Y-H-L-

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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 698 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4206
Matter of Y-H-L-, Respondent
Decided by Board May 8, 20261
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) Reconsideration is not warranted where the respondent has not shown error in the
Board’s determination that the Immigration Judge properly required corroboration of
credible but unpersuasive testimony and properly found that corroboration of an alleged
forced abortion in China was reasonably available.
(2) The respondent did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel because it was
not unreasonable for counsel to rely on a certified translation of evidence that was
submitted by the respondent’s prior counsel.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Theodore N. Cox, Esquire, New York, New York
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	GORMAN, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge,
GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge, and MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate
Immigration Judge.
MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge:
This case was last before us on March 18, 2025, when we dismissed the
respondent’s appeal from the Immigration Judge’s June 9, 2020, decision
denying her applications for asylum and withholding of removal. 	Sections
208(b)(1)(A) and 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A) (2018). The respondent,
a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, has filed a timely
motion to reconsider and timely motion to reopen. 	INA § 240(c)(6)(B),
(c)(7)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B), (c)(7)(C)(i) (2024). The Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has not responded to either motion. 	The
motions will be denied.
The respondent testified that she was forced to abort her third pregnancy
after giving birth to two children in China, and hospital officials told her to
return for a tubal ligation. On appellate review, we affirmed the Immigration
1 	Pursuant to Order No. 6933-2026, dated June 15, 2026, the Acting Attorney General
designated the Board’s decision in Matter of Y-H-L- (BIA May 8, 2026), as precedent in
all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3) (2026).
Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a
precedent.

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Judge’s determination that the respondent’s testimony was unpersuasive and
she did not provide reasonably available evidence to corroborate her claim.
See INA §§ 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 241(b)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii),
1231(b)(3)(C); see also Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 2009)
(acknowledging that an Immigration Judge may require corroboration of
even credible testimony); Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 2018)
(explaining that an applicant’s “testimony may not be sufficient to carry the
burden of persuading the fact finder of the accuracy of his claim of crucial
facts if he fails to put forth corroboration that should be readily available”).
The respondent now moves us to reconsider our decision.
We will deny the motion to reconsider, as the respondent has not
identified an error of fact or law in our previous order. INA § 240(c)(6)(C),
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2026). In her
motion to reconsider, the respondent contends that the Board erred by
affirming the Immigration Judge’s corroboration requirement based on the
respondent’s failure to submit medical records from China. The respondent
cites to Pinel-Gomez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 523 (2d Cir. 2022), wherein the
United 	States 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the 	Second 	Circuit 	held 	that 	an
Immigration Judge’s determination to deny a respondent’s claim for lack of
corroboration should have two components: (1) the Immigration Judge must
determine that a respondent should provide evidence that corroborates
otherwise credible testimony, and (2) the Immigration Judge must then
determine 	whether 	the 	necessary 	corroborating 	evidence 	is 	in 	the
respondent’s possession or the respondent could reasonably obtain it. Id. at
529. The respondent argues that the Immigration Judge’s analysis does not
contain both of these components and thus the Board erred by affirming the
Immigration Judge’s finding of insufficient corroboration. We disagree.
In the instant case, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent’s
testimony was unpersuasive and thus she should provide evidence to
corroborate her otherwise credible testimony. 	We concluded that the
Immigration Judge properly accorded the respondent’s testimony limited
weight in light of evidence submitted by DHS. The respondent’s arguments
in the motion do not persuade us of error in that conclusion, and thus we
again affirm the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent
should provide corroborating evidence considering the limited weight and
persuasiveness of her testimony. 	See Pinel-Gomez, 52 F.4th at 529–30
(holding that the Board reviews de novo the threshold determination that
corroborating evidence is required).
The 	Immigration 	Judge 	further 	found 	that 	the 	respondent 	did 	not
adequately corroborate her claim that she underwent a forced abortion. The

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Immigration Judge credited the testimony of an Asylum Officer who testified
that, 	in 	fraudulent 	cases 	with 	the 	same 	general 	fact 	pattern 	as 	the
respondent’s, the applicants could not produce any checkup books or medical
records that would have been generated if an abortion or follow-up visits had
occurred. 	By crediting this testimony, the Immigration Judge implicitly
found that checkup books or medical records would be generated and
reasonably obtainable in non-fraudulent Chinese asylum claims involving
forced abortion. 	DHS counsel confronted the respondent about the lack of
such evidence in the record and gave her the opportunity to explain. 	The
Immigration 	Judge 	concluded 	that 	“considering 	the 	respondent’s
unpersuasive 	testimony 	and 	the 	lack 	of 	reasonably 	obtainable
documentation, the respondent failed to satisfy her burden of proof.” 	In so
stating, the Immigration Judge found that documentation such as checkup
books or medical records was reasonably obtainable in the respondent’s case,
yet was not provided, and we discern no clear error in that determination.
See Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 293 (2017) (holding that, on clear error
review, “[a] finding that is ‘plausible’ in light of the full record—even if
another is equally or more so—must govern” (citation omitted)). 	We
conclude that the Immigration Judge complied with Pinel-Gomez, as he made
sufficient findings to satisfy both the requisite components for a lack of
corroboration determination under Second Circuit law. 	Pinel-Gomez, 52
F.4th at 529.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the respondent’s 2012 American
gynecological records are sufficient corroborating evidence of her alleged
2007 abortion in China. 	While counsel offers his interpretation of the
respondent’s medical documents, statements of counsel are not evidence, and
the 	record 	does 	not 	contain 	sufficient 	evidence 	to 	support 	counsel’s
interpretation. 	See Matter of Mariscal-Hernandez, 28 I&N Dec. 666, 673
(BIA 2022); Matter of J.J. Rodriguez, 27 I&N Dec. 762, 765–66 (BIA 2020).
Finally, for the reasons explained in our prior decision, we are not
persuaded 	that 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	was 	required 	to 	confront 	the
respondent with the inconsistency regarding the hospital’s alleged threat of
sterilization, as the inconsistency was obvious from the record evidence
which she herself submitted and should not have taken the respondent by
surprise. For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the motion to reconsider.
The respondent also argues separately in a motion to reopen that the
success of her application for asylum and withholding of removal was
directly impacted by two of her prior attorneys, Attorney Gavlin and

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Attorney Zhang.2 	She asserts that both attorneys acted incompetently by
failing to identify and correct a translation error in a letter from her ex-
boyfriend, and by failing to advocate that the proper evidentiary weight be
assigned to her corroborating letters and medical records. The motion further
asserts that Attorney Gavlin failed to effectively address DHS’ suggestion
that the respondent’s claim was fraudulent because her application bore
similarities to other applications prepared by one of her prior attorneys, who
was convicted of fraud.
We are not persuaded that Attorney Gavlin or Attorney Zhang provided
ineffective assistance. The respondent submitted the certified translation of
her 	ex-boyfriend’s 	letter 	in 	2011, 	before 	either 	attorney 	entered 	an
appearance in her case. Considering that the translation was certified as true
and accurate, it was not unreasonable for the respondent’s attorneys to have
relied upon it. Counsel can reasonably rely upon a translation that is certified
as true and accurate by a translator who certifies their competence in the
foreign language. 	Moreover, the respondent has not provided persuasive
evidence of the alleged translation error, as the alternative translation
accompanying the motion is not certified.
Regarding the respondent’s remaining allegations against her 	prior
attorneys, the arguments presented on appeal are not sufficient to establish
that either Attorney Gavlin or Attorney Zhang rendered ineffective assistance
or a reasonable likelihood that the result of the proceeding would have been
different if the alleged errors had not occurred. 	For the foregoing reasons,
we will deny the motion to reopen.
Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.
ORDER: The motion to reconsider is denied.
FURTHER ORDER: The motion to reopen is denied.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
2 	Although the respondent’s motion refers to “Attorney Gavil,” our records reflect that
the correct spelling of the attorney’s last name is Gavlin.

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penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See section
274D of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026).
Further, any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or
has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).