Town of Fenwick Island and Sussex County v. State of Delaware

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TOWN OF FENWICK ISLAND and §
SUSSEX COUNTY, §
§ No. 153, 2026
Plaintiffs Below, §
Appellants, § Court Below: Court of Chancery
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ C.A. No. 2025-1478
STATE OF DELAWARE and THE §
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. §
MEYER, in his official capacity as §
Governor of the State of Delaware, §
and RENEWABLE §
REDEVELOPMENT, LLC, §
§
Defendants Below, §
Appellees. §

Submitted: May 20, 2026
Decided: May 26, 2026

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery. AFFIRMED.

M. Jane Brady, Esquire (argued), HALLORAN FARKAS + KITTILA, Wilmington,
Delaware; Stephani J. Ballard, Esquire (argued), LAW OFFICES OF STEPHANI
J. BALLARD, LLC, Montchanin, Delaware, for Plaintiffs Below/Appellants, Town
of Fenwick Island and Sussex County.

Patricia A. Davis, Esquire, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Wilmington, Delaware, for Defendants Below/Appellees, State of Delaware and The
Honorable Matthew S. Meyer.

Richard A. Forsten, Esquire (argued), Wendie C. Stabler, Esquire, Jennifer M.
Becnel-Guzzo, Esquire, SAUL EWING LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, for Defendant
Below/Appellee, Renewable Redevelopment, LLC.
SEITZ, Chief Justice:

Sussex County and the Town of Fenwick Island filed an expedited appeal from

an expedited Court of Chancery bench ruling dismissing their claims against the

defendants. The court held that a recently adopted state statute authorizing

conditional use permits for electrical substations did not violate the Delaware

Constitution or other rights.

On appeal, the plaintiffs repeat many of the same arguments dismissed by the

Court of Chancery. They argue that the statute violates (1) the separation of powers

doctrine in the Delaware Constitution; (2) Article II, Section 25 of the Delaware

Constitution, which authorizes the General Assembly to enact laws that allow

municipalities and counties to adopt zoning ordinances; (3) Article II, Section 16 of

the Delaware Constitution, which provides that, except for public-purpose

appropriation bills, no bill shall embrace more than one subject, which must be

clearly expressed in the title; and (4) the public’s due process rights. The Town of

Fenwick Island also disputes its lack of standing to challenge the legislation.

As explained below, we agree with the Court of Chancery’s reasoning on each

issue and affirm its summary judgment ruling for the defendants. It is unnecessary

to reach the standing issue.

2
I.

A.

We take the undisputed facts from the Court of Chancery’s decision.1

Renewable Redevelopment, LLC, a subsidiary of U.S. Wind, owns about 140 acres

in Sussex County, Delaware. In 2024, Renewable sought a conditional use permit

from Sussex County to build an electrical substation on the property. The substation

will receive power from wind turbines planned for construction off the Delaware and

Maryland coasts.

The Sussex County Planning and Zoning Commission agreed unanimously to

recommend that Sussex County Council approve Renewable’s permit. At a July 30,

2024 hearing, County Council considered the Commission’s recommendation.

Members of the public objected to the permit. By a 4-to-1 vote, County Council

denied Renewable’s conditional use permit.

Renewable petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of certiorari challenging

County Council’s decision. On July 30, 2025, while the Superior Court action was

pending, the General Assembly passed Senate Bills 159 and 199 negating the permit

denial. The Governor signed the legislation the same day. As the Court of Chancery

1
Town of Fenwick Island v. State, C.A. No. 2025-1478, Dkt. No. 42, at 4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 2026)
(TRANSCRIPT) [hereinafter Transcript Op.] (“I draw from the undisputed facts presented by the
parties’ cross-motions.”).

3
explained in its ruling, the General Assembly and the Governor found that “the

substation is critical to the offshore wind turbine project, and wind turbine

development is a key part of the State’s efforts to fight climate change and transition

Delaware to renewable forms of energy.”2

SB 159, titled “An Act to Amend Title 26 of the Delaware Code Relating to

Public Utilities,” is codified at Title 26, Section 910 of the Delaware Code. It

provides as follows:

§ 910. Conditional use permit for electrical substations.

(a) No county shall deny a conditional use permit to any
electrical substation, along with any directly related project
infrastructure, proposed to be located on unincorporated land within
such county where the following conditions apply:

(1) The substation is being proposed to support the operation of
a proposed renewable energy generation project of 250 MW or greater;

(2) The proposed substation would be located in a heavy
industrial zone;

(3) An electrical substation is an allowed conditional use within
the proposed zone; and

(4) The specific zoning district in which the proposed substation
would be located already has an electrical substation located in such
zone with a rating of 230kv or greater as of August 3, 2023.3

2
Id. at 6.
3
Del. S.B. 159, 153d Gen. Assem. (2025) (underline omitted) [hereinafter S.B. 159]; see also
26 Del. C. § 910.

4
Section 2 of the Act states:

This Act shall have retroactive effect and any previous application to a
county, on or after August 3, 2023, for approval of an electrical
substation prior to the enactment of this Act that complies with the
provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be approved, notwithstanding
any adverse action which a county may have already taken with respect
to such application prior to the enactment of this Act. Further, any
action on the part of a county to alter the underlying zoning
classification applicable to a previously filed application for a
conditional use for electrical substation or otherwise render an
application unqualifying by any means, including changing the
underlying zoning or zoning code, is prohibited.4

SB 199 provides that SB 159 takes effect on January 31, 2026.5

After the legislation became law, the Superior Court asked the parties to

address whether the General Assembly validly enacted the legislation. Eventually,

the court observed that “it appears” that the General Assembly had the authority to

enact the legislation and overturn County Council’s permit denial.6 But the Superior

Court stayed the case because it believed that a decision before the legislation’s

effective date would be an improper advisory opinion.7

4
S.B. 159.
5
Del. S.B. 199, 153d Gen. Assem. (2025) (“An Act to Amend Title 26 of the Delaware Code and
Chapter 44 of Volume 85 of the Laws of Delaware Relating to Public Utilities.”).
6
Renewable Redevelopment, LLC v. Sussex Cnty. Council, 2025 WL 3443112, at *1 (Del. Super.
Dec. 1, 2025).
7
Id.

5
B.

On December 23, 2025, almost five months after the Governor signed SB 159,

the plaintiffs filed this action in the Court of Chancery. The complaint alleged that

SB 159 violates (i) the separation of powers doctrine; (ii) Article II, Section 25 of

the Delaware Constitution; (iii) Article II, Section 16 of the Delaware Constitution;

and (iv) the public’s due process rights. The plaintiffs also sought expedition and a

temporary restraining order. The court agreed to expedite the case but denied the

temporary restraining order when Renewable agreed to postpone construction until

April 30, 2026.

After considering the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court

of Chancery upheld the legislation. In a comprehensive bench ruling, the court held

that: the Town of Fenwick lacked standing to challenge the legislation; separation of

powers restrictions did not apply to a subordinate governmental body like Sussex

County that is “an arm of the legislative branch”;8 the General Assembly had plenary

land use authority and could reclaim zoning power delegated to the counties and

municipalities; the legislation did not violate the one subject/one title constitutional

requirement because the bill adequately described and concerned public utilities and

electrical substations; the County’s “public” due process theory did not succeed

8
Transcript Op. at 23.

6
because due process protects substantive rights of injured parties that were not before

the court and a County cannot assert due process against the State; the General

Assembly may by statute amend or limit delegations of authority when conflicts

exist; and finally, the County waived its spot zoning claim, but even if it did not,

Delaware courts have not used spot zoning to invalidate ordinances. The court

entered summary judgment for the defendants.

C.

On appeal, the plaintiffs have for the most part narrowed their arguments to

challenges under the Delaware Constitution and standing. We review de novo

constitutional challenges to state laws and statutory interpretation issues.9 As with

any constitutional challenge, we start with the “‘strong judicial tradition in

Delaware’ that supports a ‘presumption of the constitutionality of a legislative

enactment.’”10 In other words, “[l]egislative acts should not be disturbed except in

clear cases . . . and should not be declared invalid unless [the legislative

9
Newark Prop. Ass’n v. State, 350 A.3d 1224, 2025 WL 3157392, at *4 (Del. Nov. 12, 2025)
(TABLE).
10
Roberson v. State, --- A.3d ---, 2026 WL 962171, at *3 (Del. Apr. 9, 2026) (quoting State v.
Baker, 720 A.2d 1139, 1144 (Del. 1998)).

7
enactment’s] invalidity is beyond doubt.”11 The plaintiff “has the burden of

overcoming the presumption of its validity.”12

II.

A.

We begin with standing. The plaintiffs contest the Court of Chancery’s

finding that the Town of Fenwick Island lacks standing to pursue the claims in the

complaint.13 Ordinarily, we treat standing “as a threshold issue ‘to ensure the

litigation before the tribunal is a case or controversy that is appropriate for the

exercise of the court’s judicial powers.’”14 On appeal, however, the defendants have

not challenged Sussex County’s standing.15 And Sussex County and Fenwick Island

raise the same claims in their complaint and on appeal. Because Fenwick Island’s

11
Rutledge v. Clearway Energy Grp. LLC, --- A.3d ---, 2026 WL 548504, at *2 (Del. Feb. 27, 2026)
(alteration in original) (quoting Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97, 102 (Del. 1974)).
12
Justice, 325 A.2d at 102.
13
Transcript Op. at 9–13.
14
Brookfield Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Rosson, 261 A.3d 1251, 1262 (Del. 2021) (quotation marks
omitted) (quoting El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C. v. Brinckerhoff, 152 A.3d 1248, 1256
(Del. 2016)).

Answering Br. 36 n.67 (“[A]s the Court [of Chancery] did not rule on the County’s standing,
15

Appellees did not cross-appeal the issue.”).

8
standing will not affect the outcome of the appeal, we can bypass standing and

proceed to the merits.16

B.

Turning to the separation of powers issue, “[t]he Doctrine of Separation of

Powers is a rule forbidding one branch of government from exercising powers

exclusively assigned to another . . . .”17 The doctrine makes clear that “state

government has been divided into the three departments, legislative, executive and

judicial” and “one department may not encroach on the field of either of

the others.”18

The plaintiffs concede that, unless the separate branches of government share

powers, the separation of powers doctrine requires the three branches of Delaware

government – executive, legislative, and judicial – to stay in their own constitutional

lanes. They contend on appeal, however, that separation of powers should also

operate not just between the separate branches of government but also within the

legislative branch. As they argue, the General Assembly cannot enact legislation

that interferes with a quasi-judicial land use decision of a subordinate government

16
McKenna v. Singer, 2017 WL 3500241, at *15 n.218 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2017) (declining to
address issue where “a decision on standing would save no resources at this stage”).
17
Op. of the Justs., 380 A.2d 109, 113 (Del. 1977).
18
Id. (quoting Trs. of New Castle Common v. Gordy, 93 A.2d 509, 517 (Del. 1952)).

9
even though the subordinate government is exercising powers delegated by the

General Assembly.

The plaintiffs have not cited a single federal or state authority supporting their

novel theory of “vertical” rather than “horizontal” separation of powers. That is not

surprising. The separation of powers doctrine addresses acts by the three branches

of government. It does not apply within a branch of government.

To accept the plaintiffs’ novel theory would ignore the hierarchical structure

of the legislative branch. Under the Delaware Constitution, the General Assembly

controls zoning within the State.19 Through various statutes, the General Assembly

has delegated zoning authority to county and municipal governments.20 That

delegation, however, is not immutable. The General Assembly may change or

revoke delegated zoning powers and has done so frequently.21 Here, County Council

19
Del. Const. art. II, § 25; Delaware Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Env’t Control v. Sussex Cnty., 34 A.3d
1087, 1090 (Del. 2011) (“The power to zone is vested in the General Assembly.”); see also New
Castle Cnty. Council v. BC Dev. Assocs., 567 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Del. 1989) (“[T]he [zoning] power
of Council is analogous to that of an administrative agency, since the fundamental power to
regulate land use rests with the General Assembly.” (citing Del. Const. art. II, § 25)).
20
See, e.g., 9 Del. C. § 6902 (delegating land use authority to Sussex County government).
21
See, e.g., Tate v. Miles, 503 A.2d 187, 191 (Del. 1986) (observing that “if the General Assembly
were to enact a statute inconsistent with [Title 9] the later statute would supersede the earlier
statute, and there would be an implied repealer”); Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bradford, 382 A.2d
1338, 1351 (Del. 1978) (upholding legislation modifying already delegated zoning power by
exempting medical facilities from county land use regulations); 29 Del. C. § 4819(b) (modifying
county zoning power to bar zoning ordinances which might prohibit slot machines); 62 Del. Laws
ch. 390 (1980) (“For purposes of all county zoning ordinances” certain facilities “shall be
construed to be a permitted single family residential use of such property.”). Cf. DiSabatino v.

10
denied a permit for an electrical substation. The General Assembly decided that

greater interests were at stake and passed legislation that overrode County Council’s

permit denial. As the ultimate authority for zoning policy throughout the State, it

could do so.

The cases relied on by the plaintiffs prove the point that separation of powers

addresses conflicts between government branches and not vertically within a branch

of government. In Evans v. State, the Superior Court sentenced a defendant to life

in prison with the possibility of parole.22 On appeal, Evans argued that he was

entitled to a conditional release date. This Court agreed with Evans and reversed.

In response to the reversal, the General Assembly passed a statute declaring the

appellate decision “null and void.” We held that legislation that purports to exercise

judicial power in a specific case violated Article IV, Sections 1 and 11 of the

Delaware Constitution – jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.23 As is apparent, Evans

involved the General Assembly infringing upon a function assigned to the judicial

branch by the Delaware Constitution. It did not apply the separation of powers

doctrine vertically within a branch of government.

Ellis, 184 A.2d 469, 473 (Del. 1962) (observing “the General Assembly’s well-established right to
alter, enlarge or revoke the power it grants to a legislative creature”).
22
872 A.2d 539, 542–43 (2005) (applying doctrine to invalidate legislation retroactively reversing
a judicial decision).
23
Id. at 549–50.

11
The plaintiffs also rely on Sierra Club v. DNREC.24 There, the Sierra Club

appealed a dredging-permit approval by DNREC to the Environmental Appeals

Board. Before the EAB issued its order, the General Assembly passed legislation

authorizing the dredging. Relying on Evans, the Sierra Club sought a preliminary

injunction to enjoin the permit. It argued that the General Assembly’s legislative

action violated the separation of powers. The Court of Chancery was not persuaded.

It distinguished Evans because the General Assembly did not “reverse” the EAB’s

decision. Instead, the EAB had not yet issued its decision when the General

Assembly passed the legislation.

The plaintiffs here speculate that the outcome of Sierra Club would have been

different if the timing had been different. In other words, the court would have

enjoined DNREC from issuing the permit if the General Assembly had passed the

legislation after the EAB ruling. In Sierra Club, however, the court did not address

the “vertical” application of separation of powers. More to the point, the Court of

Chancery recognized that the legislation was “a permissible exercise of legislative

authority—notwithstanding its application to an ongoing administrative proceeding,

its specificity mooting a particular administrative appeal, and its impact upon a third

24
2006 WL 1716913 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2006), aff’d sub nom., Sierra Club v. Delaware Dep’t of
Nat. Res. & Env’t Control, 919 A.2d 547 (Del. 2007).

12
party.”25 And the court held that when the General Assembly gives “specific

guidance” through legislation “in an area where managerial authority already had

been delegated to DNREC and the EAB,” it could “reclaim[] a portion of that

authority by duly enacting legislation and [does] not, therefore, overstep its

constitutional bounds.”26

Separation of powers issues arise when one co-equal branch of government

invades the exclusive constitutional authority of another. Here, the conflict arose

exclusively within the legislative branch. Thus, the separation of powers claim was

properly dismissed.

C.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that SB 159 violates Article II, Section 25 of the

Delaware Constitution. Section 25 authorizes the General Assembly to enact laws

allowing municipalities and the three counties to adopt zoning ordinances and other

land use regulations. The plaintiffs claim that once the General Assembly delegates

zoning authority to County Council, it cannot through targeted legislation override

County Council’s delegated powers.

25
Id. at *4.
26
Id. at *5.

13
Nothing in the text of Section 25, however, supports this argument.27 And, as

noted earlier, the General Assembly has done so before. Undeterred, the plaintiffs

argue that “[t]he Delaware Supreme Court has previously recognized that the

delegation of zoning authority to Sussex County is binding.”28 But the cases relied

on by the plaintiffs do not support the argument.

For instance, in Delaware Department of Natural Resources & Environmental

Control v. Sussex County, DNREC adopted regulations addressing buffer zones

around bodies of water.29 In its zoning code, Sussex County had more limited

buffers. At issue was whether DNREC exceeded its statutory authority, which

prohibited DNREC from adopting regulations that “extend, modify or conflict with

any law of this State or the reasonable implications thereof.”30 We upheld a Superior

27
It reads:

§ 25. Laws permitting zoning ordinances and use of land.

The General Assembly may enact laws under which municipalities and the County
of Sussex and the County of Kent and the County of New Castle may adopt zoning
ordinances, laws, or rules limiting and restricting to specified districts and
regulating therein buildings and structures according to their construction and the
nature and extent of their use, as well as the use to be made of land in such districts
for other than agricultural purposes; and the exercise of such authority shall be
deemed to be within the police power of this State.

Del. Const. art. II, § 25.
28
Opening Br. 25.
29
34 A.3d 1087, 1089 (Del. 2011).
30
Id. (quoting 7 Del. C. § 6010(a)).

14
Court decision finding that DNREC’s buffer regulation amounted to zoning that

conflicted with Sussex County’s zoning code and therefore exceeded DNREC’s

authority under the statute.

DNREC is irrelevant here. The General Assembly’s legislative power is not

restricted by limitations it placed on DNREC’s regulatory authority. The same goes

for Hayward v. Gaston, where our Court affirmed a Court of Chancery decision

holding that sovereign immunity did not exempt a state agency from complying with

zoning restrictions for group housing.31 Like DNREC, Hayward addressed a state

agency requirement to follow local zoning codes. It did not address the General

Assembly’s constitutional authority to regulate zoning through legislative acts.

The General Assembly controls the zoning power. Even though it has

delegated that power to the counties and municipalities, it has the power to reclaim

it and need not defer to the decisions of subordinate governments.

D.

SB 159 is titled “An Act to Amend Title 26 of the Delaware Code Relating to

Public Utilities.” Article II, Section 16 of the Delaware Constitution requires that,

except for appropriations, no bill “shall embrace more than one subject, which shall

be expressed in its title.” The plaintiffs argue that SB 159 violates the title

31
542 A.2d 760, 767 (Del. 1988).

15
requirement because the substance of SB 159 concerns county zoning functions, not

public utilities. Alternatively, they argue that, if the proposed legislation relates to

public utilities, it violates the one-subject limitation of Section 16 because it also

addresses zoning. As explained next, each argument fails.

1.

As this Court stated in 1963 in Opinion of the Justices:

[T]he purpose of this section of the Constitution is to insure that the
titles of bills shall be sufficiently comprehensive to give the people of
the State, as well as the members of the General Assembly, fair and
reasonable notice of the subject matter of the proposed legislation.
Fundamentally, it is designed to prevent deception of the general public
and the members of the General Assembly by titles to bills which give
no ad[e]quate information of the subject matter of the bills.32

In other words, Section 16 safeguards against “so-called sleeper legislation,” or

legislation that is hidden from the public.33

When it comes to the descriptiveness of a bill’s title, “[t]his court has often

held that the title of an act need not be an index of the details of the bill.” 34 Rather,

a bill satisfies Section 16 “if the title is so framed as to apprise a reasonable person,

interested in the subject matter of the legislation, sufficiently to lead him to an

32
194 A.2d 855, 856 (Del. 1963).
33
Evans, 872 A.2d at 551 (quoting Op. of the Justs., 194 A.2d at 856).
34
Wilson v. State, 264 A.2d 510, 512 (Del. 1970).

16
inquiry into the body of the bill.”35 In addition, “the constitutional requirement of

particularization in the title of legislation is less rigid in the case of amendatory acts

rather than original legislation.”36

The plaintiffs say that “by the very terms of the statute itself, the bill addresses

‘conditional use permits,’ a county zoning function.”37 They argue that, because the

bill has “nothing to do with ‘Public Utilities’ and everything to do with placing

limitations on the exercise of local zoning authority,” the public did not have

adequate notice of the bill’s subject matter.38

We disagree. The bill has everything to do with public utilities. As the Court

of Chancery described it, SB 159 “addresses conditional use permits of electrical

substations that provide public utilities.”39 The legislation was related to the topic

of public utilities, and the title embraced the same subject matter.

35
Id.; see also Op. of the Justs., 246 A.2d 90, 95 (Del. 1968) (finding title constitutionally sufficient
even though “the bill contain[ed] many matters which are not referred to at all in the title,” because
“the title ha[d] broad implications” which would have motivated an “interested person to inquire
into its contents”).
36
Drake v. State, 682 A.2d 626, 1996 WL 343822, at *2 (Del. June 13, 1996) (TABLE) (holding
that the challenged title, “An Act to Amend Title 11 of the Delaware Code Relating to Certain
Sexual Offenses,” was constitutional because despite not stating the section of the Delaware Code
being amended, the title would put a person interested in the subject matter on notice to make a
deeper inquiry).
37
Opening Br. 33.
38
Id.
39
Transcript Op. at 36.

17
2.

Alternatively, the plaintiffs argue that, even if the legislation relates to public

utilities, it also concerns a county zoning function. According to the plaintiffs, it

therefore violates Section 16’s single subject matter limitation.

The one-subject limitation “is not violated by any act having various details

properly pertinent and germane to one general subject.”40 Although SB 159

addresses a county zoning function, it addresses zoning within the context of the

general subject matter of public utilities.

Our decision in Smith v. Guest is instructive.41 In Smith, the respondent argued

that SB 84, titled “An Act to Amend Title 13 of the Delaware Code Relating to

Parents,” violated the Delaware Constitution’s one subject rule. Although the

legislation included (a) the addition of a new type of legal parent-child relationship

(b) an amendment to the statutory definition of a parent (c) a retroactivity provision

and (d) sections relating to claim and issue preclusion, we upheld the legislation

because all the sections were germane to the act’s stated subject matter –

40
State v. Caruso, 32 A.2d 771, 778 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1943).
41
16 A.3d 920 (Del. 2011).

18
parenthood.42 So too here. The zoning issues were germane to the public utility

purposes of the legislation.43

E.

Finally, the plaintiffs claim that Section 2 of SB 159, which provides that prior

conditional use applications satisfying the statutory criteria are deemed approved,

violates due process protections “to which the public is entitled.”44 We are unsure

about the basis for this argument. The plaintiffs disavow a due process argument

based on the federal Constitution.45 And they state in their brief, without further

elaboration, that “they are claiming due process violations under the Delaware

42
Id. at 930.
43
See Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 382 A.2d at 1343 (finding that the Delaware Health Facilities
Act did not violate the one-subject limitation “in that it not only creates the [Delaware Health
Facilities] Authority, but it also purports to divest certain taxing powers of New Castle County”
because “(m)any things may be included in the body of an Act which are, in themselves, matters
of detail concerning the subject as expressed in the title” (alteration in original) (quotation
omitted)); Hall v. Coupe, 2016 WL 3094406, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2016) (dismissing the
plaintiffs’ one-subject challenge for statute relating to records of incarcerated individuals because
“[t]he mere fact that several categories of records” were addressed could not form the basis of a
constitutional violation).
44
Opening Br. 3.
45
Id. at 39.

19
Constitution . . . .”46 At oral argument, the plaintiffs characterized their due process

claim as a “common law” due process claim.47

We are unaware of any “common law” basis for a due process claim. And the

two cases relied upon by the plaintiffs support only a constitutional basis for due

process. In County Council of Sussex County v. Green, we affirmed the Court of

Chancery’s decision invalidating a rezoning ordinance. The Court of Chancery

invalidated the rezoning ordinance because it was inconsistent with the

comprehensive development plan adopted by County Council at the direction of the

General Assembly.48 On appeal, we observed that County Council does not have a

“free hand” to regulate land use – instead, “[i]t must conform with standards

established by the General Assembly,” including “due process considerations.”49 In

other words, County Council had to respect due process requirements when it

undertook a quasi-judicial function set by the General Assembly.

46
Id.
47
Oral Argument Video at 9:03–27, https://courts.delaware.gov/supreme/oralarguments (“The
Court: [W]hat is your due process claim rooted in, is it a [ ] Delaware Constitutional claim . . . ?
Counsel: It would be . . . a common law claim really that this Court by common law in Green and
also . . . this is Chancery, in Citizens Coalition v. County Council, has recognized the due process
that applies to all zoning decisions which is notice and a right to be heard from the public.”).
48
516 A.2d 480, 481 (Del. 1986).
49
Id.

20
Citizens Coalition, Inc. v. County Council of Sussex County is the same.50

Relying on Green, the court held that, in certain circumstances “the Council must

provide its citizens with procedural due process, i.e., adequate notice of the matter

to be decided and an opportunity to be heard.”51 The court relied on the Delaware

Constitution and a state statute, 9 Del. C. § 6812, requiring notice and public

hearings the County must follow for certain planning and zoning functions. Once

again, the County, not the General Assembly, must follow those requirements when

performing quasi-judicial acts. There is no “common law” due process requirement

restricting legislative action by the General Assembly.

III.

The judgment of the Court of Chancery is affirmed.

50
773 A.2d 1018 (Del. Ch. 2000).
51
Id. at 1023.

21