Rahim v. JP Court 13 and Stoneybrook Preservation Associates, LLC.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MUHAMMAD RAHIM, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. )
) C.A. No. N24A-01-002 CLS
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT )
NO. 13 )
)
and )
)
STONEYBROOK PRESERVATION )
ASC. )
)
Respondent. )

Submitted: January 10, 2025
Decided: March 6, 2025

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Upon Consideration of Petitioner Rahim’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
GRANTED.

Upon Consideration of the Appeal from the Decision of the Justice of the Peace
Court,
AFFIRMED.

Anthony M. Sierzega, Esquire and Richard H. Morse, Esquire of COMMUNITY LEGAL
AID SOCIETY, INC., Attorneys for Petitioner.

Jillian M. Pratt, Esquire of MORTON VALIHURA & ZERBATO, LLC, Attorney for
Respondent.

SCOTT, J.
INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Certiorari seeking review of a

decision by Justice of the Peace Court No. 13’s August 3, 2023 Order in the matter

of Stoney Brook Preservation Associates, LLC. V. Rahim.1 The case concerns a

summary possession action for a federally subsidized housing unit in Claymont,

Delaware. Upon review, the Court finds that the lower tribunal committed no error

of law. Therefore, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Cetiorari is GRANTED, and the

Justice of the Peace Court’s Order is AFFIRMED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
A. THE PARTIES

Petitioner Muhammad Rahim (“Rahim”) was a resident of Stoneybrook

Townhomes until his eviction on December 28, 2023.3

Respondent Stoneybrook Preservation Associates, LLC (“Stoneybrook”) is a

Delaware limited liability company that operates Stoneybrook Townhomes, a

federally subsidized housing community under the HUD Section 8 program.4

1
C.A. No. JP13-22-013011.
2
Unless otherwise noted, this Court’s recitation is drawn from Petitioner’s Opening Brief and
Reply Brief, Respondent’s Answering Brief, and all documents the parties incorporated by
reference.
3
Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 2, D.I. 15 (“Opening Br.”); Respondent’s Answering Brief at 2, D.I.
18 (“Answering Br.”).
4
Answering Br. at 2.

2
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 1, 2021, Rahim and Stoneybrook entered into a Model Lease for

Subsidized Programs for the rental unit located at 303 Earhart Court, Claymont, DE

19701.5 As a condition of tenancy in the subsidized housing community, residents

must meet certain income requirements and comply with both the lease terms and

HUD regulations.6

On November 14, 2022, Stoneybrook served Rahim a Lease Termination

Notice after discovering his alleged failure to properly report his full household

income.7 Specifically, Stoneybrook asserted that during prior periodic certifications,

Rahim had been self-completing Employment Verification forms indicating he was

a driver for RUS Transportation without disclosing that he was also an owner of the

company.8 On November 18, 2022, following Rahim’s non-compliance with the

termination notice, Stoneybrook filed a summary possession action in the Justice of

the Peace Court (“JP Court”).9

5
Opening Br. at 3; Answering Br. at 2.
6
Answering Br. at 2.
7
See id., App. 1 at AB 10.
8
Id.
9
Opening Br. at 2; Answering Br. at 3.

3
The JP Court entered judgment for Stoneybrook, following a full trial on

March 30, 2023, finding that Rahim failed to report all income as required and that

all notice requirements under HUD regulations and the Landlord-Tenant Code were

satisfied.10 Rahim filed a Notice of Appeal on April 4, 2023, seeking a de novo

hearing before a three-judge panel.11 After technical difficulties necessitated a

continuance to accommodate Rahim’s request for a Pashto interpreter, the de novo

trial took place on June 22, 2023.12

On August 3, 2023, the panel issued its decision awarding possession to

Stoneybrook.13 The panel determined that Rahim had materially breached the lease

by knowingly providing incomplete information, specifically finding that he had

withheld information about owning a business on his Personal Income Declaration

forms.14 The panel concluded this omission, combined with Rahim’s completion of

his own employment verification form on behalf of the company he owned,

demonstrated an intentional effort to mislead the landlord.15

10
See Answering Br., App. 2 at AB 33.
11
Id. at AB 36.
12
Id.
13
See id. at AB 36–38; Answering Br., App. 3 at AB 39 (“JP Court Panel Order”).
14
See JP Court Panel Order at AB 39.
15
Id.

4
Rahim filed a Motion for New Trial and Reargument on August 11, 2023,

which was denied on December 12, 2023.16 The Writ of Possession was finalized

on December 28, 2023, at which time Stoneybrook took possession of the rental

unit.17 Rahim filed this Petition for Writ of Certiorari on January 10, 2024, asserting

that the decision must be voided and remanded due to errors of law by the lower

tribunal’s three-judge panel.18 The matter has been fully briefed,19 and it is ripe for

decision.

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS20
Rahim advances several arguments in support of his petition. First, he

contends that reversal is required because the JP Court did not find that he caused or

threatened to cause irreparable harm, which he argues is required under 25 Del. C. §

5513(b), the statute under which Stoneybrook proceeded.

Second, Rahim argues that the JP Court committed error of law by entering

judgment for Stoneybrook on its claim that termination was justified by fraud when

the court never made a finding that fraud occurred. He maintains that the complaint

16
Answering Br., App. 3 at AB 42–43.
17
Answering Br. at 5.
18
See Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Certiorari and Appeal for Judicial Review at 7, D.I. 1.
19
See generally Opening Br.; Answering Br.; Petitioner’s Reply Brief, D.I. 19 (“Reply Br.”).
20
Petitioner’s contentions are drawn from his Opening Br. and Reply Br.

5
specifically alleged fraud as the basis for lease termination, and therefore,

Stoneybrook was required to prove fraud rather than mere lease noncompliance.

Third, Rahim contends that even if fraud had been found, the facts established

by the JP Court would have been insufficient to establish fraud under Delaware law.

Specifically, he argues that three essential elements of fraud were not proven: (1)

intent to induce action, (2) justifiable reliance, and (3) resulting damages.

Finally, Rahim asserts that the JP Court committed error of law in its

interpretation of the Personal Declaration Forms. He points out that while the court

found he “withheld information regarding owning a business repeatedly,” the 2022

form actually showed that he had indicated “yes” to business ownership.

B. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS21
Stoneybrook maintains that the JP Court’s decision should be affirmed. First,

it argues that Rahim’s conduct constituted material noncompliance with the lease

terms, specifically citing his failure to fully report his business ownership and

income from RUS Transportation.

Second, Stoneybrook contends that Rahim mischaracterizes its claim by

focusing solely on fraud. It argues that the complaint alleged both fraud and material

noncompliance with the lease, and that proof of either would justify termination.

21
Respondent’s contentions are drawn from its Answering Br.

6
Stoneybrook maintains that the JP Court properly found material noncompliance

based on Rahim’s failure to provide complete and accurate information as required

by the lease.

Third, Stoneybrook argues that even if fraud were the sole basis for

termination, the elements of fraud were met. It contends that Rahim’s repeated

failure to disclose his business ownership, combined with discrepancies between

reported income and tax returns, demonstrates fraudulent intent. Stoneybrook

further argues that it took action upon discovering these discrepancies and faced

potential harm in its relationship with HUD due to Rahim’s inaccurate disclosures.

Finally, Stoneybrook asserts that the JP Court’s interpretation of the Personal

Declaration Forms was a factual determination not subject to review on certiorari,

and that the JP Court had adequate reasoning for its decision based on the totality of

the evidence presented.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court has original, and exclusive, trial court jurisdiction to issue writs of

certiorari to the Justice of the Peace Court in summary possession cases.22

22
Maddrey v. Justice of the Peace Court 13, 956 A.2d 1204, 1212 (Del. 2008).

7
Petitioners for a writ of certiorari must satisfy two threshold conditions—“the

judgment must be final and there can be no other available basis for review.”23

On certiorari, the Court’s review is on the record, and it may not weigh

evidence or review the lower tribunal's factual findings.24 Rather, the

reviewing court considers the record before the lower tribunal to determine whether

it: (1) exceeded its jurisdiction; (2) committed errors of law; or (3) “proceeded

irregularly.”25 In these situations, the decision of a lower tribunal will be reversed:

(1) for exceeding the tribunal’s jurisdiction only if the record fails to show that the

matter was within the lower tribunal’s personal and subject matter jurisdiction; (2)

for an error of law committed by the lower tribunal when the record affirmatively

shows that the lower tribunal has “proceeded illegally or manifestly contrary to law;”

and (3) for irregularities of proceedings if the lower tribunal failed to create an

adequate record for review.26

DISCUSSION

There is no dispute that the decision of the three-judge panel of the JP Court

constitutes the final trial adjudication of the summary possession complaint. Rahim

23
Id. at 1213.
24
Reise v. Board of Bldg. Appeals of City of Newark, 746 A.2d 271, 274 (Del.2000).
25
Id. (citing 1 Woolley's Delaware Practice, § 896 (1906)).
26
Christiana Town Ctr., LLC v. New Castle Cnty., 865 A.2d 521 (Del. 2004) (TABLE) (citations
omitted).

8
does not argue that the JP Court exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded irregularly.

Instead, he contends that the JP Court committed legal error in three ways: (1) by

failing to find fraud while granting possession based on a fraud claim; (2) by finding

material noncompliance without sufficient factual findings to support fraud under

Delaware law; and (3) by misinterpreting the Personal Declaration forms.27 These

arguments are unpersuasive.

A. THE JP COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE CONTROLLING LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
The Delaware Residential Landlord Tenant Code expressly provides that,

“[w]ith regard to a tenant occupying a federally-subsidized housing unit, in the event

of any conflict between the terms of this Code and the terms of any federal law,

regulations or guidelines, the terms of the federal law, regulations or guidelines shall

control.”28 Rahim’s argument that Delaware common law fraud should apply to this

action therefore fails.29 The framework for analyzing the alleged fraud in this case

must be derived from federal standards rather than state common law.

Under HUD’s Regulations, fraud may be established if “(1) the tenant was

made aware of program requirements and prohibitions (i.e., all appropriate

27
See Opening Br.; Reply Br.
28
25 Del. C. § 5106(e); see also Delaware State Hous. Auth./Clark's Corner v. Just. of Peace Ct.
16, 2008 WL 4120038, at *4 n.27 (Del. Super. Aug. 8, 2008).
29
Opening Br. at 10–11; Reply Br. at 9–11.

9
signatures are on the intake documents);” and “(2) [t]he tenant intentionally

misstated or withheld some material information. . . .”30 “Fraudulent intent can also

be demonstrated by documenting that: … (d) [t]he tenant omitted material facts that

were known to the tenant (e.g., employment of self of other household members) . .

. .”31 A landlord’s “authority to pursue eviction in cases of tenant fraud is grounded

in the material noncompliance provision contained in both the model lease and in

the regulations [24 CFR 247.3].”32 “Material noncompliance includes ‘knowingly

provides inaccurate or incomplete information.’”33

Under 24 CFR 247.3(a), a landlord may terminate a lease on the grounds of:

(1) a tenant’s material noncompliance with the rental agreement, (2) the tenant’s

material failure to carry out obligations under any state landlord and tenant act, (3)

criminal activity by a tenant, or (4) other good cause.34 24 CFR 247.3(c)(3) further

defines “material noncompliance” to include situations where a tenant either: (i) fails

to supply on time all required information on the income and composition, or

30
U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., HUD Handbook 4350.3: Occupancy Requirements of
Subsidized Multifamily Housing Programs, § 8-19(C).
31
Id. § 8-19(C)(2).
32
Id. § 8-19(D)(1).
33
Id.
34
24 C.F.R. § 247.3(a).

10
eligibility factors, of the tenant household…; or (ii) knowingly provides incomplete

or inaccurate information as required under these provisions.”35

While Stoneybrook cited both 25 Del. C. § 5513(b) and 24 CFR 247.3(c),36

establishing material noncompliance under the federal regulations alone is sufficient

to support eviction. The JP Court’s ruling was based on “grounds for termination

pursuant to the guidelines found with the HUD Occupancy Handbook.”37 The panel

concluded that “[Stoneybrook] has met the burden of proof to show that there has

been material noncompliance with terms of the lease, as [Rahim] knowingly

provided incomplete or inaccurate information.”38 For the purpose of this writ, the

JP Court did not commit errors of law by applying the appropriate legal framework.

B. THE JP COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT RAHIM
MATERIALLY BREACHED HIS LEASE AGREEMENT
The JP Court’s determination that Rahim knowingly withheld material

information and materially breached his lease agreement, and thus, ground for

summary possession, is supported by the record. The panel found that Rahim

withheld information regarding owning a business on his Personal Declaration

35
24 C.F.R. § 247.3(c)(3).
36
See JP Court Panel Order at AB 38; Answering Br. at 12.
37
JP Court Panel Order at AB 39.
38
Id.

11
Forms.39 Specifically, it determined that this withholding, combined with his self-

completion of employment verification forms on behalf of the company he owned,

demonstrated that he “omitted material facts known to him.”40 Such a pattern of

non-disclosure and self-completion prompted the conclusion that the omissions were

intentional rather than inadvertent.

These findings satisfy both prongs of material noncompliance under 24 CFR

247.3(c)(3) and fraud under the HUD Regulations—Rahim failed to supply required

information about his business ownership status, and he knowingly provided

incomplete information by omitting his ownership role while self-verifying his

employment. The JP Court had before it substantial documentation establishing that

Rahim was aware of program requirements regarding income disclosure and reached

its conclusion that Rahim intentionally withheld material information.41 On the

record before this Court, no error of law appears in the JP Court’s conclusion that

Rahim’s conduct is sufficient to justify termination of his tenancy under the

applicable HUD regulations.

39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at AB 37–38.

12
C. RAHIM’S ARGUMENTS DO NOT DEMONSTRATE ERROR OF LAW

Rahim’s contention that the JP Court misinterpreted the 2022 Personal

Declaration Form likewise fails to establish legal error.42 Rahim argues that the JP

Court erroneously characterized the 2022 form—on which he marked “yes” in the

section inquiring whether he owned a business—as not indicating business

ownership and “based its conclusion that [Rahim] omitted facts, in part on that

erroneous characterization.”43 He suggests this constituted legal error rather than a

factual determination.44

This argument misconstrues the nature of the JP Court’s findings. The court’s

decision did not turn solely on the 2022 form, but rather on the pattern of non-

disclosure.45 Stoneybrook correctly notes that this Court’s role on certiorari review

is not to weigh evidence or reevaluate factual findings. Rahim’s attempt to reframe

the interpretation of documentary evidence as a legal question rather than a factual

determination is unavailing.46 The characterization of the form and what it revealed

about Rahim’s intent fall squarely within the fact-finding province of the JP Court.

42
Opening Br. at 13–15.
43
Reply Br. at 12.
44
Id.
45
JP Court Panel Order at AB 37–38.
46
Rahim raised similar arguments on the Motion for Reargument: (1) that the reference to the 2020
Declaration form should be the 2021 and 2022 Declaration Forms; and (2) that how him and his
son filled out the forms were appropriate. The JP Court held that there was no error of fact, and
13
CONCLUSION

The JP Court’s decision demonstrates no error of law that would warrant

reversal under this Court’s standard of review on certiorari. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari is GRANTED, and the Justice of the

Peace Court’s decision is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Calvin L. Scott
Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.

each jurist independently came to the conclusion that he failed to report required information. See
Answering Br., App. 3 at AB 42–43.

14