State v. Narcisse

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State v. Narcisse

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARVIN NARCISSE
(AC 48257)
Cradle, C. J., and Moll and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The acquittee appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying his applica-
tion for discharge from the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board pursuant to statute (§ 17a-593). He claimed, inter alia, that the court
improperly found that he was diagnosed with unspecified bipolar disorder.
Held:

The trial court’s finding that the acquittee suffers from a mental illness was
not clearly erroneous, as the court was presented with evidence that could
lead a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that the acquittee suffered from
unspecified bipolar disorder.

The trial court’s conclusion that the acquittee presented a danger to himself
or to society was not clearly erroneous, as it was supported by evidence in
the record and this court was not left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake had been made.

Argued February 2—officially released June 9, 2026

Procedural History

Application for discharge from the jurisdiction of
the Psychiatric Security Review Board, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Bridgeport and
tried to the court, Dayton, J.; judgment denying the
application, from which the acquittee appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender, for
the appellant (acquittee).
Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Joseph Corradino, state’s attor-
ney, and Jonathan Formichella, deputy assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The acquittee,1 Marvin Narcisse,
also known as Delmar Rose, appeals from the judgment
1
Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-580 (1), the term “acquittee”
refers to a defendant who was found not guilty by reason of mental
State v. Narcisse

of the trial court denying his application for discharge
from the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board (board) in accordance with General Statutes §
17a-593 (a).2 On appeal, the acquittee claims that the
court improperly (1) found that he was diagnosed with
“severe personality disorder” and unspecified bipolar
disorder and (2) concluded that he failed to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that his psychiatric
disabilities, if any, do not cause him to be a danger to
himself or others. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the court or otherwise
undisputed in the record, and procedural history are rel-
evant to our resolution of this appeal. On the afternoon
of December 22, 2011, the victim, Marjorie Meketa, who
was seventy-seven years old, exited a store located near
the intersection of William Street and Roosevelt Street
in Bridgeport. The acquittee ran toward the victim at a
high rate of speed and tackled her from behind, causing
her to hit her head on the concrete sidewalk. The acquit-
tee then proceeded to stab the victim in the face with the
broken off stem of a wine glass. He also stomped on and
kicked the victim. Ultimately, it took two men to pull
the acquittee away from the victim, but not before she
suffered severe injuries. When the police arrived, they
arrested the acquittee, and he was charged with attempt
to commit murder, assault in the first degree, and assault
on an elderly victim in violation of General Statutes §§
53a-49 and 53a-54a, 53a-59 (a) (1), and 53a-59a, respec-
tively. The acquittee pleaded not guilty to each charge.
On April 26, 2013, the trial court, Devlin, J., issued
its memorandum of decision and found the acquittee not
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to
disease or defect in a criminal proceeding pursuant to General Statutes
§ 53a-13.
2
General Statutes § 17a-593 (a) provides in relevant part: “The board
. . . may recommend to the court the discharge of the acquittee from
custody or the acquittee may apply directly to the court for discharge
from custody. . . .”
State v. Narcisse

General Statutes § 53a-13 (a).3 In reaching its conclusion,
the court reviewed reports from Madelon Baranoski, a
clinical psychologist, and Alexander Westphal, a psy-
chiatrist. Baranoski performed a series of psychological
tests on the acquittee, which revealed both psychotic
and mood disorder symptoms. Baranoski concluded that
“[the acquittee’s] baseline function is likely controlled
by his schizotypal, paranoid and narcissistic personality
features and mood lability.”
Westphal stated in his report that the acquittee exhib-
ited psychiatric symptoms at an early age, but that he
was not diagnosed with a mental illness until 2003 when
he was in the custody of the Department of Correction
(department). The department diagnosed the acquittee
with “Psychotic Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified and
Intermittent Explosive Disorder” and prescribed him
antipsychotic, antidepressant, and mood stabilizing
medicines. Westphal ultimately found that the acquittee
“was suffering from a mental disease that caused such
a degree of confusion and disorganization in him that it
prevented him from understanding the wrongfulness of
his actions . . . .” He found that the acquittee’s behav-
ior was consistent with a portion of his past diagnoses,
specifically his diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder,
bipolar disorder, and major depression with psychotic
features. Additionally, he believed “that the ingestion
of substances was not the predominant cause of [the
acquittee’s] state of mind at the time of the attack.”
After reviewing the Westphal and Baranoski reports,
the court concluded that the acquittee had met his burden
of proof and established that he lacked the capacity to
3
General Statutes § 53a-13 (a) provides: “In any prosecution for an
offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time
the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial
capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the
requirements of the law.”
Although § 53a-13 (a) has been amended since the events underlying
this case; see Public Acts 2019, No. 19-27, § 1; that amendment has no
bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we
refer to the current revision of § 53a-13 (a).
State v. Narcisse

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct due to his
mental disease or defect. The court found that “the evi-
dence demonstrates that for at least ten years before the
crime (and probably longer), the [acquittee] suffered from
a mental disease or defect likely classified as a schizoaf-
fective disorder or bipolar disorder.” Additionally, the
court found that the state’s assertion that the acquittee’s
mental disease was the result of his known drug use was
of no moment as his most recent drug test, taken mere
months before the index offense,4 was negative. The
acquittee also had continued to exhibit symptoms of
mental illness throughout periods of his pretrial incar-
ceration when he ostensibly would have had no access to
illicit drugs. On July 31, 2013, the acquittee was com-
mitted to the Whiting Service of the Whiting Forensic
Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital (Whiting) under
the jurisdiction of the board for a maximum term of
commitment not to exceed forty years.
As documented in the 2013 Department of Mental
Health and Addiction Services (DMHAS) report, which
recommended the acquittee’s commitment at Whiting,
Julie Jacobs, a forensic monitor at Whiting, diagnosed
the acquittee with, inter alia, “Schizoeffective Disorder,
Bipolar Type, Most Recent Episode Depressed Polysub-
stance Dependence, In a Controlled Environment,” and
“Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, with
Schizotypal, Narcissistic, Paranoid, and Dependent
Traits.” Jacobs found that the acquittee “displayed the
tendency to minimize how his actions on the day of the
crime affected the life of the victim.” Jacobs also found
that the acquittee “demonstrated dangerous impulsive
4
“[T]he psychiatric profession refers to the offenses that led to an
acquittee’s arrest as index offenses.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Foster, 353 Conn. 1, 6 n.5, 339 A.3d 1093 (2025); see,
e.g., M. Kaggwa et al., “Weapon Use During the Index Offense: A
Study Among Forensic Psychiatry Patients in Ontario, Canada,” 11
Inj. Epidemiol. 66, December 18, 2024, p. 2, available at https://link.
springer.com/content/pdf/10.1186/s40621-024-00551-z.pdf (last
visited June 1, 2026).
State v. Narcisse

behaviors and poor decision making while unmedicated
and experiencing psychotic symptoms.”
At the acquittee’s March 2016 hearing to review his
status, Rebecca Ewald, who holds a master’s degree in
social work, testified that the acquittee had multiple
physical altercations and episodes of aggression spanning
from October 2013 to July 2014. At the acquittee’s Feb-
ruary 2018 hearing to review his status, Ewald testified
that the acquittee was involved in additional altercations
in March and December 2016. By 2017, the acquittee
began showing signs of increased engagement in psycho-
therapy and was more consistent with his medications,
resulting in a demonstrated improvement of his mood
stability. As a result of the acquittee’s improvements,
he was approved for a transfer to Dutcher Service at
Whiting (Dutcher), the lower security section of Whit-
ing. A few months after his transfer was approved, the
acquittee became engaged in a verbal altercation with
another patient. Although the argument was heated, the
altercation never became physical. Shortly thereafter,
the acquittee apologized to the other patient and took
responsibility for his behavior. He also requested to
speak with his therapist. After this event, the acquittee’s
most significant risk factors were his untreated mood
symptoms, his history of noncompliance with psychiatric
treatment and refusal to take psychotropic medications,
and his substantial history of substance abuse.
The 2019 reports on the acquittee’s status showed that
his engagement with treatment varied after his move to
Dutcher. Although the acquittee did not initially exhibit
any troublesome behavior, the acquittee stopped taking
his psychotropic medications by December 2018, and
he stopped participating in all prescribed treatment
by February 2019. The acquittee, additionally, lost his
level four privileges and attempted to leverage his par-
ticipation in his prescribed treatment to regain those
privileges. It was not until July 2019 that the acquittee
began to reengage with his treatment after his attorney
warned him that he was at risk of returning to Whiting.
State v. Narcisse

During this time, the acquittee also made a series of
threatening and provocative statements to Dutcher’s
staff and patients.
On July 23, 2021, the board held a hearing to review
the status of the acquittee and to determine whether
he should remain confined, conditionally released, or
discharged. The board determined that the acquittee
was still a threat to himself and others and not fit for
discharge or conditional release. Paul Bryant, a consult-
ing forensic psychiatrist with DMHAS, testified that
the acquittee did not engage in any episodes of physical
assault, nor were restraints or seclusion needed. He fur-
ther explained, however, that the acquittee “did experi-
ence several episodes of verbal aggression, assaultive or
aggressive posturing, and rule violations.” For example,
the acquittee waved a pen in the face of a staff member
in an agitated and verbally aggressive manner. Bryant
also testified that when the acquittee finally reengaged in
treatment, he expressed feelings of regret and embarrass-
ment but also had difficulty acknowledging his behavior.
Bryant testified that, as of July 23, 2021, the acquittee
had psychiatric diagnoses, including “Other Specified
Personality Disorder with Antisocial and Narcissistic
Traits; Unspecified Bipolar Disorder, Alcohol Use Dis-
order in Sustained Remission in a Controlled Environ-
ment; Cannabis Use Disorder in Sustained Remission
in a Controlled Environment; and Phencyclidine [PCP]
Use Disorder in Sustained Remission in a Controlled
Environment.”
At the acquittee’s August 11, 2023 board hearing, Bry-
ant testified that the acquittee “had multiple behavioral
incidents and rule violations which resulted in many fluc-
tuations to his privilege level over the reporting period.”
Bryant also testified that, “despite multiple episodes of
angry and dysregulated behavior, [the acquittee] did seem
to show some progress around recognizing and apologiz-
ing for behaviors after they occur in a timelier manner.”
He noted, however, that the acquittee had not taken
some of his medication in “quite some time,” including
State v. Narcisse

lorazepam and haloperidol, which are both prescribed to
treat severe agitation. Additionally, he testified that the
acquittee’s continued withdrawal from treatment and
other activities whenever he feels slighted or upset is a
product of his narcissistic personality structure and his
difficulty tolerating feelings of internal distress. Bryant
indicated that the acquittee was eager to return to the
community but that he required additional work before
he would be able to do so successfully. Lastly, he testi-
fied that the acquittee’s diagnoses remained the same.
The board ultimately concluded, on the basis of the
testimony of the treating physicians, that the acquit-
tee continued to struggle with rule adherence, impulse
control and demonstrating frustration tolerance skills.
Although the board expressed some optimism that the
acquittee’s condition may improve, it still believed that
he required the level of support provided by Whiting for
adequate risk mitigation.
On February 6, 2024, pursuant to General Statutes §§
17a-593 (a)5 and 17a-580 (11),6 the acquittee filed with
the Superior Court an application for discharge from
the jurisdiction of the board. The trial court, Dayton,
J., held an evidentiary hearing on the application on
July 10, 2024. Three witnesses testified at that hearing:
Andrew Meisler, a forensic psychologist; Felix Rivera,
a certified addiction counselor; and Bryant. The acquit-
tee called Meisler, who, on the basis of the information
available to him, diagnosed the acquittee as suffering
from a personality disorder with antisocial and narcis-
sistic traits. He further explained that the acquittee’s
5
General Statutes § 17a-593 (a) provides in relevant part: “[T]he
acquittee may apply directly to the court for discharge from custody.
The court shall send copies of the recommendation or application to
the state’s attorney and to counsel for the acquittee. An acquittee
may apply for discharge not more than once every six months and no
sooner than six months after the initial board hearing held pursuant
to section 17a-583.”
6
General Statutes § 17a-580 (11) provides: “ ‘Person who should be
discharged’ means an acquittee who does not have psychiatric disabilities
or does not have intellectual disability to the extent that such acquittee’s
discharge would constitute a danger to the acquittee or others . . . .”
State v. Narcisse

long-standing, permanent disorder with a pervasive pat-
tern of thinking supported his conclusion. Additionally,
he testified that, although coping skills can be taught and
medications can be used to manage mood features and
other symptoms, the acquittee’s illness is not amenable
to treatment.
Meisler, however, did not agree with the board’s
conclusion that the acquittee suffers from unspecified
bipolar disorder. Meisler claimed that, on the basis of
his review of the acquittee’s psychological reports, no
evidence ever existed to support a diagnosis of unspeci-
fied bipolar disorder. He testified that, although the
acquittee may have had, at times, dysregulated behav-
ior, these were not symptoms of mania, hypomania, or
depression, one of which must be present for a diagnosis
of bipolar disorder. Additionally, Meisler associated the
acquittee’s behavior with his use of PCP at the time the
diagnoses were made. Meisler believed that the acquit-
tee recognized the severity of his historic substance use
and stated that, were he to relapse, it is possible that his
diagnoses could return.
Meisler believed that the acquittee’s inappropriate
sexual behavior, including intentionally exposing his
genitalia to doctors and staff, was not symptomatic of a
major serious mental illness. Instead, it was his opinion
that it was symptomatic of his interpersonal, judgment,
and impulse control impairments indicative of his anti-
social and narcissistic personalities.
Lastly, Meisler did not believe that the acquittee was
“faking good,” but, instead, he thought the acquittee was
“minimizing” his behavior as evidenced by the fact that
the tests did not reflect the acquittee’s well documented
broader problems with maladaptive beliefs, externaliza-
tion of blame, poor insight into his own medical illness,
and chronic interpersonal conflicts.
The acquittee then called Rivera. Rivera was aware
that the acquittee was diagnosed with PCP and can-
nabis use disorder but was not aware that he was also
State v. Narcisse

diagnosed with alcohol use disorder. Rivera testified
that the acquittee’s substance abuse is in remission in
a controlled environment, as the acquittee’s ability to
use illegal substances is significantly restrained. Rivera
was not aware of any behavioral issues the acquittee
had while at Whiting and was not aware of whether
the acquittee was being noncompliant with his treat-
ment plan. He testified that the acquittee’s discharge
plan includes intensive twelve step meetings; however,
he acknowledged that the acquittee’s success with the
discharge plan would be entirely dependent upon the
acquittee’s willingness to engage with it. Rivera believed,
however, that the acquittee would be willing to do so.
Lastly, Rivera was unaware of whether the acquittee
ever complained about having to undergo random drug
testing, even while at Whiting.
Bryant was the last witness called and the state’s only
witness. In the four years prior to his testimony at the
July 10, 2024 hearing, he served as a consulting foren-
sic psychiatrist and met with the acquittee’s treatment
team weekly and with the acquittee occasionally. During
Bryant’s meetings with the treatment team, he received
updates from the acquittee’s psychiatrist, psychologists,
social workers, case manager, and nursing staff to ensure
that his risks were being effectively managed. Bryant
testified that the acquittee’s current psychological diag-
noses were unspecified bipolar disorder; other specified
personality disorder with narcissistic and antisocial
traits; and alcohol, cannabis, and PCP use disorders in
sustained remission in a controlled environment. These
diagnoses have remained the same for approximately
seven years.
It was Bryant’s opinion that the acquittee’s involve-
ment with his treatment team was varied over the years,
partly because the acquittee was “unsure how much he
really wanted to work on things.” Although the acquit-
tee’s episodes of physical aggression have become “few
and far between,” Bryant still described incidents in the
six months prior to his testimony where the acquittee
State v. Narcisse

engaged in physical violence toward a patient and ver-
bally threatened a member of the staff.
With respect to the risk the acquittee presents upon
a potential release, Bryant believed that the acquittee’s
lack of insight into his own mental illness could “[create]
challenges in [his] treatment relationships, [his] engage-
ment and treatment, which those things usually do end up
affecting risk.” He further testified that a return to the
community after eleven years of hospitalization would
be a stressful and challenging event for any individual
to endure. He testified: “I think he has this maladaptive
behavioral pattern of when he feels insulted or . . . things
don’t go the way he wants, sometimes of pulling back
from treatment. . . . [S]o, I worry . . . that’s going to be
a factor for him because . . . he’s been in [Whiting] for
eleven years now. Going back into the community after
you’ve been in such a controlled, confined environment
for eleven years is stressful.” Bryant further testified
that any support the acquittee receives in the commu-
nity will be entirely dependent upon his willingness to
engage in it.
Bryant testified that, at one point, he believed that
the acquittee’s primary risk factor was his substance
abuse. The acquittee, however, recently told him that
he was not using any unlawful substances at the time
of the index offense. This caused Bryant to change his
assessment of the acquittee’s risk of violence, as he now
was less convinced that the index offense was simply the
result of the acquittee’s use of illicit substances. Byrant’s
assessment of the acquittee resulted in his conclusion
that both the acquittee and the community would be safer
if the acquittee were to be gradually stepped down to a
slightly less structured environment that still provided
the acquittee with all the resources available at Whiting.
Lastly, Bryant testified that it is Whiting’s responsibil-
ity to determine whether the acquittee is eligible for
temporary leave or conditional leave.7
7
Bryant testified that the “stepping down,” or “gradual transition,”
as it was colloquially referred to is simply temporary leave, which is
State v. Narcisse

On October 8, 2024, the trial court issued its memoran-
dum of decision and denied the acquittee’s application
for discharge.8 The trial court held that it did not agree
with “the acquittee’s characterization of his mental
health issues as being ‘abnormalities manifested only
by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.’ ”
Instead, the court found that “the acquittee continues
to suffer from a mental illness, namely, a severe person-
ality disorder and unspecified bipolar disorder, and his
potential dangerousness to the community continues due
to those illnesses.” Additionally, the court found that
“the acquittee’s past violent behavior and the nature
of the offense of which he was acquitted are relevant
factors in determining current dangerousness in this
proceeding.” The court also found that “the evidence
demonstrates that the acquittee has poor insight into
the serious nature of his psychiatric illness and fails to
appreciate the relationship between his illness and his
violent behavior.” The trial court concluded that “the
acquittee’s mental illness would present a danger to him-
self and others in the community if he [were] released,
and accordingly . . . he has failed to meet his burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no
longer such a danger.” This appeal followed.
We begin by setting forth relevant legal standards and
our standard of review. First, we must note that “the
“where somebody is granted . . . day visits into the community, and then
the next step is overnight visits into the community. . . . [T]hey would
still be a hospital patient, although sometimes they’d be spending seven
nights a week in the community. . . . [T]he next step would be to apply
for conditional release, where . . . they . . . become the community’s
patient, and they’re living there full time.”
8
The trial court reached this conclusion on the basis of “evidence
received at the hearing,” which included “several [board] reports and
six month evaluations from [DMHAS], the investigatory report from
the initial incident, [Meisler’s] psychological assessment, prior psy-
chological reports and assessments, and prior hearing transcripts . . .
.” The trial court also “assessed the weight, if any, to be given specific
evidence and measured the probative force of conflicting evidence . . .
reviewed all briefs, exhibits, relevant statutes, and case law . . . and .
. . [drew] such inferences from the evidence or facts established by the
evidence that it deems reasonable and logical.”
State v. Narcisse

confinement of [§ 53a-13] acquittees, although result-
ing initially from an adjudication in the criminal justice
system, is not punishment for a crime. The purpose of
commitment following an . . . acquittal [by reason of
mental disease or defect], like that of civil commitment,
is to treat the individual’s mental illness and protect
him and society from his potential dangerousness. The
committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has
recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous. . . . As he
was not convicted, he may not be punished. His confine-
ment rests on his continuing illness and dangerousness.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Payne v. Fairfield
Hills Hospital, 215 Conn. 675, 683–84, 578 A.2d 1025
(1990). “[A]s a matter of due process, an acquittee is
entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or
is no longer dangerous.” State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400,
417–18, 645 A.2d 965 (1994).
Our Supreme Court has explained that, after an acquit-
tee has applied for discharge from the board’s jurisdic-
tion and the board, in accordance with the requirement
of § 17a-593 (d),9 has filed its report regarding whether
the acquittee should be discharged, the trial court must
hold a hearing on the application, at which the acquit-
tee bears the burden of proving that he or she is a per-
son who should be discharged. See General Statutes §
17a-593 (f);10 see also State v. March, 265 Conn. 697,
705, 830 A.2d 212 (2003). After the hearing, the court,
9
General Statutes § 17a-593 (d) provides: “The court shall forward any
application for discharge received from the acquittee and any petition
for continued commitment of the acquittee to the board. The board
shall, within ninety days of its receipt of the application or petition, file
a report with the court, and send a copy thereof to the state’s attorney
and counsel for the acquittee, setting forth its findings and conclusions
as to whether the acquittee is a person who should be discharged. The
board may hold a hearing or take other action appropriate to assist it
in preparing its report.”
10
General Statutes § 17a-593 (f) provides: “After receipt of the board’s
report and any separate examination reports, the court shall promptly
commence a hearing on the recommendation or application for discharge
or petition for continued commitment. At the hearing, the acquittee
shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged.”
State v. Narcisse

considering that its primary concern is the protection of
society and its secondary concern is the safety and well-
being of the acquittee, must make a finding as to whether
the acquittee is a person who should be discharged. See
General Statutes § 17a-593 (g);11 see also State v. March,
supra, 705. The term “[p]erson who should be discharged”
is defined as “an acquittee who does not have psychiat-
ric disabilities . . . to the extent that such acquittee’s
discharge would constitute a danger to the acquittee or
others . . . .” General Statutes § 17a-580 (11).
I
The acquittee first claims that the trial court erred in
denying the acquittee’s application for discharge because
the diagnoses found by the court either were not sup-
ported by the evidence or are not psychiatric disabilities
under Connecticut law. As we discussed previously in
this opinion, the trial court found that the acquittee
was suffering from a mental illness, “namely, a severe
personality disorder and unspecified bipolar disorder.”
After careful review and consideration of the totality of
the record, we conclude that the court’s finding that the
acquittee suffers from a mental illness was not clearly
erroneous.
This court’s “determination as to whether an acquittee
is currently mentally ill to the extent that he would pose
a danger to himself or the community if discharged is a
question of fact and, therefore, our review of this find-
ing is governed by the clearly erroneous standard. . . .
A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
11
General Statutes § 17a-593 (g) provides: “The court shall make a
finding as to the mental condition of the acquittee and, considering
that its primary concern is the protection of society and its secondary
concern is the safety and well-being of the acquittee, make one of the
following orders: (1) If the court finds that the acquittee is not a person
who should be discharged, the court shall order the recommendation or
application for discharge be dismissed; or (2) if the court finds that the
acquittee is a person who should be discharged, the court shall order
the acquittee discharged from custody. The court shall send a copy of
such finding and order to the board.”
State v. Narcisse

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed. In applying the clearly
erroneous standard to the findings of a trial court, we
keep constantly in mind that our function is not to decide
factual issues de novo. Our authority . . . is circumscribed
by the deference we must give to decisions of the trier of
fact, who is usually in a superior position to appraise and
weigh the evidence.” (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Jacob, 69 Conn. App. 666,
680, 798 A.2d 974 (2002).
The term “psychiatric disabilities,” as used in § 17a-
593 (c), which is defined under the term “ ‘[m]ental ill-
ness’ ” in our state regulations, is “any mental illness or
mental disease as defined by the current Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association12 and as may hereafter be
amended. This definition includes any mental illness in
a state of remission which may become active with rea-
sonable medical probability.” (Footnote added.) Regs.,
Conn. State Agencies § 17a-581-2 (a) (5); see State v.
March, supra, 265 Conn. 706–707. Additionally, we
have previously concluded that, although “it would be a
better practice for the state to present evidence that an
acquittee’s diagnosis of a mental illness is based on the
[DMS-5],” the trial court may still find that the acquit-
tee is suffering from a mental illness as defined by our
statutes and regulations. State v. Dyous, 198 Conn. App.
253, 268 n.11, 233 A.3d 1138, cert. denied, 335 Conn.
948, 238 A.3d 17 (2020).
In the present case, the trial court explicitly found
that the acquittee “continues to suffer a mental illness,
namely . . . unspecified bipolar disorder.”13 Unspecified
12
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders will
herein be referred to as the DSM-5.
13
The trial court also found that the acquittee suffers from a “severe
personality disorder,” which the acquittee claims is not a mental ill-
ness enumerated within the DSM-5 and, therefore, cannot support
a finding that the acquittee suffers from a mental illness. Although
there seems to be evidence supporting the trial court’s determination
that the acquittee is suffering from “severe personality disorder,” we
State v. Narcisse

Bipolar Disorder is defined by the DSM-5 as “presenta-
tions in which symptoms characteristic of a bipolar and
related disorder that cause clinically significant distress
or impairment in social, occupational, or other important
areas of functioning predominate but do not meet the full
criteria for any of the disorders in the bipolar and related
disorders diagnostic class.” American Psychiatric Assn.,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(5th Ed. 2013) p. 149.
The record provides sufficient support to establish that
the acquittee suffered from unspecified bipolar disorder.
The acquittee had a long history of mental illness that
was first documented in 2003 when the acquittee was
incarcerated. Since then, the acquittee has consistently
been found to be suffering from some form of bipolar
disorder. In 2013, at the acquittee’s commitment hear-
ing, Jacobs diagnosed the acquittee with “Schizoeffective
Disorder, Bipolar Type,” among other diagnoses. Eight
years later, at the July 23, 2021 status hearing, Bryant
stated that the acquittee was diagnosed with “Unspeci-
fied Bipolar Disorder.” Two years after that date, at the
acquittee’s August 11, 2023 status hearing, the acquit-
tee’s diagnosis still had not changed. By the acquittee’s
July 10, 2024 hearing for his application for discharge,
Bryant testified that the acquittee was still diagnosed
with unspecified bipolar disorder. The trial court made a
factual determination on the basis of evidence that could
support the finding that the acquittee is suffering from
unspecified bipolar disorder.
The acquittee claims that the evidence provided by his
expert, Meisler, should belie Bryant’s, Westphal’s, and
Jacobs’ testimony that the acquittee is suffering from
unspecified bipolar disorder. Meisler claimed, after his
review of the acquittee’s mental history, that there was
no evidence of hypomania, mania, or depression, one
of which is necessary to establish that the acquittee is
need not reach the issue. As we discuss subsequently in this opinion,
the record contained sufficient evidence to conclude that the acquittee
is suffering from bipolar disorder, which the acquittee concedes is an
illness enumerated in the DSM-5.
State v. Narcisse

suffering from unspecified bipolar disorder. Instead,
Meisler claimed that the acquittee’s dysregulated behav-
ior was likely symptomatic of his use of illicit drugs.
Although some of the acquittee’s treating physicians
once considered this to be a possibility, they soon rejected
its plausibility. Prior to the index offense, the acquittee’s
test for illicit substance use showed that the acquittee
was likely not under the influence of illicit substances on
the date of the index offense. Furthermore, the acquit-
tee told Bryant that he was not taking illicit substances
around the date of the index offense. This caused Bry-
ant to change his risk assessment of the acquittee, as he
previously believed that the acquittee’s mental illness
may have been partially attributable to his illicit sub-
stance abuse.
The trial court, as the trier of fact, is free to credit
the testimony of one expert over that of another. State
v. Leroya M., 340 Conn. 590, 618–19, 264 A.3d 983
(2021) (“It is axiomatic that [t]he credibility of expert
witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony
. . . on issue of sanity is determined by the trier of fact.
. . . We will not . . . substitute our judgment for that of
the fact finder with respect to the weight to be given the
testimony of the expert . . . witness on the issue of the
defendant’s sanity.” (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.)). As we previously noted in State
v. Dyous, supra, 198 Conn. 272, “we are mindful of our
limited role in this process. In applying the clearly erro-
neous standard to the findings of a trial court, we keep
constantly in mind that our function is not to decide fac-
tual issues de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
After a review of the record, we are not left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. The trial court was presented with evidence that
could lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the
acquittee suffers from a mental illness, namely, unspeci-
fied bipolar disorder. Therefore, the trial court did not
commit clear error in concluding that the acquittee suf-
fers from a mental illness.
State v. Narcisse

II
The acquittee next claims that he met his burden of
proof of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that his psychiatric disabilities do not cause him to be
a danger to himself or others and that the trial court
clearly erred by denying his application for discharge.
Conversely, the state argues that the record belies the
acquittee’s claim that he is no longer a danger to himself
or others. We agree with the state.
This court has held that “[t]he determination of dan-
gerousness presents a question of fact for the court to
resolve. . . . Accordingly, appellate review of a court’s
dangerousness determination is governed by the clearly
erroneous standard.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Ardiz-
zone, 230 Conn. App. 187, 206, 330 A.3d 231, cert.
denied, 351 Conn. 920, 333 A.3d 104 (2025). As our
Supreme Court held, “[t]he determination of dangerous-
ness in the context of a mental status hearing reflects a
societal rather than a medical judgment, in which the
rights and needs of the [acquittee] must be balanced
against the security interests of society. . . . The . . .
[court’s] inquiry should focus on whether the person is
a danger to himself or others, whether he presents . . .
the risk of imminent physical injury to others or self .
. . . [T]he ultimate determination of mental illness and
dangerousness is a legal decision . . . [and, in making that
determination] the court may and should consider the
entire record available to it, including the [acquittee’s]
history of mental illness, his present and past diagnoses,
his past violent behavior, the nature of the offense for
which he was prosecuted, the need for continued medi-
cation and therapy, and the prospects for supervision
if released. . . .
“This legal determination of dangerousness is inher-
ently predictive in nature, with the definition of danger-
ousness being necessarily vague given the difficulty of the
prediction, even with the aid of medical expert testimony.
. . . Further, in this context, the word [i]mminent does
not mean immediate or likely but, rather, simply ready
State v. Narcisse

to take place or hanging threateningly over one’s head
. . . .” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Foster, 353 Conn.
1, 32–33, 339 A.3d 1093 (2025); see also State v. Ardiz-
zone, supra, 230 Conn. App. 205.
In the case before us, the index offense was of an
extreme and violent nature. The acquittee, seemingly
unprovoked, severely attacked the victim. The acquittee
tackled the victim, which caused her to hit her head on
the concrete. He then stabbed the victim in the face with
the broken stem of a wine glass, kicked and stomped on
the victim, and only stopped when two men were able to
pull the acquittee away from the victim. As the trial court
found, “[t]he nature of the index offense is . . . telling
because it speaks to the acquittee’s ability to engage in
extremely violent behavior when dysregulated.” Further-
more, this attack was not symptomatic of the acquittee’s
substance use as such use was reasonably ruled out by
his negative drug tests and conversations with Bryant.
The index offense gives insight into the extreme level
of violence of which the acquittee is capable when he is
dysregulated.
Throughout his confinement, the acquittee has engaged
in several acts of verbal and physical violence, includ-
ing, but not limited to, punching a peer and making
inappropriate sexual remarks. The acquittee has shown
some improvement. For instance, the acquittee has been
able to take accountability for the harm his actions have
caused, and his improved behavior resulted in his move
to a lower security unit, although his privilege levels in
that unit tend to fluctuate. Although the acquittee’s
condition has generally improved, he still presents sev-
eral risk factors that pose a potential danger to himself
and society.
The acquittee continues to have a history of noncompli-
ance with psychiatric treatment and takes his psychotro-
pic medications only intermittently. The acquittee’s six
month disengagement from all treatment and Meisler’s
description of the acquittee as someone who exhibits
State v. Narcisse

“poor insight, poor impulse control, poor interpersonal
judgment, and a persisting and pervasive pattern of
aggressive posturing and lack of empathy for others or
appreciation of the impact of his behavior on others,” sup-
ports the conclusion that the acquittee presents a signifi-
cant risk to both himself and others. This assessment is
heightened by the fact that the acquittee would not have
any support upon his release into the community. As both
Bryant and Rivera testified, any treatment, for either
his mental illness or substance abuse, would be entirely
dependent upon his willingness to engage with such treat-
ment. His conduct during confinement, however, does
not provide reason to believe that he would continue to
seek the support he needs. Bryant, whose testimony the
court credited in its memorandum of decision, stated that
the acquittee continues to withdraw from treatment. He
also testified that the acquittee lacked insight into his
mental illness. Bryant remarked that these both present
significant risk factors, as his withdrawal from treat-
ment indicates “difficulty tolerating feelings of internal
distress,” and his lack of insight into his mental illness
creates “challenges in [his] treatment relationships, [and
his] engagement and treatment, which . . . usually [does]
end up affecting risk.”
From a review of the record, the acquittee has made
some modest improvements and his treating physicians
believe that he is capable of potentially returning to
the community in the future. These same physicians,
however, also believe that the acquittee needs signifi-
cantly more work to address his tendency to withdraw
from treatment, minimize his mental illness, and avoid
accountability. In the absence of these improvements, the
acquittee, as reported in the board’s June 6, 2024 report,
still needs the support provided by Whiting. Therefore,
the trial court’s conclusion that the acquittee presents
a danger to himself or society was not clearly erroneous
because it is supported by evidence in the record and we
are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. The trial court, in denying the
acquittee’s application for discharge, did not commit
State v. Narcisse

clear error by concluding that the acquittee suffers from
a mental illness and presents a danger to himself or soci-
ety, as the acquittee failed to satisfy his burden under
§ 17a-593 (a).
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

************************************************
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************************************************
State v. Narcisse

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARVIN NARCISSE
(AC 48257)
Cradle, C. J., and Moll and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The acquittee appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying his applica-
tion for discharge from the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board pursuant to statute (§ 17a-593). He claimed, inter alia, that the court
improperly found that he was diagnosed with unspecified bipolar disorder.
Held:

The trial court’s finding that the acquittee suffers from a mental illness was
not clearly erroneous, as the court was presented with evidence that could
lead a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that the acquittee suffered from
unspecified bipolar disorder.

The trial court’s conclusion that the acquittee presented a danger to himself
or to society was not clearly erroneous, as it was supported by evidence in
the record and this court was not left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake had been made.

Argued February 2—officially released June 9, 2026

Procedural History

Application for discharge from the jurisdiction of
the Psychiatric Security Review Board, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Bridgeport and
tried to the court, Dayton, J.; judgment denying the
application, from which the acquittee appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender, for
the appellant (acquittee).
Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Joseph Corradino, state’s attor-
ney, and Jonathan Formichella, deputy assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The acquittee,1 Marvin Narcisse,
also known as Delmar Rose, appeals from the judgment
1
Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-580 (1), the term “acquittee”
refers to a defendant who was found not guilty by reason of mental
State v. Narcisse

of the trial court denying his application for discharge
from the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board (board) in accordance with General Statutes §
17a-593 (a).2 On appeal, the acquittee claims that the
court improperly (1) found that he was diagnosed with
“severe personality disorder” and unspecified bipolar
disorder and (2) concluded that he failed to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that his psychiatric
disabilities, if any, do not cause him to be a danger to
himself or others. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the court or otherwise
undisputed in the record, and procedural history are rel-
evant to our resolution of this appeal. On the afternoon
of December 22, 2011, the victim, Marjorie Meketa, who
was seventy-seven years old, exited a store located near
the intersection of William Street and Roosevelt Street
in Bridgeport. The acquittee ran toward the victim at a
high rate of speed and tackled her from behind, causing
her to hit her head on the concrete sidewalk. The acquit-
tee then proceeded to stab the victim in the face with the
broken off stem of a wine glass. He also stomped on and
kicked the victim. Ultimately, it took two men to pull
the acquittee away from the victim, but not before she
suffered severe injuries. When the police arrived, they
arrested the acquittee, and he was charged with attempt
to commit murder, assault in the first degree, and assault
on an elderly victim in violation of General Statutes §§
53a-49 and 53a-54a, 53a-59 (a) (1), and 53a-59a, respec-
tively. The acquittee pleaded not guilty to each charge.
On April 26, 2013, the trial court, Devlin, J., issued
its memorandum of decision and found the acquittee not
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to
disease or defect in a criminal proceeding pursuant to General Statutes
§ 53a-13.
2
General Statutes § 17a-593 (a) provides in relevant part: “The board
. . . may recommend to the court the discharge of the acquittee from
custody or the acquittee may apply directly to the court for discharge
from custody. . . .”
State v. Narcisse

General Statutes § 53a-13 (a).3 In reaching its conclusion,
the court reviewed reports from Madelon Baranoski, a
clinical psychologist, and Alexander Westphal, a psy-
chiatrist. Baranoski performed a series of psychological
tests on the acquittee, which revealed both psychotic
and mood disorder symptoms. Baranoski concluded that
“[the acquittee’s] baseline function is likely controlled
by his schizotypal, paranoid and narcissistic personality
features and mood lability.”
Westphal stated in his report that the acquittee exhib-
ited psychiatric symptoms at an early age, but that he
was not diagnosed with a mental illness until 2003 when
he was in the custody of the Department of Correction
(department). The department diagnosed the acquittee
with “Psychotic Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified and
Intermittent Explosive Disorder” and prescribed him
antipsychotic, antidepressant, and mood stabilizing
medicines. Westphal ultimately found that the acquittee
“was suffering from a mental disease that caused such
a degree of confusion and disorganization in him that it
prevented him from understanding the wrongfulness of
his actions . . . .” He found that the acquittee’s behav-
ior was consistent with a portion of his past diagnoses,
specifically his diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder,
bipolar disorder, and major depression with psychotic
features. Additionally, he believed “that the ingestion
of substances was not the predominant cause of [the
acquittee’s] state of mind at the time of the attack.”
After reviewing the Westphal and Baranoski reports,
the court concluded that the acquittee had met his burden
of proof and established that he lacked the capacity to
3
General Statutes § 53a-13 (a) provides: “In any prosecution for an
offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time
the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial
capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the
requirements of the law.”
Although § 53a-13 (a) has been amended since the events underlying
this case; see Public Acts 2019, No. 19-27, § 1; that amendment has no
bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we
refer to the current revision of § 53a-13 (a).
State v. Narcisse

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct due to his
mental disease or defect. The court found that “the evi-
dence demonstrates that for at least ten years before the
crime (and probably longer), the [acquittee] suffered from
a mental disease or defect likely classified as a schizoaf-
fective disorder or bipolar disorder.” Additionally, the
court found that the state’s assertion that the acquittee’s
mental disease was the result of his known drug use was
of no moment as his most recent drug test, taken mere
months before the index offense,4 was negative. The
acquittee also had continued to exhibit symptoms of
mental illness throughout periods of his pretrial incar-
ceration when he ostensibly would have had no access to
illicit drugs. On July 31, 2013, the acquittee was com-
mitted to the Whiting Service of the Whiting Forensic
Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital (Whiting) under
the jurisdiction of the board for a maximum term of
commitment not to exceed forty years.
As documented in the 2013 Department of Mental
Health and Addiction Services (DMHAS) report, which
recommended the acquittee’s commitment at Whiting,
Julie Jacobs, a forensic monitor at Whiting, diagnosed
the acquittee with, inter alia, “Schizoeffective Disorder,
Bipolar Type, Most Recent Episode Depressed Polysub-
stance Dependence, In a Controlled Environment,” and
“Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, with
Schizotypal, Narcissistic, Paranoid, and Dependent
Traits.” Jacobs found that the acquittee “displayed the
tendency to minimize how his actions on the day of the
crime affected the life of the victim.” Jacobs also found
that the acquittee “demonstrated dangerous impulsive
4
“[T]he psychiatric profession refers to the offenses that led to an
acquittee’s arrest as index offenses.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Foster, 353 Conn. 1, 6 n.5, 339 A.3d 1093 (2025); see,
e.g., M. Kaggwa et al., “Weapon Use During the Index Offense: A
Study Among Forensic Psychiatry Patients in Ontario, Canada,” 11
Inj. Epidemiol. 66, December 18, 2024, p. 2, available at https://link.
springer.com/content/pdf/10.1186/s40621-024-00551-z.pdf (last
visited June 1, 2026).
State v. Narcisse

behaviors and poor decision making while unmedicated
and experiencing psychotic symptoms.”
At the acquittee’s March 2016 hearing to review his
status, Rebecca Ewald, who holds a master’s degree in
social work, testified that the acquittee had multiple
physical altercations and episodes of aggression spanning
from October 2013 to July 2014. At the acquittee’s Feb-
ruary 2018 hearing to review his status, Ewald testified
that the acquittee was involved in additional altercations
in March and December 2016. By 2017, the acquittee
began showing signs of increased engagement in psycho-
therapy and was more consistent with his medications,
resulting in a demonstrated improvement of his mood
stability. As a result of the acquittee’s improvements,
he was approved for a transfer to Dutcher Service at
Whiting (Dutcher), the lower security section of Whit-
ing. A few months after his transfer was approved, the
acquittee became engaged in a verbal altercation with
another patient. Although the argument was heated, the
altercation never became physical. Shortly thereafter,
the acquittee apologized to the other patient and took
responsibility for his behavior. He also requested to
speak with his therapist. After this event, the acquittee’s
most significant risk factors were his untreated mood
symptoms, his history of noncompliance with psychiatric
treatment and refusal to take psychotropic medications,
and his substantial history of substance abuse.
The 2019 reports on the acquittee’s status showed that
his engagement with treatment varied after his move to
Dutcher. Although the acquittee did not initially exhibit
any troublesome behavior, the acquittee stopped taking
his psychotropic medications by December 2018, and
he stopped participating in all prescribed treatment
by February 2019. The acquittee, additionally, lost his
level four privileges and attempted to leverage his par-
ticipation in his prescribed treatment to regain those
privileges. It was not until July 2019 that the acquittee
began to reengage with his treatment after his attorney
warned him that he was at risk of returning to Whiting.
State v. Narcisse

During this time, the acquittee also made a series of
threatening and provocative statements to Dutcher’s
staff and patients.
On July 23, 2021, the board held a hearing to review
the status of the acquittee and to determine whether
he should remain confined, conditionally released, or
discharged. The board determined that the acquittee
was still a threat to himself and others and not fit for
discharge or conditional release. Paul Bryant, a consult-
ing forensic psychiatrist with DMHAS, testified that
the acquittee did not engage in any episodes of physical
assault, nor were restraints or seclusion needed. He fur-
ther explained, however, that the acquittee “did experi-
ence several episodes of verbal aggression, assaultive or
aggressive posturing, and rule violations.” For example,
the acquittee waved a pen in the face of a staff member
in an agitated and verbally aggressive manner. Bryant
also testified that when the acquittee finally reengaged in
treatment, he expressed feelings of regret and embarrass-
ment but also had difficulty acknowledging his behavior.
Bryant testified that, as of July 23, 2021, the acquittee
had psychiatric diagnoses, including “Other Specified
Personality Disorder with Antisocial and Narcissistic
Traits; Unspecified Bipolar Disorder, Alcohol Use Dis-
order in Sustained Remission in a Controlled Environ-
ment; Cannabis Use Disorder in Sustained Remission
in a Controlled Environment; and Phencyclidine [PCP]
Use Disorder in Sustained Remission in a Controlled
Environment.”
At the acquittee’s August 11, 2023 board hearing, Bry-
ant testified that the acquittee “had multiple behavioral
incidents and rule violations which resulted in many fluc-
tuations to his privilege level over the reporting period.”
Bryant also testified that, “despite multiple episodes of
angry and dysregulated behavior, [the acquittee] did seem
to show some progress around recognizing and apologiz-
ing for behaviors after they occur in a timelier manner.”
He noted, however, that the acquittee had not taken
some of his medication in “quite some time,” including
State v. Narcisse

lorazepam and haloperidol, which are both prescribed to
treat severe agitation. Additionally, he testified that the
acquittee’s continued withdrawal from treatment and
other activities whenever he feels slighted or upset is a
product of his narcissistic personality structure and his
difficulty tolerating feelings of internal distress. Bryant
indicated that the acquittee was eager to return to the
community but that he required additional work before
he would be able to do so successfully. Lastly, he testi-
fied that the acquittee’s diagnoses remained the same.
The board ultimately concluded, on the basis of the
testimony of the treating physicians, that the acquit-
tee continued to struggle with rule adherence, impulse
control and demonstrating frustration tolerance skills.
Although the board expressed some optimism that the
acquittee’s condition may improve, it still believed that
he required the level of support provided by Whiting for
adequate risk mitigation.
On February 6, 2024, pursuant to General Statutes §§
17a-593 (a)5 and 17a-580 (11),6 the acquittee filed with
the Superior Court an application for discharge from
the jurisdiction of the board. The trial court, Dayton,
J., held an evidentiary hearing on the application on
July 10, 2024. Three witnesses testified at that hearing:
Andrew Meisler, a forensic psychologist; Felix Rivera,
a certified addiction counselor; and Bryant. The acquit-
tee called Meisler, who, on the basis of the information
available to him, diagnosed the acquittee as suffering
from a personality disorder with antisocial and narcis-
sistic traits. He further explained that the acquittee’s
5
General Statutes § 17a-593 (a) provides in relevant part: “[T]he
acquittee may apply directly to the court for discharge from custody.
The court shall send copies of the recommendation or application to
the state’s attorney and to counsel for the acquittee. An acquittee
may apply for discharge not more than once every six months and no
sooner than six months after the initial board hearing held pursuant
to section 17a-583.”
6
General Statutes § 17a-580 (11) provides: “ ‘Person who should be
discharged’ means an acquittee who does not have psychiatric disabilities
or does not have intellectual disability to the extent that such acquittee’s
discharge would constitute a danger to the acquittee or others . . . .”
State v. Narcisse

long-standing, permanent disorder with a pervasive pat-
tern of thinking supported his conclusion. Additionally,
he testified that, although coping skills can be taught and
medications can be used to manage mood features and
other symptoms, the acquittee’s illness is not amenable
to treatment.
Meisler, however, did not agree with the board’s
conclusion that the acquittee suffers from unspecified
bipolar disorder. Meisler claimed that, on the basis of
his review of the acquittee’s psychological reports, no
evidence ever existed to support a diagnosis of unspeci-
fied bipolar disorder. He testified that, although the
acquittee may have had, at times, dysregulated behav-
ior, these were not symptoms of mania, hypomania, or
depression, one of which must be present for a diagnosis
of bipolar disorder. Additionally, Meisler associated the
acquittee’s behavior with his use of PCP at the time the
diagnoses were made. Meisler believed that the acquit-
tee recognized the severity of his historic substance use
and stated that, were he to relapse, it is possible that his
diagnoses could return.
Meisler believed that the acquittee’s inappropriate
sexual behavior, including intentionally exposing his
genitalia to doctors and staff, was not symptomatic of a
major serious mental illness. Instead, it was his opinion
that it was symptomatic of his interpersonal, judgment,
and impulse control impairments indicative of his anti-
social and narcissistic personalities.
Lastly, Meisler did not believe that the acquittee was
“faking good,” but, instead, he thought the acquittee was
“minimizing” his behavior as evidenced by the fact that
the tests did not reflect the acquittee’s well documented
broader problems with maladaptive beliefs, externaliza-
tion of blame, poor insight into his own medical illness,
and chronic interpersonal conflicts.
The acquittee then called Rivera. Rivera was aware
that the acquittee was diagnosed with PCP and can-
nabis use disorder but was not aware that he was also
State v. Narcisse

diagnosed with alcohol use disorder. Rivera testified
that the acquittee’s substance abuse is in remission in
a controlled environment, as the acquittee’s ability to
use illegal substances is significantly restrained. Rivera
was not aware of any behavioral issues the acquittee
had while at Whiting and was not aware of whether
the acquittee was being noncompliant with his treat-
ment plan. He testified that the acquittee’s discharge
plan includes intensive twelve step meetings; however,
he acknowledged that the acquittee’s success with the
discharge plan would be entirely dependent upon the
acquittee’s willingness to engage with it. Rivera believed,
however, that the acquittee would be willing to do so.
Lastly, Rivera was unaware of whether the acquittee
ever complained about having to undergo random drug
testing, even while at Whiting.
Bryant was the last witness called and the state’s only
witness. In the four years prior to his testimony at the
July 10, 2024 hearing, he served as a consulting foren-
sic psychiatrist and met with the acquittee’s treatment
team weekly and with the acquittee occasionally. During
Bryant’s meetings with the treatment team, he received
updates from the acquittee’s psychiatrist, psychologists,
social workers, case manager, and nursing staff to ensure
that his risks were being effectively managed. Bryant
testified that the acquittee’s current psychological diag-
noses were unspecified bipolar disorder; other specified
personality disorder with narcissistic and antisocial
traits; and alcohol, cannabis, and PCP use disorders in
sustained remission in a controlled environment. These
diagnoses have remained the same for approximately
seven years.
It was Bryant’s opinion that the acquittee’s involve-
ment with his treatment team was varied over the years,
partly because the acquittee was “unsure how much he
really wanted to work on things.” Although the acquit-
tee’s episodes of physical aggression have become “few
and far between,” Bryant still described incidents in the
six months prior to his testimony where the acquittee
State v. Narcisse

engaged in physical violence toward a patient and ver-
bally threatened a member of the staff.
With respect to the risk the acquittee presents upon
a potential release, Bryant believed that the acquittee’s
lack of insight into his own mental illness could “[create]
challenges in [his] treatment relationships, [his] engage-
ment and treatment, which those things usually do end up
affecting risk.” He further testified that a return to the
community after eleven years of hospitalization would
be a stressful and challenging event for any individual
to endure. He testified: “I think he has this maladaptive
behavioral pattern of when he feels insulted or . . . things
don’t go the way he wants, sometimes of pulling back
from treatment. . . . [S]o, I worry . . . that’s going to be
a factor for him because . . . he’s been in [Whiting] for
eleven years now. Going back into the community after
you’ve been in such a controlled, confined environment
for eleven years is stressful.” Bryant further testified
that any support the acquittee receives in the commu-
nity will be entirely dependent upon his willingness to
engage in it.
Bryant testified that, at one point, he believed that
the acquittee’s primary risk factor was his substance
abuse. The acquittee, however, recently told him that
he was not using any unlawful substances at the time
of the index offense. This caused Bryant to change his
assessment of the acquittee’s risk of violence, as he now
was less convinced that the index offense was simply the
result of the acquittee’s use of illicit substances. Byrant’s
assessment of the acquittee resulted in his conclusion
that both the acquittee and the community would be safer
if the acquittee were to be gradually stepped down to a
slightly less structured environment that still provided
the acquittee with all the resources available at Whiting.
Lastly, Bryant testified that it is Whiting’s responsibil-
ity to determine whether the acquittee is eligible for
temporary leave or conditional leave.7
7
Bryant testified that the “stepping down,” or “gradual transition,”
as it was colloquially referred to is simply temporary leave, which is
State v. Narcisse

On October 8, 2024, the trial court issued its memoran-
dum of decision and denied the acquittee’s application
for discharge.8 The trial court held that it did not agree
with “the acquittee’s characterization of his mental
health issues as being ‘abnormalities manifested only
by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.’ ”
Instead, the court found that “the acquittee continues
to suffer from a mental illness, namely, a severe person-
ality disorder and unspecified bipolar disorder, and his
potential dangerousness to the community continues due
to those illnesses.” Additionally, the court found that
“the acquittee’s past violent behavior and the nature
of the offense of which he was acquitted are relevant
factors in determining current dangerousness in this
proceeding.” The court also found that “the evidence
demonstrates that the acquittee has poor insight into
the serious nature of his psychiatric illness and fails to
appreciate the relationship between his illness and his
violent behavior.” The trial court concluded that “the
acquittee’s mental illness would present a danger to him-
self and others in the community if he [were] released,
and accordingly . . . he has failed to meet his burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no
longer such a danger.” This appeal followed.
We begin by setting forth relevant legal standards and
our standard of review. First, we must note that “the
“where somebody is granted . . . day visits into the community, and then
the next step is overnight visits into the community. . . . [T]hey would
still be a hospital patient, although sometimes they’d be spending seven
nights a week in the community. . . . [T]he next step would be to apply
for conditional release, where . . . they . . . become the community’s
patient, and they’re living there full time.”
8
The trial court reached this conclusion on the basis of “evidence
received at the hearing,” which included “several [board] reports and
six month evaluations from [DMHAS], the investigatory report from
the initial incident, [Meisler’s] psychological assessment, prior psy-
chological reports and assessments, and prior hearing transcripts . . .
.” The trial court also “assessed the weight, if any, to be given specific
evidence and measured the probative force of conflicting evidence . . .
reviewed all briefs, exhibits, relevant statutes, and case law . . . and .
. . [drew] such inferences from the evidence or facts established by the
evidence that it deems reasonable and logical.”
State v. Narcisse

confinement of [§ 53a-13] acquittees, although result-
ing initially from an adjudication in the criminal justice
system, is not punishment for a crime. The purpose of
commitment following an . . . acquittal [by reason of
mental disease or defect], like that of civil commitment,
is to treat the individual’s mental illness and protect
him and society from his potential dangerousness. The
committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has
recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous. . . . As he
was not convicted, he may not be punished. His confine-
ment rests on his continuing illness and dangerousness.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Payne v. Fairfield
Hills Hospital, 215 Conn. 675, 683–84, 578 A.2d 1025
(1990). “[A]s a matter of due process, an acquittee is
entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or
is no longer dangerous.” State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400,
417–18, 645 A.2d 965 (1994).
Our Supreme Court has explained that, after an acquit-
tee has applied for discharge from the board’s jurisdic-
tion and the board, in accordance with the requirement
of § 17a-593 (d),9 has filed its report regarding whether
the acquittee should be discharged, the trial court must
hold a hearing on the application, at which the acquittee
bears the burden of proving that he or she is a person who
should be discharged. See General Statutes § 17a-593
(f);10 see also State v. March, 265 Conn. 697, 705, 830
A.2d 212 (2003). After the hearing, the court, consider-
9
General Statutes § 17a-593 (d) provides: “The court shall forward any
application for discharge received from the acquittee and any petition
for continued commitment of the acquittee to the board. The board
shall, within ninety days of its receipt of the application or petition, file
a report with the court, and send a copy thereof to the state’s attorney
and counsel for the acquittee, setting forth its findings and conclusions
as to whether the acquittee is a person who should be discharged. The
board may hold a hearing or take other action appropriate to assist it
in preparing its report.”
10
General Statutes § 17a-593 (f) provides: “After receipt of the board’s
report and any separate examination reports, the court shall promptly
commence a hearing on the recommendation or application for discharge
or petition for continued commitment. At the hearing, the acquittee
shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged.”
State v. Narcisse

ing that its primary concern is the protection of society
and its secondary concern is the safety and well-being
of the acquittee, must make a finding as to whether
the acquittee is a person who should be discharged. See
General Statutes § 17a-593 (g)11; see also State v. March,
supra, 705. The term “[p]erson who should be discharged”
is defined as “an acquittee who does not have psychiat-
ric disabilities . . . to the extent that such acquittee’s
discharge would constitute a danger to the acquittee or
others . . . .” General Statutes § 17a-580 (11).
I
The acquittee first claims that the trial court erred in
denying the acquittee’s application for discharge because
the diagnoses found by the court either were not sup-
ported by the evidence or are not psychiatric disabilities
under Connecticut law. As we discussed previously in
this opinion, the trial court found that the acquittee
was suffering from a mental illness, “namely, a severe
personality disorder and unspecified bipolar disorder.”
After careful review and consideration of the totality of
the record, we conclude that the court’s finding that the
acquittee suffers from a mental illness was not clearly
erroneous.
This court’s “determination as to whether an acquittee
is currently mentally ill to the extent that he would pose
a danger to himself or the community if discharged is a
question of fact and, therefore, our review of this find-
ing is governed by the clearly erroneous standard. . . .
A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
11
General Statutes § 17a-593 (g) provides: “The court shall make a
finding as to the mental condition of the acquittee and, considering
that its primary concern is the protection of society and its secondary
concern is the safety and well-being of the acquittee, make one of the
following orders: (1) If the court finds that the acquittee is not a person
who should be discharged, the court shall order the recommendation or
application for discharge be dismissed; or (2) if the court finds that the
acquittee is a person who should be discharged, the court shall order
the acquittee discharged from custody. The court shall send a copy of
such finding and order to the board.”
State v. Narcisse

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed. In applying the clearly
erroneous standard to the findings of a trial court, we
keep constantly in mind that our function is not to decide
factual issues de novo. Our authority . . . is circumscribed
by the deference we must give to decisions of the trier of
fact, who is usually in a superior position to appraise and
weigh the evidence.” (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Jacob, 69 Conn. App. 666,
680, 798 A.2d 974 (2002).
The term “psychiatric disabilities,” as used in § 17a-
593 (c), which is defined under the term “ ‘[m]ental ill-
ness’ ” in our state regulations, is “any mental illness or
mental disease as defined by the current Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association12 and as may hereafter be
amended. This definition includes any mental illness in
a state of remission which may become active with rea-
sonable medical probability.” (Footnote added.) Regs.,
Conn. State Agencies § 17a-581-2 (a) (5); see State v.
March, supra, 265 Conn. 706–707. Additionally, we
have previously concluded that, although “it would be a
better practice for the state to present evidence that an
acquittee’s diagnosis of a mental illness is based on the
[DMS-5],” the trial court may still find that the acquit-
tee is suffering from a mental illness as defined by our
statutes and regulations. State v. Dyous, 198 Conn. App.
253, 268 n.11, 233 A.3d 1138, cert. denied, 335 Conn.
948, 238 A.3d 17 (2020).
In the present case, the trial court explicitly found
that the acquittee “continues to suffer a mental illness,
namely . . . unspecified bipolar disorder.”13 Unspecified
12
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders will
herein be referred to as the DSM-5.
13
The trial court also found that the acquittee suffers from a “severe
personality disorder,” which the acquittee claims is not a mental ill-
ness enumerated within the DSM-5 and, therefore, cannot support
a finding that the acquittee suffers from a mental illness. Although
there seems to be evidence supporting the trial court’s determination
that the acquittee is suffering from “severe personality disorder,” we
State v. Narcisse

Bipolar Disorder is defined by the DSM-5 as “presenta-
tions in which symptoms characteristic of a bipolar and
related disorder that cause clinically significant distress
or impairment in social, occupational, or other important
areas of functioning predominate but do not meet the full
criteria for any of the disorders in the bipolar and related
disorders diagnostic class.” American Psychiatric Assn.,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(5th Ed. 2013) p. 149.
The record provides sufficient support to establish that
the acquittee suffered from unspecified bipolar disorder.
The acquittee had a long history of mental illness that
was first documented in 2003 when the acquittee was
incarcerated. Since then, the acquittee has consistently
been found to be suffering from some form of bipolar
disorder. In 2013, at the acquittee’s commitment hear-
ing, Jacobs diagnosed the acquittee with “Schizoeffective
Disorder, Bipolar Type,” among other diagnoses. Eight
years later, at the July 23, 2021 status hearing, Bryant
stated that the acquittee was diagnosed with “Unspeci-
fied Bipolar Disorder.” Two years after that date, at the
acquittee’s August 11, 2023 status hearing, the acquit-
tee’s diagnosis still had not changed. By the acquittee’s
July 10, 2024 hearing for his application for discharge,
Bryant testified that the acquittee was still diagnosed
with unspecified bipolar disorder. The trial court made a
factual determination on the basis of evidence that could
support the finding that the acquittee is suffering from
unspecified bipolar disorder.
The acquittee claims that the evidence provided by his
expert, Meisler, should belie Bryant’s, Westphal’s, and
Jacobs’ testimony that the acquittee is suffering from
unspecified bipolar disorder. Meisler claimed, after his
review of the acquittee’s mental history, that there was
no evidence of hypomania, mania, or depression, one
of which is necessary to establish that the acquittee is
need not reach the issue. As we discuss subsequently in this opinion,
the record contained sufficient evidence to conclude that the acquittee
is suffering from bipolar disorder, which the acquittee concedes is an
illness enumerated in the DSM-5.
State v. Narcisse

suffering from unspecified bipolar disorder. Instead,
Meisler claimed that the acquittee’s dysregulated behav-
ior was likely symptomatic of his use of illicit drugs.
Although some of the acquittee’s treating physicians
once considered this to be a possibility, they soon rejected
its plausibility. Prior to the index offense, the acquittee’s
test for illicit substance use showed that the acquittee
was likely not under the influence of illicit substances on
the date of the index offense. Furthermore, the acquit-
tee told Bryant that he was not taking illicit substances
around the date of the index offense. This caused Bry-
ant to change his risk assessment of the acquittee, as he
previously believed that the acquittee’s mental illness
may have been partially attributable to his illicit sub-
stance abuse.
The trial court, as the trier of fact, is free to credit
the testimony of one expert over that of another. State
v. Leroya M., 340 Conn. 590, 618–19, 264 A.3d 983
(2021) (“It is axiomatic that [t]he credibility of expert
witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony
. . . on issue of sanity is determined by the trier of fact.
. . . We will not . . . substitute our judgment for that of
the fact finder with respect to the weight to be given the
testimony of the expert . . . witness on the issue of the
defendant’s sanity.” (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.)). As we previously noted in State
v. Dyous, supra, 198 Conn. 272, “we are mindful of our
limited role in this process. In applying the clearly erro-
neous standard to the findings of a trial court, we keep
constantly in mind that our function is not to decide fac-
tual issues de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
After a review of the record, we are not left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. The trial court was presented with evidence that
could lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the
acquittee suffers from a mental illness, namely, unspeci-
fied bipolar disorder. Therefore, the trial court did not
commit clear error in concluding that the acquittee suf-
fers from a mental illness.
State v. Narcisse

II
The acquittee next claims that he met his burden of
proof of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that his psychiatric disabilities do not cause him to be
a danger to himself or others and that the trial court
clearly erred by denying his application for discharge.
Conversely, the state argues that the record belies the
acquittee’s claim that he is no longer a danger to himself
or others. We agree with the state.
This court has held that “[t]he determination of dan-
gerousness presents a question of fact for the court to
resolve. . . . Accordingly, appellate review of a court’s
dangerousness determination is governed by the clearly
erroneous standard.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Ardiz-
zone, 230 Conn. App. 187, 206, 330 A.3d 231, cert.
denied, 351 Conn. 920, 333 A.3d 104 (2025). As our
Supreme Court held, “[t]he determination of dangerous-
ness in the context of a mental status hearing reflects a
societal rather than a medical judgment, in which the
rights and needs of the [acquittee] must be balanced
against the security interests of society. . . . The . . .
[court’s] inquiry should focus on whether the person is
a danger to himself or others, whether he presents . . .
the risk of imminent physical injury to others or self .
. . . [T]he ultimate determination of mental illness and
dangerousness is a legal decision . . . [and, in making that
determination] the court may and should consider the
entire record available to it, including the [acquittee’s]
history of mental illness, his present and past diagnoses,
his past violent behavior, the nature of the offense for
which he was prosecuted, the need for continued medi-
cation and therapy, and the prospects for supervision
if released. . . .
“This legal determination of dangerousness is inher-
ently predictive in nature, with the definition of danger-
ousness being necessarily vague given the difficulty of the
prediction, even with the aid of medical expert testimony.
. . . Further, in this context, the word [i]mminent does
not mean immediate or likely but, rather, simply ready
State v. Narcisse

to take place or hanging threateningly over one’s head
. . . .” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Foster, 353 Conn.
1, 32–33, 339 A.3d 1093 (2025); see also State v. Ardiz-
zone, supra, 230 Conn. App. 205.
In the case before us, the index offense was of an
extreme and violent nature. The acquittee, seemingly
unprovoked, severely attacked the victim. The acquittee
tackled the victim, which caused her to hit her head on
the concrete. He then stabbed the victim in the face with
the broken stem of a wine glass, kicked and stomped on
the victim, and only stopped when two men were able to
pull the acquittee away from the victim. As the trial court
found, “[t]he nature of the index offense is . . . telling
because it speaks to the acquittee’s ability to engage in
extremely violent behavior when dysregulated.” Further-
more, this attack was not symptomatic of the acquittee’s
substance use as such use was reasonably ruled out by
his negative drug tests and conversations with Bryant.
The index offense gives insight into the extreme level
of violence of which the acquittee is capable when he is
dysregulated.
Throughout his confinement, the acquittee has engaged
in several acts of verbal and physical violence, includ-
ing, but not limited to, punching a peer and making
inappropriate sexual remarks. The acquittee has shown
some improvement. For instance, the acquittee has been
able to take accountability for the harm his actions have
caused, and his improved behavior resulted in his move
to a lower security unit, although his privilege levels in
that unit tend to fluctuate. Although the acquittee’s
condition has generally improved, he still presents sev-
eral risk factors that pose a potential danger to himself
and society.
The acquittee continues to have a history of noncompli-
ance with psychiatric treatment and takes his psychotro-
pic medications only intermittently. The acquittee’s six
month disengagement from all treatment and Meisler’s
description of the acquittee as someone who exhibits
State v. Narcisse

“poor insight, poor impulse control, poor interpersonal
judgment, and a persisting and pervasive pattern of
aggressive posturing and lack of empathy for others or
appreciation of the impact of his behavior on others,” sup-
ports the conclusion that the acquittee presents a signifi-
cant risk to both himself and others. This assessment is
heightened by the fact that the acquittee would not have
any support upon his release into the community. As both
Bryant and Rivera testified, any treatment, for either
his mental illness or substance abuse, would be entirely
dependent upon his willingness to engage with such treat-
ment. His conduct during confinement, however, does
not provide reason to believe that he would continue to
seek the support he needs. Bryant, whose testimony the
court credited in its memorandum of decision, stated that
the acquittee continues to withdraw from treatment. He
also testified that the acquittee lacked insight into his
mental illness. Bryant remarked that these both present
significant risk factors, as his withdrawal from treat-
ment indicates “difficulty tolerating feelings of internal
distress,” and his lack of insight into his mental illness
creates “challenges in [his] treatment relationships, [and
his] engagement and treatment, which . . . usually [does]
end up affecting risk.”
From a review of the record, the acquittee has made
some modest improvements and his treating physicians
believe that he is capable of potentially returning to
the community in the future. These same physicians,
however, also believe that the acquittee needs signifi-
cantly more work to address his tendency to withdraw
from treatment, minimize his mental illness, and avoid
accountability. In the absence of these improvements, the
acquittee, as reported in the board’s June 6, 2024 report,
still needs the support provided by Whiting. Therefore,
the trial court’s conclusion that the acquittee presents
a danger to himself or society was not clearly erroneous
because it is supported by evidence in the record and we
are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. The trial court, in denying the
acquittee’s application for discharge, did not commit
State v. Narcisse

clear error by concluding that the acquittee suffers from
a mental illness and presents a danger to himself or soci-
ety, as the acquittee failed to satisfy his burden under
§ 17a-593 (a).
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.