EEOC Appeal 2025003706

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Sector
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Latina E.,1
Complainant,
v.
David Steiner,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Field Areas and Regions),
Agency.
Appeal No. 2025003706
Hearing No. 520-2024-00198X
Agency No. 4B-020-0099-23
DECISION
Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s
June 24, 2025, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)
complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621
et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission REVERSES the final order and
REMANDS the matter for further action.
1 	This 	case 	has 	been 	randomly 	assigned 	a 	pseudonym 	which 	will 	replace
Complainant’s 	name 	when 	the 	decision 	is 	published 	to 	non-parties 	and 	the
Commission’s website.

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BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a
Supervisor Customer Service at the Agency’s Central Square Post Office in
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
On August 29, 2023, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the
Agency subjected her to discriminatory harassment on the bases of color (White)
and age (YOB: 1970), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity, when:
1. 	on unspecified dates, Complainant’s first-line supervisor (Supervisor)
said, “you’re not very good at your job,” and told Complainant to find
another career path. He also allegedly stated, “I am giving you one
chance to leave on your own, and if you don’t, I will force you out,”
and that he knew too many people for Complainant to stop him from
doing what he wants. The Supervisor also denied Complainant’s
request to change the date of her training;
2. 	on an unspecified date, the Supervisor stated that Complainant was
not qualified; would not be selected; and would not be permitted to
work in Cambridge after she applied for another position;
3. 	in April 2023, the Supervisor gave Complainant the option to choose a
Letter of Warning or a reassignment, and when she turned down the
reassignment, he said that she would regret it;
4. 	on April 26, 2023, Complainant’s start time was changed, and she was
sent to Harvard Station;
5. 	on April 29, 2023, the Supervisor verbally harassed Complainant on
the telephone and attempted to make her repeat, “I am not the boss in
Cambridge”;
6. 	on an unspecified date, the Supervisor called Complainant for a
meeting and made her wait two (2) hours, and then sent her to another
facility for the closing shift;
7. 	on May 12, 2023, the Supervisor accused Complainant of fraud and
revoked her “TACS” access;
8. 	between May 15, and 24, 2023, the Supervisor texted Complainant
while she was on leave;
9. 	on May 24, 2023, Complainant received a voicemail stating, “Happy
Birthday, bitch. You should’ve gone to the Annex. Tomorrow the fun
begins”;

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10. 	on May 25, 2023 the Supervisor accused Complainant of hiding a
postal laptop; told her to contact her National Association of Postal
Supervisors representative; and stated, “now I got you”;
11. 	on May 26, 2023, the Supervisor said he would contact a Labor
Specialist regarding possible disciplinary action against her; and
12. 	on May 30, 2023, the Supervisor instructed Complainant to force a
clerk to work overtime.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a
copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and notice of her right to request a
hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a
hearing. Over Complainant’s objections, the AJ granted the Agency’s motion and
issued a decision without a hearing on June 9, 2025.
As an initial matter, the AJ highlighted that Complainant failed to dispute any of
the Agency’s facts, and the AJ found no genuine disputes of material facts. The AJ
noted that Complainant proffered 81 facts, but they were not proper facts or were
irrelevant or immaterial, and the AJ declined to adopt any of them. The AJ then
found that Complainant did not engage in protected EEO activity because there
was no evidence that she was ever interviewed, or otherwise participated in, a
Coworker’s EEO case. Notably, the evidence showed that the EEO Specialist did
not contact any potential witness for the matter, which was withdrawn at the
informal stage. Complainant also claimed her EEO activity involved ten (10)
telephone calls to a Labor Relations Manager (LR Manager) about harassment and
discrimination, but the LR Manager only recalled a single conversation with
Complainant when she stated that interactions with the Supervisor had improved.
Further, there was no evidence that the LR Manager informed the Supervisor about
this conversation, or that it involved discrimination.
Regarding the alleged hostile work environment based on color or age, the AJ
determined that the events did not occur as alleged, or they were not based on a
protected category. In addition, Complainant did not show that the behavior was so
severe or pervasive to rise to the level of actionable conduct. The AJ concluded by
granting the Agency’s motion and entering a finding of no discrimination.
The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that
Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as
alleged.

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The instant appeal followed. Complainant argues that the AJ ignored witness
statements and other documentary evidence, and she requests a hearing. The
Agency opposes Complainant’s appeal. Complainant moved to strike the Agency’s
response as untimely.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, the Agency’s
decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a).
See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part
1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de
novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without
regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and
that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including
any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based
on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the
law”); see also EEO MD-110, at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an
administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the
decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo).
ANALYSIS
Agency Brief
As 	an 	initial 	matter, 	we 	address 	Complainant’s 	Motion 	to 	Strike 	Agency’s
Opposition to Complainant’s Appeal. Complainant asserts that she filed her appeal
on July 24, 2025, and the Agency had 30 days to file its opposition brief but did
not do so until August 29, 2025. The Commission’s regulations provide that “any
statement or brief in opposition to an appeal must be submitted to the Commission
... within 30 days of receipt of the statement or brief supporting the appeal, or, if no
statement or brief supporting the appeal is filed, within 60 days of receipt of the
appeal.” 29 C.F.R. §1614.403(f).
The record shows that Complainant filed her appeal brief on July 24, 2025, and 30
days later was August 24, 2025. However, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(g) states that if
the last day of a filing period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or federal holiday, the

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filing period will be extended to include the next business day. The Agency’s
deadline was August 25, 2025, and its opposition brief followed four (4) days later.
The Commission’s regulations further provide that the filing limitation period is
subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f). Agency
Counsel explained that she did not receive Complainant’s brief until July 30, 2025,
and even if it was untimely, it was inadvertent. The Commission’s portal contains
the acknowledgement letter sent to the Agency advising it of Complainant’s appeal
filed on July 24, 2025, with instructions to file an opposition brief and notice that
statements or briefs submitted after the applicable date may not be considered. We
find that the Agency was properly notified of its obligation to adhere to its deadline
to file an opposition brief, and Agency Counsel’s explanation is insufficient to
waive, estop, or equitably toll its deadline. As such, we will not consider the
Agency’s opposition brief.
Decision Without a Hearing
We must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision
without a hearing on this record. The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to
issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine
issue of material fact. 	29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after
the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 	The 	U.S. 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	held 	that 	summary 	judgment 	is
appropriate 	where 	a 	court 	determines 	that, 	given 	the 	substantive 	legal 	and
evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of
material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling
on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence
but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. 	Id. at 249. The
evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage
and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at
255. An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact
finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir.
1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.
If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision
without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative
proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a

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hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed
for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206
(July 11, 2003). Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without
holding a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is
given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing, (2) a
comprehensive 	statement 	of 	the 	allegedly 	undisputed 	material 	facts, 	(3) 	the
opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance to engage in
discovery before responding, if necessary. According to the Supreme Court, Rule
56 itself precludes summary judgment “where the [party opposing summary
judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to
his opposition.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that
the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of
discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a
hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an AJ could order
discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision
without a hearing).
The courts have been clear that summary judgment is not to be used as a “trial by
affidavit.” 	Redmand 	v. 	Warrener, 	516 	F.2d 	766, 	768 	(1st 	Cir. 	1975). 	The
Commission has noted that when a party submits an affidavit and credibility is at
issue, “there is a need for strident cross-examination and summary judgment on
such evidence is improper.” Pedersen v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC Request No.
05940339 (February 24, 1995).
After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ erred when concluding
that there were no genuine issues of material fact in this case. The AJ found that,
even if the complained of actions occurred, Complainant provided no evidence that
they were based on her age or color. However, the record contains witness
statements that support the Supervisor’s animus against Complainant based on her
age and color, which raises a genuine dispute about his motives. For example, the
Coworker attested that he heard the Supervisor state, “you can’t teach an old dog
new trick.” Coworker Deposition at 15-16. The AJ stated that the Coworker
admitted that it was unclear who the Supervisor was referring to because half the
people in the room were older than the Supervisor. However, a Postmaster
explained that he heard the Supervisor say this “[m]any times,” in reference to
Complainant. Postmaster Deposition at 23. The Postmaster also disclosed that he
heard the Supervisor talk about his “vision” to replace employees with “his
people,” who were African American and Hispanic women of color because “it

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was 	easier to 	control 	them.” 	Postmaster 	Deposition 	at 	23-4. 	The 	Coworker
observed that those hired by the Supervisor were “all women of color,” and he
specified that the Supervisor hired four (4) Black women in four (4) months.
Coworker Deposition at 29, 108. The Postmaster added that during a conversation
with the Supervisor about hiring the four (4) Black women, the Supervisor stated
that they were more easily controlled. Postmaster Deposition at 84. Complainant
attested that when she learned of the Supervisor’s plan to hire women of color, she
informed him that her husband and children are Black, and he responded that
Complainant “wasn’t Black.” ROI at 172.
We also find that additional evidence is needed regarding the reprisal basis. In her
appeal, Complainant contends that she placed ten (10) calls to the LR Manager, as
shown by her submitted telephone records. Complainant asserts that the LR
Manager did not state that she only received one (1) call, only that she remembered
a single conversation. The LR Manager’s affidavit reveals that she recalled a
conversation with Complainant during which she complained of harassment but
indicated no action was requested because her interactions with the Postmaster had
improved. ROI at 264. While the AJ found that there was no evidence that the LR
Manager informed the Supervisor about this single conversation or that it pertained
to 	discrimination, 	the 	LR 	Manager’s 	statement 	is 	too 	sparse 	to 	draw 	any
conclusions against Complainant’s assertions that she asked for the LR Manager’s
assistance with the Supervisor’s harassment and discrimination. The LR Manager
should 	be 	questioned 	further 	about 	any 	additional 	communications 	with
Complainant to enable an AJ to determine if Complainant engaged in protected
EEO activity, and if so, whether the LR Manager communicated such protected
activity to the Supervisor. In addition, the Supervisor should testify to any
awareness of Complainant’s opposition to unlawful discrimination or harassment.
We further find a need to assess credibility of the Supervisor and other witnesses.
Notably, the Supervisor averred that he “never” used the phrase “you can’t teach
an old dog new trick,” and that this “phrase is not in [his] repertoire.” ROI at 197,
Supervisor Deposition (March 20, 2025) at 175. However, as discussed above, the
Coworker and Postmaster witnessed the Supervisor repeatedly use the expression.
Complainant also attested that the Supervisor made this comment and that it was
too late for her to learn anything new when he was annoyed that she did not know
enough about the delivery aspect of the operation, and that he did not know of
anyone Complainant’s age who did not drive. ROI at 130-1.

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The Supervisor also repeatedly denied the purported conduct. For example, he
averred that he never made the statement that Complainant was not good at her job
and should find a new career path; or that he presented a Letter of Warning and
told her she needed to take it or transfer. ROI at 181, 184. However, the Postmaster
heard the Supervisor tell Complainant that she was not good at her job and was
giving her a chance to leave on her own or he would force her out, and he
witnessed the Supervisor give Complainant the option to choose a Letter of
Warning or a reassignment. Postmaster Deposition at 9-11, 13. The Coworker
attested that, while he did not hear about the Letter of Warning, he heard the
Supervisor tell Complainant that she would regret not taking a reassignment.
Coworker Deposition at 169-70. In response to the allegation that the Supervisor
stated that he would 	contact 	a Labor Specialist regarding discipline against
Complainant, he averred that he never contacted Labor Relations, but he provided
a memorandum to the LR Manager requesting a removal action for Complainant,
or a demotion and reassignment to another installation.2 ROI at 195, 200-1.
To the extent that the Agency contends that the Supervisor treated Complainant in
the same manner as other employees, there is a genuine dispute. For example, the
Coworker stated that Complainant “was getting the brunt of it at that time.”
Coworker Deposition at 33. The Postmaster attested that Complainant was the
“main focus” of the Supervisor’s ire, and that no one was treated as badly as
Complainant. Postmaster Deposition at 14, 86. Complainant also believed that her
treatment was not consistent with the way the Supervisor treated other supervisors,
and he stated that he would make her life a “living nightmare.” ROI at 141.
The Coworker confirmed that there were “many instances” when the Supervisor
threatened to fire Complainant, and the threats to fire employees occurred daily.
ROI at 256, Coworker Deposition at 41-2, 48. The Coworker added that the
Supervisor said that he wanted to get rid of Complainant. Coworker Deposition at
26. The Postmaster emailed an unsworn statement noting that the Supervisor
indicated that he would make Complainant’s “life a living hell,” if she did not
accept a position at the Porter Carrier Annex. Complainant’s Opposition to
Agency’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2. The Postmaster should
provide sworn testimony for such statements he witnessed by the Supervisor.
2 The 	Supervisor 	disclosed 	that 	no 	discipline 	was 	issued 	to 	Complainant.
Supervisor Deposition (March 25, 2025) at 38.

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Finally, the Agency concluded in an Initial Management Inquiry Process that
Complainant’s allegations of harassment by the Supervisor were substantiated.3
Complainant’s Opposition to Agency’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1.
The hearing process is intended to be an extension of the investigative process,
designed to ensure that the parties have “a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain and supplement the record and, in appropriate instances, to examine and
cross-examine 	witnesses.” 	See 	EEO 	MD-110, 	7-1; 	see 	also 	29 	C.F.R. 	§
1614.109(e). “Truncation of this process, while material facts are still in dispute
and the credibility of witnesses is still ripe for challenge, improperly deprives
Complainant of a full and fair investigation of her claims.” Bang v. U.S. Postal
Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01961575 (March 26, 1998). See also Peavley v. U.S.
Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05950628 (October 31, 1996); Chronister v. U.S.
Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05940578 (April 25, 1995). An AJ should obtain
additional testimony and evaluate credibility to determine if Complainant was
subjected to conduct based on a protected class that was so severe or pervasive as
to alter the conditions of her employment or that would reasonably dissuade
protected EEO activity.
In summary, there are simply too many unresolved issues which require additional
information and assessment as to the credibility of the various management
officials, coworkers, and Complainant, herself. Therefore, judgment as a matter of
law for the Agency should not have been granted as to the alleged harassment.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including Complainant’s arguments
on appeal, and arguments and evidence not specifically discussed in this decision,
the Commission REVERSES the Agency’s final action and REMANDS the matter
to the Agency in accordance with this decision and the Order below.
3 We note that the Agency did not examine the Supervisor’s motives and the
question of whether Complainant was subjected to discriminatory or retaliatory
harassment remains for the EEOC to determine.

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ORDER
The Agency is directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC
Hearings Unit within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes
final. The Agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at
the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted to the
Hearings Unit. Thereafter, a different Administrative Judge shall hold a hearing
and issue a decision on the complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109 and
the Agency shall issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S DECISION (K0719)
Under 	29 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1614.405(c) 	and 	§ 	1614.502, 	compliance 	with 	the
Commission’s corrective action is mandatory. Within seven (7) calendar days of
the completion of each ordered corrective action, the Agency shall submit via the
Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP) supporting documents in the digital format
required by the Commission, referencing the compliance docket number under
which compliance was being monitored. Once all compliance is complete, the
Agency shall submit via FedSEP a final compliance report in the digital format
required by the Commission. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency’s final
report must contain supporting documentation when previously not uploaded, and
the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant and his/her
representative.
If the Agency does not comply with the Commission’s order, the Complainant may
petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a).
The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with
the Commission’s order prior to or following 	an 	administrative petition 	for
enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g).
Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying
complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled “Right to File a Civil
Action.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a
civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42
U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil
action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition
for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409.

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Failure by an agency to either file a compliance report or implement any of the
orders set forth in this decision, without good cause shown, may result in the
referral of this matter to the Office of Special Counsel pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §
1614.503(f) for enforcement by that agency.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1125)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if
Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or
evidence that tend to establish that:
1. 	The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of
material fact or law; or
2. 	The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Sector
(OFS) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party
requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the
request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for
reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of
another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or
statement 	in 	opposition. 	See 	29 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1614.405; 	Equal 	Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at
Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015).
Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or
brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at
https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. 	Alternatively, 	Complainant 	can
submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Sector, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street,
NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFS receives it by mail within
five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. §
1614.604.

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An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the
EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g).
Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the
EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required.
Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s
request 	for 	reconsideration 	as 	untimely, 	unless 	extenuating 	circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must
be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0124)
This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of
your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to
file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90)
calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you
may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the
date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the
complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head,
identifying that person by their full name and official title. Failure to do so may
result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you
work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your
complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so,
you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without
paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent
you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you.

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You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an
attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the
time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s
Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
T. Gimbrere __________ Chaudhry’s signature
T. Gimbrere, Acting Director
Office of Federal Sector
September 17, 2026
Date