EEOC Appeal 2025000693

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Sector
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Karen L.,1
Complainant,
v.
Douglas A. Collins,
Secretary,
Department of Veterans Affairs,
Agency.
Appeal No. 2025000693
Hearing No. 430-2022-00066X
Agency No. 2004-0652-2021-103298
DECISION
Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency's
October 22, 2024, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)
complaint of employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following
reasons, the Commission VACATES the Agency's final order.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a
Kinesiotherapist, GS-0635-10, at the Agency’s VA Medical Center, located in
Richmond, Virginia. On May 28, 2021, Complainant filed an EEO complaint
1 This 	case 	has 	been 	randomly 	assigned 	a 	pseudonym 	which 	will 	replace
Complainant’s 	name 	when 	the 	decision 	is 	published 	to 	non-parties 	and 	the
Commission’s website.

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alleging that the Agency discriminated against her in reprisal for prior protected EEO
activity when, on March 5, 2021, she was removed from her clinical duties for
approximately six days and, among other impacts, she was not permitted to work
scheduled overtime on March 6 and 7, 2021.2
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a
copy of the report of investigation and Notice of her right to request a hearing before
an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. The
AJ assigned to the case issued a summary judgment decision in favor of Complainant
and awarded make whole relief, including, but not limited to $9,865.86 in attorney’s
fees.3 The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully adopting the AJ’s findings.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Complainant asserts that the AJ erred in his calculation of attorney’s fees by applying
the Richmond, Virginia, market rate as opposed to the Washington D.C. market rate.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A decision issued without hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), is subject
to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal
Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter
9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires
that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal
determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the
documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant
submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own
assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”).Attorney’s Fees – Hourly
2 Complainant withdrew several additional claims.
3 The AJ also awarded backpay, nonpecuniary compensatory damages, and costs
which are not at issue herein.

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Attorney Hourly Rate
The law is well-established that a successful civil rights litigant is entitled to be
reimbursed for attorney's fees incurred at a reasonable hourly rate based on
“prevailing market rates in the relevant community” for attorneys of similar
experience in similar cases. Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive
for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Ch. 11, § VI.F.1 (Aug. 5, 2015). Here,
the parties differ on the question of which is the appropriate “community” for
determining the prevailing attorney's fees rate. Complainant’s attorney’s fee petition
sought reimbursement at rates charged in the Washington, D.C. area, where
Complainant's counsel maintains offices.4 The AJ concluded that the appropriate
community was Richmond, Virginia where Complainant resides and the actions
underlying the complaint occurred. Based on this finding, the AJ reduced the
attorney’s fees award from $15,789.90 to $9,812.50.
The Commission has held that if a party does not find counsel readily available in
the locality of the case with whatever degree of skill that may reasonably be required,
it is reasonable for the party to go elsewhere to find an attorney. See Harden v. Soc.
Sec. Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 0720080002 (Aug. 12, 2011) (citing Southerland v.
U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01A05403 (Oct. 16, 2002)). The burden is on
the agency to show that a complainant's decision to retain out-of-town counsel was
unreasonable. Id; see also Elliott v. Dep’t. of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No.
0720080046 (Apr. 15, 2009) (holding that (1) an affidavit from a veteran local
attorney 	attesting 	to 	representing 	clients 	in 	“various 	employment 	related
administrative proceedings” and estimating that 300 attorneys in the gulf coast area
perform “this type of legal work,” and (2) affidavits from two attorneys attesting to
representing clients in EEOC proceedings, in the area, to be insufficient to show that
appropriately skilled counsel was “readily available and that complainant's decision
to use out-of-state counsel was unreasonable); Dayle H. v. Dep’t. of Veterans
Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120150116 (Apr. 18, 2017) (holding that agency did
not carry its burden of proving that qualified counsel was readily available to
represent the complainant in the Indianapolis area).
4 The Agency 	did 	not 	address 	the 	issue 	of 	market 	rate in 	its 	response 	to
Complainant’s attorney’s fee petition.

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In the present case, the Agency did not assert an argument, let alone present any
evidence to support such an argument. Rather, the AJ made the conclusory statement
that Richmond, Virginia was the relevant market rate, without any facts or evidence
to support such conclusion. As the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that
it was unreasonable for Complainant to seek counsel in Washington, D.C., and the
Agency made no such argument, we agree with Complainant that the Washington
D.C. rate is appropriate here.
While we agree that the Washington D.C. market is the proper location to
determine the market rate, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to
determine what the rate should be. Complainant’s attorney relies primarily on the
Fitzpatrick matrix.5 In order to determine an appropriate rate for a particular
attorney in a particular case, matrices should be supplemented with “surveys to
update the[m]; affidavits reciting the precise fees that attorneys with similar
qualifications have received from fee-paying clients in comparable cases; and
evidence of recent fees awarded by the courts or through settlement to attorneys
with comparable qualifications handling similar cases.” MD-110 likewise notes
the need for additional details, stating that a verified statement of fees “shall
include . . . documentary evidence of reasonableness of rate, such as an affidavit
stating that the requested rate is the attorney’s normal billing rate, a detailed
affidavit 	of 	another 	attorney 	in 	the 	community 	familiar 	with 	prevailing
community rates for attorneys of comparable experience and expertise, a resume,
a list of cases handled, or a list of comparable cases where a similar rate was
accepted.” MD-110, Chapter 11 at § VI(G)(1)(c) (emphasis added). Eley v. D.C.,
793 F.3d at 101 (quoting Covington v. D.C., 57 F.3d 1101, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
see also Chara S. v. Dep’t. of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 2024005027 (Aug. 10,
2026). 6
5 The Fitzpatrick Matrix provides hourly rates for legal fees for complex federal
litigation in the District of Columbia. Like the Laffey Matrix, the U.S. Department
of 	Justice 	publishes 	the 	Fitzgerald 	Matrix 	on 	its 	public 	website.
www.justice.gov/usao-dc/media/1395096/dl?inline.
6 While a petitioner is not precluded from using a matrix as a “starting point,” the
petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the matrix meaningfully assists
in 	determining 	a 	reasonable 	rate 	for 	work 	in 	the 	EEOC 	federal 	sector
administrative complaint process. Existing matrices derived from litigation in
federal court, like the Fitzpatrick Matrix and its ilk, may not satisfy that burden

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Accordingly, on appeal, we find that Complainant’s fee petition did not contain
sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable hourly rate under the lodestar
method. 7 Although Complainant’s attorney relies on the Fitzpatrick Matrix, we
do not fault that decision because Commission decisions have, until recently,
routinely endorsed that approach. Nevertheless, because the lodestar method
requires 	individualized 	determination 	supported 	by 	competent 	evidence,
Complainant’s attorney must submit a new fee petition containing sufficient
evidentiary support to justify their rate.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the 	Agency’s 	final 	order 	is 	V A C A T E D , 	and this matter is
REMANDED to the Agency for compliance with the ORDER herein.
ORDER
The Agency shall award Complainant attorney’s fees following the submission of a
new attorney’s fees petition in accordance with this decision and the Order (below).
The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in
the statement entitled “Implementation of the Commission’s Decision.” The
report shall include supporting 	documentation 	verifying 	that 	the 	corrective
action has been implemented.
because they were designed to estimate prevailing rates for complex federal
litigation 	in 	the 	Washington, 	D.C., 	market, 	not 	for 	representation 	in
administrative EEO proceedings, where the nature of the work, procedural
setting, and legal market may differ substantially. To be useful, a matrix must be
calibrated to the nature of the work done in the EEO administrative process.
7 Affidavits solely from Complainant’s attorney or attorneys within the same firm
are insufficient to establish a community rate. See MD-110, Chapter 11 at §
VI(G)(1)(c).

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ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1016)
If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. §
1614.501 (e)(1)(iii)), she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred
in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's
fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of
fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office
of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision was
issued. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance
with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S DECISION (K0719)
Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(c) and §1614.502, compliance with the Commission’s
corrective action is mandatory. Within seven (7) calendar days of the completion of
each ordered corrective action, the Agency shall submit via the Federal Sector EEO
Portal (FedSEP) supporting documents in the digital format required by the
Commission, referencing the compliance docket number under which compliance
was being monitored. Once all compliance is complete, the Agency shall submit via
FedSEP a final compliance report in the digital format required by the Commission.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). 	The Agency’s final report must contain supporting
documentation when previously not uploaded, and the Agency must send a copy of
all submissions to the Complainant and his/her representative.
If the Agency does not comply with the Commission’s order, the Complainant may
petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 	29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a).
The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with
the Commission’s order prior to or following 	an 	administrative petition 	for
enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g).
Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying
complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled “Right to File a Civil
Action.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a
civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C.
2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the
administrative 	processing 	of 	the 	complaint, 	including 	any 	petition 	for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409.

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Failure by an agency to either file a compliance report or implement any of the orders
set forth in this decision, without good cause shown, may result in the referral of this
matter to the Office of Special Counsel pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(f) for
enforcement by that agency.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1125)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if
Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or
evidence that tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of
material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Sector
(OFS) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. 	If the party
requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request,
that 	statement 	or 	brief 	must 	be 	filed 	together 	with 	the 	request 	for
reconsideration. 	A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of
another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or
statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity
Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B
(Aug. 5, 2015).
Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or
brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at
https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. 	Alternatively, Complainant can
submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Sector, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE,
Washington, DC 20507. 	In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFS receives it by mail within
five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604.

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An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the
EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either
party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the EEOC
Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required.
Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented
the timely filing of the request. 	Any supporting documentation must be
submitted together with the request for reconsideration. 	The Commission will
consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0124)
This decision affirms the Agency’s final decision/action in part, but it also requires
the Agency to continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint.
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court
within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision on
both that portion of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that
portion of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative
processing. 	In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and
eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency,
or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the Agency issues its final
decision on your complaint. 	If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department
head, identifying that person by their full name and official title. 	Failure to do so
may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means
the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which
you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so,
you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without
paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent
you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you.

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You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an
attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the
time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s
Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
T. Gimbrere 	Acting Director's signature
T. Gimbrere, Acting Director
Office of Federal Sector
September 14, 2026
Date