Farias v. Rodriguez

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Farias v. Rodriguez

DANIEL FARIAS v. ESAUL RODRIGUEZ ET AL.
(AC 47710)
Suarez, Seeley and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, who had been employed as a bartender at restaurants owned
and operated by the defendants, appealed from the trial court’s judgment
granting the defendants’ motion to strike his putative class action complaint,
which alleged, inter alia, violations of state minimum fair wage regulations
(§ 31-62-E3 et seq.) in effect in 2015. Held:
The trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion to strike that count
of the plaintiff’s complaint that alleged that the applicable statute (§ 31-68
(a)) gave rise to a private right of action for violations by employers of the
recordkeeping requirements in § 31-62-E3 of the regulations, as this court
twice previously determined that no private right of action exists for viola-
tions of that regulation.
The trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint was legally
insufficient as a matter of law because it was not premised on the applicable
state regulation (§ 31-60-2), as required under the legislature’s amendment
(P.A. 22-134) to the statute (§ 31-60) governing actions for violations of
wage laws.
Contrary to the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court applied P.A. 22-134
retroactively to take away his substantive rights under the 2015 state wage
regulations that had previously been in effect, this court concluded that
P.A. 22-134 is prospective and did not change the nature of causes of action
for a fair minimum wage but, rather, required only that claims filed after
September 24, 2022, as were the plaintiff’s claims, be adjudicated pursuant
to the updated regulatory scheme, namely, § 31-60-2 of the regulations, and
the legislature did not create any exceptions in § 31-60 (d) (4) for causes of
action that had accrued but were not commenced within the mandatory time
frame delineated therein.
The trial court correctly determined that any retroactive effect of P.A.
22-134 on the plaintiff’s statutory cause of action did not violate his federal
and state constitutional rights to due process, as he did not have a vested
property right in his cause of action.

Argued November 13, 2025—officially released March 31, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for the defendants’ alleged
violations of minimum wage laws and regulations, and
for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judi-
cial district of Hartford and transferred to the Complex
Litigation Docket, where the court, Noble, J., granted the
Farias v. Rodriguez

defendants’ motion to strike, and the plaintiff appealed
to this court; thereafter, the court, Noble, J., granted the
plaintiff’s motion for judgment, and the plaintiff filed
an amended appeal; subsequently, this court dismissed
the plaintiff’s original appeal. Affirmed.
Richard E. Hayber, for the appellant (plaintiff).
James T. Shearin, with whom were Dana M. Hrelic
and, on the brief, Ryan A. O’Donnell, for the appellees
(defendants).

Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The plaintiff, Daniel Farias, brought this
putative class action1 complaint, individually and on
behalf of others who were similarly situated as employees
of Puerto Vallarta restaurants (Puerto Vallarta), alleging
violations of Connecticut wage laws and regulations; see
General Statutes § 31-60;2 see also Regs., Conn. State
Agencies § 31-62-E1 et seq. (2015) (repealed September
24, 2020).3 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the
1
Prior to certification as a class pursuant to Practice Book § 9-9, a
complaint alleging claims on behalf of a class is commonly referred to
as a “putative” class action. See, e.g., Del Rio v. Amazon.com Services,
Inc., 354 Conn. 151, 152, 349 A.3d 570 (2026).
2
General Statutes § 31-60 provides in relevant part: “(b) The Labor
Commissioner shall adopt such regulations, in accordance with the provi-
sions of chapter 54, as may be appropriate to carry out the purposes of
this part. Such regulations . . . shall recognize, as part of the minimum
fair wage, gratuities in an amount (1) equal to twenty-nine and three-
tenths per cent, and . . . effective January 1, 2015, and ending on June
30, 2019, equal to thirty-six and eight-tenths per cent of the minimum
fair wage per hour for persons, other than bartenders, who are employed
in the hotel and restaurant industry, including a hotel restaurant, who
customarily and regularly receive gratuities . . . .
“(d) . . . (4) Notwithstanding any other law or regulation, any claim
brought under this subsection, section 31-68 as it relates to gratuities
as part of the minimum wage or section 31-62-E3 of the regulations
of Connecticut state agencies filed after September 24, 2022, shall
be adjudicated, solely, under section 31-60-2 of the regulations of
Connecticut state agencies effective on September 24, 2020, and any
amendments thereto. . . .”
3
The plaintiff’s complaint alleges violations of only §§ 31-62-E3 (old
E3) and 31-62-E4 (old E4) of the 2015 Regulations of Connecticut State
Farias v. Rodriguez

defendants violated (1) § 31-62-E34 (old E3) of the 2015
Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies (2015 regula-
tions) by, inter alia, failing to properly record the amount
claimed as a percentage of the minimum fair wage (tip
credit)5 they would otherwise be required to pay with
respect to each server, and (2) § 31-62-E46 (old E4) of the
2015 regulations by improperly deducting a tip credit
from his earnings and paying him and other similarly
situated employees less than the minimum wage for
the performance of “nonservice” work.7 The trial court
Agencies. Following the practice of the parties and the trial court, we
refer to the plaintiff’s claims in counts one and two of his operative
complaint as alleging violations of “old E3” and “old E4,” respectively.
4
Section 31-62-E3 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
(2015) (repealed September 24, 2020) provided in relevant part: “Gra-
tuities shall be recognized as constituting a part of the minimum fair
wage when all of the following provisions are complied with . . . (b) the
amount received in gratuities claimed as credit for part of the minimum
fair wage shall be recorded on a weekly basis as a separate item in the
wage record even though payment is made more frequently, and (c)
each employer claiming credit for gratuities as part of the minimum
fair wage paid to any employee shall obtain weekly a statement signed
by the employee attesting that he has received in gratuities the amount
claimed as credit for part of the minimum fair wage. Such statement
shall contain the week ending date of the payroll week for which credit
is claimed. . . .”
5
“A tip credit allows employers [to] take a credit for tips received by a
tipped employee for up to a stated percentage or portion of the minimum
wage. J. Lockhart, Annot., Tips as Wages for Purposes of Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act, 46 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 23, 40, § 2 (2010).” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Rodriguez v. Kaiaffa, LLC, 337 Conn. 248,
259 n.11, 253 A.3d 13 (2020).
6
Section 31-62-E4 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
(2015), which was repealed effective September 24, 2020, provided: “If
an employee performs both service and non-service duties, and the time
spent on each is definitely segregated and so recorded, the allowance for
gratuities as permitted as part of the minimum fair wage may be applied
to the hours worked in the service category. If an employee performs
both service and non-service duties and the time spent on each cannot
be definitely segregated and so recorded, or is not definitely segregated
and so recorded, no allowances for gratuities may be applied as part of
the minimum fair wage.”
7
Effective September 24, 2020, §§ 31-60-2 and 31-62-E3 of the Regula-
tions of Connecticut State Agencies (regulations) were each amended to
provide in relevant part that “the amount received in gratuities claimed
as credit for part of the minimum fair wage shall be recorded on a daily,
Farias v. Rodriguez

granted the motion to strike filed by the defendants,
Esaul Rodriguez, Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Puerto Val-
larta, LLC, Puerto Vallarta Group, LLC, Puerto Val-
larta Danbury, LLC, Puerto Vallarta Fairfield, LLC,
Puerto Vallarta Orange, LLC, Juan Rodriguez, LLC,
and Rodriguez Enterprises, LLC,8 and rendered judg-
ment thereon. On appeal, the plaintiff claims, inter alia,9
weekly, or bi-weekly basis in a wage record, even though payment is
made more frequently . . . .” See Regs., Conn. State Agencies §§ 31-60-2
(2) and 31-62-E3 (b).
Also effective September 24, 2020, § 31-62-E3a of the Regulations of
Connecticut State Agencies was added. Section 31-62-E3a of the regu-
lations changed an employer’s obligation to segregate an employee’s
time for nonservice duties to provide that such time must be segregated
only when a service employee performs nonservice employee duties
for “two hours or more,” or “[f]or more than 20 percent of the service
employee’s shift, whichever is less . . . .” Regs., Conn. State Agencies
§ 31-62-E3a (a) (1) and (2).
The plaintiff does not dispute that he has not alleged any violations
of the 2020 version of E3 contained in the regulations (new E3) or “new
E4,” the latter of which is now codified at § 31-62-E3a of the regulations.
See footnote 3 of this opinion.
8
The individual defendants are managing members and/or co-owners
of the various limited liability companies, which operate under the
name Puerto Vallarta. For convenience, we refer to all defendants
collectively as the defendants, and to Puerto Vallarta, LLC, Puerto
Vallarta Group, LLC, Puerto Vallarta Danbury, LLC, Puerto Vallarta
Fairfield, LLC, Puerto Vallarta Orange, LLC, Juan Rodriguez, LLC,
and Rodriguez Enterprises, LLC, collectively as the defendant entities.
We refer to Esaul Rodriguez and Juan Carlos Rodriguez, collectively,
as the individual defendants.
9
The plaintiff also claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded
that (1) his “follow-on” class action does not relate back to the filing
of Reyes v. Rodriguez, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,
Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, a prior class
action against the defendants, even though that case did not result in
the denial of class certification, and (2) Governor Ned Lamont’s Execu-
tive Order No. 7G expired on March 1, 2021, by operation of Governor
Lamont’s Executive Order No. 10A, rather than on May 20, 2021.
In his tolling claims, the plaintiff asserts that the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,
414 U.S. 538, 94 S. Ct. 756, 38 L. Ed. 2d 713 (1974), which was adopted
by our Supreme Court in Grimes v. Housing Authority, 242 Conn. 236,
244, 698 A.2d 302 (1997), together with Governor Lamont’s executive
orders, tolled the applicable two year statute of limitations in General
Statutes § 52-596.
Farias v. Rodriguez

that (1) the court incorrectly determined that General-
Statutes § 31-6810 does not provide a private cause of
action for a recordkeeping violation under old E3, (2)
No. 22-134 of the 2022 Public Acts (P.A. 22-134)11 was
not intended to retroactively take away his substantive
cause of action under the Connecticut Minimum Wage
Act (minimum wage act), General Statutes § 31-58 et seq.,
and (3) the court incorrectly determined that applying
P.A. 22-134 to his claims, which the plaintiff asserts ret-
roactively changed his substantive rights, did not violate
We need not address these claims, however, in light of our disposi-
tive conclusion that § 31-60 (d) (4) applies to the plaintiff’s claims and
that the plaintiff did not comply with its requirements. See General
Statutes § 31-60 (d) (4) (“any claim brought under this subsection, sec-
tion 31-68 as it relates to gratuities as part of the minimum wage or
section 31-62-E3 of the regulations of Connecticut state agencies filed
after September 24, 2022, shall be adjudicated, solely, under section
31-60-2 of the regulations of Connecticut state agencies effective on
September 24, 2020, and any amendments thereto”). Thus, even if we
were to agree with the plaintiff’s tolling claims, the plaintiff still would
not prevail because, pursuant to § 31-60 (d) (4), any claims filed after
September 24, 2022, must be adjudicated solely under § 31-60-2 of the
regulations, and, in the present case, the plaintiff alleged violations
of only old E3 and old E4.
10
General Statutes § 31-68 (a) (1) provides: “If any employee is paid by
his or her employer less than the minimum fair wage or overtime wage
to which he or she is entitled under sections 31-58, 31-59 and 31-60 or
by virtue of a minimum fair wage order he or she shall recover, in a civil
action, (A) twice the full amount of such minimum wage or overtime
wage less any amount actually paid to him or her by the employer, with
costs and such reasonable attorney’s fees as may be allowed by the court,
or (B) if the employer establishes that the employer had a good faith
belief that the underpayment of such wages was in compliance with the
law, the full amount of such minimum wage or overtime wage less any
amount actually paid to him or her by the employer, with costs and such
reasonable attorney’s fees as may be allowed by the court.”
11
In May, 2022, the legislature enacted P.A. 22-134, titled, “An Act
Concerning Employee Record Keeping,” which includes the provision
relevant to this appeal. Public Act 22-134 amended § 31-60 (d) by add-
ing subdivision (4), which provides: “Notwithstanding any other law or
regulation, any claim brought under this subsection, section 31-68 as it
relates to gratuities as part of the minimum wage or section 31-62-E3
of the regulations of Connecticut state agencies filed after September
24, 2022, shall be adjudicated, solely, under section 31-60-2 of the
regulations of Connecticut state agencies effective on September 24,
2020, and any amendments thereto.”
Farias v. Rodriguez

due process. We disagree with the plaintiff’s claims
and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, as alleged in the plaintiff’s
complaint,12 and procedural history are relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff was employed by
Puerto Vallarta at its Orange and Fairfield locations as
a bartender from 2011 until 2022. The plaintiff alleged
that the individual defendants are co-owners of all Puerto
Vallarta restaurants in Connecticut and that the defen-
dant entities operate several Puerto Vallarta locations
in Connecticut. The plaintiff further alleged that the
defendants function as a single enterprise and collec-
tively have the status of a single employer of the plain-
tiff pursuant to Connecticut wage laws. At all relevant
times, the defendants maintained a common practice
at all Puerto Vallarta locations of taking the full tip
credit against the wages of their servers and bartenders.
Accordingly, the defendants paid their servers $6.38
per hour, and their bartenders $8.23 per hour, rather
than the full minimum wage.13 The defendants assigned
the plaintiff, and other similarly situated servers and
bartenders, “nonservice duties,” which included, but
were not limited to, setting up the restaurant before it
was opened to the public, and “ ‘side work,’ ” which they
were required to perform during their shifts and after
they had finished their shifts. This side work included,
inter alia, general cleaning and stocking duties, brewing
coffee, cleaning iced tea containers, and filling ice bins,
among other tasks. The side work tasks were performed
for the restaurant generally and were not specific to the
servers’ or the bartenders’ own customers.
12
“For purposes of reviewing a motion to strike, we take the facts
alleged in the complaint as true.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Ferrua v. Napoli Foods, Inc., 237 Conn. App. 23, 25 n.5, 349 A.3d 620
(2025), petition for cert. filed (Conn. March 6, 2026) (No. 250349).
13
During the alleged claim period of August 21, 2018, through Sep-
tember 23, 2020, a “minimum fair wage” was defined in § 31-58 (i) (1)
as not less than $10.10 per hour effective January 1, 2017; as not less
than $11 per hour effective October 1, 2019; and as not less than $12
per hour effective September 1, 2020.
Farias v. Rodriguez

On December 6, 2022,14 the plaintiff commenced the
present putative class action against the defendants, on
behalf of himself and other Puerto Vallarta servers and
bartenders employed during the alleged class period, for
violations of Connecticut wage laws and regulations.15
The plaintiff’s complaint contains two counts. In count
one, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated
old E3 by failing to record properly the amount claimed
as credit in the wage record for him and other servers on
a weekly basis, and by failing to obtain “tip statements”
on a weekly basis confirming that the plaintiff received
sufficient tips to satisfy the tip credit that the defendants
took each week. In the second count, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendants violated old E4 by failing to segre-
gate his and other servers’ and bartenders’ service and
nonservice duties. The plaintiff alleged that, by failing
to segregate these nonservice duties pursuant to old E4,
they were underpaid in violation of Connecticut’s “ ‘tip
credit’ ” laws. The plaintiff alleged an applicable claim
period for his putative class action claims16 under old
E3 and old E4 of August 21, 2018, through September
23, 2020.
In April, 2023, the defendants filed a motion to strike
both counts of the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to
14
The plaintiff served the complaint on all named defendants on
December 6, 2022, with the exception of Juan Carlos Rodriguez, who
was served on December 7, 2022. Because this one day difference does
not impact our analysis of the plaintiff’s claims, we, like the trial court,
use December 6, 2022, as the relevant date for purposes of the statute
of limitations.
15
The present case is the second putative class action brought against
the defendants on behalf of servers and bartenders asserting class
wide violations pursuant to old E3 and old E4. In 2021, Omar Reyes,
a server at a Puerto Vallarta restaurant, commenced the first class
action complaint, asserting substantially similar allegations against the
defendants. See Reyes v. Rodriguez, Superior Court, judicial district
of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S.
The Reyes action was withdrawn in June, 2022, after the parties reached
a settlement. At the time Reyes was withdrawn, a motion for class
certification pursuant to Practice Book §§ 9-7 and 9-8 had neither been
filed nor ruled on by the court.
16
It is not disputed that the plaintiff did not allege any individual
claims in his complaint but, rather, alleged only putative class action
claims.
Farias v. Rodriguez

Practice Book § 10-39,17 together with an accompany-
ing memorandum of law. The defendants contended,
first, that the complaint failed to state a claim on which
relief could be granted for violations of old E3 and old
E4. Second, the defendants asserted that the plaintiff’s
claims were barred by the two year statutory limitation
period set forth in General Statutes § 52-596.18 Finally,
the defendants argued that the plaintiff’s old E3 claims
should be stricken because the minimum wage act, as
amended by P.A. 22-134, did not provide a private right
of action with respect to those claims.
On April 19, 2023, the plaintiff filed a memorandum
of law in opposition to the defendants’ motion to strike,
along with exhibits, including, inter alia, relevant legis-
lative history and certain of Governor Lamont’s execu-
tive orders, which were issued during the COVID-19
pandemic. The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that P.A.
22-134 should not be construed to retroactively change
old E3 and old E4, and that doing so would constitute a
taking of the class’ vested property interest in its mem-
bers’ causes of action in violation of their due process
rights. As to whether old E3 conferred a private right of
action, the plaintiff asserted that the trial court should
defer ruling on that issue because this court’s decision
in Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC, 219 Conn. App. 648,
296 A.3d 173 (2023), had, as of the time of the plaintiff’s
briefing before the trial court, not yet been released.19 On
April 28, 2023, the defendants filed a reply. On May 5,
2023, the plaintiff, with permission of the court, filed a
surreply brief. On June 6, 2023, before oral argument on
the defendants’ motion to strike, Nettleton was released
by this court. See id.
17
Practice Book § 10-39 provides in relevant part: “(a) A motion to
strike shall be used whenever any party wishes to contest: (1) the legal
sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim or cross
claim, or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted . . . .”
18
General Statutes § 52-596 provides in relevant part: “No action for
the payment of remuneration for employment payable periodically shall
be brought but within two years after the right of action accrues . . . .”
19
In Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC, supra, 219 Conn. App. 653, one
of the issues presented was whether § 31-68 (a) provides a private cause
of action for a recordkeeping violation under old E3.
Farias v. Rodriguez

On June 26, 2023, the parties appeared before the
court, Noble, J., for oral argument.20 On December 29,
2023, the court issued a memorandum of decision, in
which it granted the motion to strike. As to count one,
which alleged violations of old E3, the court concluded
that it was bound by this court’s decision in Nettleton v.
C & L Diners, LLC, supra, 219 Conn. App. 678, which
held that “the recordkeeping requirements in § 31-62-E3
(b) and (c) of the regulations are directory and, therefore,
that the defendant’s noncompliance with those require-
ments does not invalidate the tip credit and does not give
rise to a private cause of action.”
As to count two, which alleged violations of old E4,
the trial court agreed with the defendants that the plain-
tiff’s complaint was legally insufficient. Specifically, the
court noted as to count two that the plaintiff’s claim was
“predicated on a regulation repealed on September 24,
2020, rather than § 31-60-2, which became effective on
September 24, 2020 . . . .” The court concluded, inter alia,
that the plain and unambiguous language of § 31-60 (d)
(4) provides that “all actions filed after September 24,
2022, must be adjudicated pursuant to § 31-60-2 of the
regulations,” and that the plaintiff’s E4 claim, which
was predicated on old E4, was therefore insufficient as
a matter of law. (Emphasis in original.)
The trial court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument
that the application of P.A. 22-134 constituted a taking
of his vested property interest in violation of due process.
The court stated that the plaintiff’s cause of action was
solely a creature of statute and did not arise under the
common law. The court determined that, because the
plaintiff’s cause of action had not been reduced to judg-
ment, he did not have any vested interest in that cause
20
The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s claim is unpreserved
for review by this court because the plaintiff did not challenge the
applicability of Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC, supra, 219 Conn. App.
648, to the present case before the trial court. At the time the plaintiff
filed his opposition to the defendants’ motion to strike, however, this
court’s decision in Nettleton had not yet been released. Furthermore,
Nettleton was discussed by the parties’ counsel at oral argument on the
motion to strike. Therefore, we conclude that the plaintiff’s claim was
properly preserved.
Farias v. Rodriguez

of action. In so concluding, the court relied on Massa
v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 3 A.2d 839 (1939), in which
our Supreme Court stated that “a right of action in tort,
not existing at common law but depending wholly upon
statutory authority and not reduced to judgment before
repeal of the statute upon which it rests, or a right to
utilize a defense similarly dependent upon statute, is
lost by and upon repeal without a saving clause.” Id.,
149. The trial court finally stated that, even if the plain-
tiff’s old E4 claims were vested, the deprivation of that
property right would remain constitutional if it survives
a rational basis review, and that the plaintiff did not
properly address whether P.A. 22-134 was justified by
a rational legislative purpose. Accordingly, the court
concluded that the application of P.A. 22-134 was not
unconstitutional.
On January 3, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to
reargue, to which the defendants objected. The trial court
denied the motion to reargue, and the plaintiff appealed
to this court. Thereafter, the trial court granted the
plaintiff’s motion for judgment on June 27, 2024, and
the plaintiff filed an amended appeal.21
We begin with our standard of review. “The standard
of review in an appeal challenging a trial court’s grant-
ing of a motion to strike is well established. A motion
to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading,
and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the
trial court. As a result, our review of the court’s ruling
is plenary. . . . We take the facts to be those alleged in
the complaint that has been stricken and we construe
the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustain-
ing its legal sufficiency. . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable
in the complaint would support a cause of action, the
motion to strike must be denied. . . . Moreover, we note
that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need
21
On June 20, 2024, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s June 10, 2024 appeal on the ground that it was untimely.
This court denied the defendants’ motion and ordered, sua sponte, that
“the original appeal filed June 10, 2024, is dismissed for lack of a final
judgment. The amended appeal may proceed.”
Farias v. Rodriguez

not be expressly alleged. . . . It is fundamental that in
determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged
by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts
and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations
are taken as admitted. . . . [W]e assume the truth of both
the specific factual allegations and any facts fairly prov-
able thereunder. . . . A [motion to strike] admits all facts
well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the
truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings. .
. . A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint
alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by
the facts alleged.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Haworth Country Club, LLC v. United
Bank, 226 Conn. App. 665, 677–78, 319 A.3d 146, cert.
denied, 350 Conn. 914, 324 A.3d 791 (2024).
I
The plaintiff first claims that the trial court incorrectly
concluded that § 31-68 does not provide a private cause
of action for a recordkeeping violation under old E3.
Specifically, the plaintiff argues that employees have a
private right of action to sue when employers take a tip
credit without complying with the mandatory rules of
old E3. We are not persuaded.
We first set forth the legal principles governing our
review of the plaintiff’s claim. “Although the interpre-
tation of statutes is ultimately a question of law . . . it is
the well established practice of this court to accord great
deference to the construction given [a] statute by the
agency charged with its enforcement. . . . This principle
applies with even greater force to an agency’s interpre-
tation of its own duly adopted regulations. . . . Never-
theless, [b]ecause we do not have the benefit of either a
prior judicial or a time-tested agency construction of
the applicable provisions, we construe the statutes and
regulations in a plenary fashion. . . . Moreover, because
regulations have the same force and effect as statutes,
we interpret both [in accordance with General Statutes
§ 1-2z]. . . . Section 1-2z provides that [t]he meaning of
a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from
Farias v. Rodriguez

the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. In addition, [w]e also
note that the minimum wage law should receive a liberal
construction in order that it may accomplish its purpose.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC, supra, 219 Conn. App.
664–65.
In Nettleton, this court considered the same issue that
is now before this court, namely, whether a violation of
old E3 gives rise to a private cause of action under § 31-68
(a). See id., 664. Nettleton also was a case in which the
plaintiff worked as a server at a restaurant operated by a
defendant employer and sought recovery pursuant to old
E3. Id., 652, 654. This court first set forth the relevant
statutory and regulatory background concerning the
tip credit regulations; see id., 665–66; and thereafter
conducted a comprehensive analysis, determining that
old E3 is directory and, therefore, that noncompliance
with its provisions does not invalidate the tip credit and
give rise to a private cause of action. See id., 667–78.
Recently, this court revisited this issue in Anderson
v. Reel Hospitality, LLC, 233 Conn. App. 618, 342 A.3d
1095, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 926, 346 A.3d 514 (2025).
In Anderson, the plaintiffs argued that this court in
Nettleton did not conclude that old E3 did not give rise to
a private cause of action. Id., 624. This court disagreed
and concluded that Nettleton was controlling and that
a violation of the recordkeeping requirements in old
E3 does not give rise to a private cause of action.22 See
id. The court reasoned that the conclusion in Nettleton
22
In Anderson, the court noted that the amendments to § 31-60 (d)
promulgated by P.A. 22-134 “now expressly [provide] for a private
right of action.” Anderson v. Reel Hospitality, LLC, supra, 233 Conn.
App. 624 n.13. The plaintiff in the present case, however, has brought
claims only under old E3, and not under new E3, as is now required by
§ 31-60 (d) (4). See part II of this opinion.
Farias v. Rodriguez

that “the recordkeeping requirements in [old E3] of the
regulations are directory . . . was not limited to the facts
of that case. Indeed, that conclusion does not contain
any qualifying language indicating that it was limited to
the particular circumstances of that case, and this court
explicitly stated that [it] agree[d] with the defendant’s
claim that the recordkeeping requirements are directory
. . . .” (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Id., 630. Moreover, this court in
Anderson stated that the determination in Nettleton that
noncompliance with the recordkeeping requirements of
old E3 does not give rise to a private cause of action was
“predicated on an interpretation of the regulation and a
legal conclusion that such requirements are directory,”
and was not limited to the underlying facts presented.23
Id. This court has now twice held that there is no private
right of action for old E3 claims pursuant to § 31-68.24
Accordingly, we reject the plaintiff’s first claim.25
II
The plaintiff’s next claim is that P.A. 22-134 was
not intended to retroactively take away his substantive
rights under the minimum wage act.26 Specifically, the
23
For this reason, we also reject the plaintiff’s argument that, “if
Nettleton applies, then whether the plaintiff and the class’ claims under
‘old E3’ are mandatory or directory should be addressed on summary
judgment, upon a record of evidence.” In Anderson, this court made
clear that the determination in Nettleton was legal in nature and was
not limited to the underlying facts presented. See Anderson v. Reel
Hospitality, LLC, supra, 233 Conn. App. 630–31.
24
At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s counsel acknowl-
edged that Anderson “removes from this court the power to adjudicate
[the plaintiff’s] E3 arguments.” The plaintiff’s counsel noted that, at
the time of oral argument before this court, a petition for certifica-
tion to appeal this court’s decision in Anderson to our Supreme Court
was pending. Our Supreme Court subsequently denied the petition for
certification on November 18, 2025. See Anderson v. Reel Hospitality,
LLC, 353 Conn. 926, 926, 346 A.3d 514 (2025).
25
Because our conclusion is dispositive as to the plaintiff’s old E3
claim, our analysis of the plaintiff’s second and third claims on appeal
pertains only to count two, which alleged violations of old E4.
26
The plaintiff also claims that the trial court incorrectly determined
that he “[did] not challenge the application of [§] 31-60 (d) (4), which
Farias v. Rodriguez

plaintiff argues that (1) “nothing in [P.A. 22-134] (now
codified as § 31-60 (d) (4)) explicitly and unequivocally
indicat[es] that it is to be applied retroactively to the sub-
stantive law of ‘old E3’ or ‘old E4,’ ” and (2) P.A. 22-134
is susceptible to multiple interpretations and, therefore,
it is not “ ‘clearly’ ” retroactive. The defendants counter
that, although § 31-60 (d) (4) operates prospectively, it
does not have any impermissible retrospective effect.
Although we agree that the plain language of § 31-60 (d)
(4) is prospective in nature, we are not persuaded by the
plaintiff’s argument that the application of § 31-60 (d)
(4) impermissibly “[took] away [his] substantive cause
of action under the minimum wage act.”
As a preliminary matter, we note that the applicability
of P.A. 22-134 to the present case presents a question
of statutory interpretation, over which our review is
plenary. See In re Cole, 347 Conn. 284, 294, 297 A.3d
151 (2023); see also General Statutes §§ 1-2z and 55-3.27
When addressing issues of retroactivity, we begin by
asking whether the legislature has expressly prescribed
the statute’s proper reach. See Maghfour v. Waterbury,
340 Conn. 41, 46–47, 262 A.3d 692 (2021). “If [it] has
done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judi-
cial default rules. When, however, the statute contains
no such express command, the court must determine
whether the new statute would have retroactive effect,
i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed
when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past con-
duct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions
already completed.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products,
violates General Statutes [§] 55-3 . . . .” The defendants concede in their
brief to this court, and we agree, that the record “reflects that both par-
ties addressed this point in some form or fashion below.” We conclude,
however, that any error is harmless in light of our determinations that
§ 31-60 (d) (4) is not retroactive and that, even if we assume arguendo
that it had a retrospective effect, its application would not violate the
plaintiff’s due process rights. See part III of this opinion.
27
General Statutes § 55-3 provides: “No provision of the general stat-
utes, not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes
any new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to
have a retrospective effect.”
Farias v. Rodriguez

511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229
(1994); cf., e.g., Maghfour v. Waterbury, supra, 46–47
(concluding that, if plain language of statute does not
answer question on appeal, court must examine relation-
ship of statute at issue with law governing retroactivity
of statutes).
In In re Cole, supra, 347 Conn. 284, our Supreme Court
previously explained that “[m]any retroactivity cases,
and most of the easy ones, involve what modern scholar-
ship calls primary retroactivity—altering the past legal
consequences of past actions. [This includes] legislative
creation of criminal or civil liability for completed acts,
significantly lessening or adding onto the burdens of
past contracts (particularly debt contracts), legislative
termination of accrued claims for relief [regardless of
whether they are] the subject of a pending action, and
legislative undoing of final judgments no longer subject
to appeal. . . .
“More troublesome is so-called secondary retroac-
tivity, which refers to statutory changes that solely
alter the future legal consequences of past transactions
or occurrences. . . . Many changes in the law could be
characterized as retroactive in some respect. That is to
say, they attach some new, future legal consequences
to actions that were taken or decisions that were made
prior to their enactment. . . . That alone is not enough
to render a statute retroactive. See, e.g., D. Bassett, In
the Wake of Schooner Peggy: Deconstructing Legisla-
tive Retroactivity Analysis, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 453, 467
(2001) ([e]ven when laws expressly state that they are to
be applied prospectively, it is virtually certain that they
will affect expectations and prior transactions). Indeed,
we frequently have recognized that a statute does not
operate [retroactively] merely because it is applied in
a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s
enactment . . . or upsets expectations based in prior law.”
(Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Cole, supra, 347 Conn. 299–301.
We begin with the text of the relevant statutory amend-
ment. Number 22-134, § 1, of the 2022 Public Acts is
Farias v. Rodriguez

codified at § 31-60 (d). Relevant to the issues presented
in this case, P.A. 22-134, which added language that has
been codified at § 31-60 (d) (4), provides: “Notwithstand-
ing any other law or regulation, any claim brought under
this subsection, section 31-68 as it relates to gratuities
as part of the minimum wage or section 31-62-E3 of
the regulations of Connecticut state agencies filed after
September 24, 2022, shall be adjudicated, solely, under
31-60-2 of the regulations of Connecticut state agencies
effective on September 24, 2020, and any amendments
thereto.” Public Act 22-134 was approved by Governor
Lamont on May 27, 2022, and took effect upon its pas-
sage. See P.A. 22-134, § 1.
The parties both agree that the statutory language
is prospective. They disagree, however, as to whether
P.A. 22-134 is retroactive in effect. The plaintiff asserts
that “this court should not construe [P.A. 22-134] to be
retroactive and hold that it applies prospectively only
and does not wipe away the substantive standards of
‘old E3’ and ‘old E4.’ ” The defendants counter that,
“[t]o the extent the plaintiff states that § 31-60 (d) (4)
is intended to operate prospectively, he is correct. But
to the extent he believes that in practice it has not, he is
simply wrong.” We agree with the defendants.
On its face, P.A. 22-134, § 1, is silent as to the accrual
dates of causes of action that are subject to § 31-60 (d)
(4). The statute expressly applies to “any claim” brought
under § 31-60 (d) (4), § 31-68 as it relates to gratuities
as part of the minimum wage, or E3, and provides that,
if such claims are “filed” after September 24, 2022,
they must be adjudicated under § 31-60-2 of the regula-
tions. (Emphasis added.) Nothing in the language of
P.A. 22-134, § 1, indicates that the legislature intended
to exempt previously accrued, but not yet commenced,
causes of action from its purview. See, e.g., In re Cole,
supra, 347 Conn. 295 (concluding that preexisting
debts fell under amended homestead exemption when
amendatory language did not indicate that legislature
intended to “carve out preexisting (or any other) debts
from the reach of the exemption”); Southwick at Milford
Farias v. Rodriguez

Condominium Assn., Inc. v. 523 Wheelers Farm Road,
Milford, LLC, 294 Conn. 311, 320, 984 A.2d 676 (2009)
(“if the legislature had intended to create any exception
to this rule . . . we must assume that it would have said
so expressly”). We do not see any other reasonable way
to interpret § 31-60 (d) (4) but to conclude, like the trial
court, that it applies to the present case, which undisput-
edly was commenced after September 24, 2022.
Accordingly, we conclude that the language of § 31-60
(d) (4) is prospective because it applies to all claims filed
after September 24, 2022.28 Section 31-60 (d) (4) did
not eliminate the ability of a plaintiff to present a claim
under the act; instead, it sought to ensure that, after
September 24, 2022, such claims were brought pursuant
to the updated regulatory scheme, which was enacted in
2019. See Public Acts 19-1, § 6 (P.A. 19-1); Nettleton v. C
& L Diners, LLC, supra, 219 Conn. App. 657–60. Thus,
the principal activity the law seeks to regulate is not the
nature of the underlying claims themselves, regardless
of when they have accrued but, rather, to ensure that,
28
The plaintiff states in his principal appellate brief that, when the
legislature enacted No. 19-198 of the 2019 Public Acts (P.A. 19-198),
the legislature’s first attempt to repeal old E4, Governor Lamont vetoed
P.A. 19-198 because it was “aimed at retroactively extinguishing ‘old
E4’ claims.” We agree with the plaintiff that Governor Lamont vetoed
P.A. 19-198 because of his concerns that it was expressly retroactive
and presented due process concerns. See P.A. 19-198, § 7 (stating that
legislation was “[e]ffective from passage and applicable to actions pend-
ing on or filed on or after said date” (emphasis altered)).
Public Act 22-134, by contrast, reflects a clear intention by the leg-
islature to make the amendments therein expressly prospective in an
effort to avoid retroactivity and/or due process concerns. In a letter
to the legislature dated September 23, 2019, which was attached to
the plaintiff’s objection to the defendants’ motion to strike, Governor
Lamont stated that P.A. 19-198 raised “serious due process and other
constitutional concerns because it retroactively repealed existing regula-
tions governing wages . . . .” Governor Lamont, however, further noted
that, following that veto, his administration crafted a “proposal that
achieves many of the [legislation’s] original goals of the vetoed bill while
also protecting workers with legitimate claims to unpaid wages. . . .
Rather than retroactively repealing existing regulations, my proposal
requires [the Department of Labor] to expedite the promulgation of
new regulations.” That proposal resulted in the passage of P.A. 22-134.
Farias v. Rodriguez

after September 24, 2022, such claims are brought under
the new regulations.29 See, e.g., In re Cole, supra, 347
Conn. 308–309. As noted previously in this opinion, old
E3 and old E4 were repealed effective September 24,
2020. Thus, as the trial court noted, P.A. 22-134, by
requiring that any old E3 or old E4 claims be filed before
September 24, 2022, “in effect restores the limitation
of § 52-596 so as to exclude the operation of [Governor
Lamont’s] Executive Order 7G.”
Moreover, the plain meaning of the term “file” in
§ 31-60 (d) (4), if construed according to its commonly
approved usage; see General Statutes § 1-1 (a); clearly
refers to the date on which an action was brought, not the
date on which it accrued. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary (12th Ed. 2026) p. 608 (defining
“file,” inter alia, as “to initiate (as a legal action) through
proper formal procedure”); see also, e.g., Rios v. CCMC
Corp., 106 Conn. App. 810, 819, 943 A.2d 544 (2008)
(action is “filed” when it is returned to court). If the
legislature had intended for P.A. 22-134 to apply only
to causes of action that accrued after September 24,
2022, it could have stated that intention expressly, but
it did not do so. See, e.g., Epright v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., 349 Conn. 679, 692, 321 A.3d 354 (2024) (“[i]t is a
well settled principle of statutory construction that the
29
We note that, in Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC, supra, 219 Conn.
App. 691–95, this court determined that the amendments to the regula-
tions passed pursuant to the legislature’s directive in P.A. 19-1 were
intended to change, rather than to clarify, the existing regulations.
Accordingly, this court concluded that the definition of “ ‘duties inci-
dental to service’ in § 31-62-E2 (d) of the Regulations of Connecticut
State Agencies (September 24, 2020)” could not be applied retroactively.
See id., 695. These amendments included new E3 and new E4.
Public Act 19-1, however, is not at issue in this appeal. The plaintiff
argues only that P.A. 22-134 was impermissibly applied retroactively
to his claims. Public Act 22-134 did not direct that the relevant regu-
lations applicable to the plaintiff’s claims be changed but, rather,
provided that, after September 24, 2022, any claims under § 31-60 (d)
(4) “shall be adjudicated, solely, under [the new regulations set forth
in §] 31-60-2 of the regulations of Connecticut state agencies effective
on September 24, 2020, and any amendments thereto. . . .” General
Statutes § 31-60 (d) (4).
Farias v. Rodriguez

legislature knows how to convey its intent expressly”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Moore,
180 Conn. App. 116, 123, 182 A.3d 696 (“the legislature
knows how to make a statute apply retroactively when it
intends to do so”), cert. denied, 329 Conn. 905, 185 A.3d
595 (2018). For example, § 52-596, the governing statute
of limitations in the present case, provides in relevant
part that “[n]o action for the payment of remuneration
for employment payable periodically shall be brought
but within two years after the right of action accrues . .
. .” (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, we agree with the defendants that the
words “shall be adjudicated, solely,” in § 31-60 (d) (4) are
mandatory in nature. See generally Lostritto v. Com-
munity Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269 Conn.
10, 20, 848 A.2d 418 (2004) (“[d]efinitive words, such
as must or shall, ordinarily express legislative mandates
of a nondirectory nature, whereas word may ordinarily
imports permissive conduct and the conferral of discre-
tion” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although
the word “shall” does not invariably create a mandatory
duty; see, e.g., Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC, supra,
219 Conn. App. 667–68; in the present case, the leg-
islature used the limiting word “solely,” to emphasize
that all actions brought under § 31-60 (d) (4) must be
brought only under § 31-60-2 of the regulations. The
legislature’s use of such limiting terminology suggests
that it intended § 31-60 (d) (4) to be mandatory. See, e.g.,
Pereira v. State Board of Education, 304 Conn. 1, 16,
37 A.3d 625 (2012) (use of negative terminology sug-
gested that statutory provision was mandatory); Stewart
v. Tunxis Service Center, 237 Conn. 71, 78, 676 A.2d
819 (1996) (same). Indeed, an interpretation of § 31-60
(d) (4) that the plaintiff’s action could be adjudicated
under the old regulations would render the term “solely”
superfluous. See, e.g., Drumm v. Freedom of Information
Commission, 348 Conn. 565, 587, 308 A.3d 993 (2024)
(“[i]nterpreting a statute to render some of its language
superfluous violates cardinal principles of statutory
interpretation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Farias v. Rodriguez

We disagree with the plaintiff that P.A. 22-134 is sus-
ceptible to multiple interpretations and that its applica-
tion in this case would have an impermissible retroactive
effect.30 The plaintiff argues that “this court should not
construe [P.A. 22-134] to be retroactive and hold that
30
We note that, in support of his argument that P.A. 22-134 is ambigu-
ous, the plaintiff asserts that the defendants had argued before the
trial court that P.A. 22-134 is retroactive. We do not agree with the
plaintiff’s characterization of the defendants’ argument before the
trial court. Rather, in their memorandum of law in support of their
motion to strike the plaintiff’s complaint, the defendants argued that,
“[b]ecause the plaintiff filed his complaint after September 24, 2022 . . .
per . . . § 31-60 (d) (4), his claim must be adjudicated solely under the
version of . . . § 31-60-2 [of the regulations] effective on September 24,
2020.” (Emphasis omitted.) We interpret the defendants’ argument to
be consistent with their argument on appeal.
Similarly, the plaintiff contends that the defendants had argued that
P.A. 22-134 applies to only “ ‘new’ ” E3. Even if we were to consider this
alternative argument, we do not construe it to be inconsistent with the
defendants’ position in the present case. Moreover, even if it were, that
would not automatically render the statutory language ambiguous. It
is axiomatic that whether statutory language is ambiguous is a matter
of statutory interpretation for the court to determine, pursuant to its
plenary review of the relevant statute. See, e.g., 777 Residential, LLC
v. Metropolitan District Commission, 336 Conn. 819, 827, 251 A.3d
56 (2020) (“[w]hen construing a statute, [the court] adhere[s] to funda-
mental principles of statutory construction . . . over which our review is
plenary” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, statutory
language does not “become ambiguous merely because the parties con-
tend for different meanings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In
re Elianah T.-T., 326 Conn. 614, 621, 165 A.3d 1236 (2017). “The test
to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Glover v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 343 Conn. 513,
529, 275 A.3d 168 (2022). When read in context, we conclude that P.A.
22-134 is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.
The plaintiff also asserts that the trial court “held that [P.A.] 22-134
was retroactive because ‘the language of § 31-60 (d) (4) . . . plainly
and unambiguously provides that all actions filed after September 24,
2022, must be adjudicated pursuant to § 31-60-2 of the regulations.’ ”
(Emphasis omitted.) The court did not explicitly conclude that the P.A.
22-134 was retroactive. The court did state in a footnote, however, that
the plaintiff “[did] not challenge” the application of § 31-60 (d) (4) in
relation to § 55-3. See footnote 26 of this opinion. Even if the court’s
decision could have implied a conclusion that it had considered P.A.
22-134 to have retrospective effect, we conclude, on the basis of our
plenary review of P.A. 22-134, that it does not.
Farias v. Rodriguez

it applies prospectively only and does not wipe away the
substantive standards of ‘old E3’ and ‘old E4.’ ” This
argument improperly assumes, however, that the proper
“reference point” for purposes of retroactivity in the
present case is the date that the underlying causes of
action accrued, rather than the date on which they were
filed. In re Cole, supra, 347 Conn. 301–302. The appli-
cation of P.A. 22-134 to causes of action that accrued
before its passage would not render such application
retroactive because P.A. 22-134 does not change the
nature of causes of action for a fair minimum wage but,
rather, requires that any actions filed after September
24, 2022, be adjudicated under the updated regulations.
See, e.g., id., 308 (applying amended statute to preexist-
ing debts was not retroactive application of law because
“the accrual of those debts is not the principal activity
that the law seeks to regulate” (emphasis omitted)).
The present case is distinguishable from cases in which
this court and our Supreme Court have concluded that a
facially prospective statute had an impermissible retroac-
tive effect on a substantive right. Our Supreme Court so
concluded in Maghfour v. Waterbury, supra, 340 Conn.
43. In that case, the court considered the legislature’s
enactment of No. 17-165, § 1, of the 2017 Public Acts
(P.A. 17-165), which eliminated the right of plaintiffs to
retain sums they had recovered from negligent or reckless
third-party tortfeasors if those sums represented medi-
cal expenses paid by self-insured municipalities. See id.,
48–49. The court reasoned that, because P.A. 17-165, § 1,
created a new right for self-insured municipalities and
limited the rights of their employees, General Statutes
§ 7-464, as amended, was substantive. See id., 49. In
Maghfour, the defendant city asserted that allowing it
to file a lien on the plaintiff’s settlement proceeds against
a third-party tortfeasor would not present a retroactive
application of the statute because the plaintiff settled his
action against the tortfeasor after the effective date of
P.A. 17-165, § 1. Id. Our Supreme Court disagreed, stat-
ing that allowing the city to pursue statutory lien rights
against the plaintiff would be an improper retroactive
Farias v. Rodriguez

application of P.A. 17-165, § 2, because it would attach
new legal consequences to events completed before the
legislation’s effective date. See id., 50. The court elabo-
rated, stating that “[t]hose events are the legal rights to
which the plaintiff became entitled as a result of personal
injuries sustained by him . . . . The act impaired the
right of the plaintiff to obtain compensation for personal
injuries caused by the tortfeasor’s negligence . . . .” Id.
Furthermore, in Maghfour, the commencement of the
plaintiff’s underlying civil action predated the effective
date of P.A. 17-165, § 1. Id., 51.
In the present case, unlike in Maghfour, P.A. 22-134
did not take away the plaintiff’s substantive right to
bring a claim under the minimum wage act. Rather,
P.A. 22-134 specified that, after September 24, 2022,
such a claim must be adjudicated under the new regula-
tions. As stated previously, employees may still make
claims under P.A. 22-134 to assert claims under the
minimum wage act. They, however, must comply with
the updated regulations in making such claims, if they are
filed after September 24, 2022. Additionally, the legisla-
ture effectively offered a grace period of approximately
four months between May 27, 2022, the effective date of
the statute, and September 24, 2022, to bring old E3 and
old E4 claims, and the plaintiff in the present case did
not bring this action until after September 24, 2022.31
We therefore conclude, on the basis of the plain lan-
guage of the statute, that § 31-60 (d) (4) expresses a clear
directive that all claims under it must be adjudicated
31
The plaintiff argues that “it is likely that the General Assembly in
fact intended to repeal cases arising under [new E4], which replaced
old E3 but not retroactively change the substantive law regarding old
E3 and [old] E4.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Similarly, in his
appellate reply brief, the plaintiff asserts that the legislature intended
P.A. 22-134 “to only apply to the two year period from [September 22,
2020] to [September 22, 2023].” We conclude that these arguments are
speculative and are inconsistent with the plain language of P.A. 22-134
and the new regulations. Nowhere in the statutory language is such an
intention expressed. We are not permitted to supply statutory language
that the legislature has not provided. See, e.g., Del Rio v. Amazon.com
Services, Inc., 354 Conn. 151, 180 n.19, 349 A.3d 570 (2026). Although
Farias v. Rodriguez

under the new regulations, if they are filed after Sep-
tember 24, 2022. It is not disputed that the present case
was not commenced until after September 24, 2022, and
the legislature did not create any exceptions in § 31-60
(d) (4) to causes of action that had accrued but were not
commenced within the mandatory time frame delineated
therein. Accordingly, the legislature has expressly pre-
scribed the statute’s temporal reach.32 Simply put, there
is no retroactivity problem in the present case.33 See,
e.g., In re Cole, supra, 347 Conn. 310 (concluding that,
because legislature did not direct otherwise, expanded
homestead exemption applied in all bankruptcy and post-
judgment proceedings initiated on or after effective
date of legislation, “regardless of when the underlying
debts accrued”); see also, e.g., id., 309 n.12 (collecting
cases); Gohel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 61 Conn. App. 806,
820, 768 A.2d 950 (2001) (concluding that amendment
did not create statute with retrospective application but,
instead, merely created statute that rendered inopera-
tive any insurance policy provisions inconsistent with
statute’s requirements). For the foregoing reasons, we
old E4 was repealed, it was replaced by § 31-62-E3a, which changed the
way in which such a claim may be pursued.
The plaintiff also argues that, if P.A. 22-134 went into effect the day
it was signed, and if a server brought a lawsuit on July 1, 2022, P.A.
22-134 “would plainly have retroactively wiped away the server’s vested
property rights in her ‘old E3’ and ‘old E4’ claims from July 1, 2020,
to September 23, 2020.” We do not agree. First, although the effective
date of P.A. 22-134 was May 27, 2022, the provisions codified in § 31-60
(d) (4) apply to claims filed after September 24, 2022. Accordingly, old
E3 and old E4 claims still could have been brought at any time before
September 24, 2022. Second, as we stated previously, P.A. 22-134 did
not “wipe away” an employee’s claims under the minimum wage act:
these claims remain but they must be brought under the new regulations
if filed after September 24, 2022. Finally, the mere commencement of
a lawsuit, which had not even occurred prior to September 24, 2022, in
the present case, does not “vest” a claimant’s property right in a purely
statutory cause of action. See part III of this opinion.
32
Moreover, even if we assume arguendo that § 31-60 (d) (4) does have
a retrospective effect, any retroactive application of that statute does
not violate due process in the present case. See part III of this opinion.
33
Because we conclude that § 55-3 is not applicable, we need not deter-
mine whether P.A. 22-134 effected a substantive or procedural change
in the law. See, e.g., In re Cole, supra, 347 Conn. 310.
Farias v. Rodriguez

conclude that the court properly applied § 31-60 (d) (4)
and correctly concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint
was legally insufficient as a matter of law because it was
not premised on § 31-60-2 of the regulations.
III
Finally, the plaintiff claims that the trial court incor-
rectly concluded that P.A. 22-134, which he claims
retroactively changed his substantive rights,34 did not
violate his federal and state constitutional rights to
due process.35 We disagree and conclude that, even if
we assume arguendo that P.A. 22-134 was retroactive
as applied, such retroactive application of P.A. 22-134
did not violate due process.
34
In his reply brief to this court, the plaintiff argues that the applica-
tion of P.A. 22-134 violated his procedural due process rights pursuant
to the framework established by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). The plaintiff, however, did
not clearly raise a procedural due process claim in his principal appel-
late brief. See, e.g., ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson, 232 Conn. App. 586, 595
n.6, 336 A.3d 1275 (2025) (“[i]t is . . . a well established principle that
arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Furthermore, the plaintiff did not argue before the trial court that
his procedural due process rights were violated pursuant to Mathews.
Rather, the plaintiff argued that “applying [P.A.] 22-134 retrospec-
tively . . . constitutes a taking of the class’ vested property interest in
[its members’ causes of action]” in violation of due process. Even if an
argument pursuant to Mathews was properly raised, this argument
would fail because we have concluded that the plaintiff did not have
a vested property interest in a purely statutory cause of action that
had not been commenced before the passage of P.A. 22-134. See, e.g.,
Frauenglass & Associates, LLC v. Enagbare, 149 Conn. App. 103,
110, 88 A.3d 1246 (“In reviewing a procedural due process claim, we
must first determine whether a protected liberty or property interest
is involved. If it is, then we must determine the nature and extent of
the process due.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied,
314 Conn. 927, 101 A.3d 273 (2014).
35
The plaintiff does not brief separately a state constitutional due
process claim or contend that the state constitution affords greater
protections than its federal counterpart. Accordingly, we consider this
claim only under the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Stephanie
U., 206 Conn. App. 754, 782 n.8, 261 A.3d 748 (2021), cert. denied,
343 Conn. 903, 272 A.3d 1126 (2022), and cert. denied, 343 Conn. 904,
272 A.3d 1127 (2022).
Farias v. Rodriguez

Determining the “constitutionality of a statute pres-
ents a question of law over which our review is plenary.
. . . It [also] is well established that a validly enacted
statute carries with it a strong presumption of consti-
tutionality, [and that] those who challenge its consti-
tutionality must sustain the heavy burden of proving
its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
The court will indulge in every presumption in favor of
the statute’s constitutionality. . . . Therefore, [w]hen
a question of constitutionality is raised, courts must
approach it with caution, examine it with care, and sus-
tain the legislation unless its invalidity is clear.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman
Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 405, 119 A.3d
462 (2015). “At their core, the due process clauses of the
state and federal constitutions require that one subject
to a significant deprivation of liberty or property must be
accorded adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity
to be heard.” Bhinder v. Sun Co., 263 Conn. 358, 373,
819 A.2d 822 (2003).
As stated previously, we agree with the trial court that
§ 31-60 (d) (4) “plainly and unambiguously provides that
all actions filed after September 24, 2022, must be adjudi-
cated pursuant to § 31-60-2 of the regulations,” and that,
accordingly, the plaintiff’s complaint must be stricken
as legally insufficient “unless grounds exist to prohibit
the application of . . . [P.A. 22-134].” (Emphasis in origi-
nal.) Notwithstanding this clear statutory directive, the
plaintiff argues that the application of P.A. 22-134 in
the present case would result in an impermissible retro-
active taking of his substantive rights. The defendants
counter, inter alia, that purely statutory rights, such as
old E3 and old E4, do not convey a property interest and
are lost upon repeal without a savings clause.
We conclude that, even if we were to assume that P.A.
22-134 had a retrospective effect on the plaintiff’s cause
of action, which had accrued but which was not com-
menced prior to September 24, 2022, the trial court
correctly determined that the plaintiff did not have any
vested property right in his purely statutory cause of
Farias v. Rodriguez

action and, therefore, any retroactive effect of § 31-60
(d) (4) was not unconstitutional. Although an enact-
ment cannot be applied retroactively when a vested
right intervenes; see, e.g., Family Financial Services,
Inc. v. Spencer, 41 Conn. App. 754, 767, 677 A.2d 479
(1996) (concluding that statutory amendment could
not be applied retroactively because it would produce
substantial change in defendant’s vested rights in pend-
ing action); in the present case, the plaintiff did not
have any vested property interest in a purely statutory
cause of action that had not been commenced at the time
P.A. 22-134 was enacted. See, e.g., Bhinder v. Sun Co.,
supra, 263 Conn. 373–74 (defendant did not have prop-
erty right in prior decision of our Supreme Court and,
therefore, application of statutory amendment did not
violate due process); Enfield Federal Savings & Loan
Assn. v. Bissell, 184 Conn. 569, 573–74, 440 A.2d 220
(1981) (defendant did not have vested right to have his
case adjudicated in accordance with statute as it existed
at time of original adjudication).
Our Supreme Court’s decision in Massa v. Nastri,
supra, 125 Conn. 144, is instructive to our analysis. In
that case, the court stated that, “[w]hether or not the
rule against retrospective construction applies fully to
acts repealing prior statutes, without a saving clause or
other clear expression of intention, such repeal does not
operate to impair rights that have been vested while the
statute was in force. . . . A right of action . . . is a vested
property interest, before as well as after judgment, at
least where it comes into existence under common-law
principles, and is not given by statute as a mere penalty
or without equitable basis.” (Citation omitted; emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 147. The
court further stated with respect to purely statutory
rights of action: “[A] right of action . . . not existing
at common law but depending wholly upon statutory
authority and not reduced to judgment before repeal
of the statute upon which it rests, or a right to utilize a
defense similarly dependent upon statute, is lost by and
upon repeal without a saving clause.”36 (Emphasis added.)
36
It is not disputed that § 31-60 (d) (4) does not contain a savings clause.
Farias v. Rodriguez

Id., 149. The court therefore distinguished between
“purely” statutory causes of action and causes of action
that are grounded both in statutes and in our common
law. See id., 149–50; see also 16A C.J.S., Constitutional
Law § 486 (2026) (“[g]enerally, a right of action created
by statute may be taken away at any time, even after it
has accrued and after proceedings have been commenced
to enforce it, the rule being that it is not vested and
may be taken away at any time prior to final judgment”
(footnotes omitted)).
In the present case, it is not disputed that the plain-
tiff’s cause of action is purely statutory. The plaintiff
had not even commenced an action pursuant to old E3
and old E4 before the passage of P.A. 22-134, much less
reduced that cause of action to a final judgment. More-
over, as stated previously, the legislature, in enacting
P.A. 22-134, provided a grace period of approximately
four months between May 27, 2022, the effective date of
the statute, and September 24, 2022, after which time
all actions pursuant to § 31-60 (d) (4) must be brought
under the new regulations. Notwithstanding that grace
period, the plaintiff still did not commence an action
asserting violations of old E3 and old E4 within that
time frame. Accordingly, the plaintiff did not have a
valid property interest in his purely statutory claim that,
although accrued, was not commenced when P.A. 22-134
was passed.37 See, e.g., F. H. Whittelsey Co. v. Windsor
37
For this reason, the plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish Doe v. Hart-
ford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 317 Conn. 357, is misplaced.
Specifically, the plaintiff refers to our Supreme Court’s reference in
Doe to Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 221 (1822), in which the
court stated that “[i]t is universally admitted, and unsusceptible of
dispute, that there may be retrospective laws impairing vested rights,
which are unjust, neither according with sound legislation, nor the fun-
damental principles of the social compact.” (Emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan
Corp., supra, 424.
In the present case, however, as stated previously, the plaintiff did
not have any vested rights in his old E3 and old E4 claims. Accordingly,
the application of § 31-60 (d) (4), regardless of whether that statute is
characterized as operating prospectively or retrospectively, did not
violate the plaintiff’s due process rights. The present case, therefore,
is similar to Doe, in which our Supreme Court concluded that there
Farias v. Rodriguez

Locks, 90 Conn. 312, 315, 97 A. 316 (1916) (rejecting
challenge to retroactive legislation because it did not
interfere with vested right); see also, e.g., Ileto v. Glock,
Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Causes of
action are a species of property protected by the [f]our-
teenth [a]mendment’s [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause. However,
a party’s property right in any cause of action does not
vest until a final unreviewable judgment is obtained.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 560
U.S. 924, 130 S. Ct. 3320, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1219 (2010);
Rabin v. Fivzar Associates, 801 F. Supp. 1045, 1055–56
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (statute did not violate due process
clause because final judgment was not rendered until
after enactment of statute, and, therefore, rights were
not vested). The plaintiff’s interest was, instead, more
in the nature of a mere expectancy or inchoate hope. See,
e.g., Aspetuck Valley Country Club v. Weston, 292 Conn.
817, 834, 975 A.2d 1241 (2009) (“[a] vested right is one
that equates to . . . the present or future enforcement
of a demand, or a legal exception from a demand made
by another,” and right is not vested unless it “amounts
to something more than a mere expectation of future
benefit or interest founded upon an anticipated continu-
ance of the existing general laws” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); 16B Am. Jur. 2d 198, Constitutional
Law § 738 (2020) (“[t]o be vested, a right must be abso-
lute, complete and unconditional, independent of a
contingency; and a mere expectancy of future benefit
does not constitute a vested right” (footnote omitted)).
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Logan
v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S. Ct.
1148, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1982), upon which the plaintiff
relies, does not compel a contrary conclusion. In that
case, the court held that a statutory discrimination claim
was a “species of property protected by the [f]ourteenth
is “no absolute vested right in a statute of limitations defense absent
entry of a final judgment . . . .” Id., 414–15; see also, e.g., Blakely v.
Danbury Hospital, 323 Conn. 741, 754, 150 A.3d 1109 (2016) (noting
that defendant’s right to defense under ordinary statute of limitations
does not vest for purposes of due process until defendant has success-
fully asserted that defense through final judgment).
Farias v. Rodriguez

[a]mendment’s [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause.” Id., 428. In
Logan, the plaintiff employee’s employment was termi-
nated by the defendant employer “purportedly because
[his] short left leg made it impossible for him to perform
his duties . . . .” Id., 426. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed
a charge with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Commission (commission) under an Illinois statute bar-
ring employment discrimination on the basis of physical
handicap unrelated to ability. Id., 424–25. The commis-
sion, pursuant to statute, was then obligated to convene
a fact-finding conference within 120 days; however,
through the commission’s inadvertence, this conference
did not occur in a timely manner. Id., 426. The court
held that the plaintiff’s statutory cause of action could
not be extinguished by the commission’s error without
violating due process. See id., 432–33.
In the present case, however, unlike in Logan, when
the plaintiff commenced the present action, the rel-
evant statutory language had been amended to provide
that, under § 31-60 (d) (4), any claims must be brought
under the new regulations.38 In Logan, there was not
any such amendment to the relevant statute governing
the employee’s claim, nor was such an issue presented in
that case.39 See id., 425 n.1. Indeed, the court stated that
38
The plaintiff relies on certain out-of-state cases for the proposition
that statutory wage claims are entitled to constitutional protection
“even before they have been reduced to judgment . . . .” He cites, for
example, to Sanders v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 418 Pa. Super. 375, 376,
382, 614 A.2d 320 (1992), appeal denied, 535 Pa. 661, 634 A.2d 224
(1993), a case in which the Superior Court of Pennsylvania concluded
that applying an expressly retroactive amendment to the Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act, 43 P.S. § 333.105 (b) (7), to causes of action that
already had accrued would violate employees’ due process rights. See
also Hageland Aviation Services, Inc. v. Harms, 210 P.3d 444, 448–49
(Alaska 2009) (concluding that unlitigated statutory causes of action
become property when they accrue). We decline to follow the reason-
ing of these nonbinding out-of-state cases, which are unpersuasive and
inconsistent with our Supreme Court’s decision in Massa v. Nastri,
supra, 125 Conn. 148–49, in which the court stated that purely statu-
tory causes of action that have not been reduced to judgment before
repeal are not vested property rights.
39
The plaintiff also relies on Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 372,
91 S. Ct. 780, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971), a case that considered whether a
Farias v. Rodriguez

“the [s]tate remains free to create substantive defenses
or immunities for use in adjudication—or to eliminate
its statutorily created causes of action altogether—just
as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment
programs.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 432.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court in the pres-
ent case correctly determined that there could not have
been a deprivation of any cognizable property right that
could give rise to a due process claim.40 Accordingly, we
conclude that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that
the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to
strike his complaint.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

plaintiff’s due process rights were violated by the state of Connecticut’s
requirement of receiving court fees before the filing of marital dissolu-
tion actions. Boddie, however, did not concern a purely statutory cause
of action, or an amendment to such a statute, but, rather, a party’s right
to access the courts in order to obtain a divorce. See id., 381.
40
The plaintiff also argues that the trial court improperly (1) applied
the rational basis test to his due process claim instead of the Mathews
balancing test, and (2) improperly concluded that he had not addressed
whether P.A. 22-134 was justified by a rational legislative purpose. As
noted previously, the plaintiff did not brief the Mathews balancing test
before the trial court. See footnote 34 of this opinion. In addition, we
need not address these arguments in light of our dispositive conclusion
that the plaintiff was not deprived of any cognizable, vested property
right.