Gainty v. Infantino

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Gainty v. Infantino

SUSAN F. GAINTY v. MICHAEL INFANTINO
(AC 47887)
Cradle, C. J., and Moll and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment affirming a family
support magistrate’s decision ordering him to pay overdue child support to
the plaintiff and granting the plaintiff’s motions for appellate attorney’s
fees and for contempt. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court
improperly affirmed the magistrate’s decision. Held:

The trial court properly affirmed the magistrate’s decision, as the magis-
trate’s finding underlying the decision regarding the balance in overdue child
support owed by the defendant was not clearly erroneous.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff’s motion
for appellate attorney’s fees, as the court’s finding that rejecting the plain-
tiff’s request for such fees would undermine the court’s prior financial
orders and lead to an inequitable result was sufficient to justify the award.

The trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, as the
defendant’s claim that the decision underlying the motion conflicted with
two prior orders and, thus, was not clear and unambiguous was unavailing.

Argued January 21—officially released May 5, 2026

Procedural History

Action to establish paternity of the plaintiff’s minor
children, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to
the court, Prestley, J.; judgment declaring that the
defendant is the father of the plaintiff’s minor children
and granting certain other relief; thereafter, the family
support magistrate, David A. Dee, issued a certain order
relating to a postjudgment motion for contempt filed by
the plaintiff; subsequently, the defendant appealed to
the court, Alfano, J.; judgment affirming the order of
the family support magistrate and granting the plain-
tiff’s motions for attorney’s fees and for contempt and
awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiff, from which the
defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
John F. Morris, for the appellant (defendant).
Gainty v. Infantino

Campbell D. Barrett, with whom was Stacie L.
Provencher, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

MOLL, J. The defendant, Michael Infantino, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court affirming a family
support magistrate’s decision ordering him to pay over-
due child support to the plaintiff, Susan F. Gainty, and
granting the plaintiff’s motions for appellate attorney’s
fees and for contempt. On appeal, the defendant claims
that the court improperly (1) affirmed the magistrate’s
decision because the magistrate clearly erred in finding
that he owed a balance of $5574.58 in overdue child sup-
port, (2) awarded appellate attorney’s fees to the plaintiff
in connection with a prior appeal, and (3) determined that
the decision underlying the contempt finding against him
was clear and unambiguous. We affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. In 2001, the plaintiff filed a
petition to establish the paternity of the parties’ son,
born in 1998, and daughter, born in 2001. On May 16,
2001, the trial court, Prestley, J., rendered a judgment
of paternity against the defendant as to both children
and ordered him to pay $250 per week in child support.
Additionally, the parties agreed that the defendant
was responsible for 50 percent of daycare and medical
expenses.1
In June, 2008, the parties began engaging in postjudg-
ment litigation stemming from the defendant’s failure to
1
As this court explained in a prior opinion, “[t]he transcript of the
hearing in the action to establish paternity . . . reflects that the [trial]
court intended to order the defendant to pay 50 percent of daycare and
medical expenses and that the parties had agreed to these orders. . . .
Although the order regarding daycare and medical expenses appears to
have been inadvertently omitted from the written order, the parties,
at all relevant times in this litigation, have operated under the under-
standing that the daycare and medical expenses were ordered as stated
in the transcript.” Gainty v. Infantino, 222 Conn. App. 785, 789 n.2,
306 A.3d 1171 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 948, 308 A.3d 36 (2024).
Gainty v. Infantino

comply with the court’s child support orders. The defen-
dant was found in contempt on several occasions prior
to the start of the proceedings relevant to this appeal.
On December 11, 2019, the plaintiff, representing
herself, filed a motion captioned “motion for order for
extension of child support order, education, medical,
dependent care expenses through age twenty-one for a
child with a qualified disability.” The plaintiff requested
that the court enter an order extending “child support,
education support, medical, [and] dependent care” for
the parties’ daughter until she turned twenty-one on the
ground that she had a qualifying disability. On December
17, 2019, the plaintiff, again representing herself, filed a
motion for modification of child support, asserting that
the daughter “ha[d] a qualifying disability and [was] eli-
gible for support through the maximum age allowed by
state statute (twenty-one)” and that there were “[s]ignifi-
cant expenses for care, support, [and] needed services.”
As relief, the plaintiff requested, inter alia, that the court
“[o]rder current support” and require the defendant to
“[c]ontribute to child care/support programs,” as well
as to “[e]xpenses pertaining to services, care, programs,
education, [and] medical expenses.”
On April 28, 2022, the court, Hon. Constance L.
Epstein, judge trial referee, issued a memorandum
of decision concluding that the plaintiff had satis-
fied her burden pursuant to General Statutes (Rev.
to 2019) § 46b-84 (c)2 (April 28, 2022 decision).3
2
General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 46b-84 (c) provides: “The court
may make appropriate orders of support of any child with intellectual
disability, as defined in section 1-1g, or a mental disability or physical
disability, as defined in subdivision (15) of section 46a-51, who resides
with a parent and is principally dependent upon such parent for mainte-
nance until such child attains the age of twenty-one. The child support
guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a shall not apply to
orders entered under this subsection. The provisions of this subsection
shall apply only in cases where the decree of dissolution of marriage,
legal separation or annulment is entered on or after October 1, 1997, or
where the initial support orders in actions not claiming any such decree
are entered on or after October 1, 1997.”
All references in this opinion to § 46b-84 are to the 2019 revision of
the statute.
3
On August 25, 2022, the court issued a corrected memorandum of
decision to correct typographical errors in the April 28, 2022 decision.
Gainty v. Infantino

The court awarded the plaintiff $31,200 in postmajority
child support, constituting the sum of $300 per week
from January 24, 2020, to January 24, 2022, which
the defendant was ordered to pay to the plaintiff in four
installments of $7800 by May 30, July 25, September
26 and November 28, 2022. The court also awarded the
plaintiff $683.10, which, as the defendant stipulated,
constituted overdue premajority obligations and which
was due immediately. Additionally, the court awarded
the plaintiff 50 percent of medical and school expenses
that she had paid for the parties’ daughter up to January
25, 2022, the amount of which would be determined later.
On May 11, 2022, the court issued a supplemental memo-
randum of decision awarding the plaintiff $44,651.78
in medical and school expenses, which the defendant
was ordered to pay by January 25, 2023 (May 11, 2022
decision). On May 19, 2022, the defendant appealed
from the April 28, 2022 decision and the May 11, 2022
decision (2022 appeal). On July 8, 2022, the plaintiff
filed a motion for appellate attorney’s fees vis-à-vis the
2022 appeal, which the court granted on August 25,
2022, awarding the plaintiff $10,000. Thereafter, the
defendant amended the 2022 appeal to encompass the
court’s $10,000 appellate attorney’s fees award.
On October 19, 2022, while the 2022 appeal remained
pending, the plaintiff, represented by counsel by that
time, filed a motion for contempt, claiming that the
defendant had failed to make the payments ordered in
the April 28, 2022 decision. The plaintiff requested
attorney’s fees in connection with the October 19, 2022
contempt motion. On November 16, 2022, the family
support magistrate, David A. Dee, found the defendant
in contempt of the April 28, 2022 decision and ordered a
purge amount of $24,083.10. On January 25, 2023, the
magistrate again found the defendant in contempt and
committed him to the Commissioner of Correction with
a $10,000 release amount and a review date of February
1, 2023. On February 1, 2023, the magistrate issued
a decision finding that (1) the purge amount had been
reduced to $14,083.10, following a $10,000 payment
For ease of reference, we refer to the April 28, 2022 decision as the
operative decision.
Gainty v. Infantino

by the defendant, and (2) the updated balance that the
defendant owed pursuant to the April 28, 2022 decision,
inclusive of the reduced purge amount, was $22,566.10,
which the magistrate ordered the defendant to pay in
four installments of $5641.52 by April 5, June 7, August
2 and October 4, 2023 (February 1, 2023 decision). On
February 23, 2023, the magistrate awarded the plaintiff
$1000 in attorney’s fees in connection with the October
19, 2022 contempt motion.
On September 15, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion for
contempt, claiming that the defendant had failed to make
the payments ordered in the February 1, 2023 decision.
The plaintiff requested attorney’s fees attendant to the
September 15, 2023 contempt motion. On October 18,
2023, the magistrate held an evidentiary hearing on the
September 15, 2023 contempt motion. On October 26,
2023, the magistrate issued a decision (1) noting that he
had made a finding on February 1, 2023, that the defen-
dant owed a balance of $22,566.104 under the April 28,
2022 decision, and (2) finding that, after crediting the
defendant for payments remitted between February 1
and October 18, 2023, the defendant owed a new balance
of $5574.58, which the magistrate ordered him to pay
in four monthly installments beginning on December
1, 2023 (October 26, 2023 decision).5 On November 1,
2023, the magistrate awarded the plaintiff $1000 in
attorney’s fees with respect to the September 15, 2023
contempt motion. On November 9, 2023, pursuant to
General Statutes § 46b-231 (n),6 the defendant appealed
from the October 26, 2023 decision to the Superior Court.
4
The October 26, 2023 decision states that the balance that the magis-
trate found on February 1, 2023, was $22,566, rather than $22,566.10.
We deem this to be a scrivener’s error.
5
On October 18, 2023, the magistrate issued a decision finding that
the defendant’s payments satisfied the $14,083.10 purge amount with
regard to the plaintiff’s October 19, 2022 contempt motion, thereby
concluding the proceedings as to that motion.
6
General Statutes § 46b-231 (n) provides in relevant part: “(1) A person
who is aggrieved by a final decision of a family support magistrate is
entitled to judicial review by way of appeal under this section.
“(2) Proceedings for such appeal shall be instituted by filing a petition
in superior court for the judicial district in which the decision of the
Gainty v. Infantino

Meanwhile, on December 12, 2023, this court released
its decision in the 2022 appeal, which affirmed the April
28, 2022 decision, the May 11, 2022 decision, and the
August 25, 2022 award of $10,000 in appellate attorney’s
fees to the plaintiff. Gainty v. Infantino, 222 Conn.
App. 785, 810, 306 A.3d 1171 (2023), cert. denied, 348
Conn. 948, 308 A.3d 36 (2024). On January 2, 2024, the
defendant filed a petition for certification to appeal to our
Supreme Court. On January 11, 2024, the plaintiff filed
an opposition to the petition. On January 24, 2024, the
plaintiff filed with the trial court a motion for appellate
attorney’s fees to defend against the petition. On Janu-
ary 30, 2024, our Supreme Court denied the petition.
On April 3, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for con-
tempt, claiming that the defendant had failed to pay (1)
the $10,000 in appellate attorney’s fees awarded by the
court on August 25, 2022, (2) the $44,651.78 in medical
and school expenses awarded by the court in the May 11,
2022 decision, (3) the $1000 in attorney’s fees awarded by
the magistrate on February 23, 2023, and (4) the $1000
in attorney’s fees awarded by the magistrate on Novem-
ber 1, 2023. The plaintiff requested attorney’s fees in
connection with the April 3, 2024 contempt motion.
On July 18, 2024, the court, Alfano, J., adjudicated the
defendant’s appeal from the October 26, 2023 decision
family support magistrate was rendered not later than fourteen days
after filing of the final decision with an assistant clerk assigned to the
Family Support Magistrate Division or, if a rehearing is requested,
not later than fourteen days after filing of the notice of the decision
thereon. . . .”
Additionally, General Statutes § 46b-231 (o) provides: “Upon final
determination of any appeal from a decision of a family support mag-
istrate by the Superior Court, there shall be no right to further review
except to the Appellate Court. The procedure on such appeal to the Appel-
late Court shall, except as otherwise provided herein, be in accordance
with the procedures provided by rule or law for the appeal of judgments
rendered by the Superior Court unless modified by rule of the judges of
the Appellate Court. There shall be no right to further review except
to the Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions of section 51-197f.”
Section 46b-231 was amended by No. 25-168, § 51, of the 2025 Public
Acts, which made changes to the statute that are not relevant to this
appeal. Accordingly, all references in this opinion to § 46b-231 are to
the current revision of the statute.
Gainty v. Infantino

and the plaintiff’s pending motions. First, the court
affirmed the October 26, 2023 decision. Second, the
court granted the plaintiff’s January 24, 2024 motion
for appellate attorney’s fees, awarding her $3500. Third,
the court granted the plaintiff’s April 3, 2024 contempt
motion, finding the defendant in contempt of the deci-
sions identified by the plaintiff and ordering him to pay
the plaintiff $56,651, which was to be paid in minimum
monthly installments of $2360.46, with the failure to
make regular monthly payments resulting in a monthly
penalty of $200. The court also awarded the plaintiff
$1000 in attorney’s fees with regard to the April 3,
2024 contempt motion. This appeal followed. Addi-
tional procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the trial court improp-
erly affirmed the October 26, 2023 decision. The defen-
dant contends that the evidence before the family support
magistrate and the court did not support the finding in
the October 26, 2023 decision that he owed a $5574.58
balance pursuant to the April 28, 2022 decision. We
disagree.
We begin by setting forth the following relevant legal
principles and standard of review. “Our legislature has
defined the role of the Superior Court in hearing an appeal
from a family support magistrate: ‘The Superior Court
may affirm the decision of the family support magistrate
or remand the case for further proceedings. The Superior
Court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because
the decision of the family support magistrate is: (A) In
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (B)
in excess of the statutory authority of the family sup-
port magistrate; (C) made upon unlawful procedure; (D)
affected by other error of law; (E) clearly erroneous in
view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record; or (F) arbitrary or capricious or char-
acterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.’ General Statutes § 46b-231 (n)
Gainty v. Infantino

(7).” Shear v. Shear, 194 Conn. App. 351, 357 n.5, 221
A.3d 450 (2019).
“The trier of fact’s determination of a question of fact
will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. . . .
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed. . . . Under the
clearly erroneous standard of review, a finding of fact
must stand if, on the basis of the evidence before the
[trier of fact] and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from that evidence, a trier of fact reasonably could have
found as it did. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do
not examine the record to determine whether the [trier
of fact] could have reached a conclusion other than the
one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable
presumption . . . in favor of the [trier of fact’s] ruling.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Giglio v. Ardohain, 233 Conn. App. 743, 752, 341 A.3d
272 (2025).
The following procedural background is relevant to
our resolution of the defendant’s claim. In the April
28, 2022 decision, the trial court, Hon. Constance L.
Epstein, judge trial referee, ordered the defendant to
pay the plaintiff a total of $31,883.10, comprising (1)
$31,200 in postmajority child support, which was to be
paid in four installments of $7800 on May 30, July 25,
September 26 and November 28, 2022, and (2) $683.10
in overdue premajority obligations, which was to be paid
immediately. This court subsequently affirmed the April
28, 2022 decision. Gainty v. Infantino, supra, 222 Conn.
App. 810. On November 16, 2022, the magistrate found
the defendant in contempt of the April 28, 2022 decision
and ordered a purge amount of $24,083.10.7
In the February 1, 2023 decision, the magistrate
found that (1) the purge amount had been reduced to
7
The $24,083.10 purge amount constituted the sum of several pay-
ments ordered in the April 28, 2022 decision, namely, (1) the three
Gainty v. Infantino

$14,083.10, taking into account a $10,000 payment made
by the defendant, and (2) the updated balance that the
defendant owed pursuant to the April 28, 2022 decision,
inclusive of the reduced purge amount, was $22,566.10,
which the magistrate ordered the defendant to pay in
four installments.8 The defendant did not appeal from
the February 1, 2023 decision.
The parties, as well as a support enforcement services
(SES) officer, appeared before the magistrate at the Octo-
ber 18, 2023 evidentiary hearing on the plaintiff’s Sep-
tember 15, 2023 contempt motion, which was predicated
on the defendant’s failure to comply with the February 1,
2023 decision. The SES officer notified the magistrate
that, according to SES records, the defendant had made
$16,991.52 in payments since February 1, 2023, leaving
$5574.58 left to be paid of the $22,566.10 balance previ-
ously found by the magistrate. The defendant’s counsel
disagreed, arguing that the defendant (1) had paid, if
not overpaid, his obligations under the April 28, 2022
decision or, alternatively, (2) owed a balance that was less
$7800 payments due by May 30, July 25 and September 26, 2022, and
(2) the $683.10 payment due immediately. The fourth $7800 payment
mandated by the April 28, 2022 decision was not due until November
28, 2022, which had not yet elapsed at the time of the magistrate’s
November 16, 2022 decision.
8
Between the magistrate’s November 16, 2022 decision and the Febru-
ary 1, 2023 decision, the fourth $7800 payment ordered in the April 28,
2022 decision became due. At the time of the February 1, 2023 decision,
then, the balance owed by the defendant under the April 28, 2022 deci-
sion was $21,883.10, calculated by adding $7800 (the fourth payment
ordered in the April 28, 2022 decision) to $14,083.10 (the reduced purge
amount), or, alternatively, by subtracting $10,000 (the defendant’s
payment that preceded the February 1, 2023 decision) from $31,883.10
(the total sum awarded in the April 28, 2022 decision). The difference
between $22,566.10 (the balance found by the magistrate in the Febru-
ary 1, 2023 decision) and $21,883.10 is $683, which approximates the
amount of overdue premajority obligations awarded to the plaintiff in
the April 28, 2022 decision. Thus, it appears that the magistrate may
have miscalculated the balance in the February 1, 2023 decision by adding
twice the amount of overdue premajority child support. Nevertheless,
as we note later in this opinion, the defendant did not appeal from the
February 1, 2023 decision, thereby leaving undisturbed the magistrate’s
finding of a $22,566.10 balance at that time.
Gainty v. Infantino

than $5574.58. The parties did not offer testimony at the
hearing; however, the magistrate admitted in full two
exhibits: (1) an SES payment statement listing payments
made by the defendant between February 1 and October
18, 2023; and (2) an SES audit explaining the basis of
the $5574.58 balance reflected in the SES records (SES
audit). In the October 26, 2023 decision, after crediting
the defendant for his payments made since February 1,
2023, the magistrate found that he owed a new balance
of $5574.58 and ordered payment of the same.
On June 28, 2024, the court, Alfano, J., held an eviden-
tiary hearing on the defendant’s appeal from the October
26, 2023 decision.9 The court heard testimony from the
parties and admitted in full the following exhibits: (1) the
SES audit; (2) an SES payment statement listing pay-
ments made by the defendant between January 1, 2000,
and June 20, 2023;10 (3) an SES payment statement list-
ing payments made by the defendant between January 1
and October 18, 2023; and (4) a document summarizing
the defendant’s payments, which the defendant’s counsel
had prepared as an aid to the court.
On July 18, 2024, the court affirmed the October 26,
2023 decision. The court stated that “[t]he defendant’s
argument rests upon his conclusion that the accounting
and math provided to the [magistrate] by [SES] in Octo-
ber of 2023, and upon which the magistrate relied in mak-
ing his decision, is inaccurate. The plaintiff disagrees.
. . . Upon extensive review of the voluminous pleadings
and exhibits and in light of the testimony provided, the
court does not conclude that the . . . magistrate acted in
violation of [§] 46b-231 (n) (7).”
9
General Statutes § 46b-231 (n) (6) provides: “The appeal shall be
conducted by the Superior Court without a jury and shall be confined
to the record and such additional evidence as the Superior Court has
permitted to be introduced. The Superior Court, upon request, shall
hear oral argument and receive written briefs.”
10
Although January 1, 2000, is shown as the start date for this SES
payment statement, the first payment date listed in the statement is
January 17, 2008.
Gainty v. Infantino

The defendant claims that the court improperly
affirmed the October 26, 2023 decision because the find-
ing therein that he owed a balance of $5574.58 pursuant
to the April 28, 2022 decision was clearly erroneous.
According to the defendant, the record demonstrates
that he paid, or overpaid, the sum awarded to the plain-
tiff in the April 28, 2022 decision, or, alternatively, the
balance that he owed was less than $5574.58. We are
not persuaded.
Initially, we note that the defendant’s claim relies in
part on evidence of payments that he made predating the
magistrate’s finding in the February 1, 2023 decision
that he owed a balance of $22,566.10 at that time. We
reject the defendant’s reliance on such evidence. The
October 26, 2023 decision, from which the defendant
appealed to the Superior Court, addressed the plaintiff’s
September 15, 2023 contempt motion, which claimed
that the defendant had not complied with the February
1, 2023 decision ordering him to pay the $22,566.10 bal-
ance. The defendant did not appeal from the February
1, 2023 decision, and, therefore, in the context of the
ensuing contempt proceeding, he was precluded from
challenging the magistrate’s finding of a $22,566.10
balance in the February 1, 2023 decision. See Tatro v.
Tatro, 24 Conn. App. 180, 187–88, 587 A.2d 154 (1991)
(“A contempt proceeding does not allow reconsideration
of the legal and factual bases of the order alleged to have
been disobeyed, which would amount to a retrying of
the original controversy. . . . The standard of review of
contempt proceedings precludes a collateral attack on the
validity of the underlying order . . . .” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.)). Thus, insofar as
the defendant asserts on appeal any error predicated on
the failure to account for payments that he made prior to
the February 1, 2023 decision, which, if credited to him,
necessarily would function to undermine the magistrate’s
finding that a $22,566.10 balance existed on February
1, 2023, we decline to consider that assertion because
it amounts to an impermissible collateral attack on the
February 1, 2023 decision.
Focusing our attention on the evidence in the record
regarding the defendant’s payments remitted after the
Gainty v. Infantino

February 1, 2023 decision, we conclude that the record
supports the finding in the October 26, 2023 decision
that the defendant owed a balance of $5574.58 pursuant
to the April 28, 2022 decision. The SES audit and the
two SES payment statements in the record delineating
payments during the relevant time frame reflect that the
defendant made $16,991.52 in payments between Febru-
ary 1 and October 18, 2023.11 The difference between the
$22,566.10 balance found by the magistrate on February
1, 2023, and the $16,991.52 in payments that the defen-
dant subsequently remitted is $5574.58, which matches
the amount found by the magistrate in the October 26,
2023 decision.
In sum, we conclude that the magistrate’s finding in
the October 26, 2023 decision that the defendant owed
a $5574.58 balance vis-à-vis the April 28, 2022 decision
was not clearly erroneous, and, therefore, the court
properly affirmed the October 26, 2023 decision.
II
The defendant next claims that the trial court improp-
erly granted the plaintiff’s January 24, 2024 motion for
appellate attorney’s fees to defend against the defendant’s
petition for certification to appeal from this court’s deci-
sion in Gainty v. Infantino, supra, 222 Conn. App. 785,
to our Supreme Court (petition).12 We are not persuaded.
11
We note that the SES payment statements in the record include an
entry, dated February 8, 2023, reflecting a $10,000 payment by the
defendant. During the October 18, 2023 evidentiary hearing before
the magistrate, the SES officer represented that the February 8, 2023
entry constituted the defendant’s $10,000 payment to be released
from incarceration prior to the February 1, 2023 decision, meaning
that said payment was not made on February 8, 2023. Moreover, in
the October 26, 2023 decision, the magistrate expressly stated that he
had credited the defendant’s $10,000 payment when calculating the
$22,566.10 balance found in the February 1, 2023 decision. Thus, the
$5574.58 balance found in the October 26, 2023 decision accounted for
the defendant’s $10,000 payment.
12
The defendant claims that the court “erred by ordering [him] to pay
the plaintiff’s fees for the . . . petition and for the motion”; (emphasis
added); and further makes a general reference to the court “err[ing] in
its orders of attorney’s fees.” (Emphasis added.) The only claim of error
Gainty v. Infantino

We first set forth the following applicable legal prin-
ciples and standard of review. “[General Statutes §] 46b-
62 governs the award of attorney’s fees in family court
proceedings and provides in relevant part that the court
may order . . . any parent to pay the reasonable attorney’s
fees of the other in accordance with their respective finan-
cial abilities and the criteria set forth in section 46b-82,
the alimony statute. These criteria include, inter alia,
the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources
of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education,
employability, estate and needs of each of the parties . . .
. Courts ordinarily award counsel fees . . . so that a party
. . . may not be deprived of [his or] her rights because of
lack of funds. . . . Where, because of other orders, both
parties are financially able to pay their own counsel fees
they should be permitted to do so. . . . An exception to
the rule . . . is that an award of attorney’s fees is justi-
fied even where both parties are financially able to pay
their own fees if the failure to make an award would
undermine its prior financial orders . . . . [A]n award of
attorney’s fees . . . is warranted only when at least one
of two circumstances is present: (1) one party does not
have ample liquid assets to pay for attorney’s fees; or
(2) the failure to award attorney’s fees will undermine
the court’s other financial orders.” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 807–808.
“A trial court is not limited to awarding fees for pro-
ceedings at the trial level. Connecticut courts have per-
mitted postjudgment awards of attorney’s fees to defend
that the defendant has briefed concerning attorney’s fees is directed to
the $3500 in appellate attorney’s fees that the court awarded in granting
the plaintiff’s January 24, 2024 motion for appellate attorney’s fees.
Insofar as the defendant claims that any other attorney’s fees award
was improper, we deem any such claim to be abandoned as inadequately
briefed. See Robb v. Connecticut Board of Veterinary Medicine, 204
Conn. App. 595, 611, 254 A.3d 915 (“We repeatedly have stated that
[w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly pre-
sented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather
than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning
an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court
judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal
. . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their
briefs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 338 Conn.
911, 259 A.3d 654 (2021).
Gainty v. Infantino

an appeal. . . . Whether to allow counsel fees, [under §
46b-62 (a)], and if so in what amount, calls for the exer-
cise of judicial discretion. . . . An abuse of discretion in
granting counsel fees will be found only if [an appellate
court] determines that the trial court could not reason-
ably have concluded as it did.” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Dolan v. Dolan, 211 Conn.
App. 390, 405–406, 272 A.3d 768, cert. denied, 343
Conn. 924, 275 A.3d 626 (2022).
The following additional procedural history is rel-
evant to our resolution of the defendant’s claim. On
June 28, 2024, the court held an evidentiary hearing
on the plaintiff’s January 24, 2024 motion for appel-
late attorney’s fees. The court heard testimony from
the parties and accepted their submissions of updated
financial affidavits.
On July 18, 2024, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s
January 24, 2024 motion for appellate attorney’s fees
and awarded her $3500, finding that she had paid that
amount to her appellate counsel with respect to the fil-
ing of her opposition to the petition. In an articulation
of its order,13 the trial court stated that “[t]he basis for,
and the circumstances surrounding, the prior award for
[$10,000 in] appellate [attorney’s] fees [on August 25,
2022] are as compelling now as they were when upheld
by this court. The defendant lost his argument [against]
attorney’s fees at the trial court level. He lost again
at the appellate court level. The plaintiff was forced
to expend funds to defend her position at each of these
stages. The defendant then made the decision to appeal
[this] court’s decision [in Gainty v. Infantino, supra, 222
Conn. App. 785] to [our] Supreme Court. He made this
decision with the understanding that this would cause
the plaintiff to incur additional legal fees to defend her
position. She did so. She hired private counsel and paid
13
On February 18, 2025, in response to an order issued by this court
on February 5, 2025, the trial court issued an articulation with respect
to its orders awarding the plaintiff (1) $3500 in appellate attorney’s
fees and (2) $1000 in attorney’s fees attendant to the plaintiff’s April
3, 2024 contempt motion.
Gainty v. Infantino

$3500 to this counsel to defend against the . . . petition
. . . . This was a sound investment on her part, as the
petition was dismissed, [this] court and the trial court’s
decisions were upheld, and the plaintiff was once again
able to recoup the funds she had expended to receive the
expanded child support for her disabled child. To deny
the plaintiff her award of [appellate] attorney’s fees for
the . . . petition would undermine the trial court’s prior
financial orders and lead to an inequitable result.”14
The defendant claims that the court abused its discre-
tion in granting the plaintiff’s January 24, 2024 motion
for appellate attorney’s fees. The defendant asserts that
the court “never considered whether there was any mis-
conduct, bad faith, frivolity, waste, or any other claim
of untoward conduct, including whether substantial
or not,” thereby precluding it from awarding appellate
attorney’s fees to the plaintiff on the ground that fail-
ing to award them would undermine its other financial
orders.15 We disagree.
The defendant does not cite any legal authority pro-
viding that misconduct must be found in order for a
14
Additionally, the court stated that it did not find the defendant cred-
ible insofar as he claimed that he was unable to pay for the plaintiff’s
appellate attorney’s fees.
15
The defendant further contends that two cases that the court cited
in its articulation—Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358,
999 A.2d 721 (2010), and Sachs v. Sachs, 60 Conn. App. 337, 759 A.2d
510 (2000)—are distinguishable, and, therefore, the court improperly
relied on them. In its articulation, however, the court did not perform
a substantive evaluation and application of those cases; rather, it cited
Misthopoulos for the proposition that “Connecticut law is clear that
trial courts have the authority to award appellate [attorney’s] fees” and
Sachs for the proposition that “[a]n award of attorney’s fees is justified
if the failure to make an award would undermine the trial court’s prior
financial orders.” The defendant does not argue that either of these
legal tenets is unsound. Thus, we reject the defendant’s contention.
Additionally, the defendant asserts that the court’s finding that he
filed the petition “with the understanding that this would cause the
plaintiff to incur additional legal fees to defend her position” was clearly
erroneous. Assuming, without deciding, that this finding was clearly
erroneous, we conclude that any such error is harmless. “[W]here . . .
some of the facts found [by the trial court] are clearly erroneous and oth-
ers are supported by the evidence, we must examine the clearly erroneous
Gainty v. Infantino

court to award attorney’s fees on the ground that fail-
ing to award them would undermine the court’s other
financial orders. Indeed, our precedent does not support
that proposition. In Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324,
915 A.2d 790 (2007), our Supreme Court iterated the
general rule, also referred to as the “Maguire rule”;16
id., 327; that awarding attorney’s fees “is warranted
only when at least one of two circumstances is present:
(1) one party does not have ample liquid assets to pay for
attorney’s fees; or (2) the failure to award attorney’s
fees will undermine the court’s other financial orders.”
Id., 352. Our Supreme Court then recognized a “limited
expansion of [the] Maguire [rule]”; id., 354; explaining
that, “when a party has engaged in egregious litigation
misconduct that has required the other party to expend
significant amounts of money for attorney’s fees, and
where the [trial] court determines, in its discretion,
that the misconduct has not been addressed adequately
by other orders of the [trial] court, the [trial] court has
discretion to award attorney’s fees to compensate for
the harm caused by that misconduct, irrespective of
whether the other party has ample liquid assets and of
whether the lack of such an award would undermine the
[trial] court’s other financial orders.”17 Id., 357; see also
Pena v. Gladstone, 168 Conn. App. 141, 161 n.16, 144
A.3d 1085 (2016) (construing Ramin to permit trial
court to award attorney’s fees “even if the innocent
party possesses ample liquid funds and regardless of
whether the [trial] court’s other financial orders would
be undermined”). In other words, a trial court’s finding
that failing to award attorney’s fees would undermine its
findings to see whether they were harmless, not only in isolation, but
also taken as a whole. . . . If, when taken as a whole, they undermine
appellate confidence in the court’s [fact-finding] process, a new hearing
is required.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Autry v. Hosey, 200
Conn. App. 795, 801, 239 A.3d 381 (2020). As we conclude in part II of
this opinion, the court’s finding that failing to award appellate attor-
ney’s fees to the plaintiff would undermine its other financial orders
was sufficient to justify its appellate attorney’s fees award. Thus, any
erroneous finding concerning the defendant’s motivation in filing the
petition is harmless.
16
See Maguire v. Maguire, 222 Conn. 32, 44, 608 A.2d 79 (1992).
17
Our Supreme Court later clarified that the limited expansion of the
Maguire rule recognized in Ramin “is limited to discovery misconduct
. . . .” Berzins v. Berzins, 306 Conn. 651, 657, 51 A.3d 941 (2012).
Gainty v. Infantino

other financial orders is a stand-alone ground on which
the court may base an attorney’s fees award, with no
attendant finding of misconduct required.
In the present case, in awarding the plaintiff $3500
in appellate attorney’s fees, the court expressly found
that rejecting the plaintiff’s request for such fees “would
undermine the . . . court’s prior financial orders and
lead to an inequitable result,” which reasoning was suf-
ficient to justify the award. Accordingly, we conclude
that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting
the plaintiff’s January 24, 2024 motion for appellate
attorney’s fees.
III
The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court
improperly granted the plaintiff’s April 3, 2024 con-
tempt motion insofar as the court found him in contempt
of the May 11, 2022 decision requiring him to pay the
plaintiff $44,651.78 in medical and school expenses.18
The defendant maintains that the May 11, 2022 decision
conflicted with two prior orders, and, therefore, the court
improperly determined that the May 11, 2022 decision
was clear and unambiguous. This claim is unavailing.
“Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a
court which has power to punish for such an offense. . . .
[C]ivil contempt is committed when a person violates an
order of court which requires that person in specific and
definite language to do or refrain from doing an act or
series of acts. . . . In part because the contempt remedy
is particularly harsh . . . such punishment should not
rest upon implication or conjecture, [and] the language
[of the court order] declaring . . . rights should be clear,
18
In granting the plaintiff’s April 3, 2024 contempt motion, the court,
Alfano, J., also found the defendant in contempt of (1) the August 25,
2022 decision by the court, Hon. Constance L. Epstein, judge trial
referee, awarding $10,000 in appellate attorney’s fees, (2) the magis-
trate’s February 23, 2023 award of $1000 in attorney’s fees, and (3)
the magistrate’s November 1, 2023 award of $1000 in attorney’s fees.
The defendant has not briefed any claims of error with regard to those
contempt findings.
Gainty v. Infantino

or imposing burdens [should be] specific and unequivo-
cal, so that the parties may not be misled thereby. . . .
To constitute contempt, it is not enough that a party
has merely violated a court order; the violation must be
wilful. . . . It is the burden of the party seeking an order
of contempt to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
both a clear and unambiguous directive to the alleged
contemnor and the alleged contemnor’s wilful noncom-
pliance with that directive. . . . The question of whether
the underlying order is clear and unambiguous is a legal
inquiry subject to de novo review. . . . If we answer that
question affirmatively, we then review the trial court’s
determination that the violation was wilful under the
abuse of discretion standard.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Margarita O. v. Fernando I., 231 Conn. App.
190, 200, 333 A.3d 530, cert. denied, 352 Conn. 904,
335 A.3d 845 (2025).
The following additional procedural history is relevant
to our resolution of the defendant’s claim. On December
6, 2018, the plaintiff, representing herself, filed a motion
for a postsecondary educational support order for the par-
ties’ children. On January 15, 2019, the defendant filed
a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s motion, arguing that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a
postsecondary educational support order pursuant to the
governing statute, General Statutes § 46b-56c,19 because
the paternity judgment against him setting forth the
initial child support orders was rendered prior to October
1, 2002. On February 13, 2019, the court, Nastri, J.,
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and denied
the plaintiff’s motion, concluding that, pursuant to §
46b-56c, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter
19
General Statutes § 46b-56c (l) provides: “The provisions of this sec-
tion shall apply only in cases when the initial order for parental support
of the child is entered on or after October 1, 2002.”
Section 46b-56c was amended by No. 21-104, § 19, of the 2021 Public
Acts and No. 22-123, § 40, of the 2022 Public Acts, which made changes
to the statute that are not relevant to this appeal. Accordingly, all
references in this opinion to § 46b-56c are to the current revision of
the statute.
Gainty v. Infantino

a postsecondary educational support order (February
13, 2019 decision).
On June 5, 2019, in connection with a motion for con-
tempt filed on February 6, 2019, the family support
magistrate, Frederic Gilman, ordered the parties to
brief whether certain expenses claimed by the plaintiff
in relation to an institution called Franklin Academy
were “necessary, appropriate, and considered medical .
. . .” The parties complied with the briefing order. On
September 18, 2019, the magistrate issued a decision
on the February 6, 2019 contempt motion, finding the
defendant not to be in contempt (September 18, 2019
decision). The September 18, 2019 decision further
included the following statement: “Contempt concluded;
Regarding Franklin Academy.”
On April 16, 2022, in connection with the motions
filed by the plaintiff in December, 2019, the court, Hon.
Constance L. Epstein, judge trial referee, ordered the
parties to submit proposed orders, with the plaintiff
required to identify “specific monetary amounts” and
the defendant required to indicate “whether he agree[d]
or disagree[d] with each amount listed in the plaintiff’s
proposed orders.” Thereafter, the plaintiff filed pro-
posed orders, but the defendant did not. In the April
28, 2022 decision, the court awarded the plaintiff 50
percent of medical and school expenses that she had
incurred up to January 25, 2022. The court further
ordered the plaintiff to submit a chronological list of her
claimed medical and school expenses, with which order
the plaintiff subsequently complied. According to that
list, the plaintiff allocated $44,651.78 to the defendant
for medical and school expenses, approximately $42,000
of which comprised expenses for Franklin Academy and
Landmark College, which schools, as the court found
in the April 28, 2022 decision, were “residential facili-
ties for individuals with learning and other disabilities,
and . . . provide[d] special supervision and attention.”
In the May 11, 2022 decision, the court awarded the
Gainty v. Infantino

plaintiff $44,651.78, the full amount in medical and
school expenses that she requested.
In the 2022 appeal, as this court previously detailed,
the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court
improperly awarded the plaintiff the expenses relating
to Franklin Academy and Landmark College because “the
plaintiff’s entitlement to reimbursement for Franklin
Academy and Landmark College expenses was addressed
by two prior court orders. First, he note[d] that the
[trial] court, Nastri, J., on February 13, 2019, denied
the plaintiff’s motion for a postsecondary educational
support order for both the parties’ son and daughter.
Second, he note[d] that the . . . magistrate . . . denied the
[February 6, 2019] motion for contempt, which motion
included an allegation that the defendant failed to pay
50 percent of the costs of the daughter attending Frank-
lin Academy. According to the defendant, because the
plaintiff previously litigated and was unsuccessful with
regard to her claims that the defendant should share in
the Franklin Academy and Landmark College costs, her
claims . . . [were] barred by res judicata and collateral
estoppel.” (Footnote omitted.) Gainty v. Infantino,
supra, 222 Conn. App. 800–801. This court declined to
review that claim because it was unpreserved, stating
that “[a]t no point . . . did the defendant alert the [trial]
court [Hon. Constance L. Epstein, judge trial referee] to
any argument of collateral estoppel or res judicata with
respect to the Franklin Academy or Landmark College
expenses related to [the] daughter”; id., 801; and that
“[this court’s] examination of the record reveal[ed] that
the defendant did not raise with the trial court any of the
claims he [was] . . . advanc[ing] on appeal with respect to
the Landmark College and Franklin Academy expenses.”
Id., 802. Additionally, this court stated that, “[a]s to
the defendant’s related contention that [the trial court,
Nastri, J., in the February 13, 2019 decision] correctly
determined that the costs for Landmark College exceeded
the [trial] court’s statutory authority pursuant to § 46b-
56c, [the trial court] was never asked to address a claim
under § 46b-84 (c). In fact, [the trial court’s] ruling
Gainty v. Infantino

denying the plaintiff’s motion for postsecondary educa-
tional support made no mention of § 46b-84 (c), Landmark
College, or the disabilities of the . . . daughter.” Id., 801.
On June 28, 2024, the court, Alfano, J., held an evi-
dentiary hearing on the plaintiff’s April 3, 2024 con-
tempt motion. During closing argument, the defendant’s
counsel argued that the May 11, 2022 decision was not
clear and unambiguous in light of the February 13, 2019
decision and the September 18, 2019 decision, which,
according to counsel, remained binding and conflicted
with the May 11, 2022 decision. On July 18, 2024, the
court found the defendant in contempt of the May 11,
2022 decision, which the court determined to be clear
and unambiguous.
The defendant contends that the court improperly
found him in contempt of the May 11, 2022 decision
because that decision was not clear and unambiguous.
The defendant maintains that the February 13, 2019
decision and the September 18, 2019 decision, which, as
he posits, “are as final and binding on the parties today
as they were when entered,” conflict with the May 11,
2022 decision, such that “[t]he existence of these orders
represents a ‘good faith dispute’ between the parties that
removes this matter from the realm of contempt.” We
reject this claim.
First, we conclude that the defendant’s claim effec-
tively constitutes a veiled, impermissible collateral attack
on the May 11, 2022 decision. As we set forth in part I
of this opinion, a contempt proceeding cannot be utilized
to mount a collateral attack on the order underlying the
proceeding. See Tatro v. Tatro, supra, 24 Conn. App.
187–88. Insofar as the defendant’s claim is premised on
the position that the May 11, 2022 decision improperly
reimbursed the plaintiff for expenses that, as he posits,
previously had been disallowed, such an assertion—pre-
suming that it was preserved—should have been raised
on appeal from the May 11, 2022 decision. As this court
previously determined, in the 2022 appeal, the defendant
attempted to rely on the February 13, 2019 decision and
Gainty v. Infantino

the September 18, 2019 decision to challenge the propri-
ety of the May 11, 2022 decision; however, this court
declined to review the merits of that claim because the
defendant had failed to preserve it before the trial court.
Gainty v. Infantino, supra, 222 Conn. App. 800–802.
The defendant now is seeking, in essence, to resurrect
his unpreserved claim in the context of a contempt pro-
ceeding to attack collaterally the May 11, 2022 decision,
which maneuver cannot be permitted.
Second, assuming that the defendant’s claim is proper,
we conclude that neither the February 13, 2019 decision
nor the September 18, 2019 decision conflicts with the
May 11, 2022 decision, and, therefore, the defendant’s
claim fails. In the February 13, 2019 decision, the court,
Nastri, J., rejected the plaintiff’s claim for postsecond-
ary educational support pursuant to § 46b-56c; however,
the court made no mention of § 46b-84, the disabilities
of the parties’ daughter, or any particular expenses.
See id., 801 (“As to the defendant’s related contention
that [the court in the February 13, 2019 decision] cor-
rectly determined that the costs for Landmark College
exceeded the court’s statutory authority pursuant to §
46b-56c, [the court] was never asked to address a claim
under § 46b-84 (c). In fact, [the court’s] ruling denying
the plaintiff’s motion for postsecondary educational
support made no mention of § 46b-84 (c), Landmark
College, or the disabilities of the parties’ daughter.”).
Thus, we discern no conflict between the February 13,
2019 decision and the May 11, 2022 decision.
As to the September 18, 2019 decision, the only ref-
erence therein to Franklin Academy was the following
statement: “Contempt concluded; Regarding Franklin
Academy.” We cannot reasonably construe that isolated
statement to mean that the magistrate had determined
that the plaintiff could not seek reimbursement for any
claimed Franklin Academy expenses; indeed, reaching
such a conclusion would require us to resort to specula-
tion and conjecture. See New Hartford v. Connecticut
Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 502, 510, 970
Gainty v. Infantino

A.2d 578 (2009) (“speculation and conjecture . . . have
no place in appellate review” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Accordingly, we do not agree with the defen-
dant that the September 18, 2019 decision and the May
11, 2022 decision conflict with one another.20
In sum, we conclude that the court properly found the
defendant in contempt of the May 11, 2022 decision.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

20
The defendant also argues that, “when two of the orders say there is
no obligation, and one says there should be a repayment of an obligation
for which [he] remains responsible, if there was never an obligation in
the first place because of a court order, there could be no repayment or
remaining responsibility under pain of contempt.” (Emphasis omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) We are not compelled by this
fleeting argument.