State v. Steele

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,
V.

ID No. 2306012913

JACOB W. STEELE,

Defendant.

Nee ee ee ee

Date Submitted: May 28, 2025
Date Decided: August 14, 2025

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Upon Defendant Jacob Steele’s Motion for Postconviction Relief: DENIED

Brett D. Fallon, Jr., Esq., Delaware Department of Justice, 820 N. French Street,
7th Floor, Wilmington, DE 19801. Attorney for the State.

James J. Haley, Jr., Esq., Ferrara & Haley, 1716 Wawaset Street, Wilmington, DE
19806-2131. Attorney for Defendant.

Scott, J.
I. INTRODUCTION

On April 4, 2024, Steele pled guilty to Possession of a Firearm During the
Commission of a Felony (IN23-07-1414), Possession of a Firearm by a Person
Prohibited (IN23-07-1415), and Felony Possession of Methamphetamine (IN23-07-
1418).' On the same day, the Court sentenced Steele as follows: for PEDCE, 5 years
Level V; for PFBPP, 10 years Level V, suspended after 3 years Level V for 2 years
Level IV DOC Discretion, followed by 1 year Level III; and for Felony Possession
of Methamphetamine, 1 year Level V, suspended for 1 year Level III.?_ On May 24,
2024, Steele filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief. On November 21,
2024, Steele’s counsel filed an amended Motion for Postconviction Relief (“PCR
Motion”).* Steele’s PCR Motion asserts one claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel based on plea counsel’s failure to complete a reasonable investigation into
who owned and possessed the firearms and ammunition.»

II. DISCUSSION

Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 allows incarcerated individuals to

set aside their judgment of conviction if there is a sufficient factual and legal basis

for a collateral attack upon the criminal conviction.°®

'D.L 9,

> DL. 10.

IDL 11.

* DI. 20.

5 Id.917.

° Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).

A. — Rule 61 Procedural Bars

Before addressing the merits of the postconviction relief claim, the Court must
first consider and apply the procedural requirements of Rule 61.’ Rule 61 bars
consideration of a postconviction motion if it is untimely, repetitive, procedurally
defaulted, or formerly adjudicated.®

I. It is Uncontested that Steele’s PCR Motion is Timely

“A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after
the judgment of conviction is final... .”? If the defendant does not file a direct
appeal, a judgment of conviction is final thirty days after the Superior Court imposes
a sentence.'® The State does not contest the timeliness of Steele’s PCR Motion.!!

2. Steele’s PCR Motion is Not Repetitive

“No second or subsequent motion is permitted under [Rule 61]... .”!?. This
is Steele’s first Rule 61 motion. Therefore, his PCR Motion is not repetitive.

3. Steele’s PCR Motion is Not Procedurally Defaulted

“Any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the

judgment of conviction . . . is thereafter barred, unless the movant shows cause for

” State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 323 (Del. 2013), as amended (May 28, 2013).
® Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4).

* Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).

10 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1)(i).

NDI. 23 46.

2 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2)(i).

relief from the procedural default and prejudice from violation of the movant's
rights.”'? Steele asserts one claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.'* This claim
was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgement of conviction and is
therefore permitted under Rule 61.'°

4. Steele’s PCR Motion has Not Been Formerly Adjudicated

“Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the
proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction
proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred.”!® Steele’s
claim was not formerly adjudicated and is therefore permitted under Rule 61.!”
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Because Steele is not procedurally barred by Rule 61, the Court will analyze
Steele’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on its merits.!8

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

establish two things: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) counsel’s

'3 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).

'4 See generally D.I. 20.

' See Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 175 (Del. 2020) (“[I]neffective-assistance claims are not
subject to Rule 61(i)(3)’s bar because they cannot be asserted in the proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction under the Superior Court's rules and this Court's precedent.”).

'© Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).

'7 Since this is Steele’s first PCR motion, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim has not been
formally adjudicated.

'8 The State responded to Steele’s claims from both his pro se motion and his amended motion.
The Court only addresses Steele’s amended motion.

4

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.'? “Unless a defendant makes both
showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the
adversary process that renders the result unreliable.””°

1. Trial Counsel’s Performance Was Not Deficient

To prove counsel’s performance was deficient, a defendant must show
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”! The
Court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts
of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.””? “Because
advocacy is an art and not a science, and because the adversary system requires
deference to counsel's informed decisions, strategic choices must be respected in
these circumstances if they are based on professional judgment.””’ To eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct
was professionally reasonable.”*

Steele argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel because plea
counsel failed to reasonably investigate Steele’s assertion that the firearms and

ammunition did not belong to him, but instead belonged to the owner of the house

'9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

20 Id.

21 Td. at 687-688.

22 Sierra v. State, 242 A.3d 563, 572 (Del. 2020) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
23 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681.

24 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

5
where the guns were found, Albert Wickkiser.”°

More specifically, Steele argues
that if plea counsel completed a reasonable investigation they would have found the
following: (A) Wickkiser’s DNA was previously secured by Delaware law
enforcement, (B) Wickkiser’s DNA could have been secured because he was in
custody, (C) a statement from Wickkiser could have been taken because he was in
custody, and (D) the DNA analysis may have given evidentiary support that the
items belonged to Wickkiser, not Steele.?°

“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”?’ “In any
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed
for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference
to counsel's judgments.”

Plea counsel contends that he did not interview Wickkiser or obtain his DNA
because “if the results excluded Wickkiser as a DNA contributor[,] counsel would
have ethically been prevented from arguing the firearms and ammunition belonged

to Wickkiser.””? Giving deference to plea counsel’s judgments under the

circumstances, this decision was reasonable. If, after further investigation, the

5 D1. 209 17.

26 Id.

27 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
28 Td.

2°21 I. 26 at 4-5.

evidence proved Wickkiser’s DNA was not on the firearms or ammunition, plea
counsel would have lost a potential defense to negotiate a plea bargain with. Plea
counsel’s decision was an attempt to protect Steele by leaving a route of defense
open and was thus reasonable.

Plea counsel further contends that he also made this decision because
Wickkiser’s DNA being present on the items, or Wickkiser admitting he owned the
items, would not have negated the State’s argument that Steele knowingly possessed
the firearms and ammunition on the date of the indicted offenses.*° Giving deference
to plea counsel’s judgments under the circumstances, this decision was reasonable.
Even if Wickkiser’s DNA was proven to be on the items, or Wickkiser made a
statement that he owned or possessed the items, it would not have negated the State’s
argument. Possession can be joint.*! Thus, the State could still argue that Wickkiser
and Steele possessed the firearms simultaneously.

In conclusion, Plea counsel’s decision to not complete further investigation
into Wickkiser’s ownership or possession of the firearms and ammunition did not
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.

2. Trial Counsel’s Performance Did Not Prejudice the Defendant

Even if Trial Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

30 D1. 26 at 5.

>! Howell v. State, 268 A.3d 754, 768 (Del. 2021) (upholding that the definition of possession
includes joint possession with another person).
reasonableness, Steele’s claim would fail because plea counsel’s actions did not
prejudice the defense. To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant must affirmatively prove counsel’s performance prejudiced the defense.**
Counsel’s performance prejudices the defense if there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.*?
In the context of a guilty plea, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”*4

Even if plea counsel completed further investigation into Wickkiser’s
ownership or possession of the firearms and ammunition, as discussed above,” it is
unlikely that Steele would have changed his plea or been given a better plea deal.
Wickkiser’s ownership or possession of the firearms and ammunition would not
negate a finding that Steele possessed the firearms and ammunition. Possession can
be joint°° Thus Wickkiser and Steele could have possessed the firearms
simultaneously. Further, Steele’s DNA was located on the frame of one firearm, and

Steele was found lying on a pillow that was on top of a separate firearm.*’ This

32 Albury, 551 A.2d at 60 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

33 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

34 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

35 See supra Section II(B)(1).

°6 Howell y. State, 268 A.3d 754, 768 (Del. 2021) (upholding that the definition of possession
includes joint possession with another person).

37 DJ. 20, Exhibit A at 2; D.J. 23 4 1, 21.
evidence alone would be sufficient to support a finding that Steele possessed the
firearms. Thus, there is not a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failure to
further investigate, Steele would not have pleaded guilty. Therefore, Steele was not
prejudiced by plea counsel’s performance.
Ill. CONCLUSION
Although Steele’s PCR Motion was not procedurally barred, for the reasons

stated above, his claim is not successful on the merits.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Steele’s PCR

Motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judge Calvin L. Séott, Jr.

cc: Original to Prothonotary
Brett D. Fallon, Jr., Esq.
James J. Haley, Jr., Esq.