State v. Church

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) I.D. No. 2403005415
)
CHRISTIAN CHURCH, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: June 2, 2025
Decided: June 11, 2025

ORDER

Upon Defendant’s Motion For Reargument

DENIED

1. Following a jury trial, Christian Church (“Defendant”) was convicted
of two counts of Assault in the Second Degree. On Defendant’s renewed motion,
the Court granted a judgment of acquittal for one assault but denied acquittal for the
other. Defendant now moves for reargument. For the reasons that follow,
Defendant’s motion is DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
2. The relevant facts are included in this Court’s memorandum opinion
and order dated May 15, 2025. 2
3. Beginning January 21, 2025, Defendant was tried on the charge of
Assault in the First Degree of Kaden Handte (“Handte”) and Assault in the Second
Degree of Amarion Nutter (“Nutter”). At the close of the State’s case-in-chief,
Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on both charges. The Court denied that

1
Citations in the form of “D.I. ___” refer to docket items.
2
See State v. Church, 2025 WL 1411722, at *2–4 (Del. Super. May 15, 2025).
motion. On January 29, 2025, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser
included offense of Assault in the Second Degree of Handte (the “Handte
Conviction”) and the charged offense of Assault in the Second Degree of Nutter (the
“Nutter Conviction”).
4. Defendant timely filed a renewed motion for judgment of acquittal and
a motion for a new trial. On May 15, 2025, the Court issued an opinion and order
granting Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the Nutter Conviction,
denying it as to the Handte Conviction, and denying his motion for a new trial.3
5. On May 22, 2025, Defendant attempted to file a motion for reargument
seeking acquittal of the Handte Conviction. That motion was rejected because it
exceeded the applicable page limitations. On May 23, 2025, Defendant re-filed the
motion along with a motion to exceed page imitations (the latter of which the State
did not oppose).4 The Court approved the motion to exceed page limitations on May
27, 2025.5 On June 2, 2025, the State filed a response to Defendant’s motion for
reargument. 6
STANDARD OF REVIEW
6. In Delaware, there is no specific criminal rule governing motions for
reargument. 7 Superior Court Criminal Rule 57(d) provides for the application of the

3
See generally id.
4
D.I. 41, 42.
5
D.I. 43. As a technical matter, Defendant’s motion for reargument was untimely, as he was
required to file the motion no later than May 22, 2025. However, because Defendant attempted to
file the motion on that date, the Court will consider it on its merits. Cf. Dishmon v. Fucci, 32 A.3d
338, 346 (Del. 2011) (“Delaware has a strong public policy that favors permitting a litigant a right
to a day in court.”).
6
D.I. 45.
7
See Samuel v. State, 3 A.3d 1098, 2010 WL 3245109, at *1 (Del. Aug. 17, 2010) (ORDER) (“A
timely-filed motion for reargument is ‘the proper device for seeking reconsideration’ of [this
Court's] findings of fact and conclusions of law.”); accord Whitfield v. State, 981 A.2d 1174, 2009
WL 3111680, at *1 (Del. Sept. 29, 2009) (ORDER).
2
Superior Court Civil Rules when no criminal rule is controlling. Thus, Superior
Court Civil Rule 59(e) applies to Defendant's motion.8
7. “Delaware law places a heavy burden on a party seeking relief pursuant
to [Superior Court Civil] Rule 59.” 9 “Motions for reargument should not be used to
rehash arguments decided by the Court, or to present new arguments not previously
raised” 10 because such use “frustrates the efficient use of judicial resources, places
the opposing party in an unfair position, and stymies the orderly process for reaching
closure on the issues.” 11 The Court will grant a motion for reargument only if the
movant shows that “the Court has overlooked a controlling precedent or legal
principles, or the Court has misapprehended the law or facts such as would have
changed the outcome of the underlying decision.” 12
ANALYSIS
8. Defendant makes three core arguments. The first is that the jury’s
verdict acquitting Defendant of Assault in the First Degree but convicting him of
Assault in the Second Degree shows that the jury concluded that Defendant acted
recklessly, not intentionally. The second is that this Court inappropriately applied
11 Del. C. § 262. The third is that the jury could not reasonably infer the necessary
intent for Assault in the First Degree.
9. Defendant’s first and third contentions largely rehash the arguments he
raised in his first two motions for judgment of acquittal, and to the extent they are
not repetitive should have been raised previously. Defendant’s second argument,

8
Samuel, 2010 WL 3245109, at *1; accord Dickens v. State, 852 A.2d 907, 2004 WL 1535814
(Del. June 25, 2004) (ORDER).
9
State v. Baird, 2024 WL 2764432, at *1 (Del. Super. May 29, 2024) (quoting Newborn v.
Christiana Pediatric Serv., P.A., 2017 WL 394096, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 25, 2017)).
10
Id. (citing Tilghman v. Del. State Univ., 2012 WL 5551233, at *1 (Del. Super. Oct. 16, 2012)).
11
Id. (quoting Tilghman, 2012 WL 5551233, at *1) (citation altered).
12
Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Invacare, Inc., 2006 WL 488590, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 2006)).
3
although asserting that this Court’s earlier opinion misapprehended the law, claims
error that would not have changed the outcome of that decision.
The jury’s verdict is irrelevant to the mens rea issue.
10. Defendant contends that the jury’s verdict—convicting him of the
lesser included offense of Assault in the Second Degree of Handte but acquitting
him of the charged offense of Assault in the First Degree—supported his renewed
motion for judgment of acquittal because it reflected the jury’s “considered
judgment” that Defendant acted recklessly.13 Defendant is incorrect.
11. The jury’s verdict is irrelevant to the question of whether the Court
erred in denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the
State’s case-in-chief. First, the jury’s verdict had not yet been rendered and was not
before the Court; second, on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the question is not
what the jury ultimately concluded, but, rather, “whether any rational trier of fact,
viewing the evidence and all the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of all the elements of the crime;”14 third, even if the jury’s verdict had some
bearing on the analysis, the verdict in this case does not necessarily indicate that the
jury concluded Defendant acted recklessly.
12. As charged in this case, Assault in the First Degree differs from Assault
in the Second Degree in two ways. A person is guilty of Assault in the First Degree
when “[t]he person intentionally disfigures another person seriously and
permanently, or intentionally destroys, amputates or disables permanently a member

13
D.I. 42, ¶ 13.
14
McGuiness v. State, 312 A.3d 1156, 1187 (Del. 2024) (quoting Hopkins v. State, 293 A.3d 145,
150 (Del. 2023)) (emphasis supplied). Taken to its rational conclusion, accepting Defendant’s
argument would mean that any jury conviction on an unindicted lesser included offense would
mandate an acquittal because the jury found the defendant not guilty of the charged offense.
4
or organ of another person’s body[.]” 15 A person is guilty of Assault in the Second
Degree when “[t]he person recklessly or intentionally causes serious physical injury
to another person.”16 In finding Defendant not guilty of Assault in the First Degree,
the jury may have concluded that Defendant acted recklessly, or the jury may have
concluded that Defendant acted intentionally but caused Handte only serious
physical injury rather than the more serious harm required for Assault in the First
Degree.
Any error in applying 11 Del. C. § 262 was harmless, as 11 Del. C. § 306(c)(1)
provides an independent basis for the Court’s decision.
13. In denying Handte’s renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, this
Court held that a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant intended to
permanently disable Handte’s jaw, or to permanently and seriously disfigure Handte,
because 11 Del C. § 306(c)(1) permits jurors to infer that individuals intend the
natural and probable consequences of their actions.17 In the alternative, the Court
reasoned that, even if Defendant did not specifically intend permanent disablement
or disfigurement, such injuries were not so remote or accidental that Defendant
should be absolved of responsibility for them,” 18 citing 11 Del C. § 262.19
14. Defendant has not cited any authority indicating that this Court
misapprehended 11 Del C. § 262 as it applies to this case. However, even if
Defendant’s arguments are correct, this Court’s application of § 262 was in the
alternative, as noted supra. For the reasons stated in this Court’s earlier decision

15
11 Del. C. § 613(a)(2).
16
11 Del. C. § 612(a)(1).
17
Church, 2025 WL 1411722, at *5–7.
18
Id. at *5.
19
In relevant part, the statute provides that “The element of intentional or knowing causation is
not established if the actual result is outside the intention or the contemplation of the defendant
unless[] . . . (2) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result
and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor's liability or
on the gravity of the offense.”
5
and those provided later in this order, 11 Del. C. § 306(c)(1) provided an
independently sufficient basis for denying Defendant’s motion. Therefore,
Defendant’s motion for reargument is also denied on this ground because any error,
even if shown, would have been harmless.
The Court did not err in holding that the jury could have inferred that
Defendant intended to cause permanent disability or permanent and serious
disfigurement to Handte.
15. In criticizing this Court’s finding that the State presented evidence of
intent sufficient to survive Defendant’s renewed motion for judgment of acquittal on
the Handte charge, Defendant makes four arguments: (1) the evidence presented
showed only that Defendant intended to strike Handte, not that he intended to cause
him sufficiently serious harm to satisfy the elements of Assault in the First Degree;
(2) even if Handte suffered the requisite injury, such a result does not justify an
inference of intent to cause that result; (3) the jury could not find that the injury
Handte suffered was the “natural and probable consequence” of striking Handte
without expert testimony to that effect; and (4) the evidence presented should have
led the jury to conclude that Defendant acted “emotionally or reactively” rather than
with a “calculated intent to maim.”
16. Defendant’s first two contentions are best dealt with together.
Defendant argues that the jury heard “no statements, threats, or conduct suggesting
that the defendant intended anything beyond a physical blow,” 20 that “[m]ere intent
to injure or strike should not equate to intent to permanently disfigure,” 21 and that
the “seriousness of the outcome alone cannot be used to infer that the defendant
intended the specific nature and permanency of that result” 22 in the absence of

20
D.I. 42, ¶ 26.
21
Id.
22
Id. at ¶ 27.
6
evidence of “purposeful targeting, use of a weapon, or repeated blows.”23
Elsewhere, Defendant complains that this Court’s denial of his renewed motion for
judgment of acquittal cited his large size as one reason the jury could infer his intent
to cause such injury.24
17. The jury was entitled to draw the inference that Defendant intended the
natural and probable consequence of his acts pursuant to 11 Del C. § 306(c)(1).
Defendant’s physical size is relevant to the question of whether Handte’s injuries
were the “natural and probable consequence” of punching Handte as Defendant did.
The physical capability of an assailant has a bearing on the foreseeability of harm,
and, by connection, the assailant’s culpability. If a person who possesses diminished
strength strikes someone, that individual’s lack of strength would render a jury’s
conclusion less reasonable that a disabling injury was the “probable” result of that
strike. On the other hand, a defendant of greater size and strength is more capable
of inflicting such injuries without the aid of a weapon.
18. This Court’s prior decision did not use Defendant’s size to eliminate
the intent element of Assault in the First Degree. Rather, the Court recognized that
the jury could infer that Defendant knew his own strength and that, by bringing his
full strength to bear on Handte’s jaw, he intended the natural and probable result that
Handte’s jaw would be severely and permanently injured. Of course, Defendant’s
size was just one factor for the jury to consider, along with the nature of the strike
itself and other surrounding circumstances.
19. Defendant’s argument that the jury could not infer his intent without
evidence of “purposeful targeting” and the like is unavailing. The Court has already
rejected the proposition that the use of a weapon is a prerequisite for a finding of

23
Id. at ¶ 28.
24
Id. at ¶¶ 21–22.
7
such intent, 25 and Defendant cites no legal basis for reconsideration. The single case
Defendant cites to support his broader argument, Carter v. State, 26 is distinguishable.
In Carter, the Court concluded that the plastic lacrosse stick wielded by the
defendant, under the circumstances in which it was used, was not “readily capable
of causing death or serious physical injury.” 27 One reason for the Court’s decision
was that the defendant did not attempt to strike the alleged victim “on the head or
some other more vulnerable part of his body.”28 Here, the Court has already held
that the jury could reasonably find Handte suffered permanent disability or serious
disfigurement,29 and, citing Carter, found that the jury could have inferred
Defendant’s intent to cause maximal injury in part because he targeted Handte’s
head.30 Thus, although Carter has some bearing on this case, it cuts against
Defendant’s position.
20. In addition, the jury did not need expert testimony to find that Handte’s
injuries were the natural and probable consequence of Defendant’s punch. Expert
testimony on causation is needed when jurors must find facts “requir[ing] an
understanding and analysis of issues beyond the ken of the typical jury[.]” 31 This is
not such a case. Simply because there is a question of a consequence’s probability
does not mean that expert testimony is required. In Bradley v. State, the Delaware

25
See Church, 2025 WL 1411722, at *5 (“As this Court has observed, ‘no doubt, serious physical
injury has been the resultant harm from fights, altercations, and bodily assaults with or without
weapons.’” (quoting State v. Clark, 2018 WL 7197607, at *5 (Del. Super. Oct. 1, 2018) (citation
altered)).
26
933 A.3d 774 (Del. 2007).
27
Id. at 778-79.
28
Id. at 779.
29
Church, 2025 WL 1411722, at *5 n.29.
30
Id. at *6 & n.32.
31
Manerchia v. Kirkwood Fitness and Racquetball Clubs, Inc., 992 A.2d 1237, 2010 WL 1114927,
at *3 (Del. Mar. 25, 2010) (ORDER) (citing Campbell v. DiSabatino, 947 A.2d 1116, 1118 (Del.
2008); Campbell v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., 966 A.2d 347, 2009 WL 315687 (Del. Feb. 10, 2009)
(ORDER)); Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, 706 A.2d 526, 533 & n.30 (Del. 1988)).
8
Supreme Court held that despite a lack of expert testimony that prophylactic HIV
treatment was necessary for a police officer after the defendant bit the officer’s arm,
“[a] rational jury could conclude that such treatment is a natural and probable
consequence of [such a] bite.”32
21. Finally, Defendant’s argument that “the evidence more appropriately
supports a conviction [of] . . . Assault in the Second Degree, which includes reckless
. . . conduct” 33 misapprehends the Court’s role on a motion for judgment of acquittal.
As the Court emphasized in its prior decision, on a motion for judgment of acquittal
“[t]he Court will grant a defendant’s motion only when the state presented
insufficient evidence to sustain a verdict of guilt,”34 and “must be careful not to
supplant the jury’s role as factfinder[.]” 35 Whether the evidence best supported a
conviction for a lesser included offense is beside the point. “[T]he question on a
motion for judgment of acquittal is ‘whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the
evidence and all the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
all the elements of the crime.’”36 By viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, the Court preserves the jury’s role as the weigher of the evidence. 37 To
the extent that Defendant raises a question of the weight of the evidence, Defendant’s
argument misses the mark and asks the Court to encroach on the province of the

32
193 A.3d 734, 739–40 (Del. 2018); cf. Winborne v. State, 455 A.2d 357, 360 (Del. 1982)
(evidence was sufficient for jury verdict that Defendant who used gun to strike elderly victim with
such force that the gun barrel dented intended to kill him, because the jury could infer that he
intended that natural consequence).
33
D.I. 42, ¶ 37.
34
Church, 2025 WL 1411722, at *4 (quoting State v. Ford, 293 A.3d 372, 377 (Del. Super. Apr.
19, 2023), aff’d, -- A.3d --, 2025 WL 1257476 (Del. May 1, 2025)) (emphasis and one alteration
in original).
35
Id. (citing State v. Thomas, 2019 WL 669934, at *3 (Del. Super Feb. 8, 2019)).
36
Id. (quoting McGuiness, 312 A.3d at 1187) (emphasis supplied).
37
Ford, 293 A.3d at 377, n.10 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), reh’g
denied, 444 U.S. 890 (1979)).
9
jury.38 To the extent that Defendant raises a question of the sufficiency of the
evidence, the evidence of Defendant’s intent was sufficient for all of the reasons
stated previously.
CONCLUSION
22. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for reargument is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

NEP/tls
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Counsel of Record

38
Cerberus Intern. Ltd. v. Appollo Mgmt., L.P., 794 A.2d 1141, 1150 (Del. 2002) (“It is not
permissible for the trial judge, in either a criminal case or a civil case . . . to weigh the evidence or
to resolve conflicts arising from . . . evidence. That is the job of the trier of fact . . . after hearing
all the evidence[.]” (internal citations omitted, emphasis in original)); Edwards v. State, 285 A.2d
805, 806 (Del. 1971) (“In passing upon a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . ‘[t]he Court is
without power to determine the weight of the evidence or where the preponderance lies.’” (quoting
State v. Biter, 119 A.2d 894, 898 (Del. Super. 1955))).
10