State v. Williams

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
)
v. ) I.D. No.: 2404009032
)
)
TYHEIR V. WILLIAMS )
)
Defendant. )
)

Submitted: January 6, 2026
Decided: January 28, 2026

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On this 28th day of January, 2026, upon consideration of Defendant Tyheir

Williams’s (“Defendant”) pro se Combined Motion for Postconviction Relief (the

“Motion”) and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:

Background

1. On January 13, 2025, Defendant pleaded guilty to (1) Carrying a

Concealed Dangerous Instrument and (2) Illegal Possession of a Controlled

Substance. 1 On the same day, Defendant was sentenced to a total of one year and

six months at Level V supervision, suspended for one year at Level II. 2 Defendant

1
D.I. No. 12.
2
D.I. No. 14. Defendant received the following sentence: (1) for Carrying a Concealed Dangerous
Instrument, one year at Level V supervision, suspended immediately for one year at Level II
was prohibited from owning or possessing a deadly weapon for a period of five

years. 3

2. Defendant did not file a direct appeal after sentencing. On January 15,

2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (the “Motion to

Withdraw”).4

3. On April 15, 2025, the Court denied the Motion to Withdraw (the

“Order”).5 The court concluded that the Motion to Withdraw was untimely because

it was raised after sentencing.6 Rather than reject the motion outright, the Court

reviewed it under the framework for postconviction relief set forth in Superior Court

Criminal Rule (“Rule”) 61. 7 The Court found that Defendant’s plea was knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily made, and that “Defendant’s contention that his lawyer

forced him to take the plea offer is without merit[.]”8

4. On April 22, 2025, Defendant again moved to withdraw his guilty plea.9

The Court directed Defendant to the Order. 10

probation; (2) for Illegal Possession of a Controlled Substance, six months at Level V supervision,
suspended immediately for one year at Level II probation.
3
Id.
4
D.I. No. 13.
5
D.I. No. 16; State v. Williams, 2025 WL 1139527 (Del. Super. Apr. 15, 2025).
6
Order p. 2.
7
Id.
8
Id. at p. 4.
9
D.I. No. 17.
10
D.I. No. 18.
2
5. On September 8, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Postconviction

Relief (the “September Motion”), which included a Motion for Appointment of

Counsel, Motion to Suppress Evidence and Vacate Plea, and Alternative Motion to

Dismiss Indictment/Charges. 11

6. On October 10, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Discovery

seeking evidence related to his charges and the chain of custody. 12

7. On October 24, 2025, Defendant filed a “Motion to Expedite Judicial

Review and Request Court Appointed Counsel.”13

8. On December 3, 2025, Defendant filed (i) a request for resolution of

the September Motion, (ii) an additional motion to compel discovery, (iii) a motion

to suppress evidence, and (iv) a motion to dismiss the charges. 14

9. On December 18, 2025, Defendant filed the Motion.15

10. On January 5, 2026, Defendant filed a letter to the Court requesting that

his birthdate be changed in his records. 16

11
D.I. No. 19.
12
D.I. No. 20.
13
D.I. No. 21.
14
D.I. No. 22.
15
Motion (D.I. No. 23) (hereinafter “Mot.”).
16
D.I. No. 27.
3
11. On January 6, 2026, Defendant filed a “Notice of Consolidation and

Clarification of Pending Rule 61 Filings[,]” in which he requested that the Court

treat all of his filings as supplements to the September Motion.17

12. On January 12, 2026, Defendant was discharged from probation. 18

Motion for Postconviction Relief

13. In the Motion, Defendant seeks relief on the bases of (i) ineffective

assistance of counsel, 19 (ii) an unconstitutional traffic stop and search,20 (iii) a

charging defect that deprived Defendant of due process,21 (iv) discovery violations,22

(v) the Court’s failure to rule in a timely manner, (vi) his birthdate being incorrect in

law enforcement and court documents, and (vii) a guilty plea that was not knowing,

voluntary, or intelligent.23

17
D.I. No. 28. Rule 61(b)(2) permits amendments as a matter of course prior to the State’s
response, so the Court considers the Motion—which Defendant characterized as a “unified”
motion for postconviction relief—as Defendant’s governing petition.
18
D.I. No. 26.
19
Specifically, Defendant argues that counsel’s performance fell below objective standards and
was prejudicial because counsel refused to file certain suppression motions, referred to
Defendant’s proposed constitutional challenges as “frivolous,” stated he “would not waste [his]
credibility with the court” by making arguments Defendant requested, knew Defendant had a
disability but failed to accommodate or investigate, and knew Defendant’s date of birth was
inaccurate in court records but did correct the error. Mot. p. 3.
20
Specifically, Defendant argues that no window tint measurements were taken, the State failed to
produce a window tint affidavit, Defendant was stopped without probable cause, the stop was
pretextual and unlawful, and all seized evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree. Mot. p. 2.
21
Specifically, Defendant argues that the State charged him with possession of a “barbiturate”
without specifying the drug, thereby preventing him from providing proof of prescription.
22
Specifically, Defendant argues that the State failed to produce body-worn camera footage and
“full chain-of-custody records[.]” Mot. p. 3.
23
Mot. p. 2.
4
14. Before turning to the merits, the Court will first address any applicable

procedural bars.24 If a procedural bar exists, the Court will not examine the merits

of that claim. 25 A claim made pursuant to Rule 61 can be barred for time limitation,

successive motions, failure to raise claims below, or former adjudication.26

Additionally, “[t]his Court will not address claims for post-conviction relief that are

conclusory and unsubstantiated.”27

Timely

15. The Motion is timely because it was filed within one-year after the

judgment of conviction was final. 28

16. The Motion was not mooted by Defendant’s subsequent release from

custody. In Martin v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that “a

defendant who files a timely postconviction motion while in custody . . . but is

released from custody before the motion is resolved, is not divested of standing if

the defendant can demonstrate that he continues to suffer collateral consequences

because of his conviction.” 29 Given the circumstances of the case, including that

Defendant’s five-year firearm possession allegedly prevents him from living in the

24
State v. Evans, 2024 WL 3691510, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 7, 2024) (citing Younger v. State, 580
A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990)).
25
Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 757–58 (Del. 2016).
26
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)–(4).
27
State v. Allen, 2024 WL 1654514, at *11 (Del. Super. Apr. 15, 2024) (quoting State v.
Guinn, 2006 WL 2441945, at *4 (Del. Super. Aug 16, 2021)).
28
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
29
Martin v. State, 306 A.3d 50, 57 (Del. 2023).
5
family home and that this is his first felony, the Court concludes that Defendant—if

given the opportunity—could meet his burden that he has suffered collateral

consequences notwithstanding the conclusion of his sentence.30

Failure to Raise Below

17. “Under Rule 61(i)(3), claims that could have been raised on direct

appeal, but were not, are barred as procedurally defaulted” unless the defendant can

show good cause for the delay. 31 “To show cause, a Rule 61 movant must . . . show

‘some external impediment’ prevented him from constructing or raising the claim.”32

A defendant cannot show an external impediment when the claim was “both evident

and available” to the defendant during the first round proceedings or on direct

appeal. 33

18. Defendant’s claim regarding an unconstitutional stop and search is

barred because he did not raise it below.34 Defendant has not shown good cause for

the default—indeed, he has not articulated why he did not raise this issue at the

appropriate time, or even in the Motion to Withdraw. 35

30
See Martin at 65 (“State and federal jurisdictions . . . increasingly presume that collateral
consequences arise as a result of a felony conviction.”).
31
State v. Prince, 2022 WL 211704, at *4 (Del. Super. Jan. 24, 2022).
32
State v. White, 278 A.3d 680, 688 (Del. Super. 2022) (Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del.
1990)).
33
Id.
34
See State v. Smith, 2018 WL 5279569, at *1 (Del. Super. Oct. 1, 2018) (finding that claims of a
pretextual traffic stop and an illegal search were barred for failure to raise below).
35
Id.
6
19. Defendant’s claim that the State erroneously failed to specify which

barbiturate constituted the basis of his possession charge was not raised on direct

appeal, and Defendant has not shown cause and prejudice excusing this default.36

Defendant’s Brady claim for the State’s purported failure to produce body-worn

camera footage and chain-of-custody records is barred on the same basis.

20. Defendant’s claim that he was harmed because his birthdate was

purportedly incorrect in police records, Superior Court records, Probation & Parole

records, and Supreme Court records is also barred for failure to raise below. This

defect has been evident and available throughout the course of this litigation. 37

21. Defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is not barred for

failure to raise below. 38 The procedural bar for failing to raise a claim below is

inapplicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because such claims

“cannot be raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings and are properly brought in

a motion for postconviction relief.” 39

36
See McGriff v. State, 326 A.3d 653 (TABLE), 2024 WL 3770733, at *2 (Del. Aug. 12, 2024)
(holding Brady claim procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) when Defendant failed to contest it
before conviction or on direct appeal, and failed to provide a basis for cause-and-prejudice from
the procedural default).
37
See White, 278 A.3d at 688.
38
September Motion p. 3.
39
Evans, 2024 WL 3691510, at *1; see also Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 175 (Del. 2020) (“Simply
put, ineffective-assistance claims are not subject to Rule 61(i)(3)’s bar because they cannot be
asserted in the proceeding leading to judgment of conviction under the Superior Court’s rules and
this Court’s precedent.”).
7
Former Adjudication

22. Under Rule 61(i)(4): “[a]ny ground for relief that was formerly

adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an

appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is

thereafter barred.”40

23. In the introduction to the Motion, Defendant argues that his plea was

not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made.41 Defendant made a similar

argument in the Motion to Withdraw. 42 Upon review of the record and Defendant’s

colloquy responses, the Court “found that Defendant’s plea was knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily made.”43 Defendant’s claim is accordingly barred as

adjudicated.44

24. Defendant also seeks relief on the basis that “the Court’s inaction on

plea-withdrawal motions denied Defendant meaningful review,” 45 but—as noted

above and in the Order—Defendant’s plea withdrawal motions were themselves

untimely and thus barred from consideration as such.46

40
White, 278 A.3d at 685 (quoting Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4)).
41
Mot. p. 2
42
See D.I. No. 13.
43
Order p. 4.
44
See State v. Daniels, 2018 WL 3853534, at *4 (Del. Super. Aug. 9, 2018) (finding that a claim
that a guilty plea was involuntary was barred when the Supreme Court had already held that the
plea was voluntary).
45
Motion p. 4.
46
Order p. 2. To the extent Defendant alleges that the Court delayed in ruling on the Motion, there
was no delay. Defendant continually entered new filings from September 2025 to January 2026,
8
Successive

25. With limited exceptions, a motion for postconviction relief is barred as

successive if it is a second or subsequent motion.47 The limited exceptions apply

only when the movant was convicted after a trial and “pleads with particularity that

new evidence exists that the movant is actually innocent” or “pleads with

particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases

on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme

Court, applies to the movant's case and renders the conviction . . . invalid.”48

26. Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective under the criteria set

forth in Strickland v. Washington.49 In the Motion to Withdraw, Defendant argued

that his counsel coerced him into taking a plea, and the Court rejected the

argument.50 Now, Defendant proposes several additional reasons why his counsel

was ineffective in representing him prior to his guilty plea. 51 These allegations were

available and known, or should have been known, at the time of Defendant’s first

many of which raised new claims and arguments. Indeed, Defendant did not file his “unified”
motion for postconviction relief until December 2025.
47
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
48
Id.; see also Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).
49
Motion p. 3 (referencing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
50
Order p. 4.
51
Motion p. 3.
9
petition, and are accordingly barred as successive.52 Moreover, Defendant waived

this claim when he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pled guilty. 53

Motion for Appointment of Counsel

27. Rule 61(e)(3) provides that the Court may appoint counsel for a

movant’s first timely postconviction motion and request for counsel following a

guilty plea if: “(i) the conviction has been affirmed by final order upon direct

appellate review or direct appellate review is unavailable; (ii) the motion sets forth

a substantial claim that the movant received ineffective assistance of counsel in

relation to the plea of guilty or nolo contendere; (iii) granting the motion would result

in vacatur of the judgment of conviction for which the movant is in custody; and (iv)

specific exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment of counsel.”54

28. If the movant fails to set forth a substantial claim of ineffective

assistance, then the Rule 61(e)(3) requirements are not satisfied.55 As the Court has

52
See State v. Watson, 2004 WL 282806, at *2 (Del. Super. Apr. 28, 2004) (finding new bases for
ineffective assistance of counsel raised on a second petition were successive). To be sure, there is
some ambiguity regarding whether a filing that is a motion for postconviction relief in substance
but not in form can bar claims in future motions for postconviction relief as successive. See State
v. Reed, 2024 WL 2746694, at *2 (Del. Super. May 23, 2024) (denying defendant’s motion as
successive even though defendant characterized previous motion as a motion to vacate rather than
a motion for postconviction relief).
53
See Evans v. State, 341 A.3d 1005 (TABLE), 2025 WL 1565409, at *1 (Del. June 2, 2025)
(holding that an appellant waived his ineffective assistance of counsel claim when he knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered a guilty plea).
54
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3).
55
Thomas v. State, 337 A.3d 1215 (TABLE), 2024 WL 5135491, at *3 (Del. Dec. 16, 2024).
10
determined that Defendant has not set forth a valid claim for ineffective assistance

of counsel, appointment of counsel is not warranted in this matter. 56

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is

DENIED. Defendant’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Sheldon K. Rennie, Judge

Original to Prothonotary

cc: Tyheir V. Williams

56
The request for counsel would also fail if the Court treated this motion as a second or subsequent
motion for postconviction relief. The applicable rule for that procedural posture, Rule 61(e)(5),
provides that the Court cannot appoint counsel for an indigent movant’s second or subsequent
motion unless the movant was convicted after a trial (and meets certain other requirements).
Defendant pled guilty, so Rule 61(e)(5) does not provide a basis for counsel.
11