Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

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Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

NORTHEASTERN CONNECTICUT COUNCIL OF
GOVERNMENTS ANIMAL SERVICES
EX REL. JENNIFER HUTCHINS v.
TRACY DONOVAN
(AC 48462)
Seeley, Wilson and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment in an animal welfare
proceeding brought pursuant to statute (§ 22-329a) that vested ownership of
certain neglected animals in the plaintiff. The animals were seized pursuant
to a warrant issued after an animal control officer viewed the conditions of
the defendant’s premises through a window during a welfare check. The
defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied her motion to
suppress evidence procured by the search and seizure warrant as the fruit of
the poisonous tree under the exclusionary rule because the judicial finding of
probable cause for the warrant rested in part on the animal control officer’s
affidavit detailing observations she made by peering through the window
and that such observations constituted an improper search of the curtilage
of the defendant’s home, which did not meet the plain view exception to the
fourth amendment’s warrant requirement. Held:

The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evi-
dence obtained as a result of the initial animal welfare check of the defendant’s
premises and arguably any other evidence obtained under the later search
warrant, which was its fruit, as the exclusionary rule does not apply in a
proceeding brought pursuant to § 22-329a because the minimal deterrent
effect of applying the exclusionary rule was substantially outweighed by the
societal interest in having otherwise reliable and relevant evidence concern-
ing animal neglect and cruelty presented at an animal welfare proceeding
seeking to remove the animals from such circumstances.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it took judicial notice of
the transcripts of a prior temporary custody hearing, as the court’s taking
of judicial notice was not improperly premised on a misapplication of § 2-1
of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, which permits courts to take judicial
notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute in the files of the trial court
in the same or other cases, and the record did not support the defendant’s
contention that the court presumed the truth of certain testimony presented
at the prior hearing and used it as a basis for its decision granting permanent
ownership of the animals to the plaintiff.

Argued January 15—officially released March 10, 2026

Procedural History

Verified petition seeking, inter alia, custody in favor
of the plaintiff of certain animals in the defendant’s
Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

possession that allegedly were neglected or cruelly
treated, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the
court, Cobb, J., issued an order vesting temporary cus-
tody of the animals with the plaintiff; thereafter, the
court, Chadwick, J., denied the defendant’s motion to
suppress certain evidence and issued an order vesting
temporary custody of the animals with the plaintiff;
subsequently, the case was tried to the court, Baio, J.;
judgment vesting permanent ownership of the animals
with the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Christopher T. DeMatteo, for the appellant (defen-
dant).
Thomas A. Plotkin, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

FLYNN, J. The defendant, Tracy Donovan, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court vesting permanent
custody with the plaintiff, Northeastern Connecticut
Council of Governments Animal Services ex rel. Jennifer
Hutchins, of various animals owned by the defendant.
The defendant raises two claims on appeal. The first
claim is that the exclusionary rule, which bars the use
of evidence seized without a warrant in violation of the
fourth amendment to the United States constitution,
applies in a civil proceeding commenced under General
Statutes § 22-329a seeking temporary and permanent
custody of certain animals alleged to have been neglected
and uncared for. The second claim is that the trial court
improperly took judicial notice of earlier proceedings.
We disagree with these claims and affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant
to this appeal. The defendant is the owner of a single-
family residence in Woodstock, at which property she
resided along with ninety-six dogs, two goats, two exotic
birds, two cats, and one rabbit. Following numerous
Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

complaints concerning the animals on the property, an
animal control officer, Jennifer Hutchins, conducted a
welfare check. Upon arriving at the property, the ani-
mal control officer observed that the property was in an
unsanitary state and the house emitted an overwhelming
odor of urine and feces. After knocking on the front and
rear doors of the house and receiving no answer other
than the sound of twenty to thirty dogs barking, some
sounding distressed, the animal control officer peered
through a window and observed numerous small dogs in
cages and crates, together with several underweight and
extremely dirty dogs running about the residence. These
observations of the animal control officer served as a basis
for an affidavit submitted in support of an application
for a search and seizure warrant for the defendant’s
property, which warrant was granted by a judge of the
Superior Court. On July 10, 2024, the animals were
seized by the plaintiff pursuant to the warrant.1
On July 23, 2024, the plaintiff filed a verified petition
seeking permanent ownership of the animals pursuant to
§ 22-329a (c),2 as well as an application for an immediate
ex parte order of temporary care and custody. The court,
Cobb, J., granted the application for an immediate ex
parte order of temporary care and custody the following
day and ordered a hearing to be held on August 5, 2024,
1
General Statutes § 22-329a (b) provides in relevant part that “[a]ny
animal control officer or regional animal control officer . . . may take
physical custody of any animal upon issuance of a warrant finding prob-
able cause that such animal is neglected or is cruelly treated in violation
of section 22-366, 22-415, 53-247, 53-248, 53-249, 53-249a, 53-250,
53-251, 53-252 or 53a-73b, and shall thereupon proceed as provided in
subsection (c) of this section . . . .”
2
General Statutes § 22-329a (c) provides: “Such officer shall file with
the superior court which has venue over such matter or with the supe-
rior court for the judicial district of Hartford at Hartford a verified
petition plainly stating such facts of neglect or cruel treatment as to
bring such animal within the jurisdiction of the court and praying for
appropriate action by the court in accordance with the provisions of
this section. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall cause a
summons to be issued requiring the owner or owners or person having
responsibility for the care of the animal, if known, to appear in court
at the time and place named.”
Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

at which the defendant had to show cause as to why the
order of temporary care and custody should not continue.
At the commencement of the August 5, 2024 hear-
ing, counsel for the defendant made an oral motion to
suppress evidence, arguing that the subject search and
seizure warrant was invalid due to the warrantless search
of the premises conducted by an animal control officer
peering through a window during a welfare check. The
defendant filed a memorandum in support of her motion
to suppress and dismiss on August 7, 2024. The court,
Chadwick, J., denied the motion to suppress on August
14, 2024, reasoning that the search and seizure war-
rant was valid because the animal control officer was
not within the building or its curtilage at the time of
his observations but, rather, the conditions as viewed
through the window fell within the plain view exception
to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.
After the hearing on August 5, 2024, which continued
on August 13, 2024, the court, Chadwick, J., issued
an August 14, 2024 order vesting temporary custody
of the animals with the plaintiff.3 In concluding that
the defendant neglected the animals and treated them
cruelly, the court made the following factual findings.
All ninety-six dogs were flea ridden, with many dis-
playing long matted and filthy fur (including urine and
feces), and some dogs displaying hair loss, dehydration,
overgrown nails, and urine scalding. Many of the dogs
3
General Statutes § 22-329a (d) provides in relevant part: “If physical
custody of an animal has been taken pursuant to subsection (a) or (b)
of this section and it appears from the allegations of the petition filed
pursuant to subsection (c) of this section and other affirmations of fact
accompanying the petition, or provided subsequent thereto, that there
is reasonable cause to find that the animal’s condition or the circum-
stances surrounding its care require that temporary care and custody
be immediately assumed to safeguard its welfare, the court shall either
(1) issue an order to show cause why the court should not vest in some
suitable state, municipal or other public or private agency or person the
animal’s temporary care and custody pending a hearing on the petition,
or (2) issue an order vesting in some suitable state, municipal or other
public or private agency or person the animal’s temporary care and
custody pending a hearing on the petition. . . .”
Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

were kept in crates, in some instances holding as many
as two, three, or four dogs, without proper water or
food. At the rear of the residence, there were two thin
and lethargic goats in a small shed, which contained
approximately three inches of wet goat feces and shav-
ings and the two small water bowls in the area were dry
and caked with dirt. Two exotic birds were in cages with
no food or water. They had overgrown beaks and nails,
with one being underweight and having plucked away
some of its feathers. The two cats were covered in fleas,
without access to water, food, or a litter box. The rabbit
was a wild animal that the defendant improperly took into
her possession and control. The defendant allowed the
residence to be riddled with animal feces and shavings,
and the residence was not properly ventilated, resulting
in a noxious odor that could be detected many feet from
the exterior of the residence. The defendant did not
provide the animals with adequate food or water. The
defendant did not provide the animals with necessary
or proper care, including veterinary care.
The order of temporary care and custody required the
defendant to relinquish ownership of her animals or
post a surety or cash bond with the plaintiff and to pay
all the expenses incurred by the plaintiff for caring for
the animals at the rate of $15 per animal, per day.4 The
order also required the defendant to pay all veterinary
expenses incurred. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion
for order of permanent ownership.
Subsequently, a hearing was held on January 7, 2025,
concerning the plaintiff’s petition seeking permanent
custody of the animals. Prior to that hearing, the plain-
tiff filed a motion for order of judicial notice, seeking
to have Judge Baio take judicial notice of the exhibits,
4
General Statutes § 22-329a (f) provides in relevant part: “If the court
issues an order vesting the animal’s temporary care and custody in some
suitable state, municipal or other public or private agency or person,
the owner or owners shall either relinquish ownership of the animal
or post a cash bond with the agency or person in whom the animal’s
temporary care and custody was vested or with such agency’s counsel
of record in the case. . . .”
Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

testimony, and transcripts of the August 5 and 13, 2024
temporary custody proceedings and Judge Chadwick’s
attendant factual findings and legal conclusions. The
defendant filed an objection. Judge Baio granted the
motion.
At the January 7, 2025 hearing, Judge Baio restated
that judicial notice was being taken of the proceedings,
evidence and findings from the initial show cause hear-
ing that resulted in an order vesting temporary custody
with the plaintiff.
Relying on an amended affidavit of Hutchins, which
the plaintiff filed in connection with the permanent
ownership hearing, as well as the materials from the
prior proceeding concerning temporary custody of which
judicial notice had been taken, the plaintiff rested. The
only witness to testify at the hearing was the defendant.
Following the hearing, Judge Baio issued a January
24, 2025 memorandum of decision vesting permanent
ownership of the animals with the plaintiff. The court
noted that, of the remaining eighty-one animals,5 the
defendant only posted bond for forty-four animals. The
court determined that permanent ownership of the ani-
mals for which bond had not been posted vested with the
plaintiff. Regarding the forty-four animals for which
bond had been posted, the court determined that the
plaintiff met its burden of proving neglect or cruelty by a
fair preponderance of the evidence and that the defendant
failed to show cause why permanent ownership should
not vest with the plaintiff. The court also ordered the
defendant to pay $226,775, representing the $15 per
day cost for each of the animals from the July 10, 2024
seizure through the date of the order vesting permanent
ownership. This appeal followed.
5
Of the 103 animals seized, the defendant eventually surrendered
sixteen dogs to the plaintiff, two of which were thereafter humanely
euthanized. A total of seven dogs were humanely euthanized due to
their poor health condition. The defendant also surrendered the rab-
bit, which was found to be a wild animal that the plaintiff had taken
into her possession.
Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

I
The defendant claims that the court, Chadwick, J.,
improperly denied her motion to suppress evidence pro-
cured by a search and seizure warrant as the fruit of the
poisonous tree under the exclusionary rule. She contends
that the judicial finding of probable cause for the search
and seizure warrant rested in part on an affidavit detail-
ing observations made by an animal control officer who
peered through a window of her home during a welfare
check and that such observation constitutes an improper
search of the curtilage of her home, which does not meet
the plain view exception to the fourth amendment’s
warrant requirement. The plaintiff counters that the
exclusionary rule does not apply in a proceeding brought
under the animal welfare statute, § 22-329a. We agree
with the plaintiff.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard
of review. When reviewing the trial court’s denial of a
motion to suppress, our review of the court’s findings
of fact is limited to deciding whether factual findings
were clearly erroneous and our review of the court’s
conclusions of law are subject to plenary review. State
v. Joseph E., 231 Conn. App. 556, 562, 333 A.3d 522,
cert. denied, 351 Conn. 927, 333 A.3d 1108 (2025).
In State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly, 228 Conn. App. 458,
325 A.3d 1159, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 933, 327 A.3d
386 (2024), cert. denied, U.S. , 146 S. Ct. 119, L.
Ed. 2d (2025), this court addressed for the first time the
issue of whether animal welfare proceedings conducted
pursuant to § 22-329a are subject to the exclusionary rule.
Id., 484. Connelly, which arises out of facts somewhat
similar to those in the present case, involved a warrant-
less search,6 wherein an animal control officer visited
6
Unlike the present case, where an animal control officer peered
through a window of the defendant’s home while conducting a welfare
check, Connelly involved a warrantless entry of a private residence. The
court in Connelly emphasized that, “in the absence of imminent harm
to an animal, the typical procedure as set forth under § 22-329a (b) for
an animal control officer to enter a premises is by first obtaining a war-
rant.” State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly, supra, 228 Conn. App. 503–504.
Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

the animal owner’s property and made observations that
became the basis for a search and seizure warrant for
various animals on the property. Id., 460–61. The defen-
dant in Connelly claimed that the trial court improperly
denied her motion in limine to exclude evidence from
the warrantless search of her property, arguing that the
exclusionary rule applies to animal welfare proceedings.
Id., 473–75.
This court in Connelly began its analysis with the
following legal principles concerning the exclusionary
rule. The plain text of the fourth amendment protects
the right to be free from “unreasonable searches and
seizures,” but it is silent about how this right is to be
enforced, and thus the United States Supreme Court
created the exclusionary rule, which bars the prosecu-
tion from introducing evidence obtained by way of a
fourth amendment violation as the fruit of the poison-
ous tree. Id., 476–77. The exclusionary rule is not con-
stitutionally mandated; rather, it is a prudential rule
formulated not to cure an invasion of rights already suf-
fered but to deter future fourth amendment violations,
thereby effectuating the guarantee of the fourth amend-
ment against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id.
The need for deterrence and the rationale for excluding
evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule is strongest
where governmental unlawful conduct would result in
the imposition of a criminal sanction on the subject of the
search. Id., 479. As a general rule, the exclusionary rule
does not apply to civil cases, although it has been applied
beyond the confines of criminal cases in a proceeding for
forfeiture of an article used in violation of the criminal
law. Id., 480.
“United States Supreme Court precedent regarding
the exclusionary rule’s use in civil cases can be succinctly
summarized as follows: it only applies in forfeiture
actions when the thing being forfeited as a result of a
criminal prosecution is worth more than the criminal
fine that might be assessed. That’s it.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 483. The exclusionary rule,
Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

however, may be extended to civil cases where the likely
social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized evidence
outweigh the likely costs.7 Id., 481, citing United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 49 L. Ed.
2d 1046 (1976).
This court in Connelly determined that the exclusion-
ary rule does not apply to animal welfare proceedings
brought pursuant to § 22-329a because such proceed-
ings do not constitute a civil forfeiture nor are such
proceedings quasi-criminal in nature as the statute is
not punitive. State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly, supra, 228
Conn. App. 485–97. Lastly, this court determined that
the exclusionary rule should not be extended to animal
welfare proceedings because the harm caused by a war-
rantless search does not outweigh the potential harm
from allowing animals to remain in a setting where they
were being neglected or cruelly treated. Id., 503.
There is no dispute that Connelly controls. At oral
argument before this court, the defendant’s appellate
counsel conceded that Connelly controlled the present
claim that the exclusionary rule applies in animal welfare
proceedings so as to exclude all evidence obtained from
a warrantless search of the premises.
For all of these reasons, whether the initial warrant-
less search of the premises occurred within the curtilage
or not, we conclude that the trial court properly denied
the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of the
initial animal welfare check of the defendant’s premises
and arguably any other evidence obtained under the later
7
“[I]f a proceeding is identified as quasi-criminal, we have treated
that as determinative of whether the exclusionary rule applies without
requiring consideration of the Janis balancing test. . . . In Connecticut,
few proceedings are deemed to be quasi-criminal, and they include (1)
forfeiture proceeding[s] intended to penalize . . . for the commission
of a criminal offense . . . (2) attorney disciplinary proceedings . . . and
(3) juvenile delinquency proceedings.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State ex rel. Dunn v. Con-
nelly, supra, 228 Conn. App. 483–84; see United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 454, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1976).
Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

search warrant, which was its fruit.8 The circumstances
in the present case mirror the circumstances in Connelly.
Guided by Connelly, we are persuaded that the minimal
deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary rule in the
present case is substantially outweighed by the societal
interest in having otherwise reliable and relevant evi-
dence concerning animal neglect and cruelty presented
at an animal welfare proceeding seeking to remove the
animal from such circumstances. See id.
II
The defendant next claims that Judge Baio improp-
erly took judicial notice of testimony presented at the
August, 2024 temporary custody hearing before Judge
Chadwick. We are not persuaded.
At the outset, the defendant acknowledges that evi-
dentiary claims, such as those involving the taking of
judicial notice, are generally reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. See, e.g., Scalora v. Scalora, 189
Conn. App. 703, 713, 209 A.3d 1 (2019) (“trial court’s
determination as to whether to take judicial notice is
essentially an evidentiary ruling, subject to an abuse of
discretion standard of review” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). She contends, however, that a plenary review
standard applies because the termination of her owner-
ship of her animals constitutes a deprivation of property
implicating constitutional due process protection. We
are not persuaded.
Although “animals are generally . . . regarded as
personal property . . . animals enjoy a unique status in
our society as opposed to typical personal property . . .
[and] they are subject to statutory welfare protections
that place them in a category separate from inanimate
8
We note that the court, in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress
and in concluding that the warrant was valid, found that the animal
control officer was not within the building or its curtilage at the time of
her observations, which were made in plain view. We do not address the
issue of whether the plain view exception to the warrant requirement
applies because our analysis is controlled by the holding in Connelly
that the exclusionary rule does not apply to animal welfare proceedings.
Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

property.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly, supra, 228
Conn. App. 485 n.24. Additionally, the purpose of animal
welfare actions brought pursuant to § 22-329a is not to
punish the owner, but rather it is to protect the health
and safety of animals. Id., 496–97. Accordingly, the
vesting of permanent ownership of animals pursuant to
§ 22-329a does not involve the deprivation of personal
property of the owner, but the protection of the welfare
of animals, and, therefore, the defendant cannot prevail
on her argument that a plenary review standard applies.
Our standard of review, therefore, is as follows. “A
trial court’s determination as to whether to take judicial
notice is essentially an evidentiary ruling, subject to an
abuse of discretion standard of review. . . . In order to
establish reversible error, the defendant must prove both
an abuse of discretion and a harm that resulted from
such abuse. . . . In reviewing a trial court’s evidentiary
ruling, the question is not whether any one of us, had
we been sitting as the trial judge, would have exercised
our discretion differently . . . . Rather, our inquiry is
limited to whether the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary
or unreasonable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Scalora v. Scalora, supra, 189 Conn. App. 713.
The defendant’s argument focuses solely on the court’s
taking of judicial notice of the transcripts from the two
day temporary custody hearing. She contends that
Judge Baio misapplied § 2-1 (c) of the Connecticut Code
of Evidence,9 which permits a court to take judicial notice
of facts not subject to reasonable dispute, by improperly
taking judicial notice of disputable testimony presented
at the two day temporary custody hearing before Judge
Chadwick, thereby depriving her of her right to a fair
9
Section 2-1 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in subsec-
tion (b) that a court may take notice of matters of fact in accordance
with subsection (c), which provides that “[a] judicially noticed fact must
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) within
the knowledge of people generally in the ordinary course of human
experience, or (2) generally accepted as true and capable of ready and
unquestionable demonstration.”
Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

trial.10 She argues that, “[i]n taking judicial notice of
the previous testimony [before Judge Chadwick] and
using it as a basis for its decision, rather than just not-
ing that it was made, the trial court (Baio, J.) effectively
presumed that it was true. The defendant was not able
to cross-examine those witnesses in the later hearing,
which could have caused the trial court, who would have
been hearing and observing those witnesses for the first
time, to make different credibility determinations and
findings of fact.”
First, Judge Baio’s decision to take judicial notice of
the earlier proceeding before Judge Chadwick does not
reflect a misapplication of § 2-1 (c) of the Connecticut
Code of Evidence. Although the plaintiff cited both § 2-1
of the Connecticut Code of Evidence and the common-law
rule concerning judicial notice in its motion for order of
judicial notice, there is no indication from the court’s
granting of the motion or comments at the January
7, 2025 hearing which ground formed the basis of its
decision. The defendant did not request an articulation
pursuant to Practice Book § 66-5. On the scant record
before us, we conclude that the court’s taking of judicial
notice was not improperly premised on a misapplication
of § 2-1 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. It is well
established that courts may take judicial notice of files
of the trial court in the same or other cases. See, e.g.,
Roger B. v. Commissioner of Correction, 190 Conn. App.
817, 851 n.18, 212 A.3d 693, cert. denied, 333 Conn.
929, 218 A.3d 70 (2019), and cert. denied, 333 Conn.
929, 218 A.3d 71 (2019).
Second, the record does not support the defendant’s
contention that Judge Baio presumed the truth of certain
testimony presented at the prior hearing before Judge
Chadwick and used it as a basis for granting permanent
ownership. In the memorandum of decision concerning
10
The claim is reviewable on appeal because it was raised by the defen-
dant’s filing of a written objection to the plaintiff’s motion for judicial
notice, which was overruled by Judge Baio. The defendant orally, again,
objected to the court taking judicial notice of the testimony on January
7, 2025, and, again, Judge Baio overruled that objection.
Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

permanent ownership, Judge Baio adopted the findings
set forth in Judge Chadwick’s August 14, 2024 order of
temporary custody, reasoning that those findings are sup-
ported by “the overwhelming evidence, which includes
the numerous exhibits . . . .” Although the defendant
does not contest Judge Baio’s adoption of the findings
of Judge Chadwick, as she only contests Judge Baio’s
taking judicial notice of transcripts from the earlier
proceeding, we note that Judge Baio only did so after
first determining that those facts were supported by the
evidence. Compare In re Mark C., 28 Conn. App. 247,
253–54, 610 A.2d 181 (it was not plain error when trial
court did not base its decision solely on findings from
earlier proceedings judicially noticed but merely took
into consideration evidence from those earlier proceed-
ings), cert. denied, 223 Conn. 922, 614 A.2d 823 (1992).
Judge Baio’s decision was based, in large part, on
photographic exhibits and the lack of credibility of the
defendant’s testimony at the show cause hearing con-
cerning permanent ownership. Specifically, Judge Baio
reasoned that the defendant “sought to downplay the
notably poor condition of the animals as chronicled and
depicted in the many exhibits, including the veterinary
records and the multiple photographs. The defendant
acknowledged that she was hiding dogs in her residence,
that her animals had unplanned litters, that there was
significant overcrowding with crates piled upon crates
with clearly visible squalid conditions and observable
poor conditions of the animals but testified that the ani-
mals were healthy and in good condition. She testified,
contrary to the clear depiction in the exhibits, that the
animals were well cared for and the animals and their
accommodations within her home were not in poor con-
dition. This testimony is not supported by the weight of
the evidence, which paints a far more dire picture. The
condition of the animals and their environment at the
defendant’s home prior to seizure are disturbing. The
defendant’s claim that the animals were healthy and
properly cared for is just not supported by the evidence
and is simply not credible.”
Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Animal Services
ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan

Accordingly, Judge Baio’s decision does not indicate
that the truth of any testimony presented at the hearing
on temporary custody was presumed. The defendant’s
counsel was not precluded from presenting her case or
from calling witnesses other than the defendant. “Judi-
cial notice relieves a party only of having to offer proof
on the matter; [but] does not constitute conclusive proof
of the matter nor is the opposing party prevented from
offering evidence disputing the matter established by
judicial notice.” In re Mark C., supra, 28 Conn. App.
252. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we
presume that the court knew the law and applied it cor-
rectly. See, e.g., In re Harlow P., 146 Conn. App. 664,
680, 78 A.3d 281, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 957, 81 A.3d
1183 (2013). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the
court’s taking of judicial notice of the transcripts of the
temporary custody hearing was an abuse of its discretion.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.