 in nontax-
able costs as common-law punitive damages and
$791.83 as costs.9 This appeal followed.
In our consideration of this appeal, we first address
Khan’s claims in the trust action. We then consider
Khan’s claim in the indemnification action.
I
THE TRUST ACTION
A
Khan first claims that the trust suffered no damages
as a result of her conduct and, therefore, the court
8
The original memorandum of decision stated: ‘‘Upon the entry of the
divorce decree [Khan] ceased to be a beneficiary under the trust, and the
children became the trust’s sole beneficiaries.’’
9
The court noted that the total amount of the judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against Khan was $370,406.85. This figure included the damages
award of $75,114.09 as reflected in the trial court’s corrected memorandum
of decision, interest in the amount of $99,341.16, punitive damages in the
amount of $195,159.77 and costs of $791.83. Because that amount was less
than the offer of compromise in the amount of $377,000, the court did not
award offer of compromise interest.
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

improperly concluded that she had breached her fidu-
ciary duty to the trust. We disagree.10
Before addressing Khan’s claims on appeal, we first
set forth the applicable standard of review and relevant
legal principles. ‘‘A trustee owes a fiduciary duty to
administer the trust in the interest of the beneficiaries,
and that duty commences when the trustee accepts the
trusteeship. . . . The trustee’s administration of the
trust must comport with her duties of loyalty and pru-
dence. . . . [I]n order to allege a claim against a trustee
for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must allege (1)
the existence of a fiduciary relationship, giving rise to
a duty, (2) breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4)
damages. . . . A breach of fiduciary duty claim pre-
sents a mixed question of law and fact. Accordingly,
we review the court’s factual findings for clear error
and conduct a plenary review of the court’s ultimate
conclusion as to whether the [defendant] proved that
[she] did not breach [her] fiduciary duty to the [plain-
tiffs]. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when
there is no evidence in the record to support it . . .
or when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. . . .
‘‘In determining whether the court’s decision was
clearly erroneous, we must examine the court’s deci-
sion in the context of the heightened standard of proof
imposed on a fiduciary. . . . Once a fiduciary relation-
ship is found to exist, the burden of proving fair dealing
properly shifts to the fiduciary. . . . Furthermore, the
standard of proof for establishing fair dealing is not the
ordinary standard of proof of fair preponderance of
10
The trial court awarded damages to the plaintiffs on their claims of
breach of fiduciary duty, conversion and imposition of a constructive trust.
We, therefore, consider the trial court’s memorandum of decision regarding
all these counts in our consideration of Khan’s claim regarding damages.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
Khan v. Khan

the evidence, but requires proof either by clear and
convincing evidence, clear and satisfactory evidence or
clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. . . . The
construction of a trust instrument presents a question
of law to be determined in the light of facts that are found
by the trial court or are undisputed or indisputable.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Spinnato v. Boyd, 231 Conn. App. 460, 477–78, 333 A.3d
818 (2025).
‘‘[A] plaintiff alleging a breach of fiduciary duty must
show that any damages sustained were proximately
caused by the fiduciary’s breach of his or her fiduciary
duty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barash v.
Lembo, 348 Conn. 264, 297, 303 A.3d 577 (2023). ‘‘Our
standard of review applicable to challenges to damages
awards is well settled. . . . [T]he trial court has broad
discretion in determining damages. . . . The determi-
nation of damages involves a question of fact that will
not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. . . .
[If], however, a damages award is challenged on the
basis of a question of law, our review [of that question]
is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mystic
Oil Co. v. Shaukat, LLC, 228 Conn. App. 147, 153, 323
A.3d 1094 (2024).
The following additional facts are necessary for the
resolution of this claim. In its corrected memorandum
of decision, the court found that ‘‘[b]y terminating the
policy and transferring the policy proceeds into her
personal accounts, [Khan] advanced her own interests
to the plaintiffs’ detriment, resulting in damage to the
plaintiffs proximately caused by her actions.’’ The court
stated that ‘‘[Khan] acted without authorization (and
without the plaintiffs’ knowledge and consent) in termi-
nating the policy, transferring the policy proceeds into
her personal banking and investment accounts, com-
mingling those funds with her personal funds, and pur-
chasing securities in her own name (at least in part
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

with the policy proceeds), all to the plaintiffs’ detri-
ment.’’ The court further stated that Khan ‘‘knowingly
misrepresented to Northwestern Mutual that the bank
account to which she transferred the policy’s proceeds
was titled in the name of the trust, when she knew that
she was directing the funds to her personal account.
[Khan] then transferred those funds to her personal
accounts at Fidelity. It is unclear whether she used the
policy proceeds to purchase various securities, given
that she had substantial holdings before she transferred
the policy proceeds to her personal accounts.’’
In its decision, the court explained, in detail, how it
calculated the award of damages and the evidence on
which the award was based. Specifically, it awarded
damages to the plaintiffs on the first, second and fourth
counts of the complaint in the amount of $196,397.51.
This figure represented the difference between the
$377,264.13 in policy proceeds that Khan had improperly
transferred to her personal account and the $180,866.62
that Khan transferred to the trust account at Fidelity.
The trial court next considered whether to award
prejudgment interest on the award pursuant to General
Statutes § 37-3a.11 ‘‘The allowance of prejudgment inter-
est as an element of damages is an equitable determina-
tion and a matter lying within the discretion of the
trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AAA
Advantage Carting & Demolition Service, LLC v.
Capone, 221 Conn. App. 256, 292, 301 A.3d 1111, cert.
denied, 348 Conn. 924, 304 A.3d 442 (2023), and cert.
denied, 348 Conn. 924, 304 A.3d 442 (2023). The court
found that an award of interest to the plaintiffs at the
rate of 8 percent per annum was fair and equitable
under § 37-3a, ‘‘given the wrongful detention of money
11
General Statutes § 37-3a provides in relevant part that ‘‘interest at the
rate of ten percent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in
civil actions . . . as damages for the detention of money after it becomes
payable. . . . ’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
Khan v. Khan

by [Khan], the failure to fully fund the trust created at
Fidelity with all of the policy proceeds, the inability to
determine precisely which securities were purchased
with the policy proceeds and their current value, and
the fact that the plaintiffs were compelled to litigate
this matter for several years, through trial, in order
to obtain a judgment in their favor for the benefit of
the trust.’’
The court next considered when the interest began
to run. ‘‘The date the interest begins to run pursuant
to § 37-3a is factual because it necessarily involves a
determination of when the wrongful detention began.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) AAA Advantage
Carting & Demolition Service, LLC v. Capone, supra,
221 Conn. App. 292–93. The court awarded interest at
the rate of 8 percent per annum for two different time
periods. It first awarded interest on the policy proceeds
of $377,264.13 from October 6, 2018, when Khan misap-
propriated the policy proceeds, to December 5, 2019,
when Khan created and funded the new account at
Fidelity. The amount of interest for this time totaled
$35,142.41.12 The court next awarded interest from
December 5, 2019, through the date of its original deci-
sion in this matter on May 23, 2023, in the amount of
$64,198.75.13 The total award of prejudgment interest,
therefore, was $99,341.16. The court then added $99,341.16
in prejudgment interest to its award of damages of
12
The court calculated the interest for this time period as follows: 8 percent
of $377,264.13 equals $30,181.13 per year, or $82.69 per day, multiplied by
425 days for the period from October 6, 2018, to December 5, 2019, totaling
$35,142.41.
13
The court calculated the interest for this time period as follows: the
total amount due to the plaintiffs as of December 5, 2019, was $412,406.54,
which includes the policy proceeds of $377,264.13 plus $35,142.41 in interest.
From this amount the court subtracted the $180,866.62 that Khan transferred
to Fidelity that day, leaving a balance of $231,539.92. Eight percent of
$231,539.92 equals $18,523.19 per year, or $50.75 per day, multiplied by
1265 days for the period from December 5, 2019, to May 23, 2023, totaling
$64,198.75.
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

$196,397.51, for a total of $295,738.67. From that, the
court credited the $220,624.58 that the plaintiff had
loaned to the trust for a net damage award to the plain-
tiffs of $75,114.09.
Khan does not contest that she improperly deposited
the policy proceeds into her personal account. She con-
tends, however, that the court erred in its calculation
of damages. The gist of her claim is that, although the
court properly credited her for the $220,624.58 in loans
that she made to the trust, the court improperly deferred
the loan repayment for approximately four years, plac-
ing the trust in a substantially better position than it
would be in the absence of the breach. Specifically, she
contends that she had the authority to surrender the
policy for its cash value pursuant to the terms of the
trust.14 She points out that the policy defines the cash
surrender value as the ‘‘cash value less any policy
debt’’15 and further provides that ‘‘[a]ny policy debt will
be deducted from the policy proceeds.’’16 Because the
court found that Khan had loaned $220,624.58 to the
trust, Khan argues that the cash value of the policy on
the date of surrender was $156,639.55, or the equivalent
of $377,264.13 less $220,624.58.17 Khan further contends
14
Article XIII (C) of the trust provides in relevant part that the ‘‘[trustee
is] authorized to . . . surrender any policy for its cash value . . . .’’
15
Section 5.4 of the policy, titled ‘‘Cash Surrender,’’ provides: ‘‘The Owner
may surrender this policy for its cash surrender value. The cash surrender
value is the cash value less any policy debt. A written surrender of all claims,
satisfactory to the Company, will be required. The date of surrender will
be the date of receipt at the Home Office of the written surrender. The
policy will terminate and the cash surrender value will be determined as
of the date of surrender. The Company may require that the policy be sent
to it.’’
16
Section 6.3 of the policy, titled ‘‘Policy Debt,’’ provides in relevant part:
‘‘Policy debt consists of all outstanding loans and accrued interest. It may
be paid to the Company at any time. Policy debt affects dividends under
Section 4.1. Any policy debt will be deducted from the policy proceeds.’’
17
Khan highlights the court’s statement that ‘‘[Khan] made a series of
sixty-eight monthly loans to the trust of some $3017.50 (and one loan of
$6406.22) to maintain the policy and to grow its cash value. Had [Khan] not
done so, the policy’s cash surrender value likely would have been reduced
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
Khan v. Khan

that, even after adding lost interest to her calculated
net cash value of $156,639.55, the trust still suffered no
damages as a result of her actions.18 According to Khan,
the court improperly required her to pay interest on
her own loans and made the trust ‘‘more than whole’’
when it failed to account for the timely repayment of
her loans.
Khan, however, fails to acknowledge the court’s find-
ings that she transferred the policy proceeds to her
personal account, contrary to the policy surrender form,
which prohibits disbursements to a trustee in his or
her individual capacity. See footnote 4 of this opinion.
The court stated that Khan ‘‘knowingly misrepresented
to Northwestern Mutual that the bank account to which
she transferred the policy proceeds was titled in the
name of the trust, when she knew that she was directing
the funds to her personal account.’’ The court found
that Khan did not advise the plaintiffs or the grantor
that the policy had been terminated or that the policy
proceeds had been invested in her personal accounts
and, further, that Khan opened the trust account at
Fidelity on December 5, 2019, only after being advised
by the grantor’s attorneys that she had improperly trans-
ferred the policy proceeds to her personal accounts.
At trial, Khan acknowledged that she had commin-
gled the trust assets with her personal accounts.19 She
to zero, the policy would have terminated, and the trust would have had
no assets at all.’’
18
Because the policy paid annual dividends in the form of interest accrual
at an annual rate of 3.5 percent, Khan posits that the trust assets would
have gained approximately $15,404.95 in interest had she not surrendered
the policy. Khan contends that adding $15,404.95 in lost interest to her
calculated net cash value of $156,639.55 demonstrates that the trust would
have had $172,044.50 in cash value on December 5, 2019, had she not
surrendered the policy. Because she deposited $180,866.62 into the new
account, which is approximately $8000 more than the trust would have had
on December 5, 2019, but for her breach, Khan argues that the trust suffered
no damages.
19
The following exchange occurred between Khan representing herself
and participating as a witness in the case:
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

further testified that she did not know which stocks
she had purchased with the money that was transferred
from the trust account to her personal account.20 In its
decision, the trial court noted the ‘‘inability to determine
precisely which securities were purchased with the pol-
icy proceeds and their current value . . . .’’ It stated
that Khan had advanced her own interests to the plain-
tiffs’ detriment, resulting in damages to the plaintiffs
proximately caused by Khan’s actions. See Barash v.
Lembo, supra, 348 Conn. 285 (‘‘[t]he trustee’s adminis-
tration of the trust must comport with her duties of
loyalty and prudence’’).

Considering all the evidence, the court then awarded
damages based on the difference between the policy
proceeds on the date Khan surrendered the policy and
the date Khan opened a new trust account at Fidelity,
‘‘Q. In your—Ms. Kahn, did you commingle the money?
‘‘A. I a hundred percent did commingle the money.
‘‘Q. For how long, Ms. Kahn?
‘‘A. Until I learned of my error after disclosing it to [counsel for the
grantor] who then a few months later advised me that the money needed
to be isolated and segregated in the Khan Family Trust.’’
20
The following exchange occurred between the plaintiffs’ counsel and
Khan:
‘‘Q. So, then, the money that was transferred from your individual bank
account to the brokerage accounts, you don’t have documentation to estab-
lish what that money was used for.
‘‘A. I put it into my brokerage account of which I buy a set of stocks.
‘‘Q. Okay.
‘‘A. Always. I don’t know if it was these exact stocks.
‘‘Q. What set of stocks did you purchase with the moneys that [were]
transferred from the trust account to the individual account to your broker-
age accounts?
‘‘A. I don’t know exactly. [Khan’s counsel] tried to come up with something
that was around the same timeline.
‘‘Q. You don’t know exactly—
‘‘A. I don’t.
‘‘Q. —what shares of stock were purchased with moneys that came from
the trust. Correct?
‘‘A. I don’t. I got the money from the trust. I invested it in my account
for myself and the children. In my mind I was safekeeping it, which I was.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
Khan v. Khan

plus prejudgment interest, and then credited the money
that Khan loaned to the trust, resulting in a net damage
award to the plaintiffs of $75,114.09. The court’s deci-
sion reflects careful consideration of the evidence
admitted at trial. On the basis of our review of the
evidence, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient
to support the court’s damages determination and,
therefore, the court’s award of $75,114.09 was not clearly
erroneous. Khan, therefore, cannot prevail on her claim
that the court improperly found her liable for breach
of fiduciary duty.
B
Khan next claims that the court acted contrary to the
plain and unambiguous language of the trust in finding
her liable for conduct that was not wilful. We disagree.
The following additional facts are necessary for the
resolution of this claim. The third count of the plaintiffs’
amended complaint alleged statutory theft.21 The court
found in favor of Khan on this count, stating in relevant
part that ‘‘the plaintiffs did not prove that [Khan] had
the requisite intent to deprive the plaintiffs (her own
children) of the policy proceeds.’’22 In light of the court’s
finding that Khan did not have the requisite intent to
deprive the plaintiffs of the policy proceeds, Khan con-
tends that the court’s conclusion that she breached her
21
‘‘A person commits statutory theft when, with intent to deprive another
of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner.’’
(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Masse v. Perez, 139
Conn. App. 794, 801, 58 A.3d 273 (2012), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 905, 61
A.3d 1098 (2013).
22
The court further stated that, ‘‘[w]hile [Khan’s] conduct was . . .
improper and breached her fiduciary duty to the trust, it did not rise to the
level of theft. The court credits [Khan’s] testimony that, upon being informed
of what she rather generously characterizes as a ‘mistake’ or ‘error in judg-
ment,’ she promptly created a new brokerage account in the trust’s name
and transferred securities with a value of $180,866.62 from her personal
brokerage accounts.’’
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

fiduciary duty was improper. In support of this claim,
Khan relies on article XIII (S) of the trust, which pro-
vides in relevant part that ‘‘[n]o . . . [f]iduciary . . .
shall be liable for any mistake or error in judgment, or
for any action taken or omitted . . . except in the case
of [wilful] misconduct.’’23
According to Khan, the plaintiffs presented no evi-
dence demonstrating that her conduct rose to the level
of wilful misconduct. Khan points to the court’s finding
that her monthly loans to the trust enabled the trust to
grow its cash value and that, had she not done so, the
cash surrender value likely would have been reduced
to zero. See footnote 17 of this opinion. Khan, however,
fails to acknowledge the court’s additional findings,
including its finding that ‘‘[Khan] acted without authori-
zation (and without the plaintiffs’ knowledge and con-
sent) in terminating the policy, transferring the policy
proceeds into her personal banking and investment
accounts, commingling those funds with her personal
funds, and purchasing securities in her own name (at
least in part with the policy proceeds), all to the plain-
tiffs’ detriment.’’
‘‘Whether a party’s conduct is wilful is a question of
fact. . . . The term has many and varied definitions,
with the applicable definition often turn[ing] on the
specific facts of the case and the context in which it
is used.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Saunders v. Firtel, 293 Conn. 515, 530, 978
A.2d 487 (2009). ‘‘While we have attempted to draw
definitional distinctions between the terms wilful, wan-
ton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been
23
Article XIII (S) of the trust provides: ‘‘No individual Fiduciary who is
related to me by blood or marriage shall be liable for any mistake or error
of judgment, or for any action taken or omitted, either by my Fiduciaries
or by any agent or attorney employed by my Fiduciaries, or for any loss or
depreciation in the value of the trust, except in the case of willful miscon-
duct.’’ (Emphasis added.)
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 19
Khan v. Khan

treated as meaning the same thing. The result is that
[wilful], wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take on
the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving
an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation
where a high degree of danger is apparent.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266
Conn. 822, 833, 836 A.2d 394 (2003); see also Doe v.
Flanigan, 201 Conn. App. 411, 426–28, 243 A.3d 333,
cert. denied, 336 Conn. 901, 242 A.3d 711 (2020).
On the basis of our review of the evidence in the
record, we conclude that the court’s findings support
the conclusion that Khan’s conduct was wilful. Khan
acknowledged at trial that she transferred money from
the trust account into her personal bank account even
though the cash surrender form required that the trustee
not be the payee in his or her individual capacity. Khan
never informed Northwestern Mutual that the money
was being transferred to her individually. Khan testified
that the following day, she transferred approximately
$377,000 of trust assets plus approximately $23,000 of
her own assets to her individual brokerage accounts.
Khan acknowledged that the money from the trust
account was commingled with her other money until
she opened a new trust account approximately fourteen
months later.
On the basis of this evidence, the court found that
Khan ‘‘did not advise the [plaintiffs] or the grantor that
the policy had been terminated or that the policy pro-
ceeds had been invested in [Khan’s] personal accounts’’
and that she opened a trust account at Fidelity ‘‘only
after the grantor’s attorneys advised her several months
earlier that it was improper for [Khan] to have trans-
ferred the policy proceeds to her personal accounts.’’
The court further stated that Khan ‘‘knowingly misrep-
resented to Northwestern Mutual that the bank account
to which she transferred the policy’s proceeds was titled
in the name of the trust, when she knew that she was
Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

directing the funds to her personal account. [Khan] then
transferred those funds to her personal accounts at
Fidelity.’’ Contrary to the contention of Khan, the court’s
finding that Khan did not have the requisite intent to
deprive the plaintiffs of the policy proceeds for pur-
poses of the statutory theft count does not require a
conclusion that Khan’s conduct was not wilful. Accord-
ingly, Khan cannot prevail on her claim that the court
improperly found her liable for breach of fiduciary duty
based on conduct that was not wilful.
C
Khan next claims that the court erroneously awarded
punitive damages after it found that no wilful or wanton
misconduct had occurred. We disagree.
Common-law punitive damages in Connecticut ‘‘serve
primarily to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries’’
and are limited to litigation expenses less taxable costs.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) McCarter &
English, LLP v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc., 351 Conn. 186,
208, 329 A.3d 898 (2025). ‘‘[I]n . . . light of the increas-
ing costs of litigation, punitive damages in this state
can also punish and deter wrongful conduct.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 209. ‘‘In order to obtain an
award of common-law punitive damages, the pleadings
must allege and the evidence must be sufficient to allow
the trier of fact to find that the defendant exhibited
a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an
intentional and wanton violation of those rights.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Landmark Investment
Group, LLC v. CALCO Construction & Development
Co., 318 Conn. 847, 878, 124 A.3d 847 (2015). Punitive
damages may result from a breach of fiduciary duty.
See Chioffi v. Martin, 181 Conn. App. 111, 141, 186
A.3d 15 (2018).
In support of her claim, Khan again relies on the
court’s finding that she did not have the requisite intent
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21
Khan v. Khan

to deprive the plaintiffs of the policy proceeds for pur-
poses of the statutory theft count. According to Khan,
the court’s award of punitive damages includes a mis-
take of law and is inconsistent with its finding that she
lacked the intent to harm. As we concluded in part I B
of this opinion, however, we conclude that the court’s
finding that Khan did not have the requisite intent to
deprive the plaintiffs of the policy proceeds for pur-
poses of the statutory theft count does not compel a
conclusion that Khan’s conduct was not wilful. Further,
reading the court’s decision as a whole reveals that the
court made numerous findings, previously set forth in
this opinion, showing that Khan exhibited a reckless
indifference to the rights of the plaintiffs or an inten-
tional and wanton violation of those rights. As these
findings are supported by the record, Khan cannot pre-
vail on her claim that the court erroneously awarded
punitive damages.
D
Khan next claims that the court improperly removed
her as a trustee and acted contrary to the trust in estab-
lishing procedures regarding the appointment of a suc-
cessor trustee. We disagree.
Khan first claims that the court improperly relied
on General Statutes §§ 45a-499ww and 45a-499uu in
removing her as trustee and appointing a successor
trustee because, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-
487t (a) (5), those statutes do not apply to acts done
prior to January 1, 2020. ‘‘To the extent that our review
requires us to construe statutory provisions, this pre-
sents a legal question over which our review . . . is
plenary.’’ Washington Mutual Bank v. Coughlin, 168
Conn. App. 278, 288, 145 A.3d 408, cert. denied, 323
Conn. 939, 151 A.3d 387 (2016).
Section 45a-499ww (a) provides that ‘‘[t]he settlor of
a noncharitable trust, the settlor of a charitable trust
Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

22 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

who has expressly retained the right to do so, the Attor-
ney General in the case of a charitable trust, a cotrustee,
a beneficiary or the surety on the trustee’s probate
bond, may request the court to remove a trustee, or a
trustee may be removed by the court on its own initia-
tive.’’ Pursuant to § 45a-499ww (b) (1), the court may
remove a trustee if ‘‘[t]he trustee becomes incapable
of executing or neglects to perform the trustee’s duties,
wastes the trust assets, fails to furnish an additional or
substitute probate bond ordered by the court, or has
committed any other serious breach of trust . . . .’’

Section 45a-499uu (a) provides that ‘‘[a] vacancy in a
trusteeship occurs if: (1) A person designated as trustee
rejects the trusteeship; (2) a person designated as
trustee cannot be identified or does not exist; (3) a
trustee resigns; (4) a trustee is disqualified or removed;
(5) a trustee dies; or (6) a conservator is appointed for
an individual serving as trustee.’’ Section 45a-499uu (c)
provides that ‘‘[a] vacancy in a trusteeship required to
be filled shall be filled in the following order of priority:
(1) By a person designated in the terms of the trust to
act as successor trustee or appointed according to a
procedure specified in the terms and, in the case of a
testamentary trust, appointed by the Probate Court; (2)
in the case of a noncharitable, inter vivos trust, by
a person appointed by unanimous agreement of the
qualified beneficiaries; or (3) by a person appointed by
the court.’’

Having found in favor of the plaintiffs on the first
and second counts of the complaint and having found
that Khan breached her fiduciary duty as trustee and
committed acts that constitute a ‘‘serious breach of
trust’’ under § 45a-499ww, the court ordered that Khan
be removed as trustee upon the appointment of a suc-
cessor trustee. The court next relied on article VI of the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 21

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 23
Khan v. Khan

trust regarding the appointment of a successor trustee24
and indicated that it would conduct a hearing to deter-
mine whether the potential successor trustees named
in the trust were willing and able to serve as trustee.25
According to Khan, the court improperly relied on
§§ 45a-499ww and 45a-499uu, which were enacted in
2019 as part of the Connecticut Uniform Trust Code
(code), General Statutes § 45a-499a et seq.; see Public
Acts 2019, No. 19-137; in removing her as trustee. In
support of her argument, Khan relies on § 45a-487t (a)
(5), also enacted in 2019, which provides that ‘‘[a]n act
done before January 1, 2020, is not affected by [the
code].’’ Because the trust was established in 2007 and
all conduct complained of occurred before 2020, Khan
contends that the court’s reliance on the code as author-
ity to remove her as trustee was improper.
Khan, however, fails to acknowledge § 45a-487t (a)
(1), which provides that the code ‘‘[applies] to all trusts
created before, on or after January 1, 2020’’ and § 45a-
487t (a) (2), which provides that the code ‘‘[applies] to
all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced
on or after January 1, 2020.’’ (Emphasis added.) In
light of the language in § 45a-487t (a) (1) and (2) indicat-
ing that the code applies to all trusts created before,
on or after January 1, 2020, and all judicial proceedings
24
Article VI (A) of the trust provides in relevant part: ‘‘My spouse, LISA
C. KHAN, is the initial Trustee of any trusts under Article I. My spouse may
appoint one or more successor Trustees. If my spouse ceases to act as a
Trustee and fails to appoint a successor, I appoint ROBERT B. FAWBER,
of West Hartford, Connecticut, as a Trustee.’’ Article VI (E) provides in
relevant part that, ‘‘[i]f [FAWBER] or any successor to such Trustee fails
or ceases to act as a Trustee, the law firm of Cummings & Lockwood LLC
may appoint one or more successor Trustees.’’
25
On December 12, 2023, the plaintiffs filed a status update indicating that
the three individuals previously identified by Khan as potential successor
trustees had declined the position. Additionally, the plaintiffs indicated that
they had contacted five additional attorneys about the successor trustee
position and that all five had declined. To date, it does not appear that a
successor trustee has been appointed.
Page 22 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

24 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

concerning trusts commenced on or after January 1,
2020, we conclude that the court properly relied on
§§ 45a-499ww and 45a-499uu in removing Khan from
her position as trustee. We further conclude that Khan’s
claim would fail even if she were correct that the court
erred in applying these provisions because the code
‘‘did not change or redefine the fiduciary duties owed
by the defendant to the trust beneficiaries but merely
codified the common law in this respect.’’ Barash v.
Lembo, supra, 348 Conn. 286 n.12; see also Benjamin
v. Corasaniti, 341 Conn. 463, 479 n.11, 267 A.3d 108
(2021);26 but see Tunick v. Tunick, 201 Conn. App. 512,
538 n.15, 242 A.3d 1011 (2020) (code not applicable to
court’s consideration of continuing duties of trustee
removed prior to January 1, 2020), cert. denied, 336
Conn. 910, 244 A.3d 561 (2021).

Khan next contends that, under either the code or
the common law, the court improperly removed her as
trustee. She first argues that the court did not make the
necessary findings for her removal pursuant to § 45a-
499ww. She cites to Cadle Co. v. D’Addario, 268 Conn.
441, 844 A.2d 836 (2004), as support for her contention
that her removal was improper. In that case, our
26
In Barash v. Lembo, supra, 348 Conn. 264, our Supreme Court noted
the tension in § 45a-487t, stating: ‘‘The retroactive applicability of the code
to any particular situation depends on the nature of the disputed issue.
Relevant to the present appeal, General Statutes § 45a-487t (a) (1) provides
in relevant part that the code applies to ‘all trusts created before, on or
after January 1, 2020.’ Subsection (a) (5) of § 45a-487t, by contrast, bars
retroactive application of the code to ‘[a]n act done before January 1, 2020
. . . .’ ’’ Id., 286 n.12. ‘‘The code did not change or redefine the fiduciary
duties owed by the defendant to the trust beneficiaries but merely codified
the common law in this respect. . . . Consequently, we need not address
whether the code applies retroactively to the defendant’s actions.’’ (Citation
omitted.) Id.
In the present case, we note that, although the parties rely on the different
provisions of § 45a-487t regarding the applicability of the code, they have
not otherwise briefed the retroactive application of the code to the facts
of this case.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 23

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 25
Khan v. Khan

Supreme Court stated that removal of an executor ‘‘is
an extraordinary remedy designed to protect against
harm caused by the continuing depletion or mismanage-
ment of an estate. . . . In the absence of continuing
harm to the interests of the estate and its beneficiaries,
removal is not justified merely as a punishment for a
fiduciary’s past misconduct.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 457.

In the present case, the court found that Khan had
removed trust assets without authorization, knowingly
made misrepresentations to Northwestern Mutual, com-
mingled trust assets with her own funds and purchased
securities in her own name, at least in part with the
policy proceeds. Additionally, the court found that Khan
opened the account at Fidelity on December 5, 2019,
only after being advised by the grantor’s attorneys that
she had improperly transferred the policy proceeds to
her personal accounts. Contrary to the contention of
Khan, the court’s findings regarding Khan’s removal as
trustee are supported by the record and support the
court’s conclusion that removal was necessary to pre-
vent future harm to the trust. Khan, therefore, cannot
prevail on her claim that the court improperly removed
her as trustee.

Finally, Khan argues that pursuant to article VI (A)
of the trust; see footnote 24 of this opinion; and article VI
(F) of the trust,27 only she had the authority to appoint,
remove and replace any trustee. Article VI (A) of the
trust provides in relevant part: ‘‘My spouse, LISA C.
KHAN, is the initial Trustee of any trusts under Article
27
Article VI (F) of the trust provides: ‘‘My spouse may remove any Trustee
of any trust. At such time as my spouse removes a Trustee, my spouse shall
appoint one or more Independent Trustees as successor to the removed
Trustee; provided, however, that such successor Trustee shall be a bank,
trust company, registered investment advisor, certified public accountant
or attorney specializing in trusts and estates matters.’’
Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

I. My spouse may appoint one or more successor Trust-
ees. If my spouse ceases to act as a Trustee and fails
to appoint a successor, I appoint ROBERT B. FAWBER,
of West Hartford, Connecticut, as a Trustee.’’ Article
VI (F) of the trust provides in relevant part: ‘‘My spouse
may remove any Trustee of any trust. At such time as
my spouse removes a Trustee, my spouse shall appoint
one or more Independent Trustees as successor to the
removed Trustee . . . .’’
Although we agree that these provisions granted Khan
the right to appoint and remove a trustee, we disagree
that she retained that right once she was removed as
trustee. Pursuant to § 45a-499uu (a) (4), ‘‘[a] vacancy
in a trusteeship occurs if . . . a trustee is disqualified
or removed . . . .’’ Khan’s removal as trustee, there-
fore, created a vacancy. Section 45a-499uu (c), pre-
viously set forth in this opinion, then provides the order
in which a vacancy is to be filled, starting with a person
designated in the terms of the trust to act as successor
trustee, and next, in the case of a noncharitable inter
vivos trust, by a person appointed by unanimous agree-
ment of the qualified beneficiaries, and finally, by a
person appointed by the court. The court, having removed
Khan as trustee pending appointment of a successor
trustee, properly applied the provisions of the statute
and stated, pursuant to the terms of the trust, that it
would conduct a hearing to determine whether Fawber,
the named successor trustee, was willing and able to
serve and, if not, whether Cummings & Lockwood or
the court should appoint a successor trustee.
E
Khan next claims that the court improperly ignored
the plain and unambiguous language of the trust which
required that she be compensated with a trustee fee.28
We disagree.
28
Article XIII (X) of the trust provides in relevant part that the fiduciaries
‘‘shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for their services.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 25

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 27
Khan v. Khan

The following additional facts are necessary for the
resolution of this issue. In her posttrial memorandum
of law, Khan asserted that, as a result of her ‘‘fifteen
years of successful service to the trust, the court should
award her a reasonable trustee fee’’ in accordance with
her previously filed motion. In her motion requesting
a reasonable trustee fee, Khan sought a trustee fee of
3 percent of the trust’s average cash value of $221,000
for the years 2012 through 2022, or $6630 per year. She
also sought a reduced fee of $2500 per year for the years
2007 through 2011.29 The court denied Khan’s request
for a trustee fee.
‘‘Under [Connecticut] law an executor, administrator,
trustee or guardian is entitled to a reasonable compen-
sation for his services, depending upon the circum-
stances of the case. . . . In Hayward [v. Plant, 98
Conn. 374, 384–85, 119 A.341 (1923)], our Supreme
Court set forth nine factors for the trial court to consider
when determining the reasonableness of such compen-
sation: (1) the size of the estate; (2) the responsibilities
involved; (3) the character of the work required; (4)
the special problems and difficulties met in doing the
work; (5) the results achieved; (6) the knowledge, skill
and judgment required of and used by the [trustee]; (7)
the manner and promptitude with which the estate has
been settled; (8) the time and service required; and (9)
any other circumstances which may appear in the case
29
In her motion requesting a trustee fee, Khan asserted that the average
value of the trust from 2012 to August 18, 2022, the date of the motion, was
approximately $221,000. She contended that her work managing the trust
consisted of ‘‘monitoring the cash value against premiums paid; reviewing
the terms of the policy in determining if premiums should be paid in full
or offset by dividends; considering the beneficiaries’ insurance needs; analyz-
ing the years it would take for the policy to be ‘paid up’; weighing the value
returned in the insurance policy versus the value lost in the more aggressive
investments; and determining the appropriate time to surrender the policy
and invest the proceeds in investments that hopefully generated a greater
return.’’
Page 26 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

28 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

and are relevant and material to this determination.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
McGrath v. Gallant, 143 Conn. App. 129, 134, 69 A.3d
968 (2013).

When determining whether the trial court used the
appropriate legal standard, our review is plenary; the
question of whether the trial court properly applied
the factors in Hayward to the facts of this case and
determined that the defendant was not entitled to
receive compensation is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Id., 135–36. In the present case,
the court considered the Hayward factors and denied
Khan’s request for a trustee fee, citing her conduct as
set forth in this opinion. Specifically, the court stated
that ‘‘whatever benefit [Khan] provided to the trust by
loaning it money to maintain the trust’s assets was
completely undermined by [Khan’s] later conduct. . . .
[Khan] is being removed as trustee because she
breached her fiduciary duty to the trust; mismanaged
trust assets by commingling trust assets with her per-
sonal assets; made no effort to return the trust assets
to the trust until the plaintiffs demanded that she do
so; and then only returned a portion of the trust assets.
Second, [Khan] failed to comply with the trust’s require-
ment to produce evidence establishing the reasonable-
ness of her requested fees.’’

Because the court’s factual findings in this regard are
supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous,
the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Khan’s
request for a trustee fee. Accordingly, Khan cannot pre-
vail on her claim that the court ignored the language
of the trust when denying her request for a trustee fee.

The court, therefore, properly rendered judgment in
part in favor of the plaintiffs in the trust action.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 27

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 29
Khan v. Khan

II
THE INDEMNIFICATION ACTION
Khan claims that the court improperly failed to apply
the plain and unambiguous language of the trust’s
indemnification clause. We disagree.
As previously set forth in this opinion, after the plain-
tiffs commenced the present action, Khan commenced
an indemnification action against the grantor, claiming
that the actions she took regarding the policy were
within the scope of powers identified in the trust as
‘‘Insurance Powers,’’ including the powers to ‘‘surren-
der any policy for its cash value,’’ to ‘‘borrow money for
any purpose,’’ and ‘‘to rely on others to pay [premiums],
with no obligation . . . to make such payments or take
any action to keep any policy in force . . . .’’ Khan
relied on article XIII (C) of the trust, in which the grantor
agreed, ‘‘[o]n behalf of [himself] and [his] legal represen-
tatives, successors, heirs and assigns . . . [to] indem-
nify and hold harmless [his] Trustees from all claims,
liabilities, penalties and costs, including attorney’s fees,
arising from any claim, demand, order or action related
in any way to investing in and retaining any such insur-
ance policies and the exercise or nonexercise of any
Insurance Powers or other incidents of ownership
therein.’’ The court found in favor of the grantor and
against Khan in the indemnification action, concluding,
inter alia, that the grantor did not agree to indemnify
Khan for the conduct at issue in the trust action, but
only for claims relating to ‘‘investing in and retaining
. . . insurance policies and the exercise or nonexercise
of any Insurance Powers or other incidents of owner-
ship.’’
On appeal, Khan contends that the word ‘‘all’’ in the
indemnity provision providing that the grantor agreed
to indemnify and hold harmless his trustees ‘‘from all
Page 28 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

30 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Khan v. Khan

claims, liabilities, penalties and costs’’ should be inter-
preted broadly and without exception. See, e.g., Cirrito
v. Turner Construction Co., 189 Conn. 701, 704–709,
458 A.2d 678 (1983) (broadly interpreting ‘‘all’’ in indem-
nification clause of contract between general contrac-
tor and subcontractor); Laudano v. General Motors
Corp., 34 Conn. Supp. 684, 688, 388 A.2d 842 (1977)
(broadly interpreting ‘‘all’’ in indemnification clause of
contract between seller of dock shelters and buyer to
‘‘[include] a promise to indemnify even the negligent
indemnitee’’). We disagree and conclude that the court
properly interpreted the trust and determined that the
grantor did not intend to indemnify Khan for her con-
duct in the present case.
‘‘The cardinal rule of construction of all trusts . . .
is to find and effectuate the intent of the testator or
settlor. . . . The issue of intent as it relates to the inter-
pretation of a trust instrument . . . is to be determined
by examination of the language of the trust instrument
itself and not by extrinsic evidence of actual intent.
. . . The construction of a trust instrument presents a
question of law to be determined in the light of facts
that are found by the trial court or are undisputed or
indisputable. . . . [W]e cannot rewrite . . . a trust
instrument. The expressed intent must control,
although this is to be determined from reading the
instrument as a whole in the light of the circumstances
surrounding the . . . settlor when the instrument was
executed . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Spinnato v. Boyd, supra, 231 Conn.
App. 472.
Although Khan is correct that the grantor agreed,
in the indemnification clause, to ‘‘indemnify and hold
harmless [his] Trustees from all claims, liabilities, penal-
ties and costs,’’ this clause was limited to claims ‘‘arising
from any claim, demand, order or action related in any
way to investing in and retaining any such insurance
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 29

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 31
Khan v. Khan

policies and the exercise or nonexercise of any Insur-
ance Powers or other incidents of ownership therein.’’
(Emphasis added.) Construing the trust to effectuate
the intent of the grantor, and in light of the facts found
by the trial court; see Spinnato v. Boyd, supra, 231
Conn. App. 472; the court properly concluded that Khan
was not entitled to indemnification under the circum-
stances of this case. Specifically, the court found that
Khan had breached her fiduciary duty to the trust by
removing trust assets without authorization, knowingly
made misrepresentations to Northwestern Mutual,
commingled trust assets with her own funds and pur-
chased securities in her own name, at least in part with
the policy proceeds. Such conduct does not fall within
the parameters of the indemnification clause in article
XIII (C) of the trust regarding claims ‘‘arising from any
claim, demand, order or action related in any way to
investing in and retaining any such insurance policies
and the exercise or nonexercise of any Insurance Pow-
ers or other incidents of ownership therein.’’ Khan,
therefore, cannot prevail on her claim that she was
entitled to indemnification pursuant to the plain and
unambiguous language of the indemnification clause.
Accordingly, the trial court properly rendered judg-
ment in favor of the grantor in the indemnification
action.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.