Clark v. Employees' Review Board

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Clark v. Employees’ Review Board

MARILEE CORR CLARK v. EMPLOYEES’
REVIEW BOARD ET AL.
(AC 47020)
Alvord, Suarez and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, a former managerial employee of the Department of Revenue
Services who was not included in any collective bargaining agreement,
appealed from the trial court’s judgment dismissing her appeal from the
decision of the defendant board, which found that the department’s decision
to terminate the plaintiff’s employment was not arbitrary or taken without
reasonable cause pursuant to statute (§ 5-202 (c)). The plaintiff claimed, inter
alia, that the court failed to use the proper just cause standard applicable
to permanent state employees. Held:

The trial court properly upheld the department’s decision to terminate the
plaintiff’s employment utilizing a just cause standard pursuant to the applica-
ble statute (§ 5-240) and regulation (§ 5-240-1a (c)), as the plaintiff’s asser-
tions that she was entitled to progressive discipline prior to the termination
of her employment or to the application of the common-law seven step
test to determine just cause conflicted with the statutory and regulatory
definitions that the legislature has adopted for nonunion employees.

The trial court did not make certain improper legal and factual findings that
were not made by the defendant, as the court correctly determined that
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the termination of
the plaintiff’s employment on the basis of her engagement in activities
that were detrimental to the best interest of the department and that the
defendant’s finding of just cause was supported by substantial evidence.

The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s administrative appeal, as
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the defendant’s
factual findings and the termination of the plaintiff’s employment from state
service for just cause.
Argued February 11—officially released August 26, 2025

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the named defendant
finding that the termination of the plaintiff’s employ-
ment by the Department of Revenue Services was not
arbitrary or taken without reasonable cause, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New
Britain and tried to the court, Budzik, J.; judgment
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Clark v. Employees’ Review Board

dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Marilee Corr Clark, self-represented, the appellant
(plaintiff).
Krista D. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with
whom were Ksenya Hentisz, assistant attorney general,
and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Marilee
Corr Clark, appeals from the judgment of the trial court
dismissing her administrative appeal from the decision
of the defendant Employees’ Review Board (board),1
finding that the decision of the Department of Revenue
Services (department)2 to terminate the plaintiff’s
employment was not arbitrary or taken without reason-
able cause pursuant to General Statutes § 5-202 (c).3
1
The board is a creature of statute. General Statutes § 5-201 provides in
relevant part: ‘‘(a) There shall be an Employees’ Review Board consisting
of seven members . . . .
‘‘(b) The board shall hear and act upon appeals filed with it in accordance
with section 5-202. The board, or any three of its members designated by
the board, may serve as a hearing panel and render a decision. . . .’’
The scope of the board’s authority is governed by General Statutes § 5-
202. See State v. State Employees’ Review Board, 231 Conn. 391, 406 n.17,
650 A.2d 158 (1994); see also footnote 3 of this opinion. Section 5-202, in
turn, is part of the State Personnel Act, codified in General Statutes §§ 5-
193 through 5-269, the purpose of which is to ‘‘establish a system of public
employment based on merit principles, eliminate political patronage, per-
sonal favoritism and discrimination against disfavored political and religious
factions, and thereby prevent governmental corruption.’’ Dept. of Adminis-
trative Services v. Employees’ Review Board, 226 Conn. 670, 681, 628 A.2d
957 (1993).
2
Mark Boughton, the Commissioner of Revenue Services, was also named
as a defendant in this action. We refer to the board and to Boughton collec-
tively as the defendants and individually when appropriate.
3
General Statutes § 5-202 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any employee
who is not included in any collective bargaining unit of state employees
and who has achieved a permanent appointment as defined in section 5-
196 may appeal to the Employees’ Review Board if such employee receives
an unsatisfactory performance evaluation or is demoted, suspended or dis-
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On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the court failed
to utilize the proper ‘‘just cause’’ standard applicable to
permanent state employees, (2) the court made certain
improper factual findings that were not made by the
board, and (3) the board’s findings of fact were unsup-
ported by substantial evidence in the administrative
record.4 We affirm the judgment of the court dismissing
the plaintiff’s administrative appeal.
The record reflects the following relevant facts and
procedural history. The plaintiff is an attorney who
served as the tax legal director of the department from
2015 until the termination of her employment in Octo-
ber, 2020. As tax legal director, the plaintiff was a man-
ager in the classified service and was, therefore, a per-
manent state employee not included in any collective
bargaining agreement.5 See General Statutes §§ 5-196
missed . . . . Such employee must have complied with preliminary review
procedures . . . .
‘‘(c) Upon receiving an appeal, the board shall assign a time and place
for a hearing and shall give notice of such time and place to the parties
concerned. The hearing panel shall not be bound by technical rules of
evidence prevailing in the courts. If, after hearing, a majority of the hearing
panel determines that the action appealed from was arbitrary or taken
without reasonable cause, the appeal shall be sustained; otherwise, the
appeal shall be denied. . . .’’
4
In the statement of issues in her principal appellate brief, the plaintiff
identifies seven issues for this court’s review. We have reframed the plain-
tiff’s claims, in some instances condensing closely related claims, to more
accurately reflect the arguments in her brief. See, e.g., Thomas v. Cleary,
229 Conn. App. 15, 17 n.2, 326 A.3d 1109 (2024). Additionally, to the extent
that any of these issues are mentioned in the statement of issues but are
not subsequently discussed or developed in the plaintiff’s brief, they have
been abandoned. See, e.g., Ramos v. State, 230 Conn. App. 524, 530, 330
A.3d 278 (2025) (‘‘[when] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but
thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive
discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
5
See General Statutes § 5-196 (6) (classified service means ‘‘every office
or position in the state service, whether full-time or part-time, for which
compensation is paid, except those offices and positions specified in section
5-198 or otherwise expressly provided by statute’’); see also General Statutes
§ 5-196 (20) (permanent position means ‘‘any position in the classified service
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Clark v. Employees’ Review Board

and 5-198. At all relevant times, the plaintiff reported
to then acting commissioner of the department, John
Biello, and to the first assistant commissioner, Louis
Bucari. The plaintiff’s duties included supervising the
research unit and legal division, which included drafting
and amending tax legislation and regulations.
It is undisputed that the plaintiff and Bucari had a
history of discord, and, when Biello became acting com-
missioner in January, 2020, he met with the plaintiff to
discuss how she and Bucari could work better together.
The plaintiff responded that she could not work with
Bucari. In or around January, 2020, the plaintiff applied
for employment with the Office of the Attorney General,
specifically indicating interest in the finance group,
which represents the department in tax matters.
On February 3, 2020, the plaintiff called William Chap-
man, the director of government and community affairs
for the Connecticut Bar Association (CBA), to inquire
as to whether the CBA was planning to bring forward
a particular proposed bill, Senate Bill No. 941, which
related to the repeal of the succession tax, during the
2020 legislative session.6 After this phone call, the plain-
tiff sent an email to Chapman, using her personal email
address, containing proposed statutory language relat-
ing to Senate Bill No. 941. The plaintiff’s revision pro-
posed adding the following relevant language in section
5 of the bill: ‘‘Any first assistant commissioner so
appointed shall serve at the pleasure of the attorney
general and will be exempt from classified service.’’7
which requires or which is expected to require the services of an incumbent
without interruption for a period of more than six months’’).
6
The prior commissioner of the department, Scott Jackson, had expressed
concerns with Senate Bill No. 941. Specifically, Jackson was concerned that
the bill may have the unexpected effect of causing confusion relating to the
position of first assistant commissioner.
7
See General Statutes § 12-389 (a) (‘‘[t]he commissioner shall appoint a
First Assistant Commissioner of Revenue Services, who shall be an attorney
at law, and shall be the attorney in charge of succession and transfer taxes
and shall have authority to act as attorney for the commissioner in all
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(Internal quotation marks omitted.) No one at the
department reviewed this language before the plaintiff
sent it to Chapman. Chapman forwarded the plaintiff’s
email to the members of the Judiciary Committee. Chap-
man believed that the plaintiff was communicating the
proposal on behalf of the department and that the draft
language had been reviewed by the commissioner.

On February 6, 2020, Nicole Lake, director of legisla-
tive affairs for the Office of the Attorney General, wrote
to Ernest Adamo, a legislative liaison with the depart-
ment, regarding her concerns with the plaintiff’s pro-
posed language, specifically her concern that it would
shift the authority to appoint a first assistant commis-
sioner from the commissioner of the department to the
Attorney General, that the first assistant commissioner
position would be exempt from classified service, and
that the department would not retain the authority to
litigate its own tax cases in the Superior Court. The
next day, Biello scheduled a team meeting, which was
attended by the plaintiff, at which he gave verbal
matters relating thereto’’); General Statutes § 12-389 (b) (‘‘The Attorney
General may delegate to the Commissioner of Revenue Services ‘‘the author-
ity to appoint an attorney to represent the commissioner in matters relating
to certain appeals to the Superior Court from an order, decision or determina-
tion or disallowance of the Commissioner of Revenue Services. The Attorney
General may enter into a memorandum of understanding with the Commis-
sioner of Revenue Services which shall list the types of appeals which are
the subject of such delegation.’’)
The administrative record contains a memorandum of understanding,
entered into in 2003, between the Office of the Attorney General and the
department pursuant to § 12-389 (b), and it is undisputed that, since that time,
the department has litigated its own tax cases pursuant to that memorandum
under the first assistant commissioner.
The plaintiff asserted at oral argument before this court that, if she had
not acted on the proposed legislation, § 12-389 would have been ‘‘fully
repealed.’’ We decline to engage in the speculation that the plaintiff invites.
Furthermore, the dispositive fact remains that the plaintiff failed to disclose
to Biello the proposed statutory language that she sent to Chapman, notwith-
standing her knowledge of a direct order to do so.
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instructions that any discussions or drafts concerning
the succession tax or General Statutes § 12-389; see
footnote 7 of this opinion; must come through him. The
plaintiff did not inform Biello, or anyone else at the
meeting, that she already had provided proposed lan-
guage on that very legislation to Chapman. After the
meeting, the plaintiff met with Biello alone and told
him that there ‘‘may be’’ a proposal that would impact
§ 12-389. She did not, however, disclose to Biello at that
time that she already had emailed proposed language
to Chapman.

On February 9, 2020, Biello emailed sixteen depart-
ment employees, including the plaintiff, to reiterate that
anything involving the succession tax or § 12-389 had
to go through him. On the morning of February 10,
2020, Chapman asked Biello about the succession tax
bill that was going to be considered by the Judiciary
Committee. Biello was unaware of the plaintiff’s pro-
posed changes to the succession tax and later was
forced to testify in opposition to the bill, stating that
he did not authorize the language concerning the
appointment by the Attorney General of the first assis-
tant commissioner position or the exemption from clas-
sified service for that position. The plaintiff’s husband,
Nathaniel Clark, testified in support of the legislation.
Clark is not an employee with the department or a state
employee.8 Later on February 10, 2020, the plaintiff was
placed on paid administrative leave, pending an investi-
gation.

On March 4, 2020, the plaintiff was issued written
notice of a predisciplinary hearing pursuant to Board
of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546, 105 S.
Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985), which was held on
8
It is undisputed that the proposed legislation, which ultimately was
submitted as raised House Bill No. 5050, did not pass.
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September 22, 2020.9 The plaintiff appeared at the hear-
ing and was represented by counsel. Following the hear-
ing, the department formally notified the plaintiff by a
letter dated September 29, 2020, that it was dismissing
her from state employment for just cause pursuant to
§§ 5-240-1a (c), 5-240-5a and 5-240-8a (b) of the Regula-
tions of Connecticut State Agencies (regulations),10
effective October 13, 2020. The September, 2020 letter
stated that the department determined that the plaintiff
engaged in wilful and egregious conduct that violated
the department’s Code of Ethics11 and General Rules
9
‘‘[A] tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the
charges against [her], an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an
opportunity to present [her] side of the story before termination. . . . The
opportunity to present one’s side of the story is generally referred to as a
Loudermill hearing.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663 v. Dept. of Children & Families, 317 Conn.
238, 243 n.3, 117 A.3d 470 (2015).
10
Section 5-240-5a (a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
provides: ‘‘An appointing authority may dismiss an employee for just cause.’’
Section 5-240-1a (c) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
provides in relevant part that ‘‘ ‘[j]ust cause’ means any conduct for which
an employee may be suspended, demoted or dismissed and includes, but
is not limited to, the following . . . (8) Deliberate violation of any law,
state regulation or agency rule . . . (11) Neglect of duty, or other employ-
ment related misconduct . . . (12) Insubordination . . . [or] (13) Engaging
in any activity which is detrimental to the best interests of the agency or
of the state. . . .’’
Section 5-240-8a (a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
provides in relevant part: ‘‘Within one week of a decision by the appointing
authority to suspend an employee, demote an employee except at the request
of an employee or dismiss an employee, the appointing authority shall
provide written notice, in addition to any notice that may have been provided
in accordance with the prediscipline procedure, to the employee stating the
appointing authority’s decision, the reasons for the decision, the effective
date of the decision and informing the employee of any right to further
review or appeal that the employee may have pursuant to either . . . [§]
5-202 or an applicable collective bargaining agreement.’’
11
The record contains the plaintiff’s signed acknowledgment of the depart-
ment’s Code of Ethics, which states: ‘‘Proper functioning of the government
requires that the agency/department, the courts, other state agencies and
the public be able to rely fully on the truthfulness of government employees
in matters of official interest.’’
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of Conduct, as well as § 5-240-1a (c) (8), (11) and (13)
of the regulations.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a timely grievance with
the board, challenging the termination of her employ-
ment. Pursuant to § 5-202 (j),12 the grievance was ini-
tially brought to the Office of Labor Relations for a
‘‘step three’’13 conference. At the conference, the Office
of Labor Relations heard the parties, through counsel,
on their positions regarding whether the department
had reasonable cause to terminate the plaintiff’s employ-
ment, and reviewed documentation submitted by the
parties. The Office of Labor Relations denied the griev-
ance in a written decision dated December 29, 2020.
The plaintiff thereafter filed a timely appeal from the
denial of her grievance to the board pursuant to § 5-
202 (a). The board held an evidentiary hearing that
spanned six days, during which it heard testimony from
several witnesses, including the plaintiff, and received
voluminous documentary evidence. The plaintiff was
represented by counsel throughout the grievance pro-
cess and was permitted to present evidence and to
cross-examine witnesses. The parties also filed post-
hearing briefs and reply briefs.
The board subsequently issued a decision concluding
that the termination of the plaintiff’s employment was
12
General Statutes § 5-202 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The third level
of the preliminary review procedure preparatory to the filing of an appeal
from an alleged grievable action under subsection (a) of this section includ-
ing dismissal, demotion or suspension shall be the Secretary of the Office
of Policy and Management or the secretary’s designated representative. . . .
The Secretary of the Office of Policy and Management or the secretary’s
designated representative shall reply to such employee not later than thirty
calendar days from the date such grievance is received or not later than
fifteen calendar days from the date of a meeting convened for the purpose
of reviewing such grievance, in which case such meeting shall be convened
not later than thirty calendar days from the date such grievance is received.’’
13
A ‘‘step three’’ conference constitutes the third level of the preliminary
review procedure under § 5-202 (j), before an alleged grievable action may
be appealed to the board. See footnote 12 of this opinion.
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not arbitrary or unreasonable pursuant to § 5-202 (c).
The board noted that, in the common law of labor arbi-
tration, a ‘‘seven step test’’ is ‘‘well established as a
guide to determine whether just cause exists for the
various levels of discipline that an employer may impose
on a worker for misconduct.14 These criteria are often
applied by the [board] in its analysis of disciplinary
cases. For ‘egregious’ misconduct, the severest disci-
pline (termination) may be imposed without consider-
ing so-called ‘progressive discipline.’ ’’ (Footnote
added.) The board found, on the basis of Biello’s testi-
mony, which it found credible, that the plaintiff’s pro-
posed legislation ‘‘struck at the heart’’ of the depart-
ment’s operations and undermined its ability to appoint
its own first assistant commissioner. The board found
that the plaintiff’s conduct was motivated by her per-
sonal interests, rather than those of the department.
Furthermore, the board stated that the plaintiff’s lack
of disclosure over four days was an ‘‘intentional act of
serious misconduct, a breach of the employee-employer
relationship and a breach of trust.’’ The board therefore
concluded that it found two levels of serious miscon-
duct: the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Biello’s
instructions, and her personal motives in drafting the
proposed legislation. It found that the plaintiff’s miscon-
duct was egregious, and, therefore, ‘‘progressive disci-
pline was not a factor.’’ Accordingly, the board denied
the plaintiff’s grievance and found that the plaintiff’s
employment was properly terminated for just cause.
14
The seven step test was first articulated in 1966 by ‘‘Arbitrator Carroll
R. Daugherty [who] issued an award in Enterprise Wire Co. v. Enterprise
Independent Union, 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 359 (Mar. 28, 1966), where,
in the absence of a contractual definition of just cause, he established
a seven prong[ed] approach to determine whether just cause existed for
discipline. Soon thereafter, other arbitrators adopted these standards, label-
ing them ‘Daugherty tests of just cause.’ ’’ Hartford Municipal Employees
Assn. v. Hartford, 128 Conn. App. 646, 662, 19 A.3d 193 (Flynn, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 301 Conn. 934, 23 A.3d 730 (2011).
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The plaintiff thereafter filed an administrative appeal
from the board’s decision to the Superior Court pursu-
ant to General Statutes §§ 4-183 and 5-202 (m).15 Follow-
ing a hearing, the court upheld the board’s decision and
dismissed the plaintiff’s administrative appeal. In its
memorandum of decision dated September 14, 2023,
the court concluded that there was substantial evidence
in the record to sustain the board’s decision finding
just and reasonable cause for the termination of the
plaintiff’s employment on the basis of insubordination
and the plaintiff’s proposing legislation for the purpose
of furthering her own interests, rather than the depart-
ment’s or the state’s interests. The court stated that the
plaintiff’s unilateral actions in proposing the legislation
provided substantial evidence of a deliberate disregard
of Biello’s instructions. The court noted that the fact
that the plaintiff sent the proposed language on Febru-
ary 3, 2020, before Biello’s instructions on February 7,
and repeated on February 9, 2020, did not immunize
her actions because ‘‘[a]ny reasonable, good faith inter-
pretation by such an employee of the acting commis-
sioner’s instruction that all legislations regarding the
succession tax go through [him] would include the idea
that . . . Biello was instructing that he be informed of
legislative proposals on that very issue that had been
sent to the General Assembly just days before.’’ The
court also found substantial, ‘‘overwhelming’’ evidence
in the record that the plaintiff acted in pursuit of her
own personal motives by drafting the proposed legisla-
tion to remove the first assistant commissioner from
15
General Statutes § 5-202 (m) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Either the Secre-
tary of the Office of Policy and Management or any employee or group of
employees aggrieved by a decision of the Employees’ Review Board may
appeal from such decision in accordance with section 4-183. . . .’’
General Statutes § 4-183 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person who has
exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who
is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court as provided
in this section. . . .’’
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classified service. Therefore, the court dismissed the
plaintiff’s administrative appeal. This appeal followed.
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The legal principles governing our review of decisions
of administrative agencies are well established. ‘‘[J]udi-
cial review of an administrative agency’s action is gov-
erned by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act
(UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., and the scope
of that review is limited. . . . When reviewing the trial
court’s decision, we seek to determine whether it com-
ports with the [UAPA]. . . . [R]eview of an administra-
tive agency decision requires a court to determine
whether there is substantial evidence in the administra-
tive record to support the agency’s findings of basic
fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those
facts are reasonable. . . . Neither this court nor the
trial court may retry the case or substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency on the
weight of the evidence or questions of fact. . . . Con-
clusions of law reached by the administrative agency
must stand if . . . they resulted from a correct applica-
tion of the law to the facts found and could reasonably
and logically follow from such facts. . . . The court’s
ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the
evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbi-
trarily, illegally, or in abuse of [its] discretion. . . .
‘‘Moreover, [a]lthough the interpretation of statutes
is ultimately a question of law . . . it is the well estab-
lished practice of [our appellate courts] to accord great
deference to the construction given [a] statute by the
agency charged with its enforcement. . . . It is also
well established that courts should accord deference
to an agency’s formally articulated interpretation of a
statute when that interpretation is both time-tested and
reasonable. . . . Our Supreme Court has determined,
however, that the traditional deference accorded to an
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Clark v. Employees’ Review Board

agency’s interpretation of a statutory term is unwar-
ranted when the construction of a statute . . . has not
previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to]
. . . a governmental agency’s time-tested interpreta-
tion . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) PMC Property Group, Inc. v. Public
Utilities Regulatory Authority, 189 Conn. App. 268,
273–74, 207 A.3d 114 (2019).
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court failed to utilize
the proper ‘‘just cause’’ standard applicable to perma-
nent state employees pursuant to General Statutes § 5-
240 (c). Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that (1) the
board and the court failed to ‘‘apply any of the seven
accepted tests for determining ‘just cause’ in the context
of terminating a permanent state employee’s employ-
ment in the classified service,’’ and (2) she was entitled
to progressive discipline prior to the termination of her
employment.16 The defendants, however, argue that the
plaintiff’s assertions conflict with the statutory and reg-
ulatory definitions that the legislature has adopted for
nonunion employees and that she was not entitled to
progressive discipline or to the application of the com-
mon-law seven step test to determine just cause in the
absence of any indication otherwise from the legisla-
ture. We agree with the defendants.
Although the parties agree that our review of this
appeal is governed by the UAPA, they disagree as to
the proper standard of review that should apply to this
claim. The plaintiff contends that de novo review
applies because her first claim requires this court to
16
The plaintiff also asserts in her statement of issues that the court erred
in ‘‘affirming the [board’s] decision on alternat[ive] grounds.’’ Upon our
review, the plaintiff’s brief contains no analysis of such a claim and, there-
fore, we decline to address it as it is inadequately briefed. See, e.g., Sicignano
v. Pearce, 228 Conn. App. 664, 690–91, 325 A.3d 1127 (2024), cert. denied,
351 Conn. 908, 330 A.3d 881 (2025).
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Clark v. Employees’ Review Board

analyze the relevant statutes and regulations governing
just cause for terminating a permanent employee,
including § 5-240. The defendants counter that we must
defer to the board’s conclusions of law and assert that
the board’s interpretation of its ‘‘statutory obligations
under § 5-202 (c) is time-tested because it has been
formally articulated and applied for an extended period
of time.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defen-
dants have not, however, argued that there is a time-
tested agency interpretation of either § 5-240 or the
regulations promulgated therewith that define ‘‘just
cause,’’ or that the plaintiff’s claim that the seven step
test should be applied to § 5-240 has been subjected to
judicial scrutiny.
We conclude that the defendants’ argument conflates
§ 5-202 (c), which limits the board’s scope of review to
determining whether the ‘‘action appealed from was
arbitrary or taken without reasonable cause,’’ with the
merits of the plaintiff’s claim, namely, that the depart-
ment terminated her employment without just cause
pursuant to § 5-240. In order to determine whether the
department’s actions were ‘‘arbitrary or taken without
reasonable cause,’’ the board held a hearing pursuant
to § 5-202 (c) and issued its own factual findings within
the scope of its review, to assess the department’s con-
clusion that there was just cause to terminate the plain-
tiff’s employment. The board’s decision states that the
parties agreed that the issues before it were (1) whether
the termination of the plaintiff’s employment was for
reasonable or just cause, and (2) ‘‘[i]f not, what shall
be the remedy?’’ Therefore, we conclude that the issues
of whether (1) a ‘‘just cause’’ standard must be met
for the discipline of a managerial employee, and (2)
‘‘whether the traditional ‘just cause’ standard that uti-
lizes the seven [part test] for determining whether ‘just
cause’ exists applies to managerial employees who are
permanent state employees in the classified service for
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the state of Connecticut,’’ raise questions of statutory
interpretation, over which our review is plenary. See,
e.g., Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission,
338 Conn. 310, 320, 258 A.3d 1 (2021); see also, e.g.,
Secretary of the Office of Policy & Management v.
Employees’ Review Board, 267 Conn. 255, 262, 837 A.2d
770 (2004).
‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec-
tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to
determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually
does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the
text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is
not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpre-
tive guidance to the legislative history and circum-
stances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative
policy it was designed to implement, and to its relation-
ship to existing legislation and [common-law] principles
governing the same general subject matter . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meriden v. Free-
dom of Information Commission, supra, 338 Conn.
320–21.
We begin with the text of the relevant statute. Section
5-240 (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘An appointing
authority may dismiss any employee in the classified
service when the authority considers the good of the
service will be served thereby. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
Section 5-240-5a (a) of the regulations provides that
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‘‘[a]n appointing authority may dismiss an employee
for just cause.’’ Section 5-240-1a (c) of the regulations
specifically defines just cause as ‘‘any conduct for which
an employee may be suspended, demoted or dismissed
and includes, but is not limited to, the following . . .
(8) [d]eliberate violation of any law, state regulation or
agency rule . . . (11) [n]eglect of duty, or other
employment related misconduct . . . (12) [i]nsubordi-
nation . . . [or] (13) [e]ngaging in any activity which
is detrimental to the best interests of the agency or of
the state. . . .’’
We conclude, on the basis of the plain language of
§ 5-240 and § 5-240-1a (c) of the regulations, that a just
cause standard governed the department’s termination
of the plaintiff’s employment. See, e.g., Wagner v. Con-
necticut Personnel Appeal Board, 170 Conn. 668, 672,
368 A.2d 20 (1976) (‘‘[u]nder [§] 5-240 . . . an employee
cannot be dismissed arbitrarily or without reasonable
cause’’ (citation omitted)).17 In the present case, the
plaintiff has not cited to any appellate authority, and
we have found none, in which this court, or our Supreme
Court, has definitively stated that the seven part test
must be applied in every case concerning just cause in
employment termination cases. Neither § 5-240 nor
§§ 5-240-1a and 5-240-7a of the Regulations of Connecti-
17
The plaintiff asserts that, at oral argument before the trial court, counsel
for the defendants had argued that a just cause standard did not apply to
her as a managerial employee. The plaintiff cites a portion of the transcript
in which the defendants’ counsel stated that ‘‘[t]he collective bargaining
employees’ rights to progressive discipline to just cause for discharge, the
seven step test, those are negotiated between . . . with the union represent-
ing the employees. And, that is absent as applied to the plaintiff here,
being a noncollective bargaining unit employee.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) We do not interpret counsel’s statement as an assertion that the
plaintiff was not subject to a just cause standard but, rather, that she was
not entitled to progressive discipline. Moreover, the defendants have not
disputed on appeal that permanent, nonunion state employees in the classi-
fied service, such as the plaintiff, are subject to termination of their employ-
ment by the department for just cause.
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cut State Agencies mandate that progressive discipline
must occur before proceedings to terminate an employ-
ee’s employment. The plaintiff essentially asks us to
graft additional language onto the applicable statutes
and regulations that does not exist. It is well settled,
however, that ‘‘[i]t is not the role of this court to engraft
additional requirements onto clear statutory language.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cochran v. Dept.
of Transportation, 350 Conn. 844, 865–66, 327 A.3d 901
(2024); see PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn.
347, 358, 324 A.3d 780 (2024); see also, e.g., Secretary
of the Office of Policy & Management v. Employees’
Review Board, supra, 267 Conn. 274 (‘‘[I]t is axiomatic
that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to accom-
plish a particular result. That is the function of the
legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
‘‘[Courts] are not in the business of writing statutes;
that is the province of the legislature. Our role is to
interpret statutes as they are written. . . . [We] cannot,
by [judicial] construction, read into statutes provisions
[that] are not clearly stated.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Aldin Associates Ltd. Partnership v. State,
230 Conn. App. 223, 249, 330 A.3d 613, cert. granted,
351 Conn. 911, 330 A.3d 882 (2025).

At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff
argued that notice of the possible consequences of an
employee’s conduct is the ‘‘biggest issue in this case.’’
The statutes and regulations governing the disciplinary
process for employees such as the plaintiff, however,
do not require that notice of the possible consequences
of an employee’s conduct be given before disciplinary
proceedings may be commenced. Although notice of
the possible consequences of an employee’s conduct is
one of the elements of the seven step test the plaintiff
advocates, the seven step test is not mandated in § 5-
240. It also is not included in the applicable regulation
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that delineates the prediscipline procedures that must
be followed prior to the termination of employment.
See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 5-240-7a (a). Prior
notice of the decision to suspend an employee, includ-
ing an opportunity to be heard pursuant to Loudermill,
is required under § 5-240-7a of the regulations. As out-
lined previously, however, the record reveals that those
required pretermination procedures were followed in
the present case.18
In its decision, the board noted that it could have
used the seven step test advocated by the plaintiff as
guidance in determining whether just cause existed to
18
To the extent the plaintiff seeks to raise claims that the administrative
process provided by the department and the board violated her due process
rights, such claims are abandoned due to inadequate briefing. Apart from
arguing that she was entitled to ‘‘progressive discipline,’’ which was not
required by any governing statute or regulation, the plaintiff has not pointed
to any other ways in which her due process rights were violated. See Regs.,
Conn. State Agencies § 5-240-7a. At one point in her brief, the plaintiff
asserts that she was not provided with the full report of Kristen Brierley,
an investigator for the department, prior to her Loudermill hearing, but she
provides no meaningful analysis of why Brierley’s redacted report, which
was disclosed in full prior to the contested hearing before the board, deprived
her of the ability to understand the charges raised against her.
Moreover, the plaintiff has not applied the traditional three part balancing
test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L.
Ed. 2d 18 (1976), to determine ‘‘what safeguards the federal constitution
requires to satisfy procedural due process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Turn of River Fire Dept., Inc. v. Stamford, 159 Conn. App. 708, 712
n.2, 123 A.3d 909 (2015). ‘‘It is well established that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through
an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue
properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but
thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive
discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Frauenglass & Associates, LLC v.
Enagbare, 149 Conn. App. 103, 110–11, 88 A.3d 1246 (federal due process
claim was inadequately briefed when defendant failed to mention balancing
test let alone include analysis of Mathews test as applied to facts of defen-
dant’s case), cert. denied, 314 Conn. 927, 101 A.3d 273 (2014). Accordingly,
we deem any procedural due process claim abandoned due to inadequate
briefing and decline to review it.
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terminate her employment.19 It did not, however,
because the board determined that the application of
the seven step test was not necessary in light of its
finding that the plaintiff’s conduct was ‘‘egregious,’’20
which was supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See part III of this opinion; see also Hannifan
v. Sachs, 150 Conn. 162, 166, 187 A.2d 253 (1962) (con-
cluding that responsibility imposed on board to deter-
mine whether appointing authority has not acted arbi-
trarily or without reasonable cause ‘‘requires an
exercise of judgment and discretion’’). We decline the
19
The plaintiff argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the
seven step test to determine just cause was inapplicable because she was
a nonunion employee. We agree with the board that the seven step test
could have been used as guidance in the present case, even though the
plaintiff was not a union employee. We conclude, however, that the board
did not have to apply that test because it found that the plaintiff’s conduct
was egregious. Thus, any error relating to the court’s conclusion that the
seven step test could not have been applied to a nonunion employee was
harmless because it does not affect our result. See Board of Selectmen v.
Freedom of Information Commission, 294 Conn. 438, 456, 984 A.2d 748
(2010) (harmless error standard in civil case is whether improper ruling
would likely affect result).
20
The plaintiff asserts, without citation to authority, that ‘‘most cases that
find egregious misconduct involve conduct that is inherently criminal in
nature.’’ She further asserts that even some criminal behavior is not sufficient
for termination without progressive discipline, citing State v. Connecticut
Employees Union Independent, 322 Conn. 713, 142 A.3d 1122 (2016). In that
case, our Supreme Court held that an arbitrator did not violate public policy
by reinstating an employee’s employment, when the employee had smoked
marijuana at work. Id., 716. That case is distinguishable, however, because
the arbitrator specifically had noted that the employee ‘‘did not engage in
. . . a breach of trust or show . . . a lack of character . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 719. In the present case, the board explicitly
did find that the plaintiff’s lack of disclosure was a breach of trust.
The plaintiff also relies on Stratford v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 407,
315 Conn. 49, 105 A.3d 148 (2014), which involved a police officer’s dishonest
conduct. That case, too, is distinguishable, first, because it addressed a
distinct procedural issue, namely, whether an arbitration award reinstating
the officer violated public policy, and second, because the dishonesty at
issue in that case did not compromise the officer’s ability to perform his
official duties and was not disruptive. Id., 50. In the present case, by contrast,
the board found that the plaintiff’s proposal, which she intended to conceal
from Biello, ‘‘struck at the heart’’ of the department’s operations.
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plaintiff’s invitation, therefore, to place a judicial gloss
on § 5-240 that would be inconsistent with the legisla-
ture’s clear statutory language. See, e.g., State v. DeCic-
cio, 315 Conn. 79, 149, 105 A.3d 165 (2014) (‘‘[w]e pre-
viously have declined to place a gloss on a statute that
contradicts its plain meaning’’); Keller v. Beckenstein,
305 Conn. 523, 536–37, 46 A.3d 102 (2012) (same). This is
particularly so given that the board is an administrative
agency, and its scope of authority is strictly limited
by statute. ‘‘An administrative agency, as a tribunal of
limited jurisdiction, must act strictly within its statutory
authority. . . . [An administrative agency] possesses
no inherent power. Its authority is found in a legislative
grant, beyond the terms and necessary implications of
which it cannot lawfully function.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. State
Employees’ Review Board, 231 Conn. 391, 406, 650 A.2d
158 (1994); see also Turrill v. Erskine, 134 Conn. 16,
23, 54 A.2d 494 (1947) (board’s authority is limited to
determination of whether appointing authority acted
improperly).

Lastly, the plaintiff argues that ‘‘[t]he seven tests for
determining ‘just cause’ is itself the subject of a treatise
that is currently in its third edition . . . . A. Koven &
S. Smith, [Just Cause: The Seven Tests (3d Ed. 2006)],’’
and asserts that our Supreme Court, in AFSCME, Coun-
cil 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction, 298 Conn. 824,
829–30, 6 A.3d 1142 (2010), ‘‘cited’’ the same seven step
test. In that case, however, our Supreme Court merely
listed the seven factors that the arbitrator had utilized
‘‘as guidance in her deliberations . . . .’’ (Emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) AFSCME,
Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction, supra,
829. Our Supreme Court did not, however, state that
these factors must be applied in all cases in which just
cause is at issue. Id., 829–30. We decline the plaintiff’s
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invitation to do so now and, accordingly, reject the
plaintiff’s claim.
II
The plaintiff also asserts that the court made certain
improper factual findings that were not made by the
board. We are not persuaded.
We first set forth the applicable standard of review.
‘‘When reviewing the trial court’s decision, we seek to
determine whether it comports with the [UAPA],’’ and
we defer to the board’s factual findings, unless they are
unsupported by substantial evidence. (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) PMC Property Group, Inc. v. Pub-
lic Utilities Regulatory Authority, supra, 189 Conn.
App. 273–74; see also Gonzalez v. State Elections
Enforcement Commission, 145 Conn. App. 458, 464, 77
A.3d 790 (‘‘[o]ur task is to review the court’s decision
to determine whether it comports with the . . .
[UAPA] . . . and whether the court reviewing the
administrative agency acted unreasonably, illegally, or
in abuse of discretion’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)), cert. denied, 310 Conn. 954, 81 A.3d 1181 (2013).
First, the plaintiff contends that the court made
improper legal and factual findings with respect to
insubordination. Specifically, she asserts that insubor-
dination was not one of the grounds for just cause
enumerated in § 5-240-1a (c) of the regulations that the
board explicitly found in determining that there was
just cause to terminate her employment. We conclude
that, even if the board did not use the exact word ‘‘insub-
ordination,’’ it found that the plaintiff’s actions consti-
tuted misconduct because she ‘‘def[ied] a direct instruc-
tion by the boss . . . .’’ The trial court looked to the
dictionary definition of ‘‘insubordination,’’ which
defines the term as ‘‘a willful disregard for an employer’s
instructions.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019) p.
953. As the term ‘‘insubordination’’ was not specifically
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defined in § 5-240-1a (c) (12) of the regulations, it was
proper for the trial court to look to the common usage
of that term as defined in the dictionary.21 See, e.g.,
Greenwich Retail v. Greenwich, 233 Conn. App. 78, 87,
A.3d (2025). The court’s determination that
there was substantial evidence in the record that just
cause existed to terminate the plaintiff’s employment
on the basis of her insubordination was reasonable and
grounded in the board’s factual findings. Moreover, in
addition to the board’s finding that the plaintiff defied
a direct order from Biello, the board also found that
the plaintiff’s conduct was in furtherance of her own
interests, rather than those of the department, because
her proposed legislation ‘‘struck at the heart’’ of the
department’s operations. Thus, the trial court deter-
mined that there was also substantial evidence in the
record, and we agree, for the termination of the plain-
tiff’s employment on the basis of her engagement in
activities that were detrimental to the best interests of
the department, pursuant to § 5-240-1a (c) (13) of the
regulations. See part III of this opinion.
Second, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly
found that she ‘‘wilfully disregarded the [department’s]
preexisting policy that proposals affecting [department]
operations be shared with the agency and be approved
by the commissioner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) We agree with the defendants that, even if the
court erroneously found that there was a preexisting
rule that the plaintiff must obtain the approval of Biello
before introducing draft legislation, any error was not
harmful because such a rule was articulated by Biello
on February 7, 2020, and she failed to disclose the fact
21
The plaintiff asserts that the court should have relied on the ‘‘standard
that has been used by the state of Connecticut’’ in determining insubordina-
tion. In support of this argument, the plaintiff cites to an employees’ manual
for the state Department of Transportation, which discusses principles of
progressive discipline. The defendants argue, and we agree, that this manual
was not applicable to employees of the plaintiff’s department.
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that she already had proposed such legislation without
Biello’s approval. See, e.g., Board of Selectmen v. Free-
dom of Information Commission, 294 Conn. 438, 456–
57, 984 A.2d 748 (2010) (concluding that agency was
not entitled to relief because any impropriety on part
of trial court was harmless). The board’s finding that
the plaintiff’s failure to disclose her proposal consti-
tuted just cause for her termination is supported by
substantial evidence. See part III of this opinion. The
plaintiff’s arguments are, therefore, unavailing.
III
The plaintiff next claims that the board made factual
findings that are unsupported by substantial evidence
in the record.22 Specifically, the plaintiff challenges the
board’s findings that (1) she failed to inform Biello or
anyone else at the February 7, 2020 meeting that she had
already submitted draft language in connection with
the succession tax bill, (2) her lack of disclosure of the
proposed legislation was an intentional act of serious
misconduct, and (3) the testimony of her husband,
Nathaniel Clark, in support of her proposed legislation
was the result of her improper influence. The defen-
dants counter that the evidence in the record supports
the conclusion that the plaintiff’s actions were against
the interests of her department and were in contraven-
tion of Biello’s clear directives that any proposed legis-
lation come through him. We agree with the defendants.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review
governing this claim. As noted previously, ‘‘under the
UAPA, judicial review of an agency’s factual determina-
tion is governed by the substantial evidence standard,
22
In this section of her brief, the plaintiff revisits her argument that the
court improperly found that there was a preexisting rule that the plaintiff
was required to obtain approval from her superiors before introducing legis-
lation. In part II of this opinion, we rejected the plaintiff’s contention. We
need not address that issue again here.
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which is highly deferential and permits less judicial
scrutiny than a clearly erroneous or weight of the evi-
dence standard of review. . . . Under the substantial
evidence standard, [t]he question is not whether the
evidence would also support a different, or even incon-
sistent conclusion but whether there is substantial evi-
dence to support the [agency’s] decision . . . .’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Commission on Human Rights & Opportu-
nities v. Dance Right, LLC, 230 Conn. App. 53, 75, 329
A.3d 1008 (2025).
The following additional facts are relevant to our
resolution of the plaintiff’s claim. At the hearing before
the board, the defendants produced an investigative
report by Kristen Brierley. That report, which was
admitted into evidence before the board, reveals that
Brierley interviewed Adamo, who expressed being
‘‘ ‘flabbergasted’ ’’ at the plaintiff’s proposed language.
Sherman had also expressed concerns with the lan-
guage and, in response, the plaintiff told Sherman that
she would speak to Biello about the proposed language.
When she did meet with Biello in a one-on-one meeting
on February 7, 2020, however, she did not tell him that
she had already sent proposed language to Chapman.
Rather, she indicated that ‘‘ ‘there may be’ ’’ a proposal
that would impact § 12-389. Biello testified: ‘‘She didn’t
say that it was the CBA or anything like that. She just
said she’s aware there may be another piece of legisl[a-
tion] that affects [§] 12-389, and that if I liked, she could
draft some language for the department.’’ On February
10, 2020, the plaintiff sent an email to Paul Mounds in
the Office of the Governor, which stated: ‘‘[Biello] has
already made it clear that he fully supports our current
[f]irst [a]ssistant [c]ommissioner . . . [Bucari], and
will seek legislation to protect him and his job. . . .
Unless the administration wants to fully support . . .
Bucari in keeping his position, the governor’s office will
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need to weigh in on whether it wants to keep the posi-
tion of [f]irst [a]ssistant [c]ommissioner, what that role
should entail . . . and whether it should be made clear
that the position is intended to be an appointed posi-
tion.’’
The plaintiff argues that the board improperly found
that she ‘‘failed to inform . . . Biello, or anyone else
at the [February 7, 2020] meeting, that she had already
provided language to . . . Chapman on the succession
tax and [§] 12-389.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
The plaintiff states that she spoke with Adamo and
Sherman ‘‘about the legislative proposal and her discus-
sions with . . . Chapman prior to the [department]
meeting. We conclude that, even if the plaintiff had
discussed the proposed language with Adamo and Sher-
man, there is substantial evidence in the record that
she did not disclose that language with the one person
who issued the directive to the department that any
proposals relating to § 12-389 must come through
him: Biello.
The plaintiff also challenges the board’s finding that
her ‘‘lack of disclosure over [four] days was an inten-
tional act of serious misconduct.’’23 (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) The plaintiff asserts that this finding
was not supported by the record because she asked to
meet with Biello on February 7, 2020, after the team
meeting; however, the record reveals that, during that
meeting, the plaintiff still did not disclose to Biello that
23
The plaintiff also argues that, although Biello sent the department an
email on Sunday, February 9, 2020, reiterating his directive, she did not
receive the email until the next day, February 10, 2020, at which time she
was placed on paid administrative leave. The plaintiff, however, was present
at the February 7, 2020 meeting, at which time Biello verbally gave the
directive that any legislation relating to § 12-389 must come through him.
Moreover, on that same date, the plaintiff met with Biello alone, at which
time she could have disclosed the proposed legislation but did not. Accord-
ingly, we reject the plaintiff’s contention that she had ‘‘fewer than eight
business hours’’ within which to comply with Biello’s directive.
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she had sent draft legislation to Chapman that would
have fundamentally changed the department’s opera-
tions. The board credited Biello’s testimony that the
plaintiff’s proposal ‘‘struck at the heart’’ of the depart-
ment’s operations, and we do not disturb the board’s
credibility determinations on appeal. See, e.g., Idlibi v.
State Dental Commission, 212 Conn. App. 501, 518–19,
275 A.3d 1214 (‘‘It is well established that it is the exclu-
sive province of the trier of fact to make determinations
of credibility, crediting some, all, or none of a given
witness’ testimony. . . . [A]n administrative agency is
not required to believe any witness . . . . As a
reviewing court, we may not retry the case or pass on
the credibility of witnesses. . . . We must defer to the
trier of fact’s assessment of the credibility of the wit-
nesses that is made on the basis of its firsthand observa-
tion of their conduct, demeanor and attitude.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 345 Conn. 904,
282 A.3d 980 (2022).
The plaintiff also challenges the board’s discussion
of her husband Nathaniel Clark’s testimony as ‘‘guilt by
association . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In its written decision, the board stated that Nathaniel
Clark, a computer engineer, who ‘‘had never appeared
before at a legislative committee,’’ attended the hearing
accompanied by the plaintiff, to support the proposal
that she drafted. The board noted Nathaniel Clark’s
testimony before the Judiciary Committee that Bucari
was ‘‘problematic’’ and that protecting his position as
first assistant commissioner would be ‘‘galling.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) As the plaintiff herself
has conceded, her relationship with Bucari was poor.
The board stated that Nathaniel Clark ‘‘could only have
been influenced by [the plaintiff] in personally attacking
Bucari.’’ We interpret the board’s discussion relating to
Nathaniel Clark as noting evidence in the record that
reasonably supported its conclusion that the plaintiff
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was motivated by her own personal interests in drafting
the legislation, rather than those of the department,
which was one of the grounds for just cause enumerated
in § 5-240-1a (c) (13) of the regulations.
Moreover, in light of the evidence in the record, we
cannot say that the board acted unreasonably, illegally
or in abuse of its discretion. The board’s finding that
the termination of the plaintiff’s employment was for
just cause was supported by substantial evidence in
the administrative record. There is substantial evidence
that the plaintiff engaged in serious misconduct by fail-
ing to comply with Biello’s clear instructions. Biello
testified before the board that, on February 7, 2020, he
held a team meeting at which he ‘‘made it verbally
clear if there was to be any discussion regarding the
succession tax or if anyone was asked to provide input
or draft anything . . . that it needed to come through
me . . . .’’ As stated previously, the board credited
Biello’s testimony, and we do not disturb that credibility
determination on appeal. See Idlibi v. State Dental
Commission, supra, 212 Conn. App. 518–19. Even when
the plaintiff met with Biello alone after the February
7, 2020 meeting, she did not disclose that she had sent
language to Chapman but stated instead that there
‘‘ ‘may be’ ’’ a proposal that could impact § 12-389. Not-
withstanding the plaintiff’s claim that she had fewer
than eight business hours to comply with Biello’s direc-
tive, she was still able to email the Office of the Gover-
nor on Monday, February 10, 2020, instead of Biello,
about the legislation.
There also was substantial evidence to support the
board’s finding that the plaintiff’s actions were moti-
vated by her own personal motives, rather than the best
interest of the department. Regs., Conn. State Agencies
§ 5-240-1a (c) (13). The personal animus between the
plaintiff and Bucari, who was the first assistant commis-
sioner and held the very position the plaintiff’s proposed
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legislation sought to take away from the department’s
control, is not disputed. The plaintiff admitted that she
sent the legislation at issue to Chapman using her per-
sonal email address, and, although she stated at oral
argument before this court that her actions were taken
in her official capacity, the board reasonably found
that the use of her personal email and cell phone to
communicate with Chapman, rather than through offi-
cial department lines of communication, constituted
evidence that she intended to conceal her actions from
Biello. These facts all supported the board’s conclusion
that the plaintiff’s actions were detrimental to the
department she was hired to serve and are supported
in the record. Accordingly, we conclude that there was
substantial evidence in the record to support the termi-
nation of the plaintiff’s employment from state service
for just cause.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.