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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4226
Matter of L-L-R-, Respondent
Decided July 31, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The respondent is ineligible for cancellation of removal because his actions and
involvement with a smuggler to bring his child to the United States constitute assisting or
aiding an “alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law” under
section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), triggering the good moral character bar under section 101(f)(3) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3).
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Gloria L. Contreras Edin, Esquire, Saint Paul, Minnesota
BEFORE: Board Panel: HUNSUCKER and GEMOETS, Appellate Immigration Judges;
TERRIEN, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
GEMOETS, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The respondent, a native and citizen of Guatemala, appeals from the
Immigration Judge’s June 30, 2025, decision pretermitting his application for
cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2024). 	We will dismiss
the appeal.
To qualify for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), the respondent must show, inter alia, that he
has been a person of good moral character during the 10 years preceding his
application. INA § 240A(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B). The 10-year
period is measured backward from the date of final adjudication of the
application. 	Matter of Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I&N Dec. 793, 797–98 (BIA
2005). 	The Immigration Judge pretermitted the respondent’s application
upon determining that the respondent is unable to demonstrate the good
moral character required for cancellation of removal because he assisted and
aided in alien smuggling.1 	See INA §§ 101(f)(3), 240(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(f)(3), 1229a(c)(4)(A) (2024).
1 	The respondent does not challenge the Immigration Judge’s finding that he is statutorily
ineligible for a waiver to the alien smuggling ground of inadmissibility, and we consider
the issue waived. See INA § 212(d)(11), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11) (2024); Matter of F-C-S-,
28 I&N Dec. 788, 789 n.3 (BIA 2024) (deeming issue waived if not raised on appeal).

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The Immigration Judge found that the respondent, in 2021, hired and paid
a smuggler to bring the respondent’s 14-year-old son from Guatemala to the
United States, where the respondent and his wife were residing, because their
son lacked appropriate familial care in Guatemala. 	The respondent did so
knowing that his son did not have authorization to enter the United States.
On appeal, the respondent does not dispute these factual findings but argues
that arranging for his son to be brought to the U.S.-Mexico border does not
constitute alien smuggling and thus does not bar a good moral character
showing.2
Although “good moral character” lacks a statutory definition, Congress
has specified by statute what “good moral character” is not. 	Matter of
Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. 664, 666 (A.G. 2019). Section 101(f)(3) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3), precludes a finding of good moral character if,
inter alia, the alien is described in section 212(a)(6)(E) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(E) (2024), regardless of whether the alien is inadmissible under
that 	provision. 	Section 	212(a)(6)(E)(i) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), states, “Any alien who at any time knowingly has
encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to
try to enter the United States in violation of law is inadmissible.”
The respondent admits to locating and paying a smuggler to assist in
transporting his minor child from Guatemala to the U.S.-Mexico border. The
respondent argues, however, that he paid the smuggler only to bring his son
to the border, but not to have him enter unlawfully or evade inspection. The
respondent asserts that his child presented himself at a port of entry and
independently applied 	for asylum when he arrived, and therefore the
respondent should not be viewed as having assisted an unlawful entry.3
The respondent presents no evidence that supports the plausibility of this
proposition nor legal authority to support it even if it were plausible.4 	See
Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 231–40 (2021) (recognizing an alien’s
burden to establish the eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal).
Aliens who present themselves at a port-of-entry must establish their lawful
authorization to enter the United States, even for those requesting the
2 	The respondent asserts that his son was 13 years old at the time.
3 	Contrary to the respondent’s testimony, the respondent’s wife testified that the child
was apprehended by immigration officials in the desert.
4 	The respondent’s uncorroborated claims are further contradicted by his wife’s testimony
about their child’s entry, namely that they “brought him over” and that they “brought him
through the desert.”

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opportunity to apply for asylum. “An alien who wishes to enter the United
States lawfully must first be ‘admitted.’ As used in the INA, ‘admission’ is
a term of art that means the ‘lawful entry of [an] alien into the United States
after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 	Mullin v. Al
Otro Lado, 146 S. Ct. 2079, 2087 (2026) (quoting section 101(a)(13)(A) of
the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2024)). “[If] the asylum officer decides
that the alien does have a credible fear [of persecution], the officer must
detain the alien for further consideration of the alien’s application for
asylum.” Id. at 2087–88. Asylum applicants are provided an opportunity to
proceed 	with 	their 	fear-based 	claims 	in 	the 	United 	States; 	however,
applicants who have not been lawfully admitted submit a “defensive”
application in removal proceedings, seeking permission to remain in the
United States lawfully. 	Brizuela v. Garland, 71 F.4th 1087, 1091 n.3
(8th Cir. 2023). Accordingly, being an applicant for asylum is not a manner
of legal entry, but rather a status in which one seeks subsequent lawful status
if approved.
While the respondent alleges no intent to assist his child in entering the
United States unlawfully, his statement is insufficient to demonstrate that the
statutory bar to good moral character does not apply, and he presents no
evidence to demonstrate the plausibility of his claim that he only paid a
smuggler to transport his unaccompanied minor child to the U.S.-Mexico
border. The respondent failed to present testimony or evidence that his child
possessed documentation that would permit lawful entry, that the respondent
had information that his child, an unaccompanied minor, had the ability or
knowledge of how to enter the United States lawfully, that the respondent
made arrangements for his child’s lawful entry to the United States, that the
respondent made arrangements for his minor, unaccompanied child to remain
at the U.S.-Mexico border, or that his child entered the United States in a
lawful manner. 	Significantly, the respondent’s submission of evidence
includes an application in his child’s name that identifies “no lawful status”
as the status in which his child entered the United States. Accordingly, the
record contains insufficient evidence to establish that the respondent did not
participate in or assist in the unlawful entry of his child to the United States.
The 	language 	in 	section 	212(a)(6)(E)(i) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 	1182(a)(6)(E)(i), 	applying 	to 	an 	alien 	who 	provides 	assistance 	or
encouragement, inter alia, to another “to enter or to try to enter” the United
States contrasts with the language in the asylum statute, which requires an
applicant to be “physically present in the United States” or to “arrive[] in the
United States.” 	INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2024); see also
Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, 146 S. Ct. at 2090–95 (answering the question of
whether an alien who seeks to enter the United States from Mexico “arrives

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in the United States” when he or she is still at the border in Mexico). 	In
Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, the Supreme Court of the United States highlighted
the importance of these distinctions in the statutory language:
“Several features of statutory context suggest that the meaning of the phrase ‘arrives
in the United States’ in §§ 1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) conforms to ordinary usage.
The first is the absence from those provisions of reference to attempted entry. Other
provisions of the INA refer to both actual entrance into the United States and
attempted entrance. 	For example, an alien who ‘enters or attempts to enter’ the
country at an improper time or place commits a misdemeanor, § 1325(a)(1), and an
alien who ‘enters’ or ‘attempts to enter’ the country after being removed commits a
felony, § 1326(a)(2)(B). 	Immigration officers may arrest aliens ‘entering or
attempting to enter the United States’ unlawfully. §1357(a)(2).”
Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, 146 S. Ct. at 2091.
This 	difference 	in 	statutory 	language 	undermines 	the 	respondent’s
argument that he is not an alien described in section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), simply because the smuggler’s duties
ended at the U.S.-Mexico border or because his son thereafter applied for
asylum. 	The respondent does not dispute that his intent in employing the
smuggler was for his son to join the family in the United States. 	The
Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent and his wife arranged
for 	their 	son 	to 	come 	to 	the 	United 	States 	is 	not 	clearly 	erroneous.
Inadmissibility for alien smuggling does not require the smuggled alien’s
physical 	presence 	in 	the 	United 	States 	and 	may 	be 	established 	by
encouraging or assisting an alien “to try to enter” the United States in
violation 	of 	law 	regardless 	of 	whether 	entry 	is 	achieved. 	INA
§ 212(a)(6)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i).
The respondent and his wife testified that he knowingly funded and
communicated 	with 	the 	smugglers 	about 	his 	child’s 	transportation
arrangements to bring the child to them at a time when they were present in
the United States. The respondent’s son had no documents that would allow
him to legally enter the United States upon arrival at the border. 	The
respondent’s acknowledgement that his minor son would be taken to the
U.S.-Mexico border through a smuggling arrangement demonstrates, at
minimum, a reasonable expectation that his son would be taken to this
location for subsequent entry into or attempt to enter the United States.
Given the respondent’s acknowledgement that he paid a smuggler to bring
his minor child to the U.S.-Mexico border with a desire for his son’s
reunification with the family residing in the United States, the child’s age,
and the respondent’s awareness that his son lacked valid documents that
would permit a lawful entry, we agree with the Immigration Judge that the

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respondent is an alien described in section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), who knowingly assisting his minor child “to
enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law.” 	INA
§ 212(a)(6)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i).
Moreover, the respondent’s actions do not demonstrate an attempt to
accompany the child to the United States, but rather to engage an unknown
individual to transport a minor child from Guatemala to the United States by
soliciting the unknown individual’s services. 	The inherent danger and
potential 	for 	exploitation 	in 	placing 	an 	unaccompanied 	minor 	with 	a
smuggler do not occur only at the U.S.-Mexico border, but throughout the
smuggling transaction. 	The respondent did not allege to have made any
effort to ensure that his unaccompanied child was not exposed to the potential
harm associated with smuggling. The statutory bar to a good moral character
showing and its application to eligibility for cancellation of removal are
rooted in the inherent dangerousness of human smuggling operations,
particularly for unaccompanied alien children. 	See United States v. Texas,
144 F.4th 632, 692 (5th Cir.) (Oldham, J., dissenting) (discussing the dangers
involved in human smuggling operations, including for unaccompanied
minors), vacated on other grounds, 150 F.4th 656 (5th Cir. 2025); United
States v. Reyes, 772 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014) (recognizing a
reasonable expectation that smuggling operations may include coercion,
violence, and bodily injury).
We recognize the respondent’s paternal interest in bringing his child to
the United States. 	However, because of the serious potential for harm and
exploitation associated with smuggling operations, the manner in which the
respondent contracted for his unaccompanied child to be transported to the
United States demonstrates the type of conduct Congress intended to prevent.
Therefore, based on the lack of evidence that the respondent’s child had a
legal basis for lawful entry, the respondent’s actions placing the child at the
U.S.-Mexico border demonstrate he assisted his child to enter or attempt to
enter the United States unlawfully.
We, thus, conclude that the respondent is ineligible for cancellation of
removal because his actions and involvement with a smuggler to bring his
child to the United States constitute assisting or aiding an “alien to enter or
to 	try 	to 	enter 	the 	United 	States 	in 	violation 	of 	law” 	under 	section
212(a)(6)(E)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), triggering the good
moral 	character 	bar 	under 	section 	101(f)(3) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1101(f)(3). 	Because these acts occurred in 2021, the respondent cannot
demonstrate that he has been a person of good moral character during the
past 10-year period, and he is, therefore, ineligible for cancellation of

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removal. 	See 	INA 	§§ 	101(f)(3), 	240A(b)(1)(B), 	8 	C.F.R.
§§ 1101(f)(3), 1229b(b)(1)(B).
Accordingly, we will dismiss the respondent’s appeal.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by Department of Homeland Security,
or conspires to or takes any action designed to prevent or hamper the
respondent’s departure pursuant to the order of removal, the respondent shall
be subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to $998 for each day the
respondent is in violation. 	See section 274D of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d
(2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026). 	Further, any respondent that has
been denied admission to, removed from, or has departed the United States
while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding and
thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States
shall be fined or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. 	See INA
§ 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).