State v. Riley

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State v. Riley

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ACKEEM RILEY
(AC 48091)
Suarez, Clark and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who previously had been convicted of murder and attempt to
commit murder, among other crimes, appealed from the trial court’s judg-
ment denying his motion for sentence modification pursuant to statute (§
53a-39). The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly failed
to consider a reduction in sentence other than that requested by him in his
motion for modification. Held:

The trial court did not erroneously refuse to consider a sentence reduction
other than that requested in the defendant’s motion for sentence modifica-
tion, as nothing in the record suggested that the court failed to consider
whether a more moderate sentence reduction was warranted, and the court’s
memorandum of decision indicated that the court was convinced that the sen-
tence in place remained appropriate in light of all of the evidence presented.

The defendant’s claim that the trial court required an admission of guilt as
a predicate to granting his motion for sentence modification was not sup-
ported by the record, as the record indicated that the court did not conclude
that the defendant could not establish good cause solely because he refused
to accept responsibility for his crimes but, rather, determined that, even
if the defendant had been fully rehabilitated, the principles of deterrence,
retribution, incapacitation, and vindication of the interests of the victims
all weighed in favor of denying the motion for modification.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there was no
good cause to modify the defendant’s sentence, as the court properly reviewed
all of the relevant information before it, including the evidence presented by
the defendant in connection with his motion and the factors considered by
the sentencing judge, and reasonably determined that the defendant failed
to establish good cause to modify his sentence.

Argued February 2—officially released May 5, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
two counts each of the crimes of attempt to commit
murder and assault in the first degree, and with one
count each of the crimes of murder and conspiracy to
commit murder, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Hartford and tried to the jury before
O’Keefe, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which
the defendant appealed to this court, Beach, Alvord and
State v. Riley

Borden, Js., which affirmed the trial court’s judgment;
thereafter, the defendant, on the granting of certifica-
tion, appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed this
court’s judgment and remanded the case to this court
with direction to reverse the trial court’s judgment as
to the defendant’s sentence and to remand the case to
the trial court for a new sentencing proceeding; subse-
quently, the court, O’Keefe, J., rendered judgment impos-
ing sentence, from which the defendant appealed to this
court, Keller, Elgo and Bright, Js., which affirmed the
trial court’s judgment; thereafter, the court, Hon. Carl
J. Schuman, judge trial referee, denied the defendant’s
motion for sentence modification, and the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Naomi T. Fetterman, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (defendant).
Rebecca Z. Oestreicher, deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott,
state’s attorney, and Robert Diaz, supervisory assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

CLARK, J. The defendant, Ackeem Riley, appeals from
the judgment of the trial court denying his motion for
modification of his sentence pursuant to General Statutes
§ 53a-39. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial
court erred by (1) failing to consider a reduction in his
sentence other than that requested by him in his motion
for modification, (2) requiring an admission of guilt as a
predicate to modifying his sentence, and (3) concluding
that there was no good cause to modify his sentence.
We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The following facts concerning the defendant’s under-
lying convictions, as set forth by this court in State v.
Riley, 140 Conn. App. 1, 58 A.3d 304 (2013), rev’d on
other grounds, 315 Conn. 637, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015),
cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1202, 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed.
State v. Riley

2d 376 (2016), and procedural history are relevant to
this appeal. “At approximately 6 p.m. on November 17,
2006, the defendant and his companion, Lasell Lewis,
were driving a borrowed car in Hartford’s North End.
As they drove by a house on Garden Street, they thought
they saw a male named Mike, who they believed was
responsible for a gang related shooting on Vine Street
the previous week. The defendant and Lewis circled back
with the intention of exacting revenge and drove by the
house again, this time firing a barrage of bullets into a
crowd of people and hitting three young men.
“Tray Davis, a sixteen year old, died of gunshot wounds
to his head and chest. Twenty-one year old Montrel Gage
and thirteen year old Jaequan Sheppard-Ray were seri-
ously injured but survived. Gage was shot in the back;
the bullet was never extracted from his body. Sheppard-
Ray was shot in the abdomen and sustained multiple
life-threatening injuries. There was no suggestion that
any of the three victims was involved in gang activity.
“The defendant was charged with six counts: one count
of murder for the shooting of Davis; two counts each
of attempted murder and first degree assault for the
shootings of Gage and Sheppard-Ray; and one count
of conspiracy to commit murder. Pursuant to General
Statutes § 46b-127 (a), the defendant’s case was auto-
matically transferred from the juvenile docket to the
regular criminal docket of the Superior Court. On March
3, 2009, after a five day trial, the jury returned a ver-
dict of guilty on all charges.” Id., 4–5. The trial court,
O’Keefe, J., imposed a total effective sentence of 100
years of imprisonment. Id., 7.
The defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time
of the underlying crimes, appealed to this court, claiming
that his sentence violated the eighth amendment to the
United States constitution, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), which
held that the eighth amendment prohibits the imposition
of a sentence of life without parole on juvenile offenders
State v. Riley

in the absence of “consideration of the offender’s youth
as mitigating against such a severe punishment . . . .”
State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 640, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015),
cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1202, 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed.
2d 376 (2016).1 After this court affirmed the trial court’s
judgment; State v. Riley, supra, 140 Conn. App. 21; our
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “the [trial]
court must consider as mitigation the defendant’s age
at the time he committed the offenses and the hallmarks
of adolescence that Miller deemed constitutionally sig-
nificant when a juvenile offender is subject to a potential
life sentence.” State v. Riley, supra, 315 Conn. 641.2
On November 2, 2016, the defendant appeared before
Judge O’Keefe for resentencing in accordance with our
Supreme Court’s remand order in State v. Riley, supra,
1
As this court noted in the defendant’s direct appeal, the parties did
not dispute that the defendant’s 100 year sentence was “tantamount to
life in prison without the possibility of parole.” State v. Riley, supra,
140 Conn. App. 3 n.2.
2
The defendant also claimed that his sentence violated the eighth
amendment to the United States constitution as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), which held that the eighth
amendment “barred life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.” State v. Riley, supra, 315 Conn.
640. Our Supreme Court declined to address that claim, noting that,
although the defendant’s murder conviction rendered him ineligible for
parole under the statute in effect at the time; see id., 642–43 n.2; the
legislature had been considering proposed legislation aimed at amending
the General Statutes to comply with Miller and Graham. Id., 662. In
2015, the General Assembly enacted No. 15-84, § 1, of the 2015 Public
Acts, which amended the parole statute, General Statutes § 54-125a, to
provide parole eligibility for juveniles who are sentenced to more than
ten years of imprisonment.
As a result of that amendment, General Statutes § 54-125a (f) (1) now
provides in relevant part: “[A] person convicted of one or more crimes
committed while such person was under eighteen years of age . . . may
be allowed to go at large on parole in the discretion of the panel of the
Board of Pardons and Paroles for the institution in which such person
is confined, provided (A) if such person is serving a sentence of fifty
years or less, such person shall be eligible for parole after serving sixty
per cent of the sentence or twelve years, whichever is greater, or (B) if
such person is serving a sentence of more than fifty years, such person
shall be eligible for parole after serving thirty years. . . .”
State v. Riley

315 Conn. 637. See State v. Riley, 190 Conn. App. 1, 7,
209 A.3d 646, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 923, 217 A.3d
993 (2019). At the resentencing hearing, the prosecu-
tor presented new information to the court that was
not available at the original sentencing, namely, that
the defendant had pleaded guilty to two other shootings
aside from the one underlying the present case: “a drive-
by shooting [in May, 2006] that left a fifteen year old boy
dead and, on a separate occasion, an incident [in Janu-
ary, 2007] where the defendant and others proceeded
to unload twenty-four rounds at close range, resulting
in one man’s permanent paralyzation.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 31 n.13. Defense counsel pre-
sented mitigation evidence concerning the defendant’s
upbringing and his youth at the time of the offense. Id.,
21–22. After hearing from the parties and noting the
mitigating effect of the defendant’s age at the time of
the offense, Judge O’Keefe resentenced the defendant to
a total effective term of seventy years of incarceration
and noted his eligibility for parole pursuant to General
Statutes § 54-125a. Id., 22; see footnote 2 of this opin-
ion. Subsequently, the defendant appealed to this court,
which affirmed the seventy year sentence. State v. Riley,
supra, 190 Conn. App. 32. The defendant then applied
for sentence review; see General Statutes § 51-195;3
and the Sentence Review Division of the Superior Court
affirmed the sentence imposed by Judge O’Keefe. State
v. Riley, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,
Docket No. CR-07-616727-T (January 28, 2020).
On or about January 11, 2024, the defendant filed the
present motion for sentence modification, seeking to
reduce his seventy year sentence to twenty-eight years
of incarceration, which, if granted, would have made
him eligible for a parole hearing pursuant to § 54-125a
3
General Statutes § 51-195 provides in relevant part: “Any person
sentenced on one or more counts of an information to a term of impris-
onment for which the total sentence of all such counts amounts to
confinement for three years or more, may, within thirty days from the
date such sentence was imposed . . . file with the clerk of the court for
the judicial district in which the judgment was rendered an application
for review of the sentence by the review division. . . .”
State v. Riley

(f) on September 23, 2024. In support of his motion for
modification, the defendant submitted a memorandum
in which he argued that good cause existed for the sen-
tence modification because he “changed significantly
since the child that he was when he entered prison . . . .”
The defendant also submitted numerous exhibits in sup-
port of his motion, including documentation of his suc-
cessful completion of several rehabilitative programs
and his graduation from the Yale Prison Education Ini-
tiative; letters from his family, friends, and peers; a
psychological evaluation; a biopsychosocial report; and
evidence of his good behavior and work experience while
incarcerated.
The court, Hon. Carl J. Schuman, judge trial referee,
conducted hearings on the motion for modification on
June 25 and July 30, 2024.4 The defendant provided a
statement on his own behalf and presented statements
from nine friends and family members in support of
his motion. In his statement, the defendant discussed
his pursuit of educational and other programs while
incarcerated, how those programs impacted him and con-
tributed to his rehabilitation, and his plans for housing,
employment, and community service after his release.
The defendant also expressed remorse for the victims
of his crimes and acknowledged his responsibility for
the two shootings to which he pleaded guilty, but he
expressly did not acknowledge responsibility for the
crimes for which he was convicted and sentenced in the
present case. Rather, the defendant expressed remorse
that his actions contributed to the environment that
caused the shooting to occur. The defendant’s counsel,
relying on the defendant’s rehabilitative efforts and
history of good behavior while incarcerated, argued that
there was good cause to modify the sentence because the
defendant “has substantially changed” and “the purposes
4
At the July 30, 2024 hearing, the court granted the defendant’s
motion to admit into the record all attachments to the motion for
modification, as well as an audio recording of his resentencing and a
video recording of a presentation in which the defendant advocated
for increased educational opportunities for incarcerated individuals.
State v. Riley

of [his] sentencing have been served.” Counsel for the
state opposed the defendant’s motion, arguing that the
defendant’s accomplishments while incarcerated did not
“[rise] to the level of good cause in this particular case”
because of the number and severity of the defendant’s
crimes and the fact that he “continues to deny his cul-
pability . . . [for] the murder that he is asking for the
sentence modification.”5
In a memorandum of decision dated August 5, 2024,
the court, Hon. Carl J. Schuman, judge trial referee,
denied the defendant’s motion to modify his sentence.
The court first noted that, “[i]n previous sentence modifi-
cation cases, the court has attempted to consider whether
any new legal or factual developments since the time of
sentencing would justify a reduction of the trial court’s
sentence and whether the penalty at issue [still] promotes
any of the penal goals that courts and commentators
have recognized as legitimate: deterrence, retribution,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) The court then began its analysis
by commending the defendant’s rehabilitative efforts,
noting that “[t]here is no question that the defendant is a
changed man . . . has become educated . . . is remorseful .
. . and now wants to help others” and that his “progress is
impressive and commendable.” The court further noted,
however, that because the defendant “maintains that he
was not present at th[e] shooting and did not know about
it until after it happened . . . [he] still does not accept
full responsibility for the crimes in this case . . . . Given
that the defendant has not fully accepted responsibility
for shooting three individuals and killing one of them,
the court must conclude that the defendant is not fully
rehabilitated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
The court further determined that, “even if the defen-
dant were fully rehabilitated, there are other purposes
that the sentence still serves. One of those purposes is
5
Counsel for the state also notified the court that it had made contact
with Gage and the family of Davis, all of whom indicated that they did
not wish to be heard. Counsel further noted that the state had attempted
to contact Sheppard-Ray but was unable to reach him.
State v. Riley

to vindicate the interests of victims.” The court noted
that “[t]he mandatory minimum sentence for murder
is twenty-five years”6 and that, “[i]f the court were to
grant the defendant’s motion and reduce his sentence
to twenty-eight years, the effect would be to impose the
minimum sentence of twenty-five years for the murder
conviction and, following Judge O’Keefe’s approach,
two consecutive sentences of one and one-half years for
the shootings of [Gage] and [Sheppard-Ray]. Wholly
apart from the propriety of reducing the sentence for
the murder of [Davis] to the minimum of twenty-five
years, a sentence of one and one-half years for shooting
Gage and Sheppard-Ray, whom the defendant seriously
injured, does not adequately recognize the sanctity of
their human life and health.”
The court also determined that “[t]he other purposes
of sentencing—deterrence, retribution, and incapaci-
tation—are more closely vindicated by a seventy year
sentence than a twenty-eight year sentence. The defen-
dant’s crimes were heinous, taking the life of one young
man and seriously wounding two others. Unfortunately,
the defendant has taken other lives and left other people
wounded. These actions deserve significant punishment
and incapacitation. To deter the defendant and others,
a long sentence is important.”
The court next observed that “[t]his case is unusual
in that the Appellate Court . . . specifically affirmed the
sentence imposed by Judge O’Keefe. Although the Appel-
late Court’s focus was on the legality of the sentence
at the time rather than whether there is good cause to
modify it now, the court’s affirmance of [the defendant’s]
sentence reassures the court today that Judge O’Keefe
considered all the appropriate factors and imposed an
acceptable sentencing decision in a difficult case. . . .
Other than rehabilitation, which the defendant has not
fully achieved, the sentencing considerations are the
same now as those that Judge O’Keefe considered. The
court sees no reason to reevaluate them or to second-guess
6
See General Statutes §§ 53a-35a (2) and 53a-54a (c).
State v. Riley

Judge O’Keefe.” The court therefore rendered judgment
denying the defendant’s motion. This appeal followed.
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
Before addressing the merits of the defendant’s claims,
we begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles
and standard of review that govern our resolution of the
defendant’s appeal. “[A] criminal defendant may seek
sentence modification of or discharge from his sentence
pursuant to § 53a-39.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Barnes, 227 Conn. App. 760, 770, 323
A.3d 1166, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 922, 325 A.3d 1093
(2024). Section 53a-39 (a) provides in relevant part:
“[A]t any time during an executed period of incarcera-
tion, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing
and for good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the
defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged
on probation or conditional discharge for a period not
to exceed that to which the defendant could have been
originally sentenced.”
“[I]n arriving at its sentencing determination, the
sentencing court may appropriately conduct an inquiry
broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of
information [it] may consider or the source from which
it may come. . . . [T]his broad discretion applies with
equal force to a sentencing court’s decision regarding
a sentence modification . . . . Accordingly, we review a
court’s judgment granting or denying a motion to modify
a sentence for abuse of discretion. . . . An abuse of dis-
cretion exists when a court could have chosen different
alternatives but has decided the matter so arbitrarily as
to vitiate logic, or has decided it based on improper or
irrelevant factors. . . . As such, [i]n determining whether
there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable
presumption should be given in favor of the correctness
of the court’s ruling. . . . Generally speaking, under this
deferential standard, [w]here the trial court has properly
considered all of the offenses proved and imposed a sen-
tence within the applicable statutory limitations, there
is no abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks
State v. Riley

omitted.) State v. Brelsford, 227 Conn. App. 53, 61,
319 A.3d 763, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 912, 324 A.3d
142 (2024).
I
The defendant first claims that the trial court erred
in refusing to consider a reduction in his sentence other
than that specifically requested in his motion. He argues
that the court “refus[ed] to consider a sentence between
the twenty-eight years requested and the seventy years
imposed” and that, “[b]y proceeding as if those were the
only two sentencing options available, the court abused
its discretion, to the extent the court exercised any dis-
cretion at all, in determining an appropriate sentence
for [the defendant].” We disagree with the defendant’s
claim.
The following additional procedural history is relevant
to this claim. In his motion for a sentence modification,
the defendant requested that the court “reduce [his sen-
tence] to a [total effective sentence] of twenty-eight
years.” In a letter to the court accompanying the motion,
the defendant’s counsel explained that the defendant
was asking the court “to reduce his sentence . . . to a
total effective sentence of twenty-eight years” so that
he “would be eligible for . . . parole release [pursuant to
§ 54-125a (f)] on September 25, 2024.”
At the outset of the June 25, 2024 hearing on the
defendant’s motion, the court noted that there were “a
few . . . things . . . [that] will necessitate a second day
of hearings in this matter.” The court then noted that,
although the defendant’s counsel had submitted a letter
with the motion, that letter “seems to me to raise more
questions than it answers” and that “there’s been no
memorandum filed by the defendant . . . that summarizes
the procedural background, other convictions, other
cases . . . [and] [e]xactly what the defendant is seeking in
this case.” The court then ordered the defendant to file
State v. Riley

such a memorandum and noted that a continuance date
would be scheduled at the end of the first hearing date.
On July 30, 2024, the defendant filed a memorandum
in support of his motion, as ordered by the court. In that
memorandum, the defendant reiterated that his “request
is to reduce his . . . total effective sentence [to] twenty-
eight years . . . [so that] he would be eligible for . . . parole
release on September 23, 2024.” During the hearing
that same day, after the defendant’s counsel delivered
her argument in support of the defendant’s motion,
the court asked counsel whether she “acknowledge[d] .
. . that you’re making a big ask, reducing a sentence of
seventy years to twenty-eight? And then, it would be up
to the parole board to further reduce it to, essentially,
eighteen. But even without that: you acknowledge that
that is a big ask?” Counsel responded: “Yes, Your Honor.”
The defendant did not ask the court to consider a more
modest sentence reduction if it concluded that he failed
to establish good cause to reduce his sentence to twenty-
eight years as he requested.
As indicated previously, in its memorandum of deci-
sion, the court rejected the propriety of a twenty-eight
year sentence because it determined that such a reduc-
tion would “not adequately recognize the sanctity of
[the victims’] human [lives] and health” and that “[t]he
other purposes of sentencing—deterrence, retribution,
and incapacitation—are more closely vindicated by a sev-
enty year sentence than a twenty-eight year sentence.”
On appeal, the defendant argues that this portion of
the memorandum of decision indicates that the court
“insist[ed] that it could only consider a reduction in sen-
tence to the requested twenty-eight years . . . .” Noting
that § 53a-39 (c) contemplates that a motion for sentence
modification may be granted “in part,”7 the defendant
7
General Statutes § 53a-39 provides in relevant part: “(c) . . . If, after
a hearing pursuant to this section, the sentencing court or judge grants
in part a motion to reduce a defendant’s sentence, the defendant may
not file a subsequent motion for relief under this section until three
years from the date of the most recent decision granting such defendant
relief pursuant to this section. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
State v. Riley

argues that the court’s concerns as to the propriety of a
twenty-eight year sentence “[did] not compel the court
to deny the modification and affirm the seventy year
sentence” and that the court erred by refusing to consider
a more moderate sentence reduction.
We conclude that the record does not support the defen-
dant’s claim that the court refused to consider whether
a more moderate sentence reduction was warranted.8 “It
is well settled that [we] do not presume error; the trial
court’s ruling is entitled to the reasonable presumption
that it is correct unless the party challenging the ruling
has satisfied its burden demonstrating the contrary.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) White v. Latimer
Point Condominium Assn., Inc., 191 Conn. App. 767,
780–81, 216 A.3d 830 (2019). “[A] judicial opinion must
be read as a whole, without particular portions read
in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tracey v. Miami
Beach Assn., 216 Conn. App. 379, 395, 288 A.3d 629
(2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 919, 291 A.3d 1040
(2023). Moreover, “[t]o the extent that the trial court’s
memorandum of decision may be viewed as ambiguous . .
. we read an ambiguous record, in the absence of a motion
for articulation, to support rather than to undermine the
judgment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis
v. Commissioner of Correction, 198 Conn. App. 345,
357 n.4, 233 A.3d 1106, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 948,
238 A.3d 18 (2020).
Here, and with these principles in mind, we conclude
that a fair reading of the memorandum of decision does
not support the defendant’s claim that the court did
not consider a sentence reduction that was more mod-
est than what the defendant requested. Although the
court expressly addressed the propriety of reducing
8
The defendant argues that, because his claim raises a question con-
cerning the proper interpretation of § 53a-39, our review is plenary.
Because we conclude that the record does not support the defendant’s
claim that the court refused to consider a sentence reduction other
than the one that he requested, we need not address the defendant’s
statutory interpretation argument.
State v. Riley

the defendant’s sentence to twenty-eight years as he
requested, the court did not rest its decision solely on a
comparative analysis of the sentence sought by the defen-
dant and the one imposed by Judge O’Keefe. Rather, the
court went on to determine that the defendant’s “actions
deserve significant punishment and incapacitation,”
that “a long sentence is important” in this case in order
“[t]o deter the defendant and others,” and that, “[o]ther
than rehabilitation, which the defendant has not fully
achieved, the sentencing considerations are the same
now as those that Judge O’Keefe considered.” Thus, the
court determined that the considerations that informed
Judge O’Keefe’s sentencing decision continued to remain
important and relevant, which indicates that the court
concluded that the seventy year sentence remained appro-
priate and, consequently, that there was no good cause
to reduce the defendant’s sentence.
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, nothing in the
record suggests that the court failed to consider whether
a more moderate sentence reduction was warranted.
As we explained previously, the defendant repeatedly
requested that the court reduce his sentence to twenty-
eight years, specifically explained the reason for that
request, and never requested that the court consider
modifying his sentence in any manner other than in
accordance with his request. In light of the defendant’s
repeated and specific request that the court reduce his
sentence to twenty-eight years, it was entirely reasonable
for the court to articulate why it determined that such a
reduction was not appropriate. That does not, however,
mean that the court believed that it lacked the discre-
tion to order a more moderate sentence reduction if it
determined there was good cause to do so. Rather, read
in its entirety, the memorandum of decision indicates
that the court was convinced that a seventy year sentence
remained appropriate in light of all of the evidence pre-
sented. “Because the record can be read to support the
court’s conclusion that the [defendant] failed to meet
his burden, [he] has failed to demonstrate that the court
erred.” White v. Latimer Point Condominium Assn., Inc.,
State v. Riley

supra, 191 Conn. App. 781. Accordingly, we reject the
defendant’s claim that the court erred by refusing to
consider a sentence reduction other than that requested
in his motion.
II
The defendant next claims that the trial court erred by
requiring an admission of guilt as a predicate to grant-
ing his motion for sentence modification. Although the
defendant’s counsel acknowledged during oral argument
before this court that a trial court properly may consider
a defendant’s failure to accept responsibility as a factor
in determining whether there is good cause to modify a
sentence, she argued that the court in the present case
treated his failure to admit guilt as a “prohibitive find-
ing” that precluded a finding of good cause. The defen-
dant argues that, because § 53a-39 “does not exclude
defendants who have persisted in a plea of not guilty
from establishing good cause for modification of their
sentence . . . the trial court is not entitled to implement
such a prohibition.”9
We disagree with the defendant’s claim because the
record does not support his contention that the court
9
In his appellate brief, the defendant also contended that “[f]or the
trial court to now hold that [he] is unable to establish good cause for
a modification, despite his significant postconviction rehabilitation
but absent an admission of guilt, would be a violation of due process.”
He did not, however, separately brief a distinct due process claim.
Moreover, during oral argument before this court, the defendant’s
counsel expressly acknowledged that the defendant did not raise a due
process claim but, rather, argued that § 53a-39 cannot be interpreted
to require an admission of guilt because such an interpretation would
lead to an unconstitutional result. Because we conclude that the court
did not require the defendant to admit guilt as a predicate to granting
his motion for sentence modification, we need not further address his
contention that doing so would violate his right to due process. In any
event, any such claim would be foreclosed by our Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in State v. Angel M., 337 Conn. 655, 255 A.3d 801 (2020), which
held that, although “[p]rinciples of due process . . . forbid a court from
retaliating against a defendant by increasing his sentence merely because
[he] exercise[d] [a statutory or constitutional] right,” a sentencing court
“is not prohibited from denying leniency to a defendant who elects to
exercise [such a] right.” Id., 669.
State v. Riley

denied his motion because he refused to admit guilt.
Indeed, although the court determined that the defen-
dant was “not fully rehabilitated” because he “has not
fully accepted responsibility for [his crimes],” the court
went on to explain that, “even if the defendant were fully
rehabilitated, there are other purposes that the sentence
still serves.” The court reasoned that a reduction in the
sentence to twenty-eight years would “not adequately
recognize the sanctity of [the victim’s] human life”;
that “[t]he defendant’s crimes,” which included “tak-
ing the life of one young man and seriously wounding
two others,” were “heinous” and “deserve significant
punishment and incapacitation”; and that, “[t]o deter
the defendant and others, a long sentence is important.”
Thus, the court did not conclude that the defendant could
not establish good cause solely because he refused to
accept responsibility but, rather, determined that, even
if the defendant were fully rehabilitated, the principles
of deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and vindica-
tion of the interests of the victims all weighed in favor
of denying the motion for modification. Accordingly,
we reject the defendant’s claim that the court erred by
predicating its denial of the motion for modification on
the defendant’s failure to accept responsibility for his
crimes.
III
The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court
abused its discretion in concluding that there was no good
cause to modify his sentence. Specifically, the defendant
argues that the court “abdicat[ed] [its] responsibility . . .
to determine whether good cause for a sentence modifica-
tion now exists” and, instead, “simply review[ed] the pro-
priety of the sentence imposed by Judge O’Keefe nearly a
decade prior.” He further argues that his “demonstrable
rehabilitation” was sufficient to establish good cause
and that the court’s conclusion to the contrary consti-
tuted an abuse of its discretion. The state argues that
the trial court “properly considered the entire record in
State v. Riley

determining that the defendant . . . failed to show good
cause.” We agree with the state.
Our review of the record convinces us that the court
properly reviewed all of the relevant information pre-
sented over the course of the two day modification hear-
ing and reasonably concluded that the defendant failed
to establish good cause to modify his sentence. The court
expressly acknowledged and commended the defendant’s
rehabilitative efforts, noting that he “earn[ed] a college
degree while in prison,” “has taken and benefitted from
numerous prison rehabilitative programs,” and, despite
not accepting responsibility for the crimes underlying his
sentence in the present case, “is remorseful for those he
hurt in the past and now wants to help others.” The court
also acknowledged the numerous friends, family, and
others who wrote letters of support or spoke on his behalf
at the hearing and commented that “[t]he defendant’s
progress is impressive and commendable.” As discussed
in part II of this opinion, however, the court concluded
that other considerations, including the severity of the
crimes, the need for general and specific deterrence, and
the impact on the victims, outweighed the defendant’s
rehabilitative efforts.
We disagree with the defendant’s contention that the
court, by discussing the factors considered by Judge
O’Keefe at sentencing, “abdicat[ed] [its] responsibility
pursuant to § 53a-39 to determine whether good cause
for a sentence modification now exists.” The defendant
appears to argue that, by discussing those factors, the
court conducted what amounts to a sentence review pur-
suant to General Statutes § 51-194 et seq. and Practice
Book § 43-23 et seq., rather than applying the good cause
standard pursuant to § 53a-39. He argues that, unlike
a sentence review, which is “limited to a determination
as to whether the sentence was appropriate or dispro-
portionate in light of the circumstances existing at the
time the sentence was imposed,”10 a motion for sentence
10
See Practice Book § 43-28 (“[t]he [sentence] review division shall
review the sentence imposed and determine whether the sentence should
State v. Riley

modification requires “a contemporary assessment of
whether the sentence continues to vivify the penologi-
cal objectives.” He further argues that the trial court
improperly failed “to determin[e] whether, years later,
good cause exists to modify the sentence imposed by
Judge O’Keefe.”
The memorandum of decision makes clear, however,
that the court, in examining the factors considered by
Judge O’Keefe, did not merely review the propriety of the
seventy year sentence at the time it was imposed. Rather,
it considered those factors in analyzing whether the
information presented by the defendant established good
cause to modify that sentence. As the court explained,
in determining whether the defendant established good
cause, the court considered (1) “whether any new legal
or factual developments since the time of sentencing
would justify a reduction of the trial court’s sentence,”
and (2) “whether the penalty at issue [still] promotes
any of the penal goals that courts and commentators
have recognized as legitimate: deterrence, retribution,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”11 (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) After assessing the evidence presented
by the defendant and discussing the factors considered
by Judge O’Keefe, the court concluded that, “[o]ther
than rehabilitation, which the defendant has not fully
achieved, the sentencing considerations are the same
now as those that Judge O’Keefe considered.” (Empha-
sis added.) Put differently, the court determined that
there was no good cause to reduce the defendant’s sen-
tence because no “new legal or factual developments . .
. justif[ied] a reduction of [the defendant’s] sentence,”
and a seventy year sentence “[still] promotes . . . the
be modified because it is inappropriate or disproportionate in the light of
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, the protection
of the public interest, and the deterrent, rehabilitative, isolative, and
denunciatory purposes for which the sentence was intended”).
11
See State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 22, 122 A.3d 1 (2015) (“the penal
goals that courts and commentators have recognized as legitimate [are]
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation”).
State v. Riley

[legitimate] penal goals” that informed Judge O’Keefe’s
sentencing decision.
It is not an abuse of discretion for a court considering
a motion for sentence modification to assess the factors
that existed at the time the sentence was imposed, such
as the severity of the crime and the impact on the victims,
and to conclude that those factors outweigh the evidence
presented by the defendant at the modification hearing.
Indeed, this court has held that a “court’s weighing of
[such] factors is consistent with the broad discretion
afforded to it in ruling on a motion for sentence modifica-
tion.” State v. Reyes, 229 Conn. App. 121, 128, 326 A.3d
589, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 934, 327 A.3d 385 (2024);
see id. (court’s determination “that the devastation and
harm resulting from the seriousness of the defendant’s
conduct and the fact that he had only served less than one
third of his sentence outweighed his rehabilitative efforts
. . . is consistent with the broad discretion afforded to it
in ruling on a motion for sentence modification” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also, e.g., State v. Dupas,
291 Conn. 778, 785–86, 970 A.2d 102 (2009) (“[i]t was
not an abuse of discretion for the court to rely on the
horrific nature of [the] crime in denying the defendant’s
motion for modification . . . [because] [t]his information
was just as relevant at the modification hearing as it was
during the defendant’s original sentencing”); State v.
Browne, 238 Conn. App. 753, 770, ___A.3d ___(2026)
(“it is clear from the court’s memorandum of decision
that it did consider the defendant’s rehabilitation but
found that the defendant did not establish good cause
in light of other factors, including the serious nature of
his crimes”); State v. Martin G., 222 Conn. App. 395,
406, 305 A.3d 324 (2023) (court properly “determined
that the gravity of the defendant’s conduct, and its con-
tinuing effect on the victim and her family, outweighed
the rehabilitative efforts he has undertaken since his
incarceration”), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 944, 308 A.3d
34 (2024). Thus, the court properly reviewed all of the
relevant information before it, including the evidence
presented by the defendant in connection with his motion
State v. Riley

and the factors considered by Judge O’Keefe at sentenc-
ing, and reasonably determined that the defendant failed
to establish good cause to modify his sentence. In light
of the broad discretion afforded to trial courts in ruling
on motions for sentence modification, we conclude that
the court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that there was no good cause to modify the defendant’s
sentence.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.