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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 723 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4211
Matter of Rasheen Stefan BEST, Respondent
Decided by Board May 7, 20261
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) The emotional and financial difficulties the respondent’s family members would
experience as a result of the respondent’s removal do not constitute extreme hardship
under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
(2) The Immigration Judge erred in granting a waiver of inadmissibility and adjustment of
status in discretion because the respondent’s equities were outweighed by his serious
and lengthy criminal history and lack of persuasive evidence of rehabilitation.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Raymond Sykes, Esquire, New York, New York
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Joanne M. Reed, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	GORMAN, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge;
VOLKERT, 	Appellate 	Immigration 	Judge; 	MCCLOSKEY, 	Temporary 	Appellate
Immigration Judge.
MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security (“DHS”) appeals 	from 	the
Immigration Judge’s July 2, 2025, decision granting the respondent’s request
for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality 	Act 	(“INA”), 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1182(h) 	(2024), 	as 	well 	as 	his
application for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255(a) (2024). The respondent, a native and citizen of Barbados, opposes
the appeal. The appeal will be sustained, and the respondent will be ordered
removed.
We reverse the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent
has established that his removal will result in extreme hardship to his
qualifying relatives, his United States citizen wife and two children (a 9-year-
1 	Pursuant to Order No. 6937-2026, dated June 18, 2026, the Acting Attorney General
designated the Board’s decision in Matter of Best (BIA May 7, 2026), as precedent in all
proceedings involving the same issue or issues. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3) (2026).
Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a
precedent.

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 723 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4211
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old and a 15-year-old), and his lawful permanent resident mother. 	See
generally Matter of Ngai, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246–47 (Comm’r 1984)
(defining 	extreme 	hardship). 	The 	Immigration 	Judge 	found 	that 	the
respondent’s wife, who pays for the household’s expenses, will experience
financial difficulties that may cause her to be unable to afford to pay her bills,
visit 	the 	respondent 	in 	Barbados, 	or 	obtain 	a 	master’s 	degree. 	The
Immigration Judge also observed that she would experience difficulties
planning to have another child with the respondent in the event of his
removal. The Immigration Judge further found that the respondent provides
assistance to his mother’s non-profit organization and wishes to assist her as
she ages. The respondent also argued that his children would be emotionally
impacted by his removal.
We acknowledge that the respondent’s family will experience emotional
and some financial difficulties as a result of the respondent’s departure.
However, the respondent has not worked since 2013, when he failed to lift
the conditions on his permanent residency, and his wife has provided support
for their household since that time. 	We conclude that the emotional and
financial hardship in this case falls short of the extreme hardship required for
relief under section 212(h) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 	See id.
(concluding that separation and financial difficulties, without more, do not
constitute extreme hardship).
We 	also 	reverse 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	determination 	that 	the
respondent is eligible for adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility
as a matter of discretion. 	See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 300
(BIA 1996) (explaining the differences between a discretion analysis in an
adjustment of status case and in a waiver of inadmissibility case); Matter
of 	Arai, 	13 	I&N 	Dec. 	494, 	495–96 	(BIA 	1970) 	(addressing 	general
discretionary factors for adjustment of status applications). It is undisputed
that the respondent has two 2017 convictions for crimes involving moral
turpitude—which pertain to theft by deception and access device fraud—as
well as a 2017 conviction for resisting arrest, a 2016 conviction for
unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, and a 2014 conviction for disorderly
conduct. 	The respondent was also arrested twice as a minor and about
10 times as an adult. 	These arrests include offenses such as petit larceny,
marijuana possession, possession of a fake identification document, and
criminal possession of a firearm. The respondent’s most recent arrest is for
a 2023 domestic violence incident where he was charged with attempted
assault, menacing, and harassment in connection with an argument he had
with his wife.

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Although the Immigration Judge correctly found that many of the
respondent’s arrests did not result in a conviction, we emphasize that
criminal conduct which has not culminated in a final conviction for the
purposes 	of 	the 	INA 	remain 	an 	appropriate 	factor 	to 	consider 	in 	a
discretionary determination. 	See Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20, 23
(BIA 	1995). 	Therefore, 	in 	the 	absence 	of 	persuasive 	evidence 	of
rehabilitation, we conclude that the respondent’s equities, such as his family
and community ties, length of residence in the United States, plans to
establish a career in fashion, and the potential hardship to his wife, children,
and mother, do not outweigh his serious and lengthy criminal history, which
is a significant adverse factor. See, e.g., Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. at
305.
ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained.
FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s July 2, 2025, decision
is vacated.
FURTHER ORDER: 	The respondent’s applications for a waiver of
inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), and
adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), are
denied.
FURTHER ORDER: The respondent is ordered removed to Barbados
based on the charge contained in the notice to appear.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. 	See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026). Further,
any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).