Chronister, Sheriff of Hillsborough County v. Prahalad

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT

CHAD CHRONISTER,
in his official capacity as Sheriff of Hillsborough County,

Appellant,

v.

JOHN PRAHALAD,

Appellee.

No. 2D2025-1039

May 22, 2026

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Helene L. Daniel,
Judge.

Jeffrey D. Jensen, Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, Tampa, for
Appellant.

Brian J. Lee of Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville, for Appellee.

KHOUZAM, Judge.

Sheriff Chad Chronister timely appeals a final judgment entered in
favor of John Prahalad after a jury trial regarding an officer-involved
motor vehicle accident. On appeal, the Sheriff asserts that the trial court
should have granted a mistrial and also that the court misapplied the
sovereign immunity cap in multiple ways.
As to the mistrial ruling, we find no error and comment no further.
But as we now explain, one of the challenges regarding sovereign
immunity has merit; the trial court misapplied a setoff in the final
judgment but properly included postjudgment interest. We therefore
reverse and remand only to correct the setoff.
The Sheriff asserts that the trial court erred on the issue of
sovereign immunity (1) by applying a setoff for prior payments against
the verdict rather than against the damages cap and (2) by including
postjudgment interest in the judgment. Mr. Prahalad concedes that the
judgment should be amended to apply the setoff against the damages
cap, but maintains that the portion addressing postjudgment interest is
correct. We agree with Mr. Prahalad on both points.
Through section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes (2017), the State of
Florida has waived sovereign immunity for liability for torts, to an extent.
As relevant here, section 768.28(5) provides that state actors are liable
like private individuals, except they shall never be liable for punitive
damages or prejudgment interest. Further, all liability to an individual is
capped at $200,000; any portions of a judgment exceeding this cap "may
be paid in part or in whole only by further act of the Legislature." Id.
Discussing this statute, the Florida Supreme Court has explained:
The maximum amount of the state's liability to any one
claimant arising out of any one incident or occurrence,
therefore, is [the applicable statutory cap], including
damages, costs, and post-judgment interest. If the damages
alone are less than [the statutory cap], then costs and post-
judgment interest are recoverable, but only up to the
maximum liability of [the statutory cap].
Berek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 422 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla. 1982)
(footnote omitted). Thus, absent further legislative action, the statutory
cap is a bright-line limitation on the amount a claimant can recover.

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Even so, under this framework, postjudgment interest is properly
included in the judgment, and it "should be calculated upon the actual
damages determined by the jury," not the capped amount of the
judgment. Id. Consequently, when the jury's damages finding exceeds
the statutory cap, "section 768.28(5) authorizes the rendition of
judgment in excess of the maximum amount which the state can be
required to pay." Id. Harmonizing the legislation, the court clarified:
The purpose of this provision is so that the excess can be
reported to the legislature and then paid in whole or in part
by further act of the legislature. These provisions recognize
that the judgment and post-judgment assessments to be
entered of record should upon motion of the plaintiff be the
full amount of actual damages suffered, costs, and post-
judgment interest and not the amount of the defendant's
liability.
Id. at 840-41.
Finally, where prior payments by the sovereign defendant result in
a setoff, it is to be applied to the damages cap, not the jury's verdict. See
Pensacola Jr. Coll. v. Montgomery, 539 So. 2d 1153, 1155-56 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1989) (holding amounts paid previously for medical bills "should be
applied to whatever amount for which [the sovereign defendant] may be
found statutorily responsible"). To do otherwise "would increase [the
sovereign defendant's] waiver of immunity in direct contravention of the
provisions of section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes." Id. at 1156.
Here, as Mr. Prahalad concedes, the trial court erred in applying a
setoff for prior payments by the Sheriff to the jury verdict rather than to
the statutory cap. Accordingly, the judgment must be remanded to apply
the setoff to the damages cap, thereby satisfying the statutory provision
precluding liability above and beyond that amount.
However, the Sheriff has not established any error with respect to
the inclusion of postjudgment interest. The sole authority cited by the
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Sheriff in this regard is Berek, which expressly states that postjudgment
interest is properly included in the judgment. The judgment here is fully
compliant with Berek and section 768.28 in this regard, as it includes
the full amount of damages as found by the jury but obligates the
defendant to pay only up to the statutory cap, absent further legislative
action. Thus, the postjudgment interest provision stands.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.

MORRIS and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.

__________________________

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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