EEOC Appeal 2020001432

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Glenna O.,1
Petitioner,
v.
Barbara M. Barrett,
Secretary,
Department of the Air Force,
Agency.
Petition No. 2020001432
Appeal No. 0720180030
Agency No. Base 9O0D15001 & Agency AFCARO No. 9O0D15001C19
DECISION ON A PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT
On December 17, 2019, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission)
docketed a petition for enforcement to examine the enforcement of an Order set forth in EEOC
Appeal No. 0720180030 (Aug. 20, 2019), finding the Agency violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Commission accepts
Petitioner’s petition for enforcement pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Petitioner, a dual citizen of the US and United
Kingdom (UK), worked for the Choctaw Archiving Enterprise of the Choctaw Nation of
Oklahoma (Staffing Firm 1) serving the Agency as an Outreach Manager (social worker) at the
Agency's 48th Medical Group, Mental Health Flight, Family Advocacy Program located on a
Royal Air Force base in Lakenheath, UK, serving Agency populations both of Lakenheath and the
Royal Air Force Base in Mildenhall. These bases are about five miles apart. As of August 2014,
Petitioner received a job offer from an Agency Squadron Commander at Mildenhall, with hiring
through Potomac Healthcare Solutions, LLC of Woodbridge, Virginia (Staffing Firm 2) to serve
the Agency as a Licensed Clinical Social Worker (LCSW) working with patients, a higher paid
position.
1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Petitioner’s name when
the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.

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On January 13, 2015, Petitioner, who is represented by counsel, filed an equal employment
opportunity (EEO) complaint, as amended, alleging she was subjected to discrimination by the
Agency:
1. 	Based on her sex (female) when, in February and March 2014, her Agency first-line
supervisor (S1) made sexualized comments.
2. 	Based on reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when she was subjected to harassment
from November 3, 2014 through May 15, 2015.
3. 	Based on her sex and reprisal when she was constructively discharged on February 5, 2016,
the date she resigned.
Following a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ), on July 17, 2018, the AJ found
discrimination on all three claims, and ordered various remedies, including instatement into the
Mildenhall position or a substantially equivalent position, retroactive to October 1, 2014,2 back
pay, front pay, and specified amounts of attorney fees, costs, and damages.
The harassment alleged in claim 2 included the Lakenheath hospital, via delay, denying Petitioner
the privileges required to practice at Mildenhall, a condition of her Mildenhall offer. This hospital
served both the Lakenheath and Mildenhall bases. Mildenhall withdrew the offer roughly nine
months after it was made in August 2014, because it needed someone to work with patients and it
was clear approval of Petitioner’s privileges was not forthcoming.
The Lakenheath hospital credentialing committee voted to approve/recommend Petitioner’s
privileges for the Mildenhall position. Hearing Transcript (HT 3), at 26, 96, 101, 108, 110, 156.3
But the hospital’s Medical Staff Chief refused the final sign off. The AJ asked the Medical Staff
Chief to elaborate on her reason for this, and found her explanation wanting.
Thereafter, on August 24, 2018, the Agency issued a final order rejecting the AJ’s findings of
discrimination and all relief, and simultaneously appealed the AJ’s decision. Meanwhile, with the
goal of mitigating damages, the Agency offered Petitioner a sole source contract, which both
parties signed as of June 4, 2019, to serve as a LCSW providing professional patient care with the
48th Medical Group, Mental Health at Lakenheath.
2 The AJ found that the administrative process for hiring Petitioner at Mildenhall after she was
offered the job in August 2014, would likely have been completed on October 1, 2014.
3 Like the Administrative Judge (AJ) with the EEOC, we refer to the hearing transcripts for each
of the days of the hearing, e.g., HT 1 for the first day, HT 2 for the second day, and so forth.

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She commenced reporting to work on June 17, 2019.4 Under the contract, Petitioner agreed to
provide 1,920 hours of service for a year working an average of 40 hours a week, for a sum of
$100,128.
The Agency’s appeal was adjudicated in Appeal No. 0720180030 (Aug. 20, 2019). The
Commission found that under common law, the Agency jointly employed Petitioner with Staffing
Firm 1, affirmed the AJ’s discrimination findings, and ordered remedies, with some modification
from what the AJ ordered. The Commission ordered the Agency, in relevant part to:
1. 	… provide Complainant the privileges she was denied to practice… at the… Lakenheath
hospital.
2. 	Identify a funded slot… [or]… open one for the position of clinical social worker serving
the Agency in Mildenhall that Complainant was denied in 2014, or a substantially
equivalent position, select her for the position, and… ask the appropriate staffing firm(s)…
to offer the position or the substantially equivalent one to Complainant…. The… Agency
shall complete this action… even if doing so takes an indefinite amount of time [to facilitate
this – various scenarios were given in the order].
4. 	The Agency shall determine and pay the amount of back pay, with interest, and associated
benefits, which includes the value of receiving compensation tax free… from October 1,
2014 through… the time Complainant is instated… or declines an offer by a staffing firm
made pursuant to this order…. [based, the order directed, on the amount she would have
earned if she was able to take the position offered by Staffing Firm 2 and its successors].
Complainant shall cooperate in the Agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay
and benefits due and shall provide all relevant information requested by the Agency…. If
there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back pay and/or benefits, the Agency shall
issue payment to the Complainant for the undisputed amount within… 60… days of the
date the Agency determines the amount it believes to be due.
5. 	If staffing firm(s) refuse to offer Complainant a position pursuant to this Order, then from
the date of the applicable last refusal for a period not to exceed 10 years, the Agency shall
pay Complainant monetary front-pay equivalent to the compensation she would have
received, including pay increases and the value of benefits, working in the denied
Mildenhall position for Staffing Firm 2 and successor staffing firms serving the Agency.
6. 	Within 60 calendar days of the date of this decision, the Agency shall pay Complainant
$125,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages.
4 Seven months after Petitioner returned to work she filed two EEO complaints. The Agency
dismissed them, Petitioner appealed, and the Commission assigned them EEOC Appeal Nos.
2020002983 & 2020002998. In both EEO complaints, Petitioner wrote that the first day she
reported to work was June 17, 2019. Because the records in these appeals contain information
pertinent to resolving the case before us, we will also cite to those records.

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7. 	Within 60 calendar days of the date of this decision, the Agency shall pay Complainant
$225,082 for attorney fees and $11,274.17 in costs.
Neither party filed a request with the Commission to reconsider the decision.
Petitioner submits an affidavit dated November 25, 2019, affirming the Agency has not complied
with any of the above ordered relief.
In the Agency’s November 14, 2019 initial provisional compliance report submitted to the
Commission, there is an internal email by Agency counsel dated October 15, 2019, stating the
Agency did not comply with any of the remedies the Commission ordered. Later, the Agency
submitted compliance report updates and correspondence, the most recent on May 21, 2020,
contending it complied with ¶¶ 1 & 2 of the Commission’s order, and portions of the order not
relevant here.
In her affidavit, Petitioner states that entering into a sole source contract required that she create
her own company. Her contract identifies her by Mem Care Solutions and her name. Using her
relationship with Staffing Firm 1 as a reference point, Petitioner indicates that her sole source
contract relationship is very different from serving the Agency as an employee of a staffing firm.
Some significant differences she identifies are that under the sole source contract she receives no
paid leave, no malpractice insurance, no health insurance, her income is taxed, and rather than
receiving consistent salary payments every two weeks from an employer, she must submit monthly
invoices which at times are untimely paid.
A review of the underlying report of investigation (ROI) and hearing record corroborates that there
are significant differences. Specifically, Staffing Firm 1 issued Wage and Tax Statements (W-2s),
an Earnings Statement, and a letter in September 2008 documenting Petitioner’s hire showing she
earned vacation and sick leave, health insurance under Aetna’s International Health Plan with her
single premium being paid by Staffing Firm 1, was exempt from federal and state income taxes,
and had withholdings for social security and Medicare taxes. Complainant Hearing Exhibit (H.E.)
C-1, Appx. 3A & 3D. The record also reflects that Staffing Firm 1 provided Petitioner Temporary
Duty Travel (TDY) for training. ROI, Exhs. F-1.i at Bates No. 549 (right bottom), F-2.b. at 33,
Bates Nos. 1052, 1162 – 1163. The sole source contract provides no leave or other benefits, no
TDY for training, no withholding of social security or Medicare taxes, and at ¶¶ 4.5.1.3 & 4.5.1.4
requires Mem Care Solutions to indemnify the Agency for any liability producing act or omission
by it during contract performance and to carry medical liability insurance (malpractice insurance).
It also allows a total of 160 non-working hours (20 work days) for the 52 work week year.
Including 10 federal holidays (no pay), administrative leave granted to all staff, and base closures
(all no pay), this leaves Petitioner less than 10 unrestricted work days a year to schedule being off
work. Petitioner states that Staffing Firm 1 gave her three weeks of paid leave yearly (not stated if
this includes sick leave).
The most fraught issue is the Agency purportedly denying Petitioner privileges to work with
patients at the Agency as a LCSW. Under Agency regulations, privileging is authorizing the
healthcare provider to practice within the scope of a license, certification, or registration.

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Privileges are based on things like education, training, experience, health status, and demonstrated
clinical competence. See Air Force Instruction (AFI) 44-119, at ¶ 6.1 (Aug. 16, 2011), located at
ROI, Ex. F-2(b), at Bates No. 1202. AFI 44-119 implements Department of Defense (DoD)
Regulation 6025.13-R. Agency counsel quotes the later regulation at 	¶ DL1.10, .1, .2, .3
(Jun. 11, 2004), which reads current competence requires being:
1. 	Authorized to practice a specified scope of care under a written plan of supervision at any
time within the past 2 years; or, completed formal graduate professional education in a
specified clinical specialty at any time within the past 2 years; or, privileged to practice a
specified scope of care;
2. 	Actively pursued the practice of his or her discipline within the past 2 years by having
encountered a sufficient number of clinical cases to represent a broad spectrum of the
privileges requested; and
3. 	Satisfactorily practiced the discipline as determined by the results of professional staff
monitoring and evaluation of the quality and appropriateness of patient care.
See the May 1, 2020 consolidated Agency Reply Brief in Opposition to Complainant’s Appeal
opposing Petitioner’s appeals in EEOC Appeal Nos. 20200002893 and 2020002998 (Reply Brief),
Regulation at Ex. 6. The Agency argues that because Petitioner did not maintain social work
privileges in clinical practice since getting her LCSW Ohio license in 2014, she is not clinically
competent under DoD Regulation 6025.13-R and AFI 44-119. See Reply Brief. While Petitioner
is being paid, she was not seeing patients. Petitioner does not contend that she has ever met the
above competence prerequisites.
On October 15, 2019, Agency counsel emailed Petitioner with an activity proposal to add a new
term to her contract, ¶ 1.2 reading "The contractor will perform the services herein under the
supervision of a licensed provider until full qualifications are met or approved by the USAF for
independent practice.” Agency counsel explained this would help ensure Petitioner can do clinical
work, and ultimately eliminate the barriers to her ability to become “certified” to independently
treat patients. Id., at Ex. 9. Petitioner asked why a modification to the contract was necessary to
get her “certified” since the Commission ordered the certification. See Complainant’s Nov. 6, 2019
Third Petition for Enforcement, at attached exhibit.
On January 29, 2020, in response to a follow up by Agency counsel, Petitioner replied, “EEOC
ordered the Agency to reinstate [Petitioner’s]… credentials…[,] not… to first prove that her
performance was worthy of credentialing… and… she… will not agree to a performance testing
period because that is not what EEOC ordered.” See Petitioner attorney’s Jan. 31, 2020 letter to
an 	EEOC 	Commissioner 	and 	this 	office, 	at 	attached 	exhibit. 	Petitioner 	argues 	that 	the
Commission’s order was unambiguous – reinstate her privileges without a training period. See,
above Jan. 31, 2020 letter.

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In an internal Agency email dated December 10, 2019, an Agency Contract Specialist recounted
that Petitioner told him that when she was originally offered the Mildenhall position, she was
allowed to be “credentialed” while still working under supervision, but now she’s not getting
“credentialed” up front. See Complaint file for Agency No. 9O0D2000452/EEOC Appeal No.
2020002998, Counselor’s Report, at Attachment 7, p. 14.
On January 31, 2020, Agency counsel emailed Petitioner that she was unaware of any credentials
Petitioner previously had which the EEOC ordered reinstated, and the Agency was under no
obligation to comply with orders requiring it to commit illegal acts. Reply Brief, at Ex. 9. Agency
counsel, citing AFI 44-119, ¶ 4.6 argues that a healthcare professional who does not obtain an
active, current, unrestricted license or other authorizing document will not practice independently.
Reply Brief, Regulation at Ex. 7, at ¶ 4.6.1. Agency counsel argues that the Agency sought to
“credential [Petitioner] and provide her privilege” by having her shadow a privileged professional
in the clinic but Petitioner refused, and had she agreed she would be on her way to “obtaining
privilege.” See Reply Brief.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Privileges
The Lakenheath Medical Staff Chief, who served as Chair of the Lakenheath credentialing
committee, explained that “credentials” are the documents like diplomas, certifications, and
licenses, while “privileges” are what you apply for which allow you to practice at a facility in
accordance with your specialty. HT 3, at 96.
Petitioner’s 	former 	second 	line 	supervisor 	(S2) 	testified 	that 	the 	credentials 	committee
approved/recommended Petitioner for privileges with supervision. Id., at 26. S2 was not on the
credentialing committee, but had input into the Chair not releasing the privileges for final sign-off.
See EEOC Appeal No. 0720180030 appellate decision at 10 - 11.
It appears that up to very recently, both parties were confused about the Commission’s order on
privileges. The Commission ordered that the Agency “provide Complainant the privileges she was
denied to practice…” at Lakenheath and Mildenhall. The privileges she was denied were to work
as a LCSW working with patients under supervision, which is consistent with S2’s testimony.
Agency privileging regulations repeatedly refer to “supervised privileges”. Reply Brief, Ex. 7 (ARI
44-119, at ¶¶ 4.4.2., 6.1, & 7.10.2.4). Paragraph 6.1.1 applies to Petitioner’s situation, i.e., new
“providers who do not have adequate documentation of current clinical competence (i.e, sole
practice providers with minimal performance data), and providers whose duties have not included
clinical practice for an extended period, should be recommended for supervised privileges”).
We find that the Agency complied or came into compliance with ¶ 1 of the Commission’s order
whenever it first made it known to Petitioner that she could practice as a LCSW working with
patients under supervision.

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In its Compliance update on May 21, 2020, the Air Force Civilian Appellate Review Office
(AFCARO) represented that after Petitioner refused to consent to modifying her contract to place
her under supervision so she get the experience needed for privileges, it unilaterally modified the
contract to add this language. This is consistent with ¶ 1 of the Commission’s order.
Job Placement
Agency counsel argues that the only viable action it could legally take to comply with the
Commission’s order to continue its relationship with Petitioner was as a sole source contractor.
See, Reply Brief. She does not explain why. On January 29, 2020, Petitioner emailed Agency
counsel that the Agency required Petitioner to create her own contract company, which is not what
the Commission ordered, and asked the Agency to explain why it did not ask a staffing firm to hire
her to serve the Agency (as ordered). The Agency still has not explained.
In its May 21, 2020 Compliance update, the Agency writes that it placed Petitioner in a LCSW
position via a sole source contract in June 2019. It represents that it is in the process of exercising
the option to extend Petitioner’s contract when it expires in June 2020, and if she accepts, this will
serve as the Agency’s placement of her into a LCSW position that is substantially equivalent to
the Mildenhall job at issue.
Petitioner contends that her position as the only worker of a company she created with a sole source
contract with the Agency is very different from serving the Agency as employee of a staffing firm.
The issue here is whether Petitioner’s position as a sole source contractor serving the Agency as a
LCSW in Lakenheath is substantially equivalent to being employed by Staffing Firm 2 and its
successors serving the Agency as a LCSW in Mildenhall.
The record contains a brief email exchange between Staffing Firm 2 and Petitioner about its offer
of employment showing that Petitioner would be paid an HOLA/COLA (Overseas Cost of Living
Allowance/Housing Allowance) every two weeks on top of hourly based salary. H.E. C-1, Appx.
3C. There is little other information in the record on the terms of Petitioner’s aborted prospective
employment relationship with Staffing Firm 2. But there is enough to support Petitioner’s
contention that things are very different.
Petitioner’s sole source contract requires the “contractor” to maintain medical liability insurance,
something she must now personally do, and she must take on administrative tasks such as
complying with payroll and tax requirements as a corporation, invoicing the Agency, complying
with procedures of the Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act (HIPAA), and so forth.
The individual identified as Coworker 1 in EEOC Appeal No. 0720180030, a witness for
Petitioner, worked in the same Outreach Manager position as her reporting to the same Agency
supervisor. Coworker 1 then took a new job with a staffing firm serving the Agency starting in
June 2014, as an LCSW in Mildenhall’s Preservation of Force and Families (POTFF), Special
Operations Wing, the same organization Petitioner was slated to start serving the Agency as an
LCSW in October 2014. HT 1, at 29 – 30, 51, 107, HT 2, at 9, 12 – 14, HT 5, at 204 – 205, ROI,
Ex. F-1.i., at Bates No. 594 (signature line).

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On January 10, 2019, in an email to the Agency about remedies, Petitioner represented that
Coworker 1 is still in the same position she was offered in Mildenhall, albeit with a successor
staffing firm – KBR. See Complaint file for Agency No. 9O0D2000452/EEOC Appeal No.
2020002998, Counselor’s Report, at Attachment 7, p. 4. In her November 25, 2019 affidavit,
Petitioner states that in his Mildenhall position, Coworker 1 receives three weeks of paid leave
annually (does not say if this includes sick leave), stateside training required to maintain his social
work license, is exempt from federal and state income taxes, and is required to serve 1880 hours
annually, not 1920 hours. Petitioner does not submit documentation to support this. But we find it
more likely than not that Petitioner’s position serving the Agency as a sole source contractor is not
substantially equivalent to the position she would have had serving the Agency as an employee of
Staffing Firm 2 and its successor(s).
Accordingly, we find that the Agency is not in compliance with ¶ 2 of the Commission’s order.
While Petitioner is free to leave her sole source contract position and start receiving front pay
under ¶¶ 2 & 5 of the Commission’s order, this will not relieve her of her continuing duty to
exercise reasonable diligence to mitigate her damages, i.e., lost earnings. See, EEOC Policy
Guidance: A determination of the appropriateness of front pay was a remedy under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (OLC Control No. EEOC-CVG-1989-1) (Oct. 25,
1988) (available at eeoc.gov); EEOC Management Directive 110 (EEO-MD-110), at 11-4 (revised
Aug. 5, 2015).
Back Pay and Ongoing Earnings
In its May 21, 2020 Compliance update, the Agency represents that it is “closing in” on the
information necessary to calculate back pay, presumably a reference in whole or part to obtaining
documentation from Petitioner on the compensation she would have received as an employee of a
staffing firm serving the Agency in Mildenhall.
In response to an email by Agency counsel asking for documentation to help it calculate back pay,
on January 10, 2020, Petitioner responded that she already provided what was needed, referring to
H.E. C-1. She added that if the Agency was uncertain how to calculate back pay, it should look at
Coworker 1’s compensation over the years. Regarding her exemption from US and state income
taxes, she wrote that Staffing Firm 1 took care of all the forms required for this, she was not sure
how this would work after being forced to create her own UK contract company which receives
payment in US dollars, that she is now subject to UK taxes and previously was not, and suggested
that the Agency speak with Coworker 1 staffing firm’s tax accountant to see how they take care of
these tax issues for its employees. See Complaint file for Agency No. 9O0D2000452/EEOC
Appeal No. 2020002998, Counselor’s Report, at Attachment 7, pp. 4 – 5.
By email on January 31, 2020, counsel for the Agency wrote Petitioner that her refusal to provide
the Agency documentation on the benefits she previously received was preventing the Agency
from determining the benefits she actually received, that some of the alleged benefits could not be
legally provided, and giving the requested documentation would help the Agency determine what
she was entitled to receive and may help it determine how to legally provide the benefits. See,
Reply Brief, at Ex. 9, pp. 1 – 2.

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The referenced brief email exchange between Staffing Firm 2 and Petitioner on the employment
offer shows Petitioner was offered a HOLA/COLA of about $1,856.33 ($44,599.92) every two
weeks, on top of her base salary. H.E. C-1, Appx. 3C. Petitioner later contended the offered base
salary was $33 hourly, albeit with no documentation, for a total annual salary of $113,240.
While there is insufficient information in the record for the Commission to resolve the parties
conflicts on the calculation of back pay, including benefits, and her ongoing wages and benefits,
we take this opportunity to discuss a few reminders and precepts.
The Commission recognizes that precise measurement cannot always be used to remedy the wrong
inflicted, and therefore, the computation of back pay awards inherently involves some speculation.
Uncertainties involved in a back pay determination should be resolved against the agency that has
already been found to have committed acts of discrimination. EEO-MD-110, at 11-3. By the same
token, Petitioner is required to cooperate with the Agency in its efforts to calculate back pay, which
includes giving all relevant documentation in her possession the Agency requests, and working
with it to obtain relevant documents not in her possession, such as from Staffing Firms 1 and 2,
and Coworker 1.
In her July 17, 2018 decision, the AJ found that documentary and testimonial evidence
demonstrated Petitioner continually worked or sought work to mitigate her damages after her
constructive discharge, but she was unable to obtain comparable employment. While the Agency
contested this on appeal, in our appellate decision No. 0720180030, we explicitly upheld this AJ
finding.
Paragraph 4 of the Commission’s order directed that if there was a dispute regarding the exact
amount of back pay and/or benefits, the Agency shall issue payment to Petitioner for the
undisputed amount within 60 days of the date the Agency determines the amount it believes to be
due. Thus far, Petitioner has not received any back pay. Without information to the contrary, we
find it unlikely that there are no undisputed amounts of back pay.
As recounted in the Agency’s final order, under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.505(a)(3), interest on payments
ordered by the AJ, other than prospective pay and benefits, now commences from the date of the
AJ’s decision (July 17, 2018).
Compensatory Damages and Attorney Fees
The AJ 	ordered 	the Agency to 	pay $125,000 	in 	non-pecuniary compensatory damages,
$186,232.99 in attorney’s fees, and $11,248.30 in costs. In its appellate decision in Appeal No.
0720180030, the Commission ordered the same amount of damages and increased attorney fees to
$225,082 and costs to $11,274.17 - partly for additional work opposing the Agency’s appeal.
In its May 21, 2020, Compliance update, the Agency represents that in April 2020, it requested
that its payment provider, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), effect payment
of all the compensatory damages and attorney fees and costs ordered by the Commission in its
appellate decision.

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We take this opportunity to remind the Agency that, as recounted in its final order, that under 29
C.F.R. § 1614.505(a)(3) interest on the payment of the amounts awarded by the AJ of
compensatory damages and attorney fees and costs now commences from the date of the AJ’s
decision ordered these payments, i.e., July 17, 2018.
Petitioner requests additional attorney fees for work done seeking compliance with EEOC’s
remedies orders. While as the prevailing party Petitioner is entitled to additional attorney fees and
costs, we decline to adjudicate the matter here because the issue before us is enforcement of the
order in EEOC Appeal No. 0720180030, and there is no right for the parties to request
reconsideration of a decision on a petition for enforcement. Accordingly, to obtain additional fees
and costs, Petitioner needs to follow the procedures in the “ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1016)”
paragraph below.
ORDER
The Agency is ordered to take the following remedial actions:
1. 	Come into compliance with ¶¶ 2 (or its substitute ¶ 3), 4, 6, and 7 of the Commission’s
appellate order in Appeal No. 0720180030, as explained in this decision, within 60 days
from the date of this decision.
2. 	To the extent the Agency contends it is unable to comply, submit a Compliance update in
digital format via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP) with a copy to Petitioner and
her attorney, detailing the reasons for this with supporting documentation within 70 days
of the date of this decision. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g).
The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance in digital format as provided in
the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall be
submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). Further, the report must include supporting
documentation of the Agency's calculation of back pay and other benefits Petitioner, including
evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1016)
If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)),
she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.
29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney
shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this
decision was issued. 	The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance
with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501.

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S DECISION (K0719)
Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(c) and § 1614.502, compliance with the Commission’s corrective
action is mandatory. Within seven (7) calendar days of the completion of each ordered corrective
action, the Agency shall submit via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP) supporting documents
in the digital format required by the Commission, referencing the compliance docket number under
which compliance was being monitored. 	Once all compliance is complete, the Agency shall
submit via FedSEP a final compliance report in the digital format required by the Commission.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency’s final report must contain supporting documentation
when previously not uploaded, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the
Complainant and his/her representative.
If the Agency does not comply with the Commission’s order, the Complainant may petition the
Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has
the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission’s order prior to or
following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and
29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the
underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled “Right to File a Civil
Action.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on
the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp.
IV 1999). 	If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the
complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. 	See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.409.
Failure by an agency to either file a compliance report or implement any of the orders set forth in
this decision, without good cause shown, may result in the referral of this matter to the Office of
Special Counsel pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(f) for enforcement by that agency.
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)
This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint.
However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate
United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this
decision. 	In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180)
calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person
who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name
and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or
“department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in
which you work. 	Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your
complaint.

2020001432	12
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request
permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs.
Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the
court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or
appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for
filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for
the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________ 	Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
June 23, 2020
Date