In re Brian C.

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In re Brian C.

IN RE BRIAN C.*
(AC 48939)
Suarez, Clark and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the
petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, sustaining an ex
parte order granting temporary custody of the respondent’s minor child,
B, to the petitioner and adjudicating B neglected. The respondent claimed,
inter alia, that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence at the
hearing sustaining the order of temporary custody. Held:

This court dismissed the respondent mother’s appeal as moot, as the trial
court’s order adjudicating B neglected and committing him to the custody
of the petitioner superseded the order of temporary custody.

The respondent mother’s claim that her challenge to the order of temporary
custody remained eligible for review under the capable of repetition, yet
evading review exception to the mootness doctrine failed under the first
required criterion of that doctrine under Loisel v. Rowe (233 Conn. 370),
namely, that the challenged action was of such limited duration that a strong
likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about its
validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded, as she
failed to pursue opportunities to challenge the order of temporary custody,
including by failing to request a contested hearing or to pursue an appeal
of the trial court’s order sustaining the order of temporary custody prior
to the adjudication of B as neglected.

Argued January 13—officially released May 6, 2026**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families
to adjudicate the respondents’ minor child neglected,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Middlesex, Juvenile Matters, where the court, Daw-
son, J., issued an ex parte order of temporary custody
vested in the petitioner; thereafter, the court, Burgdorff,
J., sustained the order of temporary custody without
prejudice; subsequently, the court, Lopez, J., granted
*
In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-
142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in
this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall
be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein
and upon order of the court.
**
May 6, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip opin-
ion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
In re Brian C.

the petitioner’s request to consolidate the contested
motion for an order of temporary custody and the neglect
petition and overruled the respondent mother’s objec-
tion to the motion to consolidate; thereafter, the case
was tried to the court, Esperance-Smith, J.; judgment
denying the respondent mother’s motion to vacate the
order of temporary custody, adjudicating the minor child
neglected and committing the child to the custody of the
petitioner, from which the respondent mother appealed
to this court. Appeal dismissed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(respondent mother).
Rosemarie T. Weber, deputy associate attorney gen-
eral, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong,
attorney general, and Nisa J. Khan, assistant attorney
general, for the appellee (petitioner).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The respondent mother, Farrah D.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered
in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families, sustaining an ex parte order granting
temporary custody of her minor child, Brian C. (Brian),
to the petitioner, and adjudicating Brian neglected.1 On
appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly
(1) sustained the order of temporary custody and denied
her motion to vacate the order and (2) admitted hearsay
evidence at the hearing sustaining the order of temporary
custody and in denying her motion to vacate. We dismiss
the appeal as moot.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history, are necessary for the resolution of
1
Brian’s biological father was named as a respondent in the proceed-
ings before the trial court, but neither he nor his attorney appeared or
participated in the trial proceedings. Prior to the start of trial, counsel
for the respondent father informed the court by letter that the respon-
dent father was “not interested in participating or being present for
the trial or any future court matters.” The respondent father is not a
party to this appeal. We therefore refer in this opinion to the respondent
mother as the respondent.
In re Brian C.

this appeal. On March 9, 2024, the respondent, a resident
of New York, went to MidState Medical Center (Mid-
State) and reported that she had been sexually assaulted
while staying at a hotel in Connecticut. Upon arrival
at MidState, the respondent presented as “confused,
delusional and paranoid.” Due to questions about the
respondent’s mental health, medical professionals at
MidState placed the respondent on a forty-eight hour
psychiatric hold.
While the respondent was being examined, Brian, his
maternal grandmother, and their dog remained in the
waiting area. Brian, who has special needs and is non-
verbal, was crouched in a fetal position in a “kid cart.”2
The hospital staff observed the maternal grandmother
strike Brian and, upon questioning, the staff found that
the maternal grandmother was confused, unaware of
why she was at the hospital, and unable to answer basic
questions. Because it was apparent that the maternal
grandmother could not care for Brian, medical profes-
sionals at MidState made a referral to the Department
of Children and Families (department).
The department recommended that Brian be evalu-
ated, and he was taken to Connecticut Children’s Medical
Center for an assessment. According to the trial court,
“[u]pon evaluation, it was discovered that Brian has a
shunt tube inside of his brain that drains excess fluid,
has a G-tube that goes through his abdomen to provide
nutrition for him, has hip dysplasia, does not have full
movement and range of his right arm, and has limited
mobility in his legs. As a result of his examination, Brian
was determined to be medically complex and in need of
twenty-four hour care.” On March 9, 2024, the same
day that the respondent was hospitalized as a result of
a psychiatric hold, the department invoked a ninety-six
hour hold on behalf of Brian.
The court found that “[t]he respondent . . . was
released from the hospital on March 10, 2024, after it
2
The trial court explained that a “kid cart” is a specialized stroller
for Brian’s medical needs, described as a cross between a wagon and a
wheelchair.
In re Brian C.

was determined that she was not a danger to herself or
others. Upon her release, the respondent . . . returned to
New York with the maternal grandmother and the dog.
She informed [the department] that she would return
to retrieve Brian on March 11, 2024. [The department]
also requested that she provide [it] with Brian’s special-
ized stroller upon her return. However, the respondent
. . . did not return to Connecticut to retrieve Brian or
provide [the department] with an appropriate stroller
for his transportation. She did explain the medications
Brian was taking and when to administer them.”
On March 12, 2024, the petitioner filed an ex parte
motion for an order of temporary custody and a petition
for neglect. On March 12, 2024, the court, Dawson, J.,
issued an ex parte order of temporary custody, finding
reasonable cause to believe that Brian was in immediate
physical danger from his surroundings, that his imme-
diate removal from such surroundings was necessary
to ensure his safety, that his continuation in the home
was contrary to his welfare, and that the department
had made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the
need for removal.
The court, Burgdorff, J., held a preliminary hearing on
the order of temporary custody on March 22, 2024. The
respondent was not present for this hearing. The court
appointed counsel for the respondent and scheduled an
initial plea hearing on the neglect petition to take place on
April 18, 2024.3 Following the preliminary hearing, the
court sustained the order of temporary custody “without
prejudice.” Thereafter, the respondent appeared virtu-
ally at a hearing on April 18, 2024, and entered a pro
3
In its decision, the court indicated that, at the March 22, 2024 hear-
ing, the court confirmed service had been made on the respondent. The
record reflects, however, that proof of service was not established at the
March 22, 2024 hearing and that the issue of service was to be addressed
at the hearing on April 18, 2024.
The record further reflects that Attorney Channa Gordon was pres-
ent at the March 22, 2024 hearing and that the trial court appointed
Attorney Gordon to represent the respondent. Attorney Gordon filed
an appearance for the respondent on March 25, 2024.
In re Brian C.

forma denial to the neglect petition. On May 28, 2024,
the respondent filed a motion to vacate the March 22,
2024 order of temporary custody. On May 30, 2024, the
court, Lopez, J., granted the petitioner’s request to con-
solidate the contested motion for an order of temporary
custody and the pending neglect petition and overruled
the respondent’s objection to the motion to consolidate.4
The court conducted a trial on the matter on January
21, and February 11 and 26, 2025. On June 3, 2025, the
court, Esperance-Smith, J., denied the respondent’s
motion to vacate the order of temporary custody that
had been sustained “without prejudice” on March 22,
2024. The same day, the court issued a memorandum
of decision sustaining the order of temporary custody
pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129 (b),5 finding that
4
The court granted the petitioner’s request for a consolidated hearing
pursuant to Practice Book § 33a-7 (e), which provides: “Subject to the
requirements of Section 33a-7 (a) (6), upon motion of any party or on
its own motion, the judicial authority may consolidate the hearing, on
the order of temporary custody or order to appear with the adjudicatory
phase of the trial on the underlying neglect or uncared for petition. At
a consolidated order of temporary custody and neglect or uncared for
adjudication hearing, the judicial authority shall determine the outcome
of the order of temporary custody based upon whether or not continued
removal is necessary to ensure the child’s or youth’s safety, irrespec-
tive of its finding on whether there is sufficient evidence to support
an adjudication of neglect or uncared for. Nothing in this subsection
prohibits the judicial authority from proceeding to disposition of the
underlying petition immediately after such consolidation hearing if
the social study has been filed and the parties had previously agreed to
sustain the order of temporary custody and waived the ten day hearing
or the parties should reasonably be ready to proceed.”
5
General Statutes § 46b-129 (b) provides in relevant part: “If it appears
from the specific allegations of the petition and other verified affirma-
tions of fact accompanying the petition and application, or subsequent
thereto, that there is reasonable cause to believe that (1) the child or
youth is suffering from serious physical illness or serious physical
injury or is in immediate physical danger from the child’s or youth’s
surroundings, and (2) as a result of said conditions, the child’s or youth’s
safety is endangered and immediate removal from such surroundings is
necessary to ensure the child’s or youth’s safety, the court shall either
(A) issue an order to the parents or other person having responsibility
for the care of the child or youth to appear at such time as the court
may designate to determine whether the court should vest the child’s or
In re Brian C.

the petitioner “[had] proven by a fair preponderance of
the evidence that, if Brian were to return to [the respon-
dent’s] care, he would be in immediate physical danger
and that continued removal was necessary to ensure his
safety and well-being.” In its decision, the court explained
that “[t]he continuation of Brian in [the respondent’s]
care and custody is contrary to his safety, well-being,
and best interest in light of his medical needs and lack
of visibility in the community. While the [respondent]
appears to love Brian and desires to be reunited with
him, she is not a suitable caretaker at this time.” The
court next found that “it is more likely than not that
Brian would be neglected if he remained in the care of
the [respondent], in that he would be permitted to live
under conditions injurious to his well-being.” The court
found that the petitioner had proven, by a preponderance
of the evidence, predictive neglect and actual neglect.
Accordingly, the court adjudicated Brian neglected and
committed him to the care and custody of the petitioner.
This appeal, which challenges only the court’s judgment
sustaining the order of temporary custody and denying
the respondent’s motion to vacate the order of temporary
custody, followed.6
On appeal, the respondent claims that the court
improperly sustained the order of temporary custody
youth’s temporary care and custody in a person related to the child or
youth by blood or marriage or in some other person or suitable agency
pending disposition of the petition, or (B) issue an order ex parte vesting
the child’s or youth’s temporary care and custody in a person related
to the child or youth by blood or marriage or in some other person or
suitable agency. A preliminary hearing on any ex parte custody order
or order to appear issued by the court shall be held not later than ten
days after the issuance of such order. . . .”
6
In her appeal form filed on July 14, 2025, the respondent indicated
that she was appealing from the court’s decision sustaining the order of
temporary custody and the court’s adjudication of Brian as neglected. In
her brief, however, the respondent does not assert a claim regarding the
court’s adjudication of Brian as neglected. During oral argument before
this court, counsel for the respondent was asked why the respondent
did not challenge the court’s neglect adjudication. Counsel answered
that the respondent lacked grounds for an appeal of the court’s finding
of neglect.
In re Brian C.

and improperly denied her motion to vacate. The respon-
dent also claims that the court improperly admitted
hearsay evidence in sustaining the order of temporary
custody and denying her motion to vacate. In response,
the petitioner asserts that the respondent’s appeal is moot
because the court’s order adjudicating Brian neglected
and committing him to the custody of the petitioner
supersedes the order of temporary custody.7 We agree
with the petitioner that the respondent’s appeal is moot.8
“Because mootness goes to the power of this court to
entertain an appeal, we address the issue as a threshold
matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re P. M.,
226 Conn. App. 378, 386, 318 A.3d 1085, cert. denied,
349 Conn. 919, 320 A.3d 978 (2024). Because mootness
implicates subject matter jurisdiction and raises a ques-
tion of law, our review is plenary. Id.
Mootness “imposes a duty on the court to dismiss a
case if the court can no longer grant practical relief to
the parties. . . . [It] presents a circumstance wherein
the issue before the court has been resolved or had lost
its significance because of a change in the condition of
affairs between the parties. . . . [T]he existence of an
actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate
jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to
decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting
of actual relief or from the determination of which no
practical relief can follow.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Pryor v. Pryor, 162 Conn. App. 451, 455, 133
A.3d 463 (2016). “In determining mootness, the dis-
positive question is whether a successful appeal would
benefit . . . [the] [respondent] in any way. . . . In other
words, the ultimate question is whether the determina-
tion of the controversy will result in practical relief to the
7
On October 16, 2025, pursuant to Practice Book § 67-13, counsel
for the minor child filed with this court a statement adopting the brief
submitted by the petitioner.
8
In light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to consider the
merits of either claim raised by the respondent in this appeal.
In re Brian C.

complainant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Julie J., 150 Conn. App. 387, 392, 90 A.3d 406 (2014).
“Our case law specifically conceives of appeals from
temporary custody orders as moot when the [child]
involved [is] adjudicated neglected.” In re Forrest B., 109
Conn. App. 772, 776, 953 A.2d 887 (2008); see id. (dis-
missing as moot respondent mother’s appeal of judgment
sustaining orders of temporary custody when children
at issue had subsequently been adjudicated neglected
and committed to custody of petitioner); see also In re
Loyal H., 238 Conn. App. 129, 130–31 n.2, ___A.3d
___ (2026) (noting that respondent’s challenge to trial
court’s orders granting temporary custody of his four
children to petitioner was dismissed as moot when, dur-
ing pendency of appeal, trial court committed two of
respondent’s children to custody of petitioner and his
other two children to custody of their mother); In re
Carl O., 10 Conn. App. 428, 434, 523 A.2d 1339 (claimed
errors in temporary custody proceedings are moot when
child is adjudicated uncared for in later proceedings),
cert. denied, 204 Conn. 802, 525 A.2d 964 (1987), and
cert. denied, 204 Conn. 802, 525 A.2d 964 (1987).
The respondent acknowledges that an appeal from
an order of temporary custody becomes moot when the
trial court adjudicates and disposes of the underlying
neglect petition. The respondent, however, argues that
her challenge to the order of temporary custody remains
eligible for review under the capable of repetition, yet
evading review exception to the mootness doctrine. For
an otherwise moot question to qualify for review under
the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception
to the mootness doctrine, it must satisfy three require-
ments as set forth by our Supreme Court in Loisel v.
Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 382, 660 A.2d 323 (1995). “First,
the challenged action, or the effect of the challenged
action, by its very nature must be of a limited duration
so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial
majority of cases raising a question about its validity will
become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded.
In re Brian C.

Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the
question presented in the pending case will arise again
in the future, and that it will affect either the same
complaining party or a reasonably identifiable group
for whom that party can be said to act as surrogate.
Third, the question must have some public importance.
Unless all three requirements are met, the appeal must
be dismissed as moot.” Id., 382–83. We disagree with
the respondent that either of her claims satisfies the
requirements for appellate review under this exception.
Like the respondent in the present case, the respondent
in In re Forrest B., supra, 109 Conn. App. 775, argued
that the orders of temporary custody remained eligible
for review under the capable of repetition, yet evading
review exception to the mootness doctrine. The respon-
dent in In re Forrest B., however, “offered no evidence
that most cases challenging a temporary custody order
are, by their very nature, of such a limited duration that
there is a strong likelihood that they will become moot
before appellate litigation can be concluded.” Id., 776.
The respondent, therefore, “fail[ed] to establish that
the substantial majority of temporary custody orders
evades review, [and, in failing to do so] foundered on the
first required criterion of the [capable of repetition, yet
evading review] exception [under Loisel].” Id.
In urging this court that her otherwise moot claims
qualify for review under the capable of repetition yet
evading review exception to the mootness doctrine, the
respondent in the present case argues, in essence, that,
in instances of a consolidated hearing, when an order of
temporary custody is sustained and the child at issue
is thereafter adjudicated neglected, respondents are
effectively barred from an opportunity to challenge
the court’s custody order. Specifically, the respondent
contends that, “[i]n cases where the [order of temporary
custody] and neglect petitions are joined . . . there is no
opportunity for the respondent to challenge the [order
of temporary custody]. Joinder effectively removes the
respondent’s right to appeal an [order of temporary
In re Brian C.

custody] judgment.” Additionally, she argues that “the
Practice Book authorizes, indeed, almost ensures, that
in consolidated cases the [order of temporary custody] is
of such limited duration that there is a strong likelihood
that the substantial majority of cases raising a question
about its validity will become moot before appellate liti-
gation can be concluded.”
The respondent cannot prevail on her claim, however,
because she failed to avail herself of the opportunities
available to challenge the order of temporary custody.
Specifically, the record indicates that, on March 12,
2024, after the respondent failed to return to Connecti-
cut to retrieve Brian, the petitioner filed an ex parte
motion for an order of temporary custody and a petition
of neglect. The same day, the court issued an ex parte
order of temporary custody. The court, Burgdorff, J.,
held a preliminary hearing on the order of temporary
custody on March 22, 2024. The court appointed coun-
sel for the respondent at the preliminary hearing, and
Attorney Channa Gordon filed an appearance on the
respondent’s behalf on March 25, 2024. Following the
preliminary hearing, the court sustained the order of
temporary custody, “without prejudice.”
The respondent thereafter failed to request a contested
hearing within ten days as permitted by § 46b-129 (f).
“Following the preliminary hearing on an ex parte order
of temporary custody, [u]pon request, or upon its own
motion, the court shall schedule a hearing on the order
for temporary custody . . . to be held not later than ten
days after the date of the preliminary hearing. General
Statutes § 46b-129 (f).” In re M. S., 226 Conn. App. 857,
863, 319 A.3d 833, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 920, 320 A.3d
978 (2024). The record further indicates that, although
she was represented and participated remotely during the
initial hearing on the neglect petition on April 18, 2024,
she did not request a contested hearing at that time.
During oral argument before this court, counsel for the
In re Brian C.

respondent conceded that the respondent did not request
a contested hearing on the order of temporary custody.
Furthermore, although the respondent filed a motion to
vacate the order of temporary custody on May 28, 2024,
the respondent did not seek immediate appellate review
of the order of temporary custody, although she had a
right to do so. See Madigan v. Madigan, 224 Conn. 749,
757, 620 A.2d 1276 (1993) (concluding that “temporary
custody orders are immediately appealable because an
immediate appeal is the only reasonable method of ensur-
ing that the important rights surrounding the parent-
child relationship are adequately protected”). Finally,
although the respondent objected to the petitioner’s
motion to consolidate the neglect petition and the order
of temporary custody, she has not challenged the court’s
ruling granting the motion to consolidate on appeal.
In In re Earl B., 121 Conn. App. 269, 275, 994 A.2d
713, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 921, 996 A.2d 1192 (2010),
this court examined whether a respondent’s then expired
banishment order qualified for review under the “ ‘capa-
ble of repetition, yet evading review’ ” exception to the
mootness doctrine. In determining that the respondent’s
appeal of the banishment order did not qualify for review
under the exception, this court explained that, although
the banishment order was subject to challenge on direct
appeal, or by seeking a correction to an illegal sentence
pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22, the respondent had
“failed to avail himself of the opportunity for prompt
review; he did not bring a direct appeal or prompt chal-
lenge to the order. His claim became moot because of
his delay, not because the banishment order was by its
very nature limited in duration . . . or presented a func-
tionally insurmountable time [constraint].” (Citation
omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 278–79. Consistent with our conclusion
in In re Earl B., we similarly conclude that, by failing
to request a contested hearing or to pursue an appeal
of the court’s order sustaining the order of temporary
custody prior to Brian’s adjudication as neglected, the
In re Brian C.

respondent in the present case failed to avail herself of
the opportunities available to her to challenge the order
of temporary custody. Under these circumstances, the
respondent’s claims became moot because of her own
inaction and not because an order of temporary custody
is, by its very nature, of an inherently limited duration
or presents an otherwise functionally insurmountable
time constraint.9
The appeal is dismissed.

9
In this regard, we note that, although orders of temporary custody
are temporary orders, they can vary in length and have been reviewed
by this court in prior cases. See, e.g., In re M. S., supra, 226 Conn.
App. 859; In re Kelsey M., 120 Conn. App. 537, 539, 992 A.2d 372
(2010); In re Kaurice B., 83 Conn. App. 519, 521, 850 A.2d 223 (2004).