Pence v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

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Pence v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

COLIN J. PENCE v. COMMISSIONER
OF MOTOR VEHICLES ET AL.
(AC 47595)
Moll, Suarez and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment dismissing his adminis-
trative appeal from the decision of the defendant Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles. In his decision, the commissioner suspended the plaintiff’s motor
vehicle operator’s license following his arrest for operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and required, pursuant to
statute (§ 14-227b (i)), as a condition for the restoration of his license, that
the plaintiff install an ignition interlock device in a motor vehicle he owned
or operated. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly dismissed his
administrative appeal for lack of standing because he had established that
he was an indigent driver who did not own a motor vehicle, could not afford
a motor vehicle, and had no access to a motor vehicle in which to install
an ignition interlock device, and, therefore, there was a possibility that his
legally protected interest in a motor vehicle operator’s license would be
adversely and unequally affected by the ignition interlock device requirement
in violation of the equal protection clauses of the United States and Connecti-
cut constitutions. Held:

The trial court properly determined that the plaintiff did not have standing
to assert his constitutional claim, as the plaintiff failed to establish that he
was a member of the group of individuals that he asserted § 14-227b (i) was
enacted to discriminate against, namely, indigent drivers who do not own
a motor vehicle, who cannot afford a motor vehicle, and who do not have
access to a motor vehicle in which to install an ignition interlock device,
as is required by § 14-227b (i).
(One judge dissenting)

Argued March 26—officially released September 23, 2025

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the named defendant
suspending the plaintiff’s motor vehicle operator’s
license and imposing an ignition interlock device
requirement, brought to the Superior Court in the judi-
cial district of New Britain and tried to the court, Bud-
zik, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the
plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
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Pence v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

J. Christopher Llinas, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Andrew M. Ammirati, assistant attorney general,
with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney
general, for the appellee (named defendant).
Opinion

MOLL, J. The plaintiff, Colin J. Pence, appeals from
the judgment of the Superior Court rendered in favor
of the defendant1 Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
(commissioner) dismissing his administrative appeal
from the decision of the commissioner suspending his
motor vehicle operator’s license for forty-five days and
requiring the installation of an ignition interlock device
in his motor vehicle for six months pursuant to General
Statutes § 14-227b (i).2 On appeal, the plaintiff argues
that the court improperly dismissed his administrative
1
The plaintiff also named as a defendant the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral.
2
General Statutes § 14-227b (i) provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) The commis-
sioner shall suspend the operator’s license or operating privilege of a person
. . . against whom a decision was issued, after a hearing, pursuant to subsec-
tion (h) of this section, as of the effective date contained in the suspension
notice, for a period of forty-five days. As a condition for the restoration of
such operator’s license or operating privilege, such person shall be required
to install an ignition interlock device on each motor vehicle owned or
operated by such person and, upon such restoration, be prohibited from
operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a
functioning, approved ignition interlock device . . . .
‘‘(2) (A) A person twenty-one years of age or older at the time of the
arrest who submitted to a test and the results of such test indicated that
such person had an elevated blood alcohol content, or was found to have
been operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or any drug, or both based on a report filed pursuant to subsection (d) of
this section, shall install and maintain an ignition interlock device for the
following periods: (i) For a first suspension under this section, six
months . . . .’’
Since the events underlying this appeal, the legislature has amended § 14-
227b in ways that have no bearing on the merits of the present case. See
Public Acts 2024, No. 24-40, § 54; Public Acts 2024, No. 24-137, § 2; Public
Acts 2025, No. 25-159, § 61. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the
current revision of the statute.
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appeal for lack of standing because he established that
he is an indigent driver who does not own a motor
vehicle, cannot afford a motor vehicle, and has no
access to a motor vehicle in which to install an ignition
interlock device, as is required by § 14-227b (i), and,
therefore, there is a possibility that his legally protected
interest in a motor vehicle operator’s license will be
adversely and unequally affected by the ignition inter-
lock device requirement. We disagree and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
The following procedural history and facts, as recited
by the court or as undisputed in the record, are relevant
to our resolution of this appeal. On August 13, 2022, at
approximately 1:05 a.m., Officer Michael Wilcoxson was
dispatched in response to a complaint about a motor
vehicle in the middle of the roadway fronting 101 North
Plains Industrial Road in Wallingford. After assessing
the scene and observing that the plaintiff’s motor vehi-
cle had collided with the guardrail on the west side
of North Plains Industrial Road, Wilcoxson asked the
plaintiff to perform three standardized field sobriety
tests, all of which the plaintiff failed. The plaintiff was
arrested and transported to the Wallingford Police
Department, where he was read his Miranda rights3
and submitted to two Breathalyzer tests in which his
blood alcohol content registered as 0.1992 and 0.1942,
respectively. As a result, Wilcoxson arrested the plain-
tiff for, inter alia,4 operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of Gen-
eral Statutes § 14-227a.5
3
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1966).
4
The plaintiff also was charged with failure to drive on the right side of
the road in violation of General Statutes § 14-230 (a) and littering in violation
of General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 22a-250 (a).
5
General Statutes § 14-227a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) No person shall
operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if such
person operates a motor vehicle (1) while under the influence of intoxicating
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On August 26, 2022, the commissioner issued a sus-
pension notice to the plaintiff notifying him of a forty-
five day suspension of his motor vehicle operator’s
license, effective September 12, 2022, with a require-
ment to install and maintain an ignition interlock device
for six months. On October 26, 2022, at the plaintiff’s
request, the commissioner held an administrative license
suspension hearing before a hearing officer, pursuant
to § 14-227b, to determine whether the plaintiff’s motor
vehicle operator’s license should be suspended and sub-
jected to an ignition interlock device requirement as
a condition of reinstatement. At the hearing, several
exhibits were admitted and the hearing officer heard
testimony from two witnesses, the plaintiff and Attor-
ney Michael Paris.6 The plaintiff did not contest the four
issues that are typically considered during a license
suspension hearing, namely, whether (1) the police offi-
cer had probable cause to arrest the person for
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, (2) such person
was placed under arrest, (3) such person submitted to
a test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the
time of operation, that indicated that such person had
liquor or any drug or both, or (2) while such person has an elevated blood
alcohol content. . . .’’
Since the events underlying this appeal, the legislature has amended § 14-
227a in ways that have no bearing on the merits of the present case. See
Public Acts 2025, No. 25-110, § 49. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to
the current revision of the statute.
6
Attorney Paris is employed as a public defender in Bridgeport. At the
October 26, 2022 hearing, Attorney Paris testified about his experiences
with indigent clients who have been convicted under § 14-227a and, as a
result, had their motor vehicle operator’s licenses suspended and were
required to install ignition interlock devices. He explained that he has
observed that such individuals ‘‘are never able to . . . get their license
properly restored and drive legally’’ and that the requirement of an ignition
interlock device ‘‘really becomes a lifetime suspension’’ of their motor vehi-
cle operator’s license because they often do not have motor vehicles in
which they can install an ignition interlock device. Attorney Paris did not
testify about the plaintiff or the facts of the present case.
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an elevated blood alcohol content, and (4) such person
was operating a motor vehicle. See General Statutes
§ 14-227b (g) (2); Do v. Commissioner of Motor Vehi-
cles, 330 Conn. 651, 658–59, 200 A.3d 681 (2019). Instead,
the plaintiff raised a constitutional challenge to § 14-
227b (i), claiming that its requirement of an ignition
interlock device, as applied to him, violates the equal
protection clauses of the United States and Connecticut
constitutions.
On October 27, 2022, the hearing officer, acting on
behalf of the commissioner, found that (1) the police
officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for a
violation of § 14-227a, (2) the plaintiff was placed under
arrest, (3) the plaintiff submitted to a Breathalyzer test
and the results indicated a blood alcohol content of
0.08 percent or more, and (4) the plaintiff was operating
a motor vehicle.7 As a result, the hearing officer sus-
pended the plaintiff’s motor vehicle operator’s license
or operating privilege for forty-five days and required
the installation of an ignition interlock device for six
months. On November 11, 2022, the plaintiff filed a
petition for reconsideration, which the commissioner’s
petition review committee subsequently denied on
November 28, 2022.
On January 18, 2023, pursuant to General Statutes
§ 4-183,8 the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court
7
During the administrative hearing, the plaintiff’s counsel raised his consti-
tutional claim but acknowledged that he did not expect the hearing officer
to declare § 14-227b (i) unconstitutional, explaining that such an expectation
would be ‘‘unrealistic.’’ He noted, however, that he was raising the issue
before the hearing officer in order to create a factual record to support
such claim in subsequent appellate proceedings. In the October 27, 2022
decision, the hearing officer did not address the plaintiff’s constitutional
argument.
8
General Statutes § 4-183 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person who
has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and
who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court as
provided in this section. . . .’’
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from the decision of the commissioner. In his petition,
the plaintiff argued that ‘‘[t]he underlying statute, § 14-
227b, is unconstitutional as an ‘as applied’ equal protec-
tion violation, pursuant to the fourteenth amendment
to the United States constitution and article first, § 20,
of the [constitution of] Connecticut . . . to the extent
it authorizes imposition of an [ignition interlock device]
requirement, across the board, on all drivers who either
fail a chemical test or refuse when offered the opportu-
nity to take a chemical test after their arrest for
operating under the influence . . . without regard for
whether they own a vehicle, can afford a vehicle, or
have access to a vehicle into which they can install
an [ignition interlock device].’’ On March 15, 2023, the
commissioner filed an answer. On April 24 and May 15,
2023, the plaintiff and the commissioner, respectively,
filed briefs addressing the plaintiff’s constitutional
claim.9
On September 19, 2023, the court, Budzik, J., heard
argument on the plaintiff’s administrative appeal. Dur-
ing the hearing, the court briefly raised, sua sponte, the
issue of whether the plaintiff had standing to raise his
constitutional claim, and the plaintiff’s counsel briefly
addressed that claim. On January 11, 2024, the court
issued a memorandum of decision dismissing the plain-
tiff’s appeal for lack of standing.10 Specifically, the court
stated that ‘‘the court cannot conclude that [the plain-
tiff] is, in fact, indigent, or otherwise unable to afford
a car on anything other than a temporary basis. Thus,
the court concludes that [the plaintiff] is not within the
class of persons whose rights he seeks to vindicate and,
therefore, [the plaintiff] has no standing to assert his
proffered claim of unconstitutionality.’’ In support of
9
On May 30, 2023, the plaintiff filed a reply brief.
10
The court also concluded that ‘‘there is substantial evidence in the
record to demonstrate the four elements set forth in . . . § 14-227b (g). See
Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1, 6–7, 509 A.2d 489 (1986).’’
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its conclusion, the court recited the following factual
findings: ‘‘The record [in the administrative proceed-
ings] establishes that [the plaintiff] is a single, twenty-
eight year old, high school graduate, who, up until the
time of his arrest, had a full time job as a cook at a
local restaurant at which he earned approximately $450
a week. It is undisputed that [the plaintiff] was in fact
able to afford a car up until the night of his arrest.
[The plaintiff] lives with his parents, who previously
purchased a car for him and paid for the insurance on
that car. There is no evidence in the record that [the
plaintiff’s] parents charged him rent or other expenses.
Although [the plaintiff] testified that he was out of work
on the day of the October [26, 2022 administrative]
hearing and had an injury to his foot, there is no evi-
dence in the record to the effect that [the plaintiff] will
be out of work permanently or for any long period of
time, that he is disabled from working or otherwise
unable to obtain some kind of income, that he lacks
savings or other financial resources, or that he does
not have access to another car through some other
means (his family, for example). While the record estab-
lishes that, on the day of the hearing, [the plaintiff] was
without a car and was unemployed, there is nothing in
the record indicating that circumstance was more than
transitory or temporary in nature, or that it was some-
how beyond [the plaintiff’s] capacity to remedy in some
reasonable time period.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)
On January 25, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to
reargue, arguing that he had established his indigency
and, therefore, had standing to assert his constitutional
claim. The plaintiff largely relied on the fact that he
was deemed eligible for public defender representation
in his associated criminal case, which arose out of the
same arrest that gave rise to the administrative proceed-
ings underlying the present case. Specifically, the plain-
tiff argued that ‘‘the public defender found [the plaintiff]
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to be an indigent defendant and determined him to be
eligible for public defender representation. . . . The
determination of indigency here is no different than the
associated determination of indigency before the public
defender. If anything, it is even more apt here, given
[the plaintiff’s] subsequent injury and unemployment.
[The plaintiff] stood before the [commissioner], and
now, before this court, as a proper party to the dispute,
with a colorable claim and allegation of injury, being
unequal treatment under the law, without rational basis,
as to the application of . . . § 14-227b (i) and its
requirement that all Connecticut drivers install an [igni-
tion interlock device] in a vehicle as [the] sole means
of reinstating their license or privilege to drive, without
regard to whether they own a vehicle, can afford a
vehicle, or have access to a vehicle within which to
install an [ignition interlock device].’’ (Citation omit-
ted.)

On April 5, 2024, the court issued an order granting in
part the plaintiff’s motion to reargue, wherein it further
articulated the basis of its January 11, 2024 decision.
Specifically, the court stated that ‘‘indigency for pur-
poses of seeking public defender representation is not
the claim [the plaintiff] asserts in this matter. As set
forth in the motion to reargue, [the plaintiff] asserts
that he is ‘indigent’ such that he is within the class of
persons who face the ‘additional burden of a potentially
infinite suspension’ of their [motor vehicle operator’s]
license because of the requirement for an [ignition]
interlock device. . . . As further set forth in the motion
to reargue, a common and plain meaning of ‘indigent’
is ‘[i]n a general sense, one who is needy and poor, or
one who has not sufficient property to furnish him a
living nor anyone able to support him to whom he is
entitled to look for support. Term commonly used to
refer to one’s financial ability, and ordinarily indicates
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one who is destitute of means of comfortable subsis-
tence so as to be in want.’ Black’s Law Dictionary (6th
Ed. [1990]) p. [773].’’ (Citation omitted.) The court there-
after concluded that ‘‘there was no evidence in the
record that [the plaintiff’s] financial condition was such
that he was facing a ‘potentially infinite suspension’
because he was ‘needy and poor’ or lacked ‘sufficient
property to furnish him a living’ or that he lacked ‘any-
one able to support him to whom he is entitled to
look for support’ or that [the plaintiff] was ‘destitute
of means of comfortable subsistence.’ Instead, the court
concludes that the record demonstrates that [the plain-
tiff] was well able to support himself up until the eve-
ning of his car accident resulting from his own intoxica-
tion (a fact that [the plaintiff] does not appear to
dispute), and that [the plaintiff’s] financial condition on
the day of the hearing [before the commissioner] was
nothing more than temporary. There is no evidence in
the record supporting the conclusion that [the plain-
tiff’s] financial condition on the day of the hearing was
permanent, or likely to be of such long duration that
he faced an ‘infinite license suspension.’ ’’ This appeal
followed.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of
review and legal principles that are relevant to our
resolution of the plaintiff’s claim. ‘‘[J]udicial review of
the commissioner’s action is governed by the Uniform
Administrative Procedure Act [General Statutes §§ 4-
166 through 4-189], and the scope of that review is very
restricted. . . . [R]eview of an administrative agency
decision requires a court to determine whether there
is substantial evidence in the administrative record to
support the agency’s findings of basic fact and whether
the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable.
. . . Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the
case or substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or
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questions of fact. . . . Our ultimate duty is to deter-
mine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency,
in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, ille-
gally or in abuse of its discretion.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Mata v. Commissioner of Motor Vehi-
cles, 221 Conn. App. 25, 34–35, 299 A.3d 1262 (2023).
‘‘The issue of standing implicates the trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction and therefore presents a
threshold issue for our determination. . . . Because a
determination regarding the trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction raises a question of law, our review is ple-
nary.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Bradley, 341 Conn. 72, 79, 266 A.3d 823
(2021).
‘‘Furthermore, [t]he scope of review of a trial court’s
factual decisions related to the issue of standing on
appeal is limited to a determination of whether they
are clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and plead-
ings. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when
there is no evidence in the record to support it . . .
or when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. . . . Because it is the trial court’s function
to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we
give great deference to its findings. . . . In reviewing
factual findings, [w]e do not examine the record to
determine whether the [court] could have reached a
conclusion other than the one reached. . . . Instead,
we make every reasonable presumption . . . in favor
of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank, National Assn.
v. Moncho, 203 Conn. App. 28, 41–42, 247 A.3d 161, cert.
denied, 336 Conn. 935, 248 A.3d 708 (2021).
‘‘Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery
in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction
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Pence v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or
representative capacity, some real interest in the cause
of action . . . . When standing is put in issue, the ques-
tion is whether the person whose standing is challenged
is a proper party to request an adjudication of the
issue . . . .
‘‘Standing is established by showing that the party
claiming it is authorized by statute to bring [an action]
or is classically aggrieved. . . . The fundamental test
for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses
a [well settled] twofold determination: first, the party
claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate
a specific, personal and legal interest in [the subject
matter of the challenged action], as distinguished from
a general interest, such as is the concern of all members
of the community as a whole. Second, the party claim-
ing aggrievement must successfully establish that this
specific personal and legal interest has been specially
and injuriously affected by the [challenged action]. . . .
Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as
distinguished from a certainty, that some legally pro-
tected interest . . . has been adversely affected. . . .
‘‘This court has explained that the two prongs of
the standing analysis are distinct and, thus, cannot be
conflated. . . . When a [party asserting standing in
an action] cannot demonstrate that he has a specific,
personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the
challenged action, a court need not decide whether his
interest has been specially and injuriously affected.’’
(Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Bradley, supra, 341 Conn. 79–
81.
‘‘Only members of a class whose constitutional rights
are endangered by a statute may ask to have it declared
unconstitutional. . . . Courts are instituted to give
relief to parties whose rights have been invaded, and
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to give it at the instance of such parties; and a party
whose rights have not been invaded cannot be heard
to complain if the court refuses to act at his instance
in righting the wrongs of another who seeks no redress.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 84.
With these legal principles in mind, we turn to the
merits of the plaintiff’s claim on appeal. The plaintiff
challenges the constitutionality of § 14-227b (i), which
requires the installation of an ignition interlock device
as a condition for the restoration of a motor vehicle
operator’s license, specifically arguing that such provi-
sion violates his right to equal protection under both
the United States and Connecticut constitutions. The
plaintiff claims that he has standing to assert this claim
in his individual capacity11 because ‘‘he is an indigent
driver who doesn’t own a vehicle, cannot afford a vehi-
cle, and has no access to a vehicle in which to install
an [ignition interlock device], as he is required to do
by . . . § 14-227b (i), and that there is a possibility
that his legally protected interest in a [motor vehicle
operator’s] license will be adversely and unequally
affected by the [ignition interlock device] requirement
of § 14-227b (i) as the sole means by which he can
restore his license.’’ We disagree.
The plaintiff lacks standing to raise an equal protec-
tion claim relating to § 14-227b (i) because he has not
successfully demonstrated ‘‘a specific, personal and
legal interest in [the subject matter of the challenged
action], as distinguished from a general interest, such
as is the concern of all members of the community as
a whole.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Bradley, supra, 341 Conn. 80. As we noted earlier in
this opinion, the court found that, at the time of the
11
We note that the plaintiff does not claim that he was authorized by
statute to bring a constitutional challenge to § 14-227b (i) or that he has
third-party standing to bring the challenge in a representational capacity on
behalf of others. See State v. Bradley, supra, 341 Conn. 81.
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Pence v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

October 26, 2022 administrative hearing, the plaintiff
did not own a car and was out of work due to an injury
to his foot. More importantly, however, the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that he was out of work perma-
nently or for a prolonged period of time, or otherwise
unable to support himself financially such that he could
not afford a motor vehicle. As the court noted, ‘‘there
is no evidence in the record to the effect that [the
plaintiff] will be out of work permanently or for any
long period of time, that he is disabled from working
or otherwise unable to obtain some kind of income,
[or] that he lacks savings or other financial resources
. . . .’’ Rather, the evidence that the plaintiff obtained
a high school degree and, at the time of his arrest, was
employed by a local restaurant, demonstrated that he
was capable of earning an income. Also relevant is the
court’s finding that the plaintiff lives in his parents’
home, and no evidence was provided to suggest that
he is responsible for any living expenses, including rent
or groceries. We cannot conclude, on the basis of these
factual findings, that the plaintiff established that he is
an indigent driver who cannot afford a motor vehicle.
Moreover, the plaintiff failed to present evidence
demonstrating that he is an indigent driver who has no
access to a motor vehicle in which to install an ignition
interlock device. Rather, the evidence presented by the
plaintiff suggested that he did, in fact, have the means
to access a vehicle, as the vehicle that he drove prior
to his arrest on August 13, 2022, was purchased for him
by his parents. His parents also paid the insurance for
that motor vehicle. There was no evidence presented
indicating that he would not have these benefits, or
similar accommodations, provided to him going for-
ward.
The plaintiff argues that the determination of his indi-
gency, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-297 (f) (1),12
12
General Statutes § 51-297 (f) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘As used in
this chapter, ‘indigent defendant’ means (A) a person who is formally charged
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in his associated criminal case demonstrates that he is
a member of the defined class that is allegedly aggrieved
by the ignition interlock device requirement set forth
in § 14-227b (i). We are unpersuaded. In his appellate
brief and during oral argument before this court, the
plaintiff explicitly stated that the aggrieved class of
which he purports to be a member is not merely indigent
drivers but ‘‘indigent driver[s] who [do not] own a vehi-
cle, cannot afford a vehicle, and [have] no access to a
vehicle into which to install an [ignition interlock
device], as [they are] required to do by . . . § 14-227b
(i) . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Thus, the controlling
question is not merely whether the plaintiff is indigent,
but rather whether the plaintiff is a member of the
aforementioned class.13 For the reasons we have stated,
the plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is an indigent
driver who cannot afford a vehicle and has no access
to a vehicle in which to install an ignition interlock
device.14
Additionally, while the plaintiff correctly notes that
‘‘[a]ggrievement is established if there is a possibility,
as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally pro-
with the commission of a crime punishable by imprisonment and who does
not have the financial ability at the time of his request for representation
to secure competent legal representation and to provide other necessary
expenses of legal representation . . . .’’
Since the events underlying this appeal, the legislature has amended § 51-
297 (f) in ways that have no bearing on the merits of the present case. See
Public Acts 2023, No. 23-204, § 201. In the interest of simplicity, we refer
to the current revision of the statute.
13
In the plaintiff’s appellate brief, he asks this court to take judicial notice
of his attorney’s pro bono representation of him in the present case. Setting
aside that a finding of indigency, alone, is not dispositive, we decline the
plaintiff’s request because such evidence was not before the court when it
determined that the plaintiff lacked standing. See Hudson City Savings
Bank v. Hellman, 196 Conn. App. 836, 863–64, 231 A.3d 182 (2020) (declining
to consider evidence on appeal that was not before trial court).
14
We recognize that the plaintiff asserts that he does not currently own
a vehicle. This fact has no bearing on whether the plaintiff has standing to
pursue his constitutional claim, as he has not demonstrated that he cannot
afford a vehicle or that he does not have access to a vehicle.
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16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Pence v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

tected interest . . . has been adversely affected’’;
(internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Bradley,
supra, 341 Conn. 80; this notion goes to the second
prong of the twofold test set forth in Bradley. Thus,
insofar as the plaintiff suggests that the court improp-
erly failed to recognize this principle when it deter-
mined that the plaintiff was not a member of the class
that he claims is aggrieved by the ignition interlock
device requirement set forth in § 14-227b (i), namely,
indigent drivers who do not own a motor vehicle, cannot
afford a motor vehicle, and do not have access to a
motor vehicle in which to install an ignition interlock
device, we disagree.
Simply stated, on the basis of the record before us,15
the plaintiff has not established that he is a ‘‘member
of the group’’ of individuals ‘‘that he asserts the statute
was enacted to discriminate against,’’ namely, indigent
drivers who do not own a vehicle, cannot afford a vehi-
cle, and do not have access to a vehicle in which to
install an ignition interlock device as is required by
§ 14-227b (i). State v. Bradley, supra, 341 Conn. 86.
Because the plaintiff has not satisfied the first part of
the twofold test set forth in Bradley, we need not decide
whether the plaintiff has ‘‘successfully establish[ed]
that this specific personal and legal interest has been
specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged
action].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 80–81.
In sum, we conclude that the court properly deter-
mined that the plaintiff did not have standing to assert
his constitutional claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion SUAREZ, J., concurred.
15
The dissent states that, at a minimum, the plaintiff was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on the standing issue. We note that the plaintiff does
not claim on appeal that the court committed error in failing to conduct
an evidentiary hearing; rather, he maintains in his appellate brief that he
established standing on the basis of the existing record.