Brewer v. State of Delaware

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
PHILLIP BREWER, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	C.A. No: S25C-07-007 MHC
)
STATE OF DELAWARE, 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
)
)
OPINION AND ORDER
Submitted: September 4, 2026
Decided: October 12, 2026
Upon Consideration of Petitioner’s Motion Application for Delaware Wrongful
Conviction Compensation and Services Act, DENIED.
Phillip L. Brewer, Pro Se.
Daniel B. McBride, Esquire, and Robert M. Kleiner, Esquire, State of Delaware
Department of Justice, Attorneys for the Respondent.
CONNER, J.

2
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Phillip Brewer’s (“Brewer”) Motion for Compensation
under the Delaware Wrongful Conviction Compensation and Services Act (“the
Act”).
This case involves a criminal episode that occurred in March of 2013, where
Margaret Smith (“Mrs. Smith”), an 89-year-old widow, was kidnapped and locked
in the trunk of her car for two days. During this time, she was denied food, water,
and access to a restroom. 	There were four individuals involved in the criminal
episode: Brewer, Rondaiges 	Harper (“Harper”), Junia McDonald (“McDonald”),
and Jackeline Perez (“Perez”) (collectively, the “Group”). Each co-defendant had a
varying level of involvement in the criminal episode.
In April of 2013, Brewer was charged with Carjacking in the First Degree,
two counts of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and Kidnapping in the First
Degree.1 On September 5, 2013, Brewer pled guilty to Carjacking in the Second
Degree, Kidnapping in the Second Degree, and Conspiracy in the Second Degree.2
However, Brewer’s charges were nolle prossed after the Supreme Court held that
Brewer’s co-defendant, Harper, was not criminally liable in the initial kidnapping or
carjacking, as the crimes took place before Brewer and Harper were involved.3
1 Compl., D.I. 1, at 12.
2 State v. Perez, 2014 WL 1303146, at *1 n.6 (Del. Super. Ct. 2014).
3 Compl., D.I. 1, at 5.

3
Now, Brewer seeks ten million dollars in damages under the Act, alleging he
was wrongfully convicted for the crimes he pled guilty to in September of 2013.4
This is the Court’s Opinion after reviewing the facts and evidence on the record and
the parties’ submissions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. 	The Facts and Circumstances Hearing
The Court held a Facts and Circumstances Hearing on July 18, 2013, to
present evidence regarding the Group’s involvement in the criminal episode against
Mrs. Smith in March of 2013.5 Mrs. Smith testified at the hearing, and while she
was noted to be forgetful or confused, her rendition of facts was consistent with the
material facts.6 The facts stated hereinafter were obtained during this hearing.
On March 18, 2013, at around 2:00 p.m., Mrs. Smith left her home in Milford,
Delaware to stop for ice cream and purchase a gift for her sister.7 Mrs. Smith was
eating ice cream in her car, a 2001 tan Buick Le Sabre (“tan car” or “Mrs. Smith’s
car”), at the Chicken Man in Milford, Delaware.8 While in her vehicle, she was
approached by McDonald, who was fourteen years old, and Perez, who was fifteen
4 Am. Mot. for Compensation, D.I. 9, at 2.
5 Perez, 2014 WL 1303146, at *1.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.

4
years old (collectively, the “female juveniles”).9 The female juveniles asked Mrs.
Smith for a ride home.10 Initially, Mrs. Smith refused, but ultimately agreed.11
One of the female juveniles sat in the front passenger seat, while the other sat
in the back seat.12 The female juveniles directed Mrs. Smith to various locations
throughout Milford. After arrival to the first location, the female juveniles told Mrs.
Smith that the mother was not home, and asked Mrs. Smith to drive them to a second
location.13 At the second location, the female juveniles told Mrs. Smith that the aunt
was not home, and directed Mrs. Smith to a third location.14 Upon arrival to the
third location, the female juveniles asked Mrs. Smith for her car keys.15 Mrs. Smith
refused. The female juveniles grabbed Mrs. Smith, and a struggle ensued.16 Mrs.
Smith was then yanked out of her car and shoved into the trunk.17 The female
juveniles got back into Mrs. Smith’s car and sped away at a fast rate of speed.18 Mrs.
Smith hollered and knocked on the back of the trunk, but the female juveniles did
not respond.19 During this episode, the female juveniles stole $500 from Mrs.
9 Id.; see also State v. McDonald, 2014 WL 1316147, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. 2014).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at *2.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.

5
Smith’s purse.20 Brewer and Harper were not involved in this portion of the criminal
episode.
On March 19, 2013, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Trooper John Wilson, a
Delaware State Police officer, received a call reporting a missing person.21 The
caller, Sabrina Carol, reported that she had not seen her elderly aunt, Mrs. Smith,
since 2:00 p.m. the previous day.22 Ms. Carol went to Mrs. Smith’s house, but
neither Mrs. Smith nor her purse were present.23 Ms. Carol expressed concerns
because her aunt showed early signs of Alzheimer’s disease or dementia.24 Mrs.
Smith’s neighbor reported that she saw Mrs. Smith outside of her house the previous
day around 11:00am, then saw her leave the house about an hour later.25 Mrs.
Smith’s sister spoke to her on the phone around 2:00 p.m. the previous day.26 Mrs.
Smith was thought to be driving her tan 2001 Buick Le Sabre.27 Trooper Wilson
issued a Gold Alert, which lists missing persons with mental conditions.28
The next morning, on March 20, 2013, Corporal James Gooch, Jr. (“Corp.
Gooch”) received a call from a woman named Betty Edwards.29 Ms. Edwards was
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.

6
visiting her son’s grave at the Mount Calvary Methodist Cemetery, which is east of
Seaford.30 She saw Mrs. Smith half-clothed and crawling on the ground.31 Mrs.
Smith initially tried to run from Ms. Edwards, but Ms. Edwards reached her and
convinced her to sit down on a tombstone.32 Mrs. Smith was wearing brown spandex
shorts and a coat, but no pants or shoes.33 Ms. Edwards called 911.
Corp. Gooch responded to the call. He found Mrs. Smith to be disheveled and
confused. 	He noted that the cemetery was not visible from King Road and was
surrounded by trees.34 He took Mrs. Smith to the hospital and notified Ms. Carol
that her aunt had been found.35 Although she was still somewhat confused, Mrs.
Smith told Corp. Gooch the details of the incident.36 Corp. Gooch returned to the
cemetery to look for Mrs. Smith’s car because Mrs. Smith had told him that two
juveniles drove the car to the top of a hill, and let it slide down the hill with the intent
to run her over.37 During this search, the officers were unable to locate Mrs. Smith’s
car.38 However, they observed tire tracks indicating that a vehicle made a U-turn.39
The officers also found what Trooper Gooch referred to as, “crawling marks, hands,
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at *3.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.

7
knees, and toes.”40 Corp. Gooch removed Mrs. Smith from the Gold alert, but kept
a Gold Alert for her car.41
Later that day, Delaware State Trooper Patrick Schlimer was on patrol, and
noticed a 2001 tan Buick Le Sabre with five passengers.42 The officer ran the
vehicle’s tag and saw that the vehicle was involved in a carjacking.43 Trooper
Schlimer stopped the car. 	There were five individuals inside the vehicle: Brewer,
Harper, McDonald, Perez, and Daniya Smith, an individual who had joined the
Group after Mrs. Smith was left in the cemetery.44 None of the occupants had
identification.45 Two of the three female occupants claimed the car belonged to the
other’s grandmother.46 The passengers were taken to Troop 4 for processing.47
The police obtained a search warrant for the vehicle.48 Among other things,
the trunk contained an Ipod lamp, three jackets, five cans of unopened ginger ale,
and an egg crate mattress.49 The trunk “measured 3 feet by 9 inches from front to
40 Harper v. State, 121 A.3d 24, 28 (Del. 2015).
41 Perez, 2014 WL 1303146, at *3.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.

8
back, 5 feet wide, but 3 feet by 6 inches in the area where the tires were located, and
1 foot by 6 inches high.”50
On March 29, 2021, Detective Maher and Detective Truitt Jr. went to the
cemetery.51 The detectives noted that there is a residence located on both sides of
King Road at the turn onto Calvary road, however, there is no signage indicating
that there is a cemetery.52 The distance from King Road to the cemetery is 133
yards.53 The area is heavily wooded, and the unpaved road is in “wretched
condition.”54 There was trash and debris all along the unpaved road.55 A chain link
gate leads into the cemetery and runs around the perimeter.56 The detectives found
tracks indicating that someone crawled over the sand, a black metal cane, a black
bag containing prescription medicine, and a pair of urine-soaked jeans on the ground
near the fence.57
On March 20, 2013, Mrs. Smith and Ms. Carol went to the police to report the
stolen car.58 Mrs. Smith was interviewed and described the incident to the police
officers. While in the trunk, Mrs. Smith received no food or water, and was given
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at *4.
58 Id.

9
no bathroom breaks.59 She also was not given her high blood pressure medication
or arthritis medication, which she carried with her.60 During her time locked in the
trunk, she hollered and banged on the trunk. 	Mrs. Smith was forced to urinate on
herself, which led her to remove her urine-soaked pants at the cemetery and leave
them on the ground.61 Mrs. Smith was dropped off at the cemetery and forced to
crawl around to find a road.62
On April 4, 2013, Mrs. Smith was interviewed at her residence.63 Mrs. Smith
showed the detective the scrapes and bruises on her knees from crawling around the
cemetery.64 Her hands and lower extremities were still numb from the exposure to
cold temperatures while in the trunk.65 The temperature during the criminal episode
was around mid-to-upper 30’s to the mid-to-low 40s.66 Mrs. Smith told the police
that the girls threatened to kill her if she reported the accident to the police.67
59 Id. at *2.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at *4.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.

10
At the hearing, Detective Truitt testified that he found a receipt from Walmart
for clothing.68 He also testified that the female juveniles blamed the other for the
carjacking, and Brewer told him the car was stolen.69
The Group forced Mrs. Smith to remain in the trunk for two days, without
food, water, or medication, and forced her to urinate on herself. 	She was then
dumped on the side of a remote, unpaved road in “wretched condition,” located in a
heavily wooded area, with trash and debris. It was truly a miracle that Mrs. Smith
survived the ordeal.
II. 	Brewer’s Testimony from McDonald’s Reverse Amenability Hearing on
September 18, 2013, and Perez’s Reverse Amenability Hearing on October 16,
2013
As part of his plea agreement, Brewer testified and provided a play-by-play
of what transpired during the two days that Mrs. Smith was held captive in the trunk
of her car.70 Initially, Brewer denied having any knowledge of the stolen car or that
Mrs. Smith was in the trunk.71 He also stated that he was not in the cemetery.72
However, as part of his agreement with the State, Brewer testified at McDonald’s
and Perez’s reverse amenability hearings. 	Realizing his best way to minimize his
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at *5.
71 Id.
72 Id.

11
criminal exposure, Brewer agreed to cooperate with the authorities. His recounting
of the criminal episode is stated hereinafter.
Brewer testified that he had known Harper his whole life.73 Brewer met Perez
and McDonald a few days before the arrest.74 Brewer met the girls when they were
driving Harper around in a black/dark blue car with a smashed window.75 McDonald
was driving the car.76 Brewer asked the female juveniles for a ride to Seaford, and
the female juveniles drove Brewer to Seaford and back.77 The female juveniles made
plans to meet up with Harper and Brewer again the following night.78
The next night, the female juveniles picked up Brewer and Harper in the same
black/dark blue car to drive them to a party in Dover, Delaware.79 However, the
Group could not find the party, so they returned to Coverdale, where they picked up
another person.80 The Group then drove back to Dover, but still could not find the
party.81 On their way back to Coverdale, the Group was stopped by a policeman.82
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 In Perez’s reverse amenability hearing, Brewer referred to the vehicle as dark blue. However,
in McDonald’s reverse amenability hearing, he testified that the car was black. The other details
are consistent between the two testimonies.
76 Perez, 2014 WL 1303146, at *5.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.

12
McDonald initially told Brewer that the car belonged to her mother, but once the
Group was stopped, she informed him that the car was stolen.83
That night, McDonald messaged Brewer on Facebook, stating that she wanted
to hang out with him again.84 The next day, the female juveniles drove Mrs. Smith’s
car to Coverdale, where they picked up Brewer.85 This is the beginning of Brewer’s
involvement in the criminal episode against Mrs. Smith. 	Then, McDonald, Perez,
and Brewer drove to pick up Harper.86 At this time, it was allegedly unknown to
Brewer and Harper that Mrs. Smith was in the trunk. 	Even though the Group had
been stopped in a stolen car a few days prior, Brewer testified that he believed the
car belonged to McDonald’s aunt.87
Brewer testified that the Group went to a park in Coverdale, where they hung
out for about thirty minutes.88 Then, the Group went to Royal Farms, where the
female juveniles purchased gas using cash.89 Brewer testified that he knew the
female juveniles had cash, but was unsure how much.90 The Group then returned to
83 Id.
84 Id. at *6.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.

13
the park, where they sat for a few hours with the car running, heater on, and the radio
playing.91 The car battery eventually died.
Then, Brewer and Harper walked to Brewer’s mother’s house, which was a
short distance away, to get her car.92 Neither Harper nor Brewer had a driver’s
license, but Brewer drove his mother’s car back to the park.93 Upon returning to the
park, Brewer found someone to help jumpstart the car.94 However, no one could
locate the battery under the hood.95 The person who Brewer found to help jumpstart
the car suggested that they look in the trunk.96 The female juveniles refused, and
McDonald said her uncle would help jumpstart the car.97 The person left.
Brewer’s mother’s car and Mrs. Smith’s car remained at the park.98 Brewer
and McDonald went into Brewer’s mom’s car, while Perez and Harper went into the
tan car.99 A little later, Harper walked over to Brewer’s mother’s car to ask Brewer
if he could borrow his phone to play music.100 Brewer said no, and Harper returned
to the tan car.101 Shortly thereafter, Harper approached Brewer again, this time to
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.

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tell him that there was someone in the trunk of the tan car.102 Harper and Brewer
opened the tan car’s trunk and found Mrs. Smith inside.103 When Brewer and Harper
asked the female juveniles why there was a person in the trunk, McDonald and Perez
responded that the woman was an alcoholic, traded her car for liquor, and preferred
to be in the trunk rather than sit in the back of the car.104 Brewer testified that he
was shocked to see the woman and that the woman told Brewer the car belonged to
her.105 Brewer and Harper removed Mrs. Smith from the trunk.106 However, the
Group decided to go to Brewer’s grandmother’s house, so Brewer and Harper put
Mrs. Smith back into the trunk.107 Brewer claims that she did not resist or ask for
help.108 The Group left Mrs. Smith in the trunk, and went to Brewer’s grandmother’s
house to smoke marijuana.109 Brewer drove the Group in his mother’s car.
The Group stayed at Brewer’s grandmother’s house for several hours.110
Sometime that night, the Group returned to the park to search for jumper cables.111
The Group opened the trunk and began to search for the cables.112 Mrs. Smith
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at *7.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.

15
remained in the trunk.113 Brewer testified that Mrs. Smith helped the Group search
for the cables.114 Brewer found the cables, and Harper helped Mrs. Smith out of the
trunk for the second time.115 Brewer attempted to jump start the car, but was
unsuccessful.116 Harper put Mrs. Smith back in the trunk, and the Group returned to
Brewer’s grandmother’s house for the remainder of the night, leaving Mrs. Smith in
the trunk of her car once again.117
The next morning, the Group returned to the park with Brewer’s uncle to
jumpstart the car.118 Brewer’s uncle jumpstarted the battery, but apparently, no one
informed him that there was a person in the trunk.119 Brewer drove his mother’s car
to drop his uncle off at his house.120 Then, Brewer and McDonald drove to Brewer’s
mother’s house, where they dropped off Brewer’s mother’s car, and were picked up
by Harper and Perez in Mrs. Smith’s car.121 Brewer and McDonald got back into
Mrs. Smith’s car, and Brewer took over as the driver.122 Harper told Brewer that
Mrs. Smith gave him $100 “for the battery.”123
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at n.20.
120 Id. at *7.
121 Id.
122 McDonald, 2014 WL 1316147, at *6.
123 Id.

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Then, the Group drove to the Days Inn in Seaford, Delaware.124 The Group
wanted to rent a room, however, no one was old enough.125 The Group picked up
Harper’s cousin to assist the Group in renting a room.126 The female juveniles gave
cash to Harper’s cousin to pay for the room.127 Brewer and Harper drove Mrs.
Smith’s car to drop the cousin off at his house. Then, Brewer and Harper returned
to the hotel room.128 Mrs. Smith remained in the trunk the entire time.129
After settling into the hotel room, Perez and McDonald took Mrs. Smith’s car
to Walmart to buy clothes.130 After the female juveniles returned, the Group stayed
at the hotel room for a few hours, then left to go to Coverdale to buy marijuana.131
Harper used Mrs. Smith’s $100 to purchase the marijuana.132 The Group purchased
a lot of marijuana, which all four of them smoked.133 Brewer testified that he and
Harper thought it was “crazy” that they were driving the car while Mrs. Smith was
in the trunk, but neither of them said that she needed to be released.134
124 Id.
125 Perez, 2014 WL 1303146, at *7.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 McDonald, 2014 WL 1316147, at *6.

17
The Group smoked “a fair amount of marijuana” throughout the incident, but
allegedly did not drink alcohol.135 The Group made several trips from Seaford to
Coverdale to purchase marijuana. During one of these trips, the Group stopped at a
fast-food restaurant.136 McDonald asked Mrs. Smith if she wanted something to eat,
in which Mrs. Smith replied that she just wanted to go home.137 Mrs. Smith was not
given food, water, or the opportunity to use the restroom.138
During one of the trips to Coverdale, the Group discussed what they should
do with Mrs. Smith.139 According to Brewer, the female juveniles suggested that
they drive the car back to Milford and burn it with Mrs. Smith trapped inside.140
Brewer and Harper disagreed with this plan.141 Harper suggested that they drop Mrs.
Smith off at a cemetery in Seaford.142 Brewer was familiar with the cemetery, and
knew it was isolated and not well-lit.143 At Perez’s hearing, Brewer testified that he
wanted to drop Mrs. Smith off at the Days Inn Hotel, but the others wanted to drop
135 Id.
136 Perez, 2014 WL 1303146, at *8.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 McDonald, 2014 WL 1316147, at *6.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.

18
her off at the cemetery.144 In the end, Brewer turned the car around and drove to the
cemetery.145 At this time, it was roughly 9:00 p.m. on Tuesday, March 19, 2013.146
The cemetery was oval shaped, with a road traveling through the center
toward the back of the cemetery.147 Brewer drove down this road to the back of the
cemetery.148 Then, Harper, Perez, and McDonald got out of the car to get Mrs. Smith
out of the trunk.149 Mrs. Smith was left at the very back of the cemetery, far away
from the entrance.150 When asked how her cane, bag, and clothes were left with her,
Brewer responded, “[t]hey probably threw it out.”151
There is a small discrepancy between Brewer’s testimony at McDonald’s
hearing and Perez’s hearing. At McDonald’s hearing, Brewer said he did not hear
Mrs. Smith after they left her at the cemetery, but saw her lying on the ground.152
He said, she “was, like, there. I mean, she couldn’t walk. You know what I mean?
She was just, like sitting there, laying there.”153 When asked why they decided to
leave Mrs. Smith at the cemetery, Brewer responded “I guess they didn’t want her
144 Perez, 2014 WL 1303146, at *8.
145 Id.
146 McDonald, 2014 WL 1316147, at *6.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.

19
to be found.”154 However, at Perez’s hearing, Brewer testified that he could not hear
what the others were saying, but testified that he heard Mrs. Smith whimpering or
crying.155 As the Group drove away, Brewer saw Mrs. Smith laying on the
ground.156 Despite having a cell phone, Brewer did not call 911, and no one
discussed taking Mrs. Smith to a different location.157
Brewer drove the Group back to the hotel room, where they spent the night.158
The Group checked out the next day and went to a nail salon, at the request of the
female juveniles.159 Brewer saw the female juveniles pay with cash at the nail
salon.160 Deniaya Smith joined the Group at this time.161
Brewer testified that throughout the time that Mrs. Smith was in the car, he
never saw anyone give her food, water, or take her out of the trunk to use the
restroom.162 He claimed that he did not hear her in the trunk due to loud music.163
Brewer testified that he did not believe that Mrs. Smith wanted to be in the trunk of
her car, or that she wanted to be left in the cemetery.164 When he was asked why he
154 Id. at *7.
155 Perez, 2014 WL 1303146, at *8.
156 Id.
157 McDonald, 2014 WL 1316147, at *7.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Perez, 2014 WL 1303146, at *9.
161 Id.
162 McDonald, 2014 WL 1316147, at *7.
163 Id.
164 Perez, 2014 WL 1303146, at *9.

20
did not do things differently, he responded: “I don’t know if it was because of the
girl [McDonald]. I don’t know if I got feelings for her or what. I don’t know why I
didn’t leave and tell somebody.” He said he “wasn’t thinking.”165
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
As aforementioned, in April of 2013, Brewer was charged with Carjacking in
the First Degree, two counts of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and Kidnapping
in the First Degree. On September 5, 2013, Brewer plead guilty to Carjacking in the
Second Degree, Kidnapping in the Second Degree, and Conspiracy in the Second
Degree.166
On July 25, 2014, Brewer’s codefendant, Harper, was found guilty of
Kidnapping in the First Degree, Carjacking in the First Degree, and two counts of
Conspiracy in the Second Degree.167 Harper appealed his conviction to the Supreme
Court. On August 13, 2015, the Supreme Court of Delaware issued its decision on
Harper’s appeal. The Supreme Court held that the carjacking was completed before
Harper’s involvement.168 Each of Harper’s convictions depended on the carjacking
as a predicate crime, therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case.169
165 Id.
166 Id. at *1 n.6.
167 Harper, 121 A.3d at 28.
168 Id. at 34.
169 Id. at 25.

21
On August 18, 2015, Brewer filed a Motion for Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
pursuant to Rule 32(d) and Rule 61, relying on the Supreme Court’s finding in
Harper’s appeal. The State did not oppose Brewer’s Motion. On October 23, 2015,
the Court granted Brewer’s Motion for Withdrawal, and the Sentence Order was
vacated. On January 20, 2016, the State nolle prossed all of the charges.170
On July 15, 2025, Brewer filed a Petition under the Delaware Wrongful
Conviction Compensation and Services Act, requesting one million dollars in
damages due to his incarceration.171 On August 8, 2025, Brewer filed an Amended
Petition, seeking five million dollars in damages.172 On September 12, 2025, Brewer
filed a Motion for Default Judgment due to a lack of response from the State.173 On
September 12, 2025, Brewer also filed a Motion for Guardian Ad Litem, requesting
that a woman named Krystle T. Blackwell be appointed as his guardian ad litem due
to “incompetence of state codes and laws.”174 On September 16, 2025, the Court
denied Brewer’s Motion for Guardian Ad Litem because Ms. Blackwell is not a
Delaware attorney.175 The Court strongly suggested that Brewer obtain Delaware
counsel if he believes he cannot effectively represent himself. 	On September 18,
170 Compl., D.I. 1, at 14.
171 Id. at 2.
172 Am. Mot. for Compensation, D.I. 3, at 2.
173 Mot. for Default J., D.I. 5.
174 Mot. for Guardian Ad Litem, D.I. 6, at 1.
175 Order, D.I. 7.

22
2025, Brewer filed another amended Petition, now seeking ten million dollars in
damages.176 On September 18, 2025, Brewer filed a Motion to Compel.177
The hearing was originally set for November 4, 2025. On November 4, 2025,
the Court did not hold the hearing. Instead, the Court ruled on the various motions
and set forth the scheduling order.178 The Court denied Brewer’s Motion for Default
Judgment and Motion for Guardian Ad Litem.179 The Court ordered Brewer to
inform the Court of his decision to continue as a pro se litigant or obtain a Delaware
attorney by December 1, 2025.180 The Court also found that Brewer’s Motion to
Compel was moot.181 Brewer appealed the Court’s Order on November 13, 2025.182
On November 19, 2025, Brewer wrote to the Court to express his intent to continue
as pro se.183
On December 8, 2025, Brewer filed a Motion to Reconsider the denial of his
Motion for Default Judgment.184 On December 12, 2025, the Supreme Court
176 Am. Mot. for Compensation, D.I. 9, at 2.
177 Mot. to Compel, D.I. 40.
178 Civil Judicial Action Form, D.I. 14.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Notice of Appeal to Supreme Court, D.I. 15.
183 Letter to Court, D.I. 17.
184 Pl.’s Mot. to Reconsider, D.I. 19.

23
dismissed Brewer’s interlocutory appeal.185 On January 5, 2026, this Court denied
Brewer’s Motion for Reconsideration due to untimeliness and lack of merit.186
On February 12, 2026, the Court held a scheduling conference with the
parties. The parties agreed to obtain discovery.187 A Scheduling Order was filed on
February 20, 2026, ordering that discovery shall be completed by May 29, 2026, and
set the pretrial conference for August 12, 2026 and the hearing date for September
16, 2026.188 On April 20, 2026, the State filed a Motion to Compel discovery, which
Brewer replied to on April 29, 2026.189 Brewer filed a Motion to Compel discovery
and to deem requests for admissions admitted on April 29, 2026.190 On May 29,
2025, the Court denied Brewer’s Motion to Compel and granted the State’s Motion
to Compel.191 The Court ordered Brewer to disclose all documents he intended to
use 	at 	the 	hearing, 	identify 	all 	witnesses, 	and 	fully 	respond 	to 	the 	State’s
interrogatories and Request for Production, by June 12, 2026. 192 Brewer failed to
comply with this Court Order.
185 Supreme Court Mandate, D.I. 21.
186 Order, D.I. 22.
187 Judicial Action Form, D.I. 27.
188 Trial Scheduling Order, D.I. 30.
189 State’s Mot. to Compel, D.I. 37; Brewer’s Resp. to State’s Mot. to Compel, D.I. 39.
190 Brewer’s Mot. to Compel, D.I. 40.
191 Judicial Action Form, D.I. 47.
192 Id.

24
On July 10, 2026, the State filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a
Motion to Dismiss.193 Brewer did not respond to either Motion, or the State’s
correspondence regarding the pretrial stipulation. 	The Court held the pretrial
conference on August 12, 2026. Brewer did not appear. The Court ordered Brewer
to respond to the State’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment
before September 4, 2026.194 The Court found that Brewer forfeited his right to a
hearing on September 16, 2026, due to his non-compliance with Court orders. The
matter will be decided on the papers.195 Brewer failed to respond to the Motions for
Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Brewer brings his claim under Delaware Wrongful Conviction and Services
Act. The purpose of this Act is as follows:
The State recognizes that certain individuals have served sentences of
incarceration, parole, probation, and sex offender registration in the
State for crimes they did not commit, and that such individuals have
been denied compensation for their wrongful convictions unless they
can 	prove 	their 	wrongful 	incarceration 	was 	caused 	by 	official
misconduct. The State believes that individuals who were innocent of
the crimes for which they were convicted suffer long-term hardships as
a result of their wrongful convictions, and are entitled to compensation
for the sentences they wrongfully served, regardless of whether their
convictions resulted from official misconduct. Therefore, this chapter
provides compensation to individuals whose convictions have been
193 Mot. for Summ. J., D.I 51; Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 52.
194 Judicial Action Form, D.I. 58.
195 Id.

25
overturned followed by either acquittal or dismissal of charges, and
who are found to have been factually innocent of the crime or crimes at
issue, for time that they served sentences due solely to the wrongful
conviction.196
An individual claiming wrongful conviction may bring a petition for an award and
other relief against the State by filing a petition in the Superior Court.197 The
Department of Justice may offer evidence and argue in opposition to the claim.198
The burden is on the petitioner to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to
compensation 	under this 	section 	by 	establishing 	six 	required 	elements 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence.199 If the petitioner establishes the six necessary
elements, the petitioner is entitled to an award under § 7005, unless the Department
of Justice establishes one of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) That the petitioner committed the crime for which the petitioner was
convicted; (2) That the petitioner was an accomplice in the commission
of the crime for which the petitioner was convicted; or (3) That the
petitioner intentionally and voluntarily caused the conviction at issue
by committing perjury at trial or fabricating evidence at trial, in order
to prevent the conviction of the true perpetrator of the crime at issue.200
A petitioner who prevails on a cause of action under § 7004 of the Act is entitled to
damages, which is set forth in the Act.201
196 10 Del. C. § 7002 (amended 2026).
197 10 Del. C. § 7004(b) (amended 2026).
198 Id.
199 10 Del. C. § 7004(c) (amended 2026).
200 10 Del. C. § 7004(e) (amended 2026).
201 10 Del. C. § 7005 (amended 2026).

26
DISCUSSION
I. 	The State’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment
Before addressing the merits of the Petition, the Court must address the State’s
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment. 	For the reasons stated
hereinafter, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED and the Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED IN PART.
A. 	The State’s Motion to Dismiss is Denied.
The State’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 41(b),
failure to prosecute the case, is denied.202
Superior Court Civil Rule 41(b) states: “[f]or failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these Rules, or any order of Court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against the defendant.”203 The Court
must consider the following factors when determining a motion to dismiss under
Rule 41(b): (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to
the adversary; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether conduct was willful or in bad
faith; (5) the effectiveness of other sanctions other than dismissal; and (6) the merits
of the claim or defense.204
202 Respondent’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 52.
203 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 41(b).
204 Swen v. Miller, 2024 WL 4930039, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. 2024)(citing Abdallah v. Rago,
2016 WL 6246891 at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. 2016); Drejka v. Hitchens Tire Serv., Inc., 15 A.3d
1221 (Del. 2010)).

27
The first factor, the extent of the party’s personal responsibility, weighs in
favor 	of 	granting 	the 	Motion. 	Brewer 	has 	not 	responded 	to 	the 	State’s
correspondence or complied with the Court’s order. 	Brewer has not provided a
reason for his lack of response. Therefore, the Court finds that the first factor weighs
in favor of granting the Motion.
The second factor, the prejudice to the adversary, weighs in favor of denying
the Motion. 	Due to Brewer’s absence and lack of response, the Court will decide
Brewer’s Petition on the papers, instead of holding a hearing. Because of the Court’s
decision, the State is not substantially prejudiced by Brewer’s lack of response
regarding the pretrial stipulation and the discovery responses.
The third factor, history of dilatoriness, weighs slightly in favor of denying
the Motion. 	Prior to the pretrial conference on August 12, 2026, Brewer attended
every court proceeding. Brewer was responsive in the beginning as well. However,
the Court recognizes the State’s argument that he delayed his case by failing to
respond to the discovery requests, filing various amendments, and filing an appeal.
However, as this is his first missed court proceeding and the first violation of a Court
order, the third factor weighs in favor of denying the Motion.
The fourth factor, whether the conduct was willful or in bad faith, weighs
slightly in favor of granting the Motion. However, as aforementioned, the pretrial
conference was the first court proceeding Brewer missed. Brewer has not provided

28
an explanation as to why he missed the pretrial conference or why he has not
responded to the State.
The fifth factor, the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, weighs in
favor of denying the Motion. 	The Court imposed a sanction during the pretrial
conference. 	As a result of Brewer’s absence at the pretrial conference, the Court
will no longer hold a hearing for his Petition. 	The Petition will be decided on the
papers. 	This is an effective sanction for Brewer’s failure to respond to the State,
failure to comply with the Court order, and failure to appear for the pretrial
conference. Therefore, the fifth factor weighs in favor of denying the Motion.
Lastly, the sixth factor, the merits of the claim or defense, will be discussed
in a later section of the memo. 	The Court prefers to decide issues on the merits.
Both of the parties had the opportunity to submit briefs to the Court, explaining the
merits of the claim and defenses, which this Court has reviewed.
For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Civil Rule 41(b) is
DENIED.
B. 	The State’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART.
In the Motion for Summary Judgment, the State brings forth two arguments.
First, the State argues that Brewer cannot establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that he served all, or part of his sentence based solely on the vacated

29
conviction.205 For the reasons stated below, the Court is not granting summary
judgment as to this argument. Second, the State argues that Brewer cannot establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not commit any felony arising from
the 	same 	transaction 	as 	the 	crime 	for 	which 	the 	petitioner 	was 	originally
convicted.206 The State’s arguments are better addressed in the section below, where
the Court analyzes each of the elements under the Delaware Wrongful Conviction
Compensation and Service Act. As to this argument and for the reasons explained
in the next section, the State’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
II. 	The Petition Under the Delaware Wrongful Conviction Compensation
and Service Act
This is a case of first impression. In deciding this case, the Court has carefully
examined the elements under § 7004, reviewed the facts of the case, and conducted
research to determine the legislative intent behind the Act.
In order to bring a claim under this Act, the Petitioner must show:
(1) that the petitioner was convicted; (2) the petitioner served all of or
part 	of 	a 	sentence 	of 	incarceration, 	time 	spent 	in 	a 	psychiatric
institution, probation, parole, or registration on 	the sex 	offender
registry; (3) the conviction was overturned, reversed, or vacated on
direct or collateral review; (4) after the conviction was overturned,
reversed, or vacated on direct or collateral appeal, the charge at issue
was dismissed or the petitioner was acquitted of the charge upon retrial;
or the petitioner entered a Robinson plea, or entered a plea of no contest,
while maintaining a claim of innocence, after the conviction was
overturned, reversed, or vacated on direct or collateral review when the
205 Respondent’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 51, at 6.
206 Id. at 10.

30
petitioner would otherwise be entitled to a new trial; (5) petitioner was
not convicted of any lesser included felony arising from the same
transaction 	as 	the 	crime for which 	the petitioner was 	originally
convicted; and (6) petitioner did not commit the crime that resulted in
the conviction, or there was no crime committed.207
If the Petitioner establishes all of the six elements, the State may present an
affirmative defense in opposition to the petition if the State establishes at least one
of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) that the petitioner committed the crime for which the petitioner was
convicted; (2) that the petitioner was an accomplice in the commission
of the crime for which the petitioner was convicted; or (3) that the
petitioner intentionally and voluntarily caused the conviction at issue
by committing perjury at trial or fabricating evidence at trial, in order
to prevent the conviction of the true perpetrator of the crime at issue.208
After reviewing the factual background of this case, it is abundantly clear that
Brewer is not factually innocent of the criminal episode that occurred in March of
2013, involving Mrs. Smith. A careful reading of the statute and an understanding
of the background of the Act demonstrates that Brewer is not the intended recipient
of compensation under the Act. Hereinafter, the Court will perform an analysis of
Brewer’s case in relation to 10 Del. C. § 7004.
A. 	Brewer Established Elements (1) Through (5) by a Preponderance of
the Evidence.
i. 	The First Element is Established.
207 10 Del. C. § 7004(c) (amended 2026).
208 10 Del. C. § 7004(e) (amended 2026).

31
The first element under the Act requires the petitioner to establish that he was
convicted. The Court agrees that Brewer is a petitioner who was convicted. Under
the Act, “conviction” is defined as “a verdict of guilty by the trier of fact, whether
judge or jury, or a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere accepted by the
court.”209 “Conviction also includes a case in which a person is adjudicated under §
1002 of this title.”210 It is undisputed that Brewer is a convicted petitioner because
he pled guilty, which was accepted by the Superior Court.
ii. The Second Element is Established.
Next, the Act requires that the petitioner serve all or part of the sentence
incarcerated, in a psychiatric institution, probation, parole or registration on the sex
offender registry based on that conviction.211 Incarceration, in addition to its
ordinary meaning, is defined as “(1) imprisonment in a Department of Correction
facility; (2) involuntary confinement in the Delaware Psychiatric Center; (3)
placement in custody of the Department of Services for Children, Youth and their
Families; or (4) pretrial detention.”212 The Court notes that Brewer was incarcerated
for pretrial detention and was sentenced to incarceration at a Department of
Correction facility. For these reasons, Brewer has established the second element.
209 10 Del. C. § 7003(1) (amended 2026).
210 Id.
211 10 Del. C. § 7004(c)(2) (amended 2026).
212 10 Del. C. § 7003(4) (amended 2026).

32
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, however, the State argues that Brewer
cannot establish this element because Brewer’s sentence was not based solely on the
vacated conviction. On December 18, 2012, prior to the criminal episode involved
in this Petition, Brewer pled guilty to Burglary Second Degree, Robbery Second
Degree, and Conspiracy Second Degree (“case number 1207018106”). Brewer was
sentenced to five years at supervision Level V, which was then deferred, and Brewer
was ordered to complete the Boot Camp Diversion Program and Aftercare Programs
set forth in 11 Del. C. §§ 6705 and 6712. On March 22, 2013, a violation report was
submitted to the Court in case number 1207018106. There are two violations listed:
(1) Brewer committed a new criminal offense; and (2) Brewer failed to report to his
supervising officer. The Court found Brewer in violation of his probation. Brewer
was sentenced to serve the full unexpired term of the original sentence, which was
five years at Level V, not including the sentence he received for the criminal episode
involving Mrs. Smith. The State argues that because Brewer violated his probation
by failing to report to his supervising officer, the Court was required to sentence him
to five years at Level V, not considering the new offenses, which were nolle prossed.
The statute states that if the participant does not complete bootcamp, violates terms
of probation, or violates the conditions of the program, the Court “shall proceed to
sentencing on all charges for which sentencing was originally deferred.”213 For these
213 Respondent’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 51, at 8; 11 Del. C. § 6712(h).

33
reasons, the State argues that even though the Court later vacated the violation of
probation sentence, it was not legally required to do so. Brewer’s claim that he is
entitled to compensation for serving a sentence based solely on a wrongful
conviction must fail.
However, the Act does not require the petitioner to serve a sentence based
solely on the alleged wrongful conviction. 	The criminal episode involving Mrs.
Smith was one of two violations considered in Brewer’s violation of probation. The
Act requires that the petitioner serve all or part of the sentence incarcerated based
on that conviction.214 Brewer served part of a sentence based on the conviction of
the criminal episode involving Mrs. Smith. The Court chose to vacate the violation
of probation based on the Supreme Court’s rulings in Harper v. State, even though
it was not legally obligated to do so. 	By vacating the violation of probation, the
Court acknowledged that Brewer’s sentence was based on the criminal episode
involving Mrs. Smith. Brewer was sentenced due to his violation of probation based
on both violations of probations, and the Act does not state that the conviction must
be based solely on the alleged wrongful conviction.
The Court is not persuaded by the State’s argument and finds that Brewer
established the second element. 	Brewer was incarcerated based on the criminal
episode involving Mrs. Smith.
214 10 Del. C. § 7004(c)(2) (amended 2026).

34
iii. The Third Element is Established.
Next, the petitioner must demonstrate that the conviction was overturned,
reversed, or vacated on direct or collateral review.215 Vacate is not defined under
the Act, however, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “vacate” as “to nullify or cancel;
make void; invalidate.”216 The State nolle prossed his charges. 	Additionally,
Brewer’s violation of probation was vacated. 	Therefore, Brewer has met this
element as well.
iv. The Fourth Element is Established.
Next, the Petitioner must establish one of the following: (1) “After the
conviction was overturned, reversed, or vacated on direct or collateral appeal, the
charge at issue was dismissed or the petitioner was acquitted of the charge upon
retrial;”217 or “(2) the petitioner entered a Robinson plea, or entered a plea of no
contest, while maintaining a claim of innocence, after the conviction was overturned,
reversed, or vacated on direct or collateral review when the petitioner would
otherwise have been entitled to a new trial.”218 Brewer’s charges were nolle prossed,
therefore, Brewer has established that after his charges were overturned, reversed,
or vacated, the charges were dismissed, or he was acquitted.
215 10 Del. C. § 7004(c)(3) (amended 2026).
216 VACATE, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
217 10 Del. C. § 7004(c)(4)(a) (amended 2026).
218 10 Del. C. § 7004(c)(4)(b) (amended 2026).

35
v. 	The Fifth Element is Established.
The fifth element requires the petitioner to demonstrate that he was not
convicted of a lesser-included felony arising from the same transaction as the crime
for which the petitioner was convicted.219 There is no evidence that Brewer was
convicted of any lesser included felonies. 	This element was amended in May of
2026, however, to require the petitioner to establish that he did not commit any
felony arising from the same transaction as the crime for which he was originally
convicted.220 The amendment does not apply retroactively.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the State argues that Brewer cannot
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not commit any felony
arising from the same transaction as the crime for which he was originally convicted.
However, this argument is based on the amendment to the Wrongful Conviction
Compensation 	Act. 	As 	aforementioned, 	the 	amendment 	does 	not 	apply
retroactively. 	Under Delaware law, there is a presumption against retroactive
application of legislation.221 Delaware Courts have found that “[l]aws apply
retroactively only where the General Assembly has made its intent plain and
unambiguous.”222 The amendment is silent as to whether it applies retroactively,
219 10 Del. C. § 7004(c)(5) (amended 2026).
220 10 Del. C. § 7004(c)(5).
221 Rutledge v. Clearway Energy Grp. LLC, 2026 WL 548504, at *13 (Del. 2026).
222 Id.

36
therefore, it applies prospectively. The amendment will be discussed in further detail
in a later section.
There is no evidence that Brewer was convicted of any lesser included
felonies. For these reasons, the Court finds that Brewer established the fifth element
by a preponderance of the evidence.
B. 	Brewer did not Establish the Sixth Element.
Lastly, the petitioner must demonstrate that he did not commit the crime that
resulted in the conviction, or there was no crime committed.223 When determining
whether Brewer has made a prima facie showing of this element under the Act, the
Court turns to the legislative intent behind the Act. Based on a review of the Senate
and House of Representative legislative sessions, it is clear that this element is meant
to protect those who are factually innocent of the crime that resulted in the
conviction, not merely, someone who is not guilty of the crime in which they were
charged.
The Wrongful Conviction Compensation Services Act was unanimously
approved in both the Senate and House of Representatives. Senator Hoffner was the
primary sponsor, as well as Representative Bush.
The purpose of the Act is to provide compensation to individuals whose
convictions have been overturned followed by acquittal or dismissal of charges, and
223 10 Del. C. § 7004(c)(6) (amended 2026).

37
are factually innocent of the crime(s) at issue.224 While the legislative intent is not
expressly written in the Act, it can be inferred that the Act is meant to apply to those
who did not commit the crime, or any related crime, and were wrongfully convicted.
i. 	The Senate Legislative and the House of Representatives
Legislative Sessions
In the Senate Legislative Session on May 23, 2024, the Bill was unanimously
passed. Senator Hoffner spoke to the Senate in support of the Bill. She focused on
innocence, and made comments such as “we will not allow the innocent to suffer in
silence.”225 Senator Hoffner discussed how devastating it is for someone to be
accused of a crime that he/she did not commit, and to be labeled as a criminal despite
being innocent.226 The compensation from the Act is an acknowledgement of a
profound wrong, and a small amount of justice in a world where justice was
denied.227 She states that the “tragedy doesn’t end with exoneration.”228 The Act is
for “those who are factually innocent of a crime or crimes at issue.”229 Her
comments regarding the Bill show that the Act is intended for those who are factually
innocent.
224 10 Del. C. § 7002 (amended 2026).
225 Senate Legislative Session, Session 2, 34th Legislative Day, at 4:41:17.
226 Id. at 4:39:13.
227 Id. at 4:40:09.
228 Id. at 4:39:40.
229 Id. at 4:41:57.

38
Next, Senator Pettyjohn spoke to the Senate. He asked to co-sponsor the Bill.
While speaking to the Senate, Senator Pettyjohn stated that the act is for the “falsely
accused” and the “factually innocent.”230 He further states that “there is a difference
between not guilty and innocent. 	This addresses the people that were innocent,
should’ve never spent a day in jail, but some of them have spent the majority of their
lives incarcerated for crimes they did not commit.”231 This comment from Senator
Pettyjohn indicates that the petitioner must be factually innocent in order to be
eligible for compensation. 	He stated that the State has a duty to “get it right” and
sometimes that does not happen.232 Sometimes, because of “what happened during
the crime [or] witnesses that were present, there have been people that were falsely
accused, falsely convicted, that were factually innocent.”233 This statement further
supports the notion that the legislative intent behind the Act is to compensate those
who are completely factually innocent, but were wrongfully convicted due to things
such as evidentiary issues. Other senators asked to co-sponsor the Bill, but did not
provide additional commentary, other than statements regarding the protection of
the innocent.
230 Id. at 4:46:55.
231 Id. at 4:46:59.
232 Id. at 4:46:32.
233 Id. at 4:46:48.

39
After hearing the other Senators speak, Senator Hoffner concluded the
discussion by stating that she does not blame the prosecutors or police for wrongful
convictions. 	She stated, “police and prosecutors did the best they could do at the
time of the situation with the information they had.”234 This statement also supports
the notion that the Act is intended to compensate those who were wrongfully
convicted because the State did not have all of the necessary information at the time
of the wrongful conviction. This further supports that the legislative intent behind
the Act is to provide compensation for those who are factually innocent of the crime
they were convicted of.
Lastly, Senator Hoffner thanked “After Innocence” for their help in drafting
the Bill.235 After Innocence is a nonprofit organization, whose mission is to “reach
every person in America released after wrongful imprisonment, provide them with
reliable post-release assistance, and advocate with them for a more accountable
justice system.”236 After Innocence also worked with the Delaware Innocence
Project, whose mission is to “secure justice for individuals wrongfully imprisoned
for crimes they did not commit.”237 The Delaware Innocence Project’s website lists
“leading factors in wrongful convictions.”238 The leading factors are: (1) false
234 Id. at 4:49:37.
235 Id. at 4:36:45.
236 After Innocence, https://www.after-innocence.org/legislative-advocacy-1 (last visited Aug.
24, 2026).
237 Innocence Project Delaware, https://www.innocencede.org/issues (last visited Aug. 24, 2026).
238 Id.

40
confessions; (2) eyewitness misidentification; (3) official government misconduct;
(4) ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) jailhouse informants; and (6) misapplication
of forensic science.239 Clearly, this is not a comprehensive list. 	Furthermore, the
list does not provide the legislative intent behind the Act. 	However, it provides
further insight into the intent of the organizations that helped draft the Bill.
On June 30, 2024, during the House of Representative Legislative Session,
the House unanimously voted to pass the Bill, with an amendment that alleviated a
few concerns from the Department of Justice.240 During the session, Representative
Bush stated, “this is a bill about justice, doing the right thing, and fixing a wrong.”241
When addressing his fellow representatives, Representative Bush stated that Senator
Hoffner has a personal connection to the Bill because her father-in-law was
wrongfully convicted in New York.242 After conducting research, it is likely that
Senator Hoffner’s father-in-law is Louis Hoffner, a man who was convicted of
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.243 Louis Hoffner spent twelve years
incarcerated due to evidentiary issues.244 He filed a motion to vacate the judgment
of conviction, which was granted.
239 Id.
240 House of Representatives Legislative Session, Session 2, June 30, 2024, at 7:21:45.
241 Id. at 7:22:09.
242 Id. 7:22:45.
243 People v. Hoffner, 129 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Co. Ct. 1952).
244 Hoffner v. State, 142 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Ct. Cl. 1955).

41
Even though this does not directly define the legislative intent behind the Act,
it provides some background information for Senator Hoffner’s intent behind
sponsoring the Act. Her father-in-law was wrongfully convicted, and his judgment
was vacated when new evidence came to light that supported his innocence. Senator
Hoffner likely intended to sponsor this Act to compensate those, like her father-in-
law, who had their judgments vacated when new evidence was discovered to show
wrongful conviction.
Based on a review of the legislative intent, it is clear to the Court that Brewer
cannot make a prima facie showing to establish the sixth element, that he did not
commit the crime that resulted in the conviction, or there was no crime committed.
Brewer argues that he is entitled to compensation under the Act because the
Supreme Court found that his co-defendant, Harper, could not be guilty of carjacking
or kidnapping, because both the carjacking and kidnapping had occurred prior to
Brewer and Harper’s involvement. 	Brewer’s charges were vacated, and the State
decided to not pursue charging Brewer under other applicable crimes. Brewer may
be “not guilty” of the kidnapping and carjacking charges, but he is not factually
innocent. 	Brewer testified in great detail about his involvement in the criminal
episode to gain a lighter sentence, realizing he had participated in committing
horrible atrocities against a vulnerable victim.

42
Brewer argues that he is innocent because Mrs. Smith stated that she
witnessed two females, and did not witness any males.245 Brewer also argues that
there are statements from Perez and McDonald stating that Brewer was not involved.
However, Brewer testified about what transpired during the two-day criminal
episode involving Mrs. Smith. He testified that he and Harper took Mrs. Smith out
of the trunk and put her back in the trunk several times. He testified that no food or
water was given to Mrs. Smith. He testified that he knew Mrs. Smith did not want
to be held in the trunk. He knew the car was stolen, and continued to drive his co-
defendants around the State of Delaware, despite not having a drivers’ license. He
and his co-defendants repeatedly drove the car with Mrs. Smith in the trunk. 	He
admitted that it was “crazy” that they were driving the car with her in the trunk.
They made several trips to purchase marijuana. 	The Group left Mrs. Smith in the
trunk overnight on two separate occasions: one to go to a different location to smoke
marijuana, and the other to go into a hotel room to party. He testified that he drove
Mrs. Smith’s car to the cemetery and left her there. 	He testified that he knew the
cemetery was a remote and secluded place, and it was wrong to leave her there.
Brewer admitted to being involved throughout the criminal episode and testified to
his involvement. 	He cannot discount the play-by-play testimony of the criminal
episode he provided to the State to gain a benefit in sentencing.
245 Compl., D.I. 1, at 2.

43
The facts of this case do not represent someone who was falsely accused and
is factually innocent. As Senator Pettyjohn stated, this Act is for “[t]he people that
were innocent, should’ve never spent a day in jail, but some of them have spent the
majority of their lives incarcerated for crimes they did not commit.”246 Brewer does
not meet this standard. Therefore, he cannot establish the sixth element.
ii. The April 22, 2026, Amendment to the Act
As aforementioned, the amendment to the Act applies prospectively. 	Even
though the amendment does not apply to Brewer’s Petition, it provides further
insight into the legislative intent of the Act.
The amendment changes the fifth element that the petitioner must establish to
make a prima facie showing of entitlement to compensation under the Act. 	The
amendment changes the fifth element to state: “[t]he petitioner did not commit any
felony arising from the same transaction as the crime for which the petitioner was
originally convicted.”247 The language of this amendment further shows the
legislation’s intent behind the Act. 	The petitioner must establish that they did not
commit any felony arising from the same transaction as the crime for which the
petitioner was committed.
246 Senate Legislative Session, Session 2, 34th Legislative Day, at 4:46:59.
247 10 Del. C. § 7004(c)(5).

44
The Act’s amendment, while to the fifth and not sixth element, further
establishes that Brewer is not the intended recipient of compensation under the Act.
He committed a crime arising from the same transaction as the crime for which he
was originally convicted. 	While Brewer’s charges for kidnapping and carjacking
were overturned, he is not innocent in this horrific criminal episode. 	He actively
participated in holding Mrs. Smith hostage in the trunk, drove her vehicle around
Delaware, did not give Mrs. Smith food or water, did not allow Mrs. Smith to use
the bathroom, and dumped her on the side of an isolated road in a cemetery. 	In
Brewer’s co-defendant’s appeal, the Supreme Court wrote:
In the event a carjacker does take the victim hostage, the carjacker
commits separate and distinct offenses – kidnapping or unlawful
imprisonment. Smith might have been the victim of a continuing crime,
but the continuing crime was not carjacking; it was the distinct crimes
of kidnapping or unlawful imprisonment, punishable under 11 Del. C.
§§ 781-783A.248
The Supreme Court’s findings in Harper v. State further demonstrate that Harper
and Brewer were not factually innocent.
Therefore, even though Brewer was given the benefit of a Supreme Court
ruling vacating the carjacking and kidnapping charges, he is not factually innocent.
While the amendment to the Act does not apply retroactively, it further demonstrates
that Brewer is not the intended recipient of compensation under the Act.
248 Harper, 121 A.3d at 32-33.

45
CONCLUSION
The State’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED and the State’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is 	GRANTED IN PART. 	Further, after reviewing the
language of the Act and the legislative intent for implementing the Act, it is clear
that Brewer is not an intended recipient of compensation under the Act. Brewer has
not made a prima facie showing of entitlement to compensation under the Act by a
preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence. 	For 	these 	reasons, 	Brewer’s 	Petition 	for
Compensation under the Delaware Wrongful Conviction Act is DENIED.
/s/ Mark H. Conner
Mark H. Conner, Judge
oc: 	Prothonotary