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Matter of Z-R-C-N-, et al., Respondents
Decided March 18, 20261
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) A respondent cannot succeed on her ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the
individual she hired was not an attorney and did not hold himself out to be one.
(2) The minor respondents’ eligibility for adjustment of status based on an approved
special immigrant juvenile petition is speculative considering the 4-year delay in visa
availability, and they have not demonstrated prima facie eligibility for relief.
FOR THE RESPONDENTS: Marlon Bayas, Esquire, Newark, New Jersey
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Milor D. Perdomo, Associate
Legal Advisor
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	MULLANE and VOLKERT, Appellate Immigration Judges;
MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
MULLANE, Appellate Immigration Judge:
On October 27, 2023, we dismissed the respondents’ appeal. On May 21,
2025, the respondents, natives and citizens of Ecuador, filed a motion to
reopen.2 	Both the respondent and the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) have submitted a brief in response to our request for supplemental
briefing. We will deny the motion to reopen.
The respondent entered the United States on August 2, 2021, and was
served with a notice to appear on September 9, 2021. The respondent claims
she hired Mr. Jerez and paid him $6,000 to prepare her asylum application,
apply for a work permit, and represent her in removal proceedings. 	The
respondent states she believed Mr. Jerez was an attorney because he was
known in the community as an attorney and he told the respondent he
specializes in immigration. 	The respondents filed asylum applications
1 	The Board has designated as precedent this decision, which was previously issued
unpublished on February 20, 2026. Editorial changes have been made consistent with the
designation of the case as a precedent.
2 	The respondents are the lead respondent and her minor daughters. References to the
respondent in the singular are to the lead respondent, unless otherwise indicated.

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prepared by Mr. Jerez on May 19, 2022. 	The respondent alleges that
Mr. Jerez advised her not to mention any information about past harm and
ongoing death threats from her ex-husband on her asylum application
because he told her that domestic violence claims are not successful. 	On
January 18, 2023, the respondent appeared pro se at her individual hearing.
She claims that Mr. Jerez informed her he would not be able to attend due to
issues 	with 	his 	wife’s 	health. 	The 	Immigration 	Judge 	denied 	the
respondent’s application for asylum and withholding of removal under
sections 208(b)(1)(A) and 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act 	(“INA”), 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1158(b)(1)(A), 	1231(b)(3)(A) 	(2018), 	and
protection under the regulations implementing the Convention Against
Torture.
Following the Immigration Judge’s decision, the respondent claims that
Mr. Jerez told her she could file an appeal, which would be granted, and she
paid him $2,000 to file an appeal with the Board. 	The respondent alleges
that she asked Mr. Jerez about the status of her appeal, and he told her it was
still pending. On February 24, 2025, the respondent spoke to an attorney to
ask about special immigrant juvenile classification for her daughters. 	The
attorney informed the respondent that Mr. Jerez never sent an appeal brief
and her appeal was dismissed on October 27, 2023. On March 10, 2025, the
respondent retained current counsel. 	The respondent, through current
counsel, was granted the requisite family court orders for special immigrant
juvenile classification on April 17, 2025, and filed Petitions for Amerasian,
Widow(er), or Special Immigrant (Form I-360) on behalf of her daughters
with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services on April 24, 2025.
The respondents indicate that these petitions were approved.
The respondent’s motion to reopen alleges ineffective assistance of
counsel against Mr. Jerez. 	The motion to reopen, filed more than 90 days
after the Board’s decision, is untimely under section 240(c)(7)(C)(i) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (2024). 	The Board entered a final
administrative order in these proceedings on October 27, 2023. 	The
respondent argues that the Board should equitably toll the filing deadline for
the motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Assuming, arguendo,
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be brought against a
nonattorney, 	the 	respondent 	has 	not 	demonstrated 	that 	reopening 	is
warranted on that basis.
As an initial matter, the respondent does not allege that Mr. Jerez told her
that he was an attorney. 	See, e.g., Jean Louis v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 914 F.3d
189, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that following the bad advice of a person
the petitioner believed to be a lawyer, but who did not hold himself out as

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such, does not constitute an exceptional circumstance for rescission of an in
absentia removal order). Moreover, the respondent’s assertion that she was
unaware that Mr. Jerez was not an attorney is not supported by the record.
See Arckange Saint Ford v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 51 F.4th 90, 96 (3d Cir. 2022)
(explaining that the facts stated in a motion to reopen “are ‘accepted as true
unless inherently unbelievable’” (citation omitted)). The respondent claims
that 	she 	contracted 	Mr. 	Jerez 	to 	prepare 	the 	respondents’ 	asylum
applications, apply for work permits, and represent them in court, which she
argues demonstrates that he held himself out as an attorney. 	However, the
respondent filed asylum applications prepared by Mr. Jerez on May 19, 2022,
but testified that same day that she did not have an attorney. The record also
lacks any discussion of Mr. Jerez failing to appear at her merits hearing, as
would be expected if she indicated to the Immigration Judge that she had an
attorney who failed to appear. Thus, contrary to the respondent’s assertion,
she has not established she reasonably believed Mr. Jerez was an attorney.
Neither the respondent nor DHS argues that knowingly accepting legal
assistance from a nonattorney can support an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. 	See, e.g., Jean Louis, 914 F.3d at 192 (holding that a
nonlawyer’s bad advice does not constitute an exceptional circumstance for
the purposes of rescinding an in absentia removal order); Gunawan v.
Gonzales, 132 F. App’x 997, 1000 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing between
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and claims of ineffective assistance
by a nonattorney who never purported to be an attorney). 	A respondent
cannot succeed on her ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the
individual she hired was not an attorney and did not hold himself out to be
one.
The respondents also have not demonstrated prima facie eligibility for
relief. See Matter of Chen, 28 I&N Dec. 676, 682 (BIA 2023) (holding that
a motion to reopen for purposes of applying for relief must establish prima
facie eligibility for the relief sought). The respondent asserts that she is prima
facie eligible for asylum based on her feminist political opinion and her
membership in the proposed particular social groups of “Ecuadorian women
in a domestic relationship who are unable to leave the relationship,”
“Ecuadorian women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions
within a domestic relationship,” and “members of Guallpa Guaman family.”
The respondent has not provided prima facie evidence that the proposed
groups are cognizable. “Ecuadorian women in a domestic relationship who
are unable to leave the relationship” is circular and defined by the harm or
threatened harm. 	See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 335 (A.G. 2018)
(explaining that “[s]ocial groups defined by their vulnerability to private

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criminal activity likely lack the particularity required” to be cognizable),
reinstated 	by 	Matter 	of 	S-S-F-M-, 	29 	I&N 	Dec. 	207 	(A.G. 	2025).
“Ecuadorian women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions
within a domestic relationship” also lacks the requisite particularity. 	See
Matter of K-E-S-G-, 29 I&N Dec. 145, 154 (BIA 2025) (holding that
“Salvadoran women viewed as property” is not a cognizable particular social
group because it lacks the requisite particularity). Finally, the respondent has
not sufficiently demonstrated that the group defined as “members of Guallpa
Guaman family” is socially distinct. See Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581,
589 (A.G. 2019), (explaining that “a nuclear family will not, without more,
constitute a ‘particular social group’ because most nuclear families are not
inherently socially distinct”), reinstated by Matter of R-E-R-M- & J-D-R-M-,
29 I&N Dec. 202 (A.G. 2025).
The respondent also does not establish that any harm was on account of
her political opinion. 	Domestic violence perpetrated by private actors
generally does not constitute harm on account of a protected ground. 	See
Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 320. 	The record does not show that the
respondent’s ex-husband attacked her because he “was aware of, and hostile
to” her political opinion. Id. at 339. Instead, he harmed her because of their
personal relationship and his issues with alcohol. See id. (finding abuse was
motivated by “preexisting personal relationship with the victim”). This type
of private criminal conduct does not constitute harm on account of a
protected ground. See Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 199, 208–09 (BIA 2021)
(explaining that a respondent targeted for private harm must demonstrate that
a protected ground is one central reason for the decision to target him or her),
reinstated by Matter of S-S-F-M-, 29 I&N Dec. 207. 	Thus, the respondent
has not made a prima facie showing that any harm occurred on account of a
protected ground.
We acknowledge that the minor respondents have approved visa petitions
for special immigrant juvenile classification. An alien with an approved visa
petition may apply for adjustment of status only when an immigrant visa is
immediately available. 	See INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2024);
8 C.F.R. §§ 245.1(a), 1245.1(a) (2026). Visa availability for those classified
as special immigrant juveniles is governed by section 203(b)(4) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4) (2024), which sets aside 7.1 percent of the worldwide
allotment of immigrant visas annually for fourth preference employment-
based immigrants, including most categories of special immigrants. See also
Bureau of Consular Affs., U.S. Dep’t of State, Visa Bulletin, Vol. XI,
No. 	9 	(Dec. 	2025), 	https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins
/visabulletin_December2025.pdf. 	According 	to 	the 	United 	States
Department of State’s visa bulletin for December 2025, visas are currently

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available to aliens who filed their special immigrant juvenile visa petitions
before February 15, 2021. See id. at 5. The respondents’ visa priority date
is April 24, 2025, indicating a 4-year gap between their priority date and the
current eligibility priority date. Thus, the minor respondents’ eligibility for
adjustment of status based on an approved special immigrant juvenile
petition is speculative considering the 4-year delay in visa availability, and
they have not demonstrated prima facie eligibility for relief. 	See Matter of
Cahuec Tzalam, 29 I&N Dec. 300, 305 (BIA 2025) (finding that the nearly
5-year gap between the current eligibility priority date and the respondent’s
priority date is too remote and the ability to adjust status is too speculative to
warrant administrative closure).
The respondent alternatively requests we reopen proceedings sua sponte.
Sua sponte authority may be exercised to reopen in “truly exceptional
situations” where the interests of justice would be served. 	Matter of G-D-,
22 I&N Dec. 1132, 1134 (BIA 1999). This sua sponte authority “is not meant
to be used as a general cure for filing defects or to otherwise circumvent the
regulations, where enforcing them might result in hardship.” Matter of J-J-,
21 I&N Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 1997). 	The respondent has the burden of
demonstrating truly exceptional circumstances and must show “a substantial
likelihood that the result in his case would be changed if reopening is
granted.” 	Matter of Beckford, 22 I&N Dec. 1216, 1219 (BIA 2000). 	We
conclude that the record before us does not present an exceptional situation
that warrants the exercise of our sua sponte reopening authority in these
proceedings.
ORDER: The motion to reopen is denied.
FURTHER ORDER: The stay of removal is vacated.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. 	See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026). Further,
any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any

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time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).